

POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

A study of three Tasmanian Departments

by

R.J.K.Chapman B.A. (Hons)

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Statement

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and to the best of my knowledge and belief the thesis contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously published or written by another person except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

Parliamentary government based on the British tradition may be viewed in many ways. One of the most often discussed aspects of this system of government, frequently referred to as the 'Westminster model', has been the position of the minister. Individual and collective responsibility of ministers is regarded as the core of the model. The constitutional expression of ministerial responsibility is contained in the conventions surrounding Cabinet, Executive offices, and the minister's membership of Parliament.

Much has been written about these conventions, especially from an institutional perspective. The major concern of this literature has been with the politics/administration dichotomy as a manifestation of these conventions. The classical concept of the dichotomy has been stated in a number of ways, but is best known as a description of the respective roles of the political minister and the public service administrator. The Westminster model has this element as a central feature, and much of the structural framework of the model depends on separation of these roles.

In the 1930s there was a trickle of literature critical of the actions of politicians and public servants. This has since turned into a flood. Some observers perceived inconsistencies when the model was used to explain the operation of the system. Parliament was thought to be increasingly dominated by the Executive and ministers by their public servants; rather than controlling the bureaucracy, politicians were under their domination.

The aim of this thesis is to ascertain whether the changes suggested in the critical literature have actually occurred. The relationship between ministers and their senior public servants is crucial to understanding whether the strict boundary is maintained between their roles as defined in the Westminster model. Some writers have doubted whether such boundary ever existed.

The purpose of the thesis cannot easily be attained without some attention to methodology, and a suitable framework for analysis has been adapted from a similar study in the Washington State Executive. This framework provides criteria by which to compare the statements and actions of the participants. Without a set of conceptually derived benchmarks, statements and actions of participants in the processes can only be recorded in an impressionistic way which is not amenable to evaluation.

In the empirical part of this study, three departments in the Tasmanian State Executive were selected. Interviews were conducted with ministers and senior officers. Chapters III, IV and V contain the result of these interviews and some historical research in secondary material. Through these studies it becomes quite obvious that the politics/administration dichotomy as expressed in the classical form is inadequate. Rather than a dichotomy there is a threefold division of activity between ministers and senior public servants. Ministers must exercise political leadership and some executive authority if they are to maintain their political credibility. Public servants are expected to contribute administrative capacity in addition to undertaking some executive authority. It is in the field of executive authority, that overlap occurs between ministers and public servants. For historical reasons, this is especially prevalent in the Australian States and close scrutiny is required to explain the balance of their relationships.

As adapted to Australian State government, the Westminster model has to be interpreted in the light of this trifurcated, rather than bifurcated, explanation. Once this has been done, previous discussion of the operation of that system of parliamentary government is shown to be inadequate. The work of Reid on Australian Federal government and Self and Brown on British government are considered in the context of this altered appreciation. No attempt is made to derive generalisations for the Westminster model as a whole from this relatively limited study, but some further avenues for study are opened.

POLITICS ADMINISTRATION AND THE WESTMINSTER MODEL

Governing, as Rose stresses, is a relational activity and government a descriptive term for the set of institutions in which those operations are carried out.¹

Studies of the latter have featured prominently in academic and popular literature, which has ranged widely among the various institutions. Recent emphasis on processes and the informal as they occur within and between institutions has led to different interpretations about the relations referred to by Rose. Factors previously glossed over have emerged with greater significance, e.g. the limitations on decisionmaking in conditions of bounded rationality, which results in a 'satisficing' or 'incremental' decision.² One of the consequences of these new insights has been a critical literature on parliamentary government and, more recently, on the roles of politicians and administrators within that system.

It is now conventional wisdom that policy-making in a parliamentary system is no longer the sole preserve of the politicians, and that administrators have significant influence in that field. Governing is dependent on a proper balance in relationship between the various elements, and especially, between the two critical actors within the system, politicians and administrators. If this balance is to be maintained in such a way as to support the

¹ R. Rose, "Models of Governing", Comparative Politics, 5(4), July 1973, pp 465-496.

² H.A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, (2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1958); C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: decision making through mutual adjustment, (New York: Free Press, 1965); D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation and Social Process, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); see also: J. Bray, Decision in Government, (London: Gollancz, 1969).

basic framework of representative and responsible parliamentary government, a deeper understanding of the processes and the interdependence of institutional form with these processes, is needed. As Vickers has noted:

"The art of governing - and of being governed - is to shape the institutions and so to regulate the working of society that it can contain the criticism that it generates."³

The appropriate balance will depend on the complementary display of political leadership and administrative capacity within those institutions. There will be little support for a system of parliamentary government which does not provide some constraints for political leadership through demands for accountability in the parliamentary processes or denies the dependence upon the administrative capacity of the public officials of those same politicians.

This network of relationships - between politicians and administrators; between governors and governed; between minister and senior official - is not simply one of identifying two distinct elements and tracing their behaviour. In many ways it is an artificial distinction, sometimes seen as a dividing line between ends and means, where 'political ends' are translated into reality through 'administrative means'. There may be some benefit in using this artificial distinction for analytical purposes, but its continual use tends to create confusion as to the reality it is supposed to reveal. As a consequence that which relates to ends, or 'policy' is assumed to be political; that which concerns means, or implementation, is seen as administrative. The relationships are far more complex than this simple dichotomy conveys and in using it for analytical purposes the observers of government have misled themselves and their readers as to the realities,

³ Sir G. Vickers, Freedom in a Rocking Boat, (London: Allan Lane The Penguin Press, 1970); see also F. Riggs, "Administrative Reform as a Problem of Dynamic Balancing", Philippines Journal of Public Administration, April 1970, p 106, where he states: "...the effectiveness of any government depends, not only on how well its machinery for implementing decisions operates, but also on its ability to command the continuing loyalty and support of its population."

resulting in confusion and uncertainty about the form of parliamentary government.

The fundamental premiss of the British version of parliamentary government is the integration of the executive tasks of government with the legislative. This form of balancing between the political and administrative was first identified by Bagehot, whose impressionistic account of the English constitution formed the staple diet of most writers on parliamentary government in the early part of this century.⁴ The interlocking pieces were Cabinet, the departments controlled by the ministers, and Parliament, in which the ministers also played out their roles as politicians. His reference to the cabinet as the 'buckle', binding together the legislative and the executive, the political and the administrative, holds the key to the interpretation of the relationship between these pieces. The reason, they so successfully performed as one whole, acting in unison and maintaining the appropriate balance, lay in the responsibility and person of the minister.

In Bagehot's time the element of responsibility was not clearly spelled out since there was an inbuilt expectation that was hardly ever disappointed. As Daalder points out:

"It (the social background) gave a special flavour to the ideal of a good minister. It united seemingly conflicting beliefs, such as a feeling of superiority and a readiness to subordinate oneself to hierarchical structures; a preference for the amateur in politics with a readiness to specialise; play and seriousness; fighting spirit and esprit de corps; individualism and group activity - qualities that all public schools cultivate and Britons extol traditionally."⁵

This, combined with the small number of ministers: five in 1783; 10-11 between 1800 and 1820; 14-15 in the period during which Bagehot was writing,

⁴ W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Fontana Books, 1963).

⁵ H. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain 1914 - 1963 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963) p 10.

gradually increasing to around 20 subsequent to 1914-1918, provides evidence of a feeling of 'tightness' of the aristocratic hold on these positions.⁶ However, the characteristics, the integration of the legislative and executive in cabinet, the relatively small ruling group from whose ranks the members of Cabinet were drawn, and the comparatively narrow range of functions, all came under great stress as the functions of government became more complex and the legislature more representative. The greater range and complexity of functions has caused specialisation and departmentation on a scale not previously envisaged. Consequential changes have occurred in relations between the minister and his department, causing problems in the maintenance of the special relationship between the political and administrative inherent in the previous arrangements. On the one hand the division of tasks between politicians and administrators increased in both a practical and professional sense. On the other hand, the line between policy-making and execution became more evident as administrative theorists prescribed in order to achieve better policy decisions and more efficient execution. This demarcation has been expressed in the 'instrumental theory' of public service administration⁷ yet, in practice it became more blurred in certain parts of the hierarchy as ministers were forced to allow their departmental officers a greater degree of discretion.⁸

⁶ Daalder, op. cit., 27 et. seq., where he supports this view in providing the following information about Cabinet meetings at this time: "Originally a Cabinet meeting was little but an occasion for high-ranking persons to deliberate in private. ... Sir Robert Peel could still control the field of administration in great detail in the middle of the nineteenth century. Peel's successor... Lord Derby, carried out his duties between July and February (when Parliament was not sitting) almost entirely from his country estate. ... Even under Rosebery at the end of the century, a large part of a Cabinet session could be spent discussing the exact text of one of Juvenal's satires."

⁷ See R.S. Parker and V. Subramaniam, "Public and Private Administration", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 30, 1964, p 355.

⁸ This vital point is taken up later in this chapter after a discussion of the Westminster model in reference to Self's 'Political-administrative arch'. P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972) p 150.

The concept of Cabinet as the 'buckle' uniting the political and administrative has remained at the core of the institutions of representative parliamentary government, but adaptation has been difficult.⁹ It is said the ministerial group, in Bagehot's day, were men of sensibility in a world where, even if everybody did not accept their right to make decisions, those of standing and who were articulate, did. What subsequent writers have taken as the classic ministerial department was not a department as now understood. Rather, it was the organisational representation of a type of person - an example of a particular elite - in which was combined the qualities of education and upbringing and the representative capacity to believe the decisions they made were expressions of the general will - of the greatest good for the greatest number. They were motivated by an unselfish, yet traditional desire to be of benefit to their country, to serve it as they had been led to believe was their birthright.¹⁰ The aspirations of those who look for the return of the golden age of ministerial departments are constrained by an understanding of this basic reality of Bagehot's description - that what he saw was the expression of an aristocratic tradition: what the 'right' man owes to his country.¹¹ Seeking to return to this 'golden age' by using the sophistry of Bagehot¹² and the utilitarian philosophy of Mill as criteria

⁹ Richard Crossman points out that Bagehot "saw the weakness and instability of multi-party government based on proportional representation. He assumed that a firm two-party system based on single member constituencies with strong personal leadership is the desirable form of parliamentary government." R. Crossman, Inside View (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) p 32.

¹⁰ S. Encel, Equality and Authority (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970) p 4.

¹¹ Gerald Caiden uses such words as "comforting mythology" and "folklore" to describe theories which grew up around the idea of the ministerial department and the position of the civil servant in the nineteenth century. G. Caiden, "The Political Role of the Commonwealth bureaucracy" Public Administration (Sydney), 24 (4), December 1965, p 311.

¹² See C. Sisson, The Case against Walter Bagehot (London: Faber & Faber, 1972) pp 65-70.

against which to measure current government performance, is still the practice of some writers.¹³

The criteria for the structure of the ministerial departments that were an integral part of the Parliamentary system are easily defined:

"...a government agency headed by a single and exclusively responsible politician, with a permanent head as chief adviser and general manager of the department."¹⁴

"... 1. Headed by a single political person, at once exclusively responsible - most powerful and yet the most temporary element of the organisation.

2. A permanent head to whom senior officers report, to be appointed by the Prime Minister, Minister and Permanent Head of the Treasury.

3. The Permanent Head to be senior adviser and general manager.

4. Hierarchical structure within the organisation with top grades of civil servant at the top of the pyramid."¹⁵

The Westminster Model is an extension of the above criteria, taking into account the complexities of the situation today, and the expected role of Parliament.

The Westminster Model - English version

The use of this term is really shorthand for a system of interacting groups and individuals formed into organisational units, which function according to regularised patterns of interaction and interdependence.¹⁶

¹³ For a very interesting example of the Westminster model as seen from crosscultural boundaries see: Dharma Vira, "The services in Parliamentary Democracy" Indian Journal of Public Administration, XVI (3), July/Sept., 1970, pp 316-320.

¹⁴ R.N.Sparr, "Bagehot on Public Administration" Public Administration (Sydney), 26(4), Dec. 1967, p 312.

¹⁵ B.B.Schaffer, "The idea of the Ministerial Department" Australian Journal of Politics and History, 3(1), 1957, p 60. The fourth criterion was not one with which Bagehot was concerned, as has been pointed out.

¹⁶ For a further discussion of this statement see R.H. Simmons, "American State Executive Systems: An Heuristic model" Western Political Quarterly, 18(1), March 1965, pp 19-26.

From these representatives a number were selected to undertake the responsibility of the specialised functions of government and to supervise the work of the public servants employed to carry out that function. These members, or Ministers, were accountable to the Parliament for their departmental activities, and any mismanagement on their part would meet with appropriate retribution at the hands of Parliament. Thus existed a circular linkage between the citizens, the institutions of government and those who were employed to administer - the public service. Two views of the same model characteristics are set out hereunder:




FIG. I¹⁹




FIG. II²⁰

18 (contd.)

"Accountability and proportional representation: The Tasmanian Case", Politics, X(2), Nov. 1975, pp 216-220. See also H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley; Los Angeles: Uni. of California Press, 1967) and A.H. Birch, The Nature and Function of Representation (Exeter: Exeter University, 1971).

¹⁹ A.H. Birch, The British System of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970).

²⁰ P.J. Madgwick, Introduction to British Politics (London: Hutchinson Educational, 1970) p 32.

The first diagram represents the nearest to the Bagehotian model - the liberal view of democracy - except that it places no emphasis on the vital Cabinet. In the second, rather more sophisticated diagram, there is a clearer distinction drawn between the institutions of government and Parliament, and also within government. This may result from more rigorous analysis of the structural side of government rather than of the ideological underpinnings which are Birch's concern.²¹

Both perspectives place the administrator in the role of implementor and the department as the 'instrument' of the minister. The ministerial department thus becomes the appropriate administrative vehicle by which functions may be performed and the above political conventions upheld.²² Even here the main structures are Parliament, Ministers, Cabinet and the Public Service as they were in Bagehot's time, although in this later analysis the principal institutions are more widely identified as: (a) the Crown; (b) Parliament; (c) Cabinet; (d) the judicial system; (e) the civil service; (f) the electoral system; (g) political parties; (h) pressure groups; and (i) the communication system.²³

²¹ Although Madgwick's diagram may only be another diagrammatic representation of Birch's other 'Whitehall' model, see A.H.Birch, British system of Government, p 34.

²² Questions about the term 'ministerial department' have been raised, particularly by Wettenhall; see R.L.Wettenhall, The Guide to Tasmanian Government Administration (Hobart: Platypus Books, 1968) pp 6-13; Evolution of a Departmental System (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 1967); "Concepts of Ministry", Public Administration (Sydney), 29(4), Dec. 1970, pp 319-329; "The ministerial department", Public Administration (Sydney) 32, September 1973, pp 233-250. It is to his guidance and writings in this field that I owe my interest. Other relevant studies are: Schaffer, loc. cit. and F.M.G.Willson, "Ministries and Boards: Some aspects of administrative development since 1832", Public Administration (London), 33, Spring 1955, pp 43-58.

²³ One of the current areas of research following K.Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), is that of communication and information systems. This also involves questions of values and identification of the 'public interest', see for example: B.Barry, Political Argument (New York: Humanities Press, 1965)

From the interaction between these interdependent groups and individuals would emanate the decisions and activity which may be simplified by the description 'public policy derived from public interest'. The heavier emphasis in this more complex model on the institutions (f) to (i) indicates the changing context of description from Bagehot's time. Reform of the electoral laws have indeed widened the gap between the governors and the governed, as he foresaw.²⁴ The 'tightness' of the system and the community of interest between the governors and the governed that existed in the time of Bagehot has disintegrated. In the 1860s the government and that articulate and small voting minority of governed, whose views had to be taken into account, were, for the purposes of his model, identical. This view is suggested in the following comment on Bagehot's view of Cabinet:

"...the cabinet was a flexible instrument for bringing to the seats of power, what might now be called a 'politico-administrative elite' - a group of men sensitive to parliamentary and public feeling, at the same time possessed of enough initiative and close contact with the day to day administration of the country to provide for coherent government."²⁵

Differentiation has taken place on a dramatic scale in the intervening period with the resultant increase in the number of variable factors in the model. However, the main ideological infrastructure - the inherent values expressed by the model - remain very similar. But Brown suggests that Parliament now provides the vital link, placing greater emphasis there than on the Cabinet.

23 (contd.)

P. Partridge, Consent and Consensus (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); D.J. Devine, The Attentive Public: Polyarchal Democracy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); D. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1971); G. Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe Ill.: Free Press, 1961 and 1960); R.E. Flathman, The Public Interest (New York: Wiley, 1966).

²⁴ Discussed by Madgwick, op. cit., especially pp 23-38.

²⁵ Spann, op. cit., p 312.

"Parliament links public departments to the political interests of the public at large and parliamentary accountability obliges ministers and their civil servants to keep in mind how their policies will look if they are challenged from that point of view!"²⁶

Note, however, that the goals of responsibility and prevention of arbitrariness are the same.

"...In a democracy the ultimate criteria for decisions about integration and allocation are supplied through the channels of political representation. The organisational problem is to ensure that the administrator pays attention to these criteria."²⁷

One or two examples of this interaction would indicate the fundamental similarity between the values sought to be expressed - government by discussion and persuasion, and a restriction on the use of arbitrary power. A system, in other words, in which the values and interests of the majority of electors, citizens, people, should dominate.

EXAMPLES (i) Parliament and the Cabinet - the interdependence of these two bodies is aimed at maximising efficiency and benefits to the people. Where Cabinet makes decisions which accord with the majority wishes as reflected in Parliament it receives strong support from that body. Parliament could take Cabinet to task or even dismiss it, should it ignore majority wishes.²⁸

(ii) Ministers and Cabinet - Ministers have a collective responsibility to participate actively in all matters before Cabinet since its decisions must be supported by all.²⁹ Yet each minister has his own

²⁶ R.G. Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain (London: Methuen, 1970) p 166.

²⁷ op. cit., p 158.

²⁸ Not the same view that Bagehot takes of Cabinet:
 "Either the Cabinet legislates and acts or else it can dissolve. ...the chief committee of the legislature has the power of dissolving the predominant part of that legislature... . It is a creature, but it has the power of destroying its creator."
 Bagehot, op. cit., p 69. This difference of views is implicit in the Australian writings of Reid and Emy (post, p 21 et seq).

²⁹ For instance Hugh Dalton in his memoirs High Tide and After:

separate administrative responsibilities in the form of a department to supervise, being answerable not only for all present actions, but also for all past ones, even whilst he may not have been in control.³⁰ In this way individual Ministers are prevented from exercising too much influence over government policies either at departmental level or at overall government level. Even the office of Prime Minister is bound by conventions which do not release him from the need to bow to the consensus of the majority.³¹

In summary, the true role of the Minister is now seen as based in his politico-administrative status and his responsibility, both individual and collective. These in turn are supported by an infrastructure of administrative devices which ensure that the Minister remains an amateur relying on professional advice; that he provides the only formal link between the executive and legislature; and that he is open to question on all his activities, thus preventing arbitrary legislation and promoting consistency with social demands.

At any one point in time ends and means may come together in an appropriate organisational and administrative structure. Means and ends merge in institutional forms - ends become indistinguishable from means.

29 (contd.)

Memoirs 1945-50 (London: Muller, 1962) pp 17-18, points out that ministers were dismissed from their jobs because they made no positive contribution to general policy matters.

"For a Cabinet should not be a band of specialists, each with no thoughts outside his own paddock."

³⁰ For a full treatment of this subject, see R.W.Ennis, ed., Accountability in Government Departments, Public Corporations and Public Companies (London: Lyon Grant and Green, 1967) especially p 45; and for a critical review of the operation of ministerial responsibility see S.E.Finer, "The Individual Responsibility of Ministers", Public Administration (London), 34, Winter 1956, pp 377-396.

³¹ See P. Gordon Walker, The Cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970) for a discussion of the current thought on Cabinet; see also J.P.Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, 2nd ed., (London: Methuen, 1968); and Daalder, op. cit., for an historical treatment.

So Bagehot and subsequent commentators all appeared to cohere in the means - the Ministerial department and Cabinet structure,³² which would consistently support the ends of representative parliamentary government.

The stress is on the "essential simplicity of most practical affairs, which goes along with the considerable inability of most people involved in them to keep them simple".³³ Scholars such as D.N.Chester and F.M.G.Willson,³⁴ W.J. Mackenzie,³⁵ B.B.Schaffer,³⁶ R.S. Parker and R.L. Wettenhall,³⁷ have identified some problems that exist and have suggested remedies. All have been concerned, however, to maintain the constitutional fiction of accountability and responsibility through the central institution of the Cabinet.³⁸

³²W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (London: Penguin Books, 1967), p 63.

³³Spann, op. cit., p 313. See also H.V.Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1974) p 253, where he describes the Westminster Model as "a deceptively simple system of government which involves a series of overlapping relationships".

³⁴D.N.Chester and F.M.G.Willson, The organisation of the British Central Government 1914-1964, ed. by D.N.Chester and written by F.M.G.Willson, 2nd edition written by F.M.G.Willson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), where stated: "...the dominant theme...since 1914 in Britain...is the struggle between two powerful forces -

1. the continual increase of functions has created problems of size and heterogeneity generating pressures for more ministers; and
2. the needs of coordination and advantages of government by a small well-knit body of ministers." p 397.

³⁵W.J.M.Mackenzie, "Structure of Central Administration" in Lord G.Campion, British Government since 1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), where he supports increasing politicisation of what should be a purely administrative situation: "...the machinery of government cannot be studied apart from the politics of government. Some administrative changes have come through causes partly fortuitous, partly political, but on the whole outside the area of administrative planning."

³⁶B.B.Schaffer, "The distinction between Executive and Administrative work". Public Administration (Sydney), 17(2), June 1958, pp 112-118, in which he argues for maintaining a clear distinction between the part of administration concerned with policy and the executive part.

³⁷Both Parker and Wettenhall maintain the essential distinction between the 'political role' of the minister and the 'administrative role' of the department. For examples see R.S.Parker, "The structure and functions of government" in Public Administration, edited by R.N.Spann (Sydney: N.S.W. Government Printer, 1958) esp. pp 67 & 68; Wettenhall, The Guide loc.cit. p 6 et seq.

³⁸Since Fulton these attitudes may be changing, especially in Britain. See R.Wilding, "The Post-Fulton Programme: Strategy and Tactics", Public Administration (London), 48, Winter 1970, 391-404; Sir R. Clarke, New Trends

This 'traditional' or 'classical' approach has led to reform movements concentrating on the civil service, which is to be streamlined for greater economy of services and efficiency in operation.³⁹ The intention was to produce an expert, efficient, but impartial public administration to perform the tasks imposed by the politicians. The diagnosis of the problem stopped short at symptoms, the internal functioning of the structure, and it was constrained because of the assumption that political activity was distinguishable from administrative activity and could be dealt with separately. The dissatisfaction with these diagnoses, which resulted in an increase in the application of O & M and organisation theory,⁴⁰ has surfaced in some questioning of the study of public administration. The explanatory potential of the existing research and teaching is in doubt and the demand is that the focus of attention should once more be the whole, now termed the political system, rather than merely the parts.⁴¹ There is now more interest in processes than institutions.

38 (contd.)

in Government (London: H.M.S.O., 1971) and British Parliament, Reorganisation of Central Government Cmnd. 4506 (London: H.M.S.O., 1970).

³⁹ Examples of this trend in recent years includes such government sponsored investigations as: Fulton (Britain)-Report of the Committee on Civil service 1966-68, Cmnd. 3638 (London:H.M.S.O., 1968); Glassco (Canada)-Royal Commission on Government Organisation Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Royal Commission and Government Organisation, 1962). There have been others in the American jurisdiction, such as the well-known series of reports by the Hoover Commission and Brownlow Report on American Government Administration Senate Document 8,75th Congress First Session, 1937; Brookings Institute: Report on Government Administration, Washington, June 1937.

⁴⁰ For examples of applications of organisation theory to public administration see R.J.S. Baker, Administrative Theory and Public Administration (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1972); R.G.S.Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain, loc. cit., and some of the essays in P. Self, Administrative Theory and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973).

⁴¹ General dissatisfaction of this kind was the basis of the Minnowbrook Conference, papers from which may be found in F. Marini, ed., Towards a New Public Administration (Scranton:Chandler Publishing Co., 1971); similarly, in Britain, calls for a new attitude came from F.F.Ridley, "Public Administration: Cause for Discontent", Public Administration (London), 50(1), Spring 1972, pp 65-78; P. Self, op. cit., pp 149-150; and R.A.Chapman, Teaching Public Administration (London: RIPA, 1974).

Parliamentary government-processes

The processes which form the patterns of action within and between the various components in the parliamentary government system are the concern of R.G.S. Brown and P. Self, whose work reflects changing British attitudes towards their institutions.⁴²

(a) Brown's system within a system

The prime consideration for Brown was the way individuals and groups contributed to the process which operates in the institutional framework. The individuals and institutions become vehicles for the process to function. At once they mould and are themselves moulded by the process, providing constraints inhibiting the way in which the process could operate, or being supportive of, or used by, those who were promoting their activities through the institutional forms. The process was identified as a system within a system by Brown, who emphasised its dynamic multilevel nature. (Described in diagrammatic form, Fig. III).⁴³ The model avoids the hierarchical arrangements by focusing on the interaction and interrelationships by which some individuals have authority, others have power, or expertise, and others have influence. Distinctions between politicians and officials on this basis indicate the role expectations and parameters of action that the actors themselves have or the observer anticipates they may have. The model implicitly accepts the validity of retaining the distinctive position of politician and official, yet throws doubt on their existence in practice.⁴⁴


Brown describes the model as "an analytic representation of what actually

⁴² R.G.S. Brown, op. cit.; P. Self, op. cit.

⁴³ The diagram was prepared by the author from Brown's written description. It has been discussed with Brown, who expressed surprise, not having conceived his narrative in quite this way. He felt no diagram could do justice to the dynamic nature of the processes involved.

⁴⁴ Brown, op. cit., p 158, where he notes that the "concept of 'control' is far too narrow for analysing the complex relationship that now exists..." but still maintains the discussion on the basis of the dichotomy - "[High officials]/views on what should be done, complement rather than compete with those of politicians."

Fig. III



happens",⁴⁵ and its basis are the contributions to the decision making process by many "specialised channels through which ideas, information and pressures are legitimately applied to the development of social policy."⁴⁶

Parliament is only one of these specialised channels, and while it is of "distinctive importance in public administration", the contribution of any specific issue "may be small and overshadowed by professional expertise, material from surveys and so on."⁴⁷ However, Brown points out that

"in our system of government no change of substance can be made without the agreement of the responsible Minister and often of a Cabinet committee."⁴⁸

There are certainly occasions when a minister can make a final decision without Cabinet approval, but there are not many important decisions that can be made without some kind of authorisation at the political level.

The diagram shows various stages in the process and indicates those groups, individuals and agencies who are likely to be closely involved at each stage. Much overlapping is bound to take place and certain groups and individuals are likely to recur in dominant positions throughout, e.g. when they are 'promoting' a policy line. As can be seen this is difficult to show on a two-dimensional drawing, as is the continual feedback process which is operating within the process between all participants and at each stage. Appraisal after the authorisation stage and at the point of implementation is another form of feedback because many group individuals and agencies are not only concerned with policy making but also with policy programming and implementation. All this Brown tries to convey by his phrase "system within a system" and his discussion of the operation of a department as a "self-sustaining machine" with "elaborate adaptive mechanisms" which fall within similar generic terms used by systems analysts.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Brown, op. cit., p 160.

⁴⁶ ibid.

⁴⁷ Brown, loc. cit., as noted previously Fn 28, his view of parliament is significantly different from that of Reid to whom reference is made later.

⁴⁸ Brown, op. cit., pp 160-167.

⁴⁹ op. cit., p 161.

The contributions to which Brown refers may be ranged along a spectrum derived from the perspectives of the contributors.

"...experts and pressure groups near the specific-technical-fact end and politicians and journalists near the general-political-value end."⁵⁰

Once again reinforcing the dichotomy which he sees as fundamental to the balances inherent in the Westminster model, but which other writers, like Self, wish to reinterpret.

(b) Self's political-administrative arch

Another view of this same concern about the contributions of various individuals, groups and agencies to the processes is expressed in Self's discussion of "Politicians and Administrators".⁵¹ He points out that

"The enormous staffs of modern government are very largely engaged upon the direct provision of public services, or the operation of fairly routinised regulations, or the provision of supporting services for the top echelons of administration."⁵²

This administrative area is clearly concerned with activities carried out as a result of policies made outside and beyond their environment. Administrators at these levels are "concerned with getting policies or rules effectively applied" and the "great bulk of [these] administrative operations continue in political obscurity."⁵³ The important area for a study of the kind undertaken in this thesis is the "relatively tiny top echelons" of government institutions. At these upper levels, among ministers and their senior officers in and around Cabinet "there come into play all the multifarious modern facets of the basic powers of the State: the power to coerce, to tax, to aid, to provide."⁵⁴ There is little argument about the distinction between the kinds of functions performed by administrators in the lower levels of the hierarchy and those higher up; just as there is a similar distinction

⁵⁰Brown, *op. cit.*, p 160. Self argues that "while there is some truth in this description it has to be remembered that political viewpoints are often narrow and specific and administrative viewpoints are sometimes broad."

⁵¹Self, *op. cit.*, pp 149-181. ⁵²Self, *op. cit.*, p 162.

⁵³Self, *op. cit.*, p 151. ⁵⁴Self, *op. cit.*, p 162.

in the political hierarchy. At the lower levels of each the difference between the political and administrative is relatively evident. However, at the upper levels there is no similar clarity.

"In modern Britain, still more in France, the top professional administrators certainly wield more influence in policy-making than do the average members of Parliament."⁵⁵

Consequently any attempt to explain and interpret activities of the Executive must take into account that this term must include senior public servants as well as ministers. Self suggests that if policy-making is viewed as a process operating in these top echelons, then there is a "fusion of political and administrative influences". He describes it as follows:

"We can envisage an arch with the left arc representing the political process and the right arc the administrative process. The junction at the top represents the critical point at which political will flows into and energises the administrative system; and it is also the point at which influences that have been generated within the administrative processes flow back into the higher levels of the political processes."⁵⁶

Self's analysis has been interpreted in Figure IV.⁵⁷

The distinction between an elected representative, owing his position to political power, and an appointed official, owing his position to promotion by merit through a career service, is not removed by this explanation. Nor is there any doubt about their respective roles within a parliamentary system in which ministers in Cabinet, parliament and the public service have their appropriate constitutional or conventional boundaries. However, by combining evidence on processes with institutional knowledge, certain informal and highly important aspects of these relationships are uncovered.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Self, *op. cit.*, p 150. There is no shortage of evidence to support this statement in the Australian context, much of it suggesting an even greater concentration of influence due to specifically cultural factors. See S. Encel, *Equality and Authority* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970) and J. Wilkes (ed.), *Who Runs Australia?* (Melbourne: AIPS, 1970).


⁵⁶*ibid.*

⁵⁷B. Chubb, *Cabinet Government in Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1974) p 69.

⁵⁸This is suggested p 32, where Fig. IX combines Figs IV and VIII.

FIGURE IV

The Political-Administrative Arch



Westminster Model - Australian Federal version

Much of what has been written about the parliamentary system in Australia has been related to parties, elections, pressure groups and their relationship within parliament. These latter considerations have been reflected in what some writers see as bureaucratic domination, or the powerless situation of backbenchers, or the role of the Senate.⁵⁹ Little has been specifically written about parliament, ministers and departments in terms of their crucial position within a parliamentary democracy until relatively recently.⁶⁰ Three articles stand out in this literature representing a continuously unfolding perception of the Australian Federal Parliamentary model.⁶¹ However, Emy's later work has challenged aspects of this perception.⁶²

In the articles which will be dealt with first, Reid's perspective is slightly different from that previously discussed under the head 'Westminster Model'. There, focus was upon the minister operating within a parliamentary

⁵⁹ Any or all of these matters are dealt with in articles and essays to be found collected, for example, in any of the three editions of H. Mayer, (ed.), Australian Politics: A Reader (Sydney: Cheshire); or C. Hughes (ed.), Readings in Australian Government (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1968).

⁶⁰ An early and important work which has not been followed up other than in a second edition was: S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, First edition 1962, Second edition 1974). Other recent works are: H.V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1974); David Solomon, Australia's Government and Parliament (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd., 1973).

⁶¹ G.S. Reid, "Australia's Commonwealth Parliament and the 'Westminster model'" in Readings in Australian Government, edited by C. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p 109 (written first and published in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, II, 1963-64); G.S. Reid, "Parliamentary-Executive Relations: the Suppression of Politics", in Australian Politics: A Reader, edited by H. Mayer, *op. cit.*, 1st edition 1966, and subsequently in 2nd edition, 1967, and Second Reader, 1969; G.S. Reid, "The Trinitarian Struggle: Parliamentary-Executive Relationships" in Australian Politics: A Third Reader, edited by H. Mayer and H. Nelson, (Sydney: Cheshire, 1973). These are referred to hereafter as Reid 1; Reid 2; Reid 3. Reid 2 contains Fig. V, p 501; Reid 3 Figs VI & VII pp 514 & 516.

⁶² Especially the work done by Emy as a Consultant for the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration. "The Public Service and Political Control", Report (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1976) Appendix B, Volume I, pp 16-63.

system and his relation with the administration, assuming a dominance of the Cabinet over parliament, but accountability and responsibility curbing that dominance. Reid's view is of the relations between the Executive (Cabinet) and the parliamentary system, and he is directing less of his attention to the administration, assuming that it is supportive of the Executive. Despite these different perspectives the crucial element in both is the behaviour of the group of elected representatives who attain office as an Executive - ministers, and for this reason his discussion of the Australian version of the Westminster model is most pertinent.

Reid claims that some important qualifications must be made to statements that the Commonwealth Constitution is based on the Westminster model. He lists these as : the fact that, in Australia, Parliament has become a symbol of national unity as well as representative government and democracy; the unique nature of the Senate; and the procedural adaptations within the Australian Parliament which lead to Executive control.

"The parliamentary symbol is 'an instrument of government', and it is the instrument as well as the trappings, that Australian governments have copied from Westminster."⁶³

"The mysteries of Westminster have frequently been invoked to provide a technical smokescreen behind which governments have escaped the rigours of political battle."⁶⁴

"The difference from Westminster in this [strength of the Executive's control of Parliament] is simply one of degree."⁶⁵

At the same time he complains that Australian parliaments have not introduced some of the procedural reforms already applied in the British Parliament in an attempt to reduce this executive domination in practice, e.g. 'allotted supply days' at the disposal of the Opposition;⁶⁶ an Estimates Committee;⁶⁷ House committees rather than Committee of the Whole;⁶⁸ and question time.⁶⁹ One persistent theme throughout has been "the strength of the Executive's control of Parliament [as] the principal characteristic of the Australian

⁶³ Reid 1, p 112.

⁶⁶ Reid 1, p 117.

⁶⁹ Reid 1, p 119.

⁶⁴ Reid 1, p 113.

⁶⁷ Reid 1, p 117.

⁶⁵ Reid 1, p 121.

⁶⁸ Reid 1, p 118.

scene."⁷⁰ This theme has emerged from a study of some of the functioning parts of the Westminster model:

"It is necessary, somehow, to penetrate the outward appearances and to measure the contribution to the process of government made by the human materials working within it."⁷¹

The use of the term 'process' appears again,

"/This chapter/ argues that, if we analyse the parliamentary process..."⁷²

and, subsequently,

"The central thesis is that politics goes on within parliament as an institution, not merely between political parties."⁷³

Reid is therefore taking the position that there are institutions which have formally been created to appear like the 'Mother Parliament', but that in order to ascertain whether these institutions are the same, their operations have to be examined.

In his second article Reid takes up and elaborates the three important qualifications he identified as differentiating the Australian situation from the Westminster frame of reference, paying particular attention to the Senate and its dominant position. But his main thrust is to support his argument that open politics (which he defines as the activity in which diverse interests conflict, contend and are reconciled or are managed and comprised through party leaders managing tensions among their supporters) is suppressed by the Executive.

"...it could be said that the party oligarchies in parliament find a wide area of agreement in suppressing politics. They seek to minimise the unpredictable elements of parliamentary behaviour. Or to put it another way, unpredictable elements are acceptable to them so long as they are not likely to bring their leadership into jeopardy."⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Reid 1, p 120.

⁷¹ Reid 1, p 110.

⁷² Reid 2, p 499.

⁷³ ibid.

⁷⁴ Reid 2, p 506.

With this in mind he again takes up the procedural adaptations, which he sees as using "the myth of faithfully preserving the 'Westminster model'...to overlay suppressive actions with a cloak of legitimacy." The Senate in this situation is envisaged as a "prize that political parties aspire to win"⁷⁵ because of its independent power. Thus Reid advances reasons for the difference he identified in the first article between the Westminster model and its Australian counterpart. From making the suggestion that "...as a result of the influence of party, the strength of the Executive's control of Parliament is the principal characteristic of the Australian scene", he moves to the position that parties suppress politics in parliament to allow the Executive to control that body. Thus, he argues, all party political resources are concentrated on the struggle to control the legislative machinery.

"To maximise its strength as a government it needs to control, by disciplined voting majorities, both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament."⁷⁶

His third article endeavours to elucidate this struggle by identifying elements within the parliamentary part of the Australian government which are deeply committed to obtaining power.

"We see politics as a struggle for power. The top prize in this trinitarian struggle is the Executive government and the power associated with its control."⁷⁷

The trinity among which this struggle takes place are the "...Crown (i.e. the Executive), the Senate, and the House of Representatives."⁷⁸

The use of the term 'executive' is meant to delineate that part of the parliamentary system in which representatives, elected by the people, become ministers, and therefore "wear two hats, have a dual role: in some respects they are part of the representative Parliament, in others, part of the

⁷⁵ Reid 2, p 511.

⁷⁶ Reid 2, p 502.

⁷⁷ Reid 3, p 516.

⁷⁸ Reid 3, p 515.

Executive government."⁷⁹ This Executive, or Cabinet has control of the legislative power through its domination of parliamentary business, as well as capacity to utilise all the existing legislative authority already on the statute book. But, significantly, it also has

"...access to the accumulated experience, the files, and the comprehensive facilities of the Commonwealth Public Service for gathering information. This brings access to the advisory services and the working potential of all the employees of the Commonwealth, from the highest to the lowest. The collective power is enormous, the prize vested in the control of the Executive is rich indeed."⁸⁰

Power, or in Reid's terms, the politics of parliamentary control, is the concern of the third article, and Reid manipulates the three variables identified in the first article: national unity, Senate control and procedural adaptations, to support his argument.

The relevance of this perspective is that it intervenes in a process, rather than stops short at the structure represented by the institutions. Seeing these structures as patterns of action which are changed and moulded according to the interests of the actors, provides a basis for analysis of the institutions themselves. Whilst Reid does not explicitly make this point it is this perspective that he adopts and in doing so concentrates his attention on the relationships between those elements in the process "which, whilst not confined to Australia, have a special form here."⁸¹

Although process is important these elements have to be identified in a formal relationship first, and in both the second and third article he starts from the Constitution⁸² and looks for the "executive parliament";⁸³

⁷⁹ Reid 3, p 515.

⁸¹ Reid 3, p 514

⁸⁰ Reid 3, p 516.

⁸² Reid 2, p 500; and Reid 3, p 513.

⁸³ A term he derives from W.H.Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (Melbourne: Charles F. Maxwell, 2nd edition, 1910), pp 105-6, 168.

which according to Section 1, Chapter 1 of the Constitution is vested in "a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called 'The Parliament'..." So, from this description Reid provides two diagrammatic representations of the Australian version of the Westminster model. (Figs. V and VI hereunder). The first differs quite significantly from the second, although Reid appears to deny any such significance when he comments in relation to the second diagram:

"You may not like Figure /17, showing the formal structure of the Commonwealth Parliament. Never mind - draw it your own way. Whichever way it comes out, two things will not change: power flows both within and between the institutional components."⁸⁴

His main concern, he indicates, is to ascertain what goes on within and between, and since "none of the components is a cohesive monolith"⁸⁵ their identification is merely a necessary first step to formulate what patterns of action are relevant. It will be noticed that they are both considerably more sophisticated than those of the Westminster model. This may be explained by the pains Reid takes to look at process, whereas Birch and Madgwick deal largely with the institutional form which shapes the infrastructure for an ideology. (Madgwick seems to take process into account more than Birch.) However, it is apparent that the basis of Figure V is nearer to Birch's (Figure I) than Figure VI. It sees the "static representation of executive-parliamentary-electorate relationships" as derived from a flow of power from the electorate "continually, through representative chambers to the executive government",⁸⁶ i.e. Cabinet. The result of this is that Figures I and V "presume representative democracy" although Figure V attempts to show that there is also a flow of power the other way, "from Ministers of State, through the representative chambers, to the electorate."⁸⁷ It is this latter flow of

⁸⁴ Reid 3, p 515

⁸⁵ ibid.

⁸⁶ Reid 2, p 501

⁸⁷ ibid.




Fig. V




Fig. VI

power that is important to Figure VI and the reason, presumably why the electorate and the elected component is separated from the official component. The complexity of the relations is indicated by the various arrows and the dotted portions which are further detailed in Figure VII (below) identifying the three elements of the legislative trinity. The way in which the Australian version of parliamentary government differs from the Westminster model is indicated by comparing Figure VIII (derived from the idea of interaction and processes, referred to earlier in the discussion of Brown and Self) with Figure VII. An even more useful and informative view may be obtained by the combination of Self's arch (Figure IV) with Figure VIII. The notions of power and policymaking processes are thus combined to reveal the extent of the overlapping which concerns Reid in his defence of parliamentary supremacy⁸⁸ (Figure IX below). They are also the concern of Emy, but for other reasons.

In his outline of the Westminster model, Emy notes the essential features but his commentary is evidence of his dissatisfaction.⁸⁹ As previously mentioned he sees it as a "deceptively simple system", but one in which the balance between the elements of the system must be satisfactorily achieved if it is to work.⁹⁰ He recognises that different cultures will produce slightly different balances and that changing environmental demands may have the same effect.⁹¹ The central importance of Cabinet in the model, has, for him, increased the dominance of the prime minister, so that

"Undoubtedly the prime minister is the central figure, indeed the lynchpin, in any administration."⁹²

There has been a similar change in the balances in respect of individual and collective responsibility of ministers. The force of these doctrines is diminished when the lower house of parliament is no longer significant. Both Emy and Reid agree that this has occurred through the party system. Emy points

⁸⁸ Birch does make some attempt to do this in his 'Whitehall' model, British System of Government, op. cit., p 34, but it is not so carefully constructed as Reid's, being only based on an intuitive feel for the civil servants' understanding of the system.

⁸⁹ Emy, loc. cit., Chapter 11

⁹¹ Emy, op. cit., p 259

⁹⁰ Emy, op. cit., p 254

⁹² Emy, op. cit., p 255

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


Fig. VII




Fig. VIII




Fig. IX

to the essential tasks of the legislature today as being "to make and support a government."⁹³ He does not, as Reid appears to, think that it was ever much different.

"Backward looking commentators may be wrong when they want to retain for parliament both an initiatory role in legislating and a role in directly controlling the executive."⁹⁴

It is not surprising to find this divergence of opinion about the role of parliament and therefore of the balances within the Westminster model leading Emy to espouse the idea of 'accountable management'. This he does very effectively in an important contribution to the debate about the proper version of the model for Australia.⁹⁵ As summarised by the Commission, the essence of his consultants report is

"...ministerial responsibility as a system for ensuring that accountability of both the executive and administrative arms of government is defunct. A new system of managing the administrative arm and of ensuring its and the executive's accountability is required. The new system is to be found in institutionalising a set of measures to be called accountable management."⁹⁶

Reid takes both Emy and the Coombs Commission, which was strongly influenced by the above considerations, to task for their "half hearted treatment of the reference 'Parliamentary Scrutiny and Control'".⁹⁷ He points out, quite rightly, that, despite the "apparent radicalism" of the approach, there is only likely to be an apparent, rather than a real, change resulting from the proposals. The final authority of parliament to control the activities of the public service will remain.

As the debate now stands it seems to reinforce the need for more empirical work to unravel the balances as they actually operate in Australia.

⁹³ Emy, op. cit., p 257

⁹⁴ ibid.

⁹⁵ H.V. Emy, "The Public Service and Political Control" in Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration: Report, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976). Appendix One, pp 16-63.

⁹⁶ op. cit., p 15.

⁹⁷ G.S.Reid, "Responsibility and Accountability and the Coombs Inquiry" Australian Journal of Public Administration, 35(4), December 1976, p 327.

Any reforms such as proposed by the Coombs Commission depend for their validity on an interpretation of this reality. Whether Emy's view or Reid's is the most appropriate cannot be judged in default of this evidence. It may be that the differences between the writers in Britain and Australia cited above is nothing more than an analytical perspective.

An added difference in the Australian context is the fact that it is a federal system and that most of the discussion about processes has been directly concerned with the national parliament and bureaucracy.⁹⁸ None of the empirical study has been at state level, nor has any effort been made to distinguish between each of the state parliamentary systems. It is not surprising that the Australian state government systems have been neglected, the relative newness of the central system and the problems of adaptation it posed, especially for constitutionalists, provided more than sufficient to study. Yet the decisions which are taken by State governments are highly significant for the ordinary citizen. This important aspect of Australian government has, however, been largely ignored in the apparently more fruitful analysis of Federal government and Federal-State relations. Matters of concern have included 'cooperative federalism',⁹⁹ financial dominance¹⁰⁰, and foreign affairs¹⁰¹. Apart from

⁹⁸ Even then it is not possible to make more than impressionistic statements of the kind made by Butler, e.g. that the tops of the Australian Departments seem flatter than the British; or that Australian ministers are on an average appreciably less interested in administration than the British ones. D. Butler, The Canberra Model (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973) pp 29 & 34. But also see M. Kogan, The Politics of Education (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971) pp 31-34, where he expresses a view of British ministers that seems to indicate Butler's idea of British ministers may also be somewhat impressionistic.

⁹⁹ L.F.Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (London: Longmans in association with Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1957).

¹⁰⁰ R.J. May, Federalism & Fiscal Adjustment (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1969) see also: J.A. Maxwell, Commonwealth State Financial Relations in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967) and: R.L. Mathews & W.R.C.Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial relations in Australia since Federation (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia, 1972).

¹⁰¹ J.D.B.Miller & B.Jinks, Australian Government & Politics, 4th edition (London: Duckworth & Co., 1971).

some compendiums¹⁰², these scholarly writings and one major work on New South Wales, State government systems have been mostly treated in journal articles.¹⁰³ All this may provide a useful background, historical and descriptive, against which to deal with explanation, but it is no substitute for that systematic analysis without which understanding is impossible.¹⁰⁴

This thesis is an attempt to fill a small part of the gap by using empirical material from state government level, not previously assembled. Its concentration on the relations between minister and his senior public servants is intended to deal with questions central to the Westminster form of government, such as have been outlined above. Its major focus is therefore on the extent to which the role of minister reflects the expectations of the Westminster model and thus the politics/administration dichotomy.

By taking empirical evidence from the Tasmanian State government system about the activities of ministers and their senior officials, the relationship between political leadership and administrative action may be clarified. As the essence of the Westminster model in either Britain or Australia is the control of the official by the politician, it is useful to look behind their institutional positions to ascertain their actions.

¹⁰²C. Hughes, ed., Readings in Australian Government (loc.cit.); S.R. Davis, ed., The Government of Australian States (Melbourne: Longmans, 1960); J. Rorke, ed., Politics at State level Australia (Sydney: Department of Adult Education for the University of Sydney, 1970).

¹⁰³For comments on the literature about the states see R.H. Simmons et al., "Australian State Administration: A need for new perspectives" Public Administration (Sydney) March 1974 and H.V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1974) p300. There are some bibliographical works, relating to South Australia: F.K. Crowley, "South Australian Political Bibliography" Politics 1 (1) 1966, 43-55; relating to New South Wales: G.N.Hawker and R.A.Grahame, "New South Wales Political Bibliography:1856-1966" Part 1 Politics III (1) 1968, 66-87; Part 2 Politics IV (1) 1969, 57-66; to Queensland: K.W.Knight & J.Adams, Politics & Administration in Queensland: A Selected Bibliography (St Lucia: University of Queensland Department of Government, 1974); to Tasmania: D.Heard and R.J.K.Chapman, "A Bibliography of literature on Tasmanian Politics and Government" Supplement to Politics VIII (1) 1974. The major work on New South Wales is : G.N. Hawker, The Parliament of NSW, 1856-1965 (Ultimo: NSW Government Printer, 1971).

¹⁰⁴Cf. the introduction to the slim volume edited by Rorke, op. cit., for example, where he claims "there can be no real grasp of national politics until the politics at state level are known."

Only actions can show how individuals, occupying such positions, interpret their obligations, and how those actions form regular patterns, indicating their contributions to the processes. It is therefore necessary at this point to identify what is regarded as the essential contribution of the politician and the public servant.

Three types of action are implicit in the positions of politician and administrator operating within the conventions of the system: political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. Discussing the processes based on these three types of action, rather than the classical dichotomy, assists explanation. It also avoids evaluation of those processes derived from simplistic stereotypes and reduces the risk of unreliable solutions for inaccurately defined problems.¹⁰⁵ The three activities are crucial to an understanding of how interactions between the politician and official maintain the boundaries between policy making and administration as required by the conventions, and at the same time preserving the necessary control of one over the other.

1. Political leadership - is indicated by the extent to which the politician makes and directs policy.¹⁰⁶ One measure of this is the officials' awareness of a minister's views in the advice they tender. His status as minister will ensure that he is always listened to, and the structures support him in this expectation. But it is the extent to which his intentions are anticipated by his officials through their actions, that a minister's political leadership is shown. On these actions the minister will be judged through

¹⁰⁵ Some examples of these may be found in J. Wilkes (ed.), Who Runs Australia? (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972); J. Spigelman, Secrecy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972); H. Thomas (ed.), Crisis in the Civil Service (London: A. Blond, 1968); H. Thomas, The Establishment: a Symposium (London: A. Blond, 1959); Max Nicholson, The System: The Misgovernment of Modern Britain (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967).

¹⁰⁶ Headey uses this term in his analysis and fivefold typology of Cabinet Ministers, but as 'executive political leadership', noting his debt to R. Neustadt's Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960) and attempts "to discover the conditions under which different types of political leaders contribute, positively or negatively, to the performance of government tasks." B. Headey, British Cabinet Ministers - The Roles of Politicians in Executive Office (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), p 19.

parliamentary accountability, electoral choice and political party constraints.

In Headey's terms, the strongest political leader would be the 'policy initiator' - that is to say one who defines and sets his own objectives, leading the department to re-interpret its own functions. A weak political leader would be the 'minimalist' who merely reflected the departmental view, allowing the inertia of the historical legacy¹⁰⁷ to carry him forward. He would perform his parliamentary and Cabinet tasks satisfactorily but without creativity.¹⁰⁸

Alternatively, ministers may be policy selectors rather than initiators, showing limited political leadership.¹⁰⁹ This significant relationship of the policymaking function to political leadership is clearly demonstrated, it is of central concern to the Westminster system.¹¹⁰

But not all ministers become involved in policy matters. Headey identifies the 'executive minister' as a further type who takes a managerial role within the department. Such a minister may be a strong personality but his activities are self-limited, and more often than not he does no more than ensure that the departmental organisation is appropriate. These ministers would be regarded as being most effective in maintaining executive authority rather than political leadership.

¹⁰⁷ Anthony Crosland refers to the "legacy of history - the material legacy of thousands of buildings and institutions of particular types and sizes"; as a major limitation on his actions as Secretary of State for Education. Kogan, op. cit., pp 159-160.

¹⁰⁸ It is assumed that officials would rather have a strong minister, who can give them leadership, but this is not always politically feasible as Farrell points out: "The need for leadership and the exercise of power is moderated by the demand that the leader should not deviate from accepted values and that the impersonality of executive action be tempered by the needs of known individual cases." B. Farrell, Chairman or Chief? The Role of the Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan (c. 1971)) p 85.

¹⁰⁹ Headey, op. cit., p 60, where he shows that twenty-one of the ministers interviewed regarded themselves as policy selectors in contrast to the twenty-three who saw themselves as initiators.

¹¹⁰ J. Bray, Decision in Government, op. cit., p 66; G. Paige, Political Leadership, op. cit., p 69 suggests that "task is an important variable combined with values in interaction with personality, role, organisation and setting, as expressed in the behaviour of salient individuals who contribute to variance in the political system."

2. Executive authority - is the formal legal arrangement, in the constitutional sense, which provides a minister with legitimate authority to act. This authority is a potent foundation for the minister and is balanced by the awesome responsibility for its exercise.¹¹¹ His formal authority is subject only to the constraints imposed by Cabinet or the Crown, and sometimes Parliament. The ministerial commission may not be removed other than by the hand which gave it, although it is well established that the Prime Minister's advice on these matters is always taken.

The exercise of this formal authority is closely linked with political leadership, indeed the former is inhibited without the latter. However, it frequently occurs that a power vacuum is created by lack of exercise of political leadership. Headey's minimalist type is an example of this situation, the minister makes no attempt to do more than he formally has to, in consequence the importance of the official is increased. Because a minister is vested legally with the executive authority, the official must always work through the minister. Such situation gives rise to enormous tensions where ministers do not involve themselves in policy issues. The temptation is for the strong official to act in the name of the minister, or for a kind of policy inertia to dominate the department which leads to a lowering of departmental morale.¹¹² However, it is true to say that, weakening the links between the minister and his department by removing to any degree his executive authority could constitute an erosion of ministerial responsibility and control.

It is not possible, however, to coerce the minister to exercise political leadership, because it depends on his own character and aptitude. However, a reduction of the legally given executive authority may provide an appropriate incentive.¹¹³

¹¹¹In Mill's words, it is the minister who received "the whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill". J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, People's edition (London: Longmans Green, 1900)

¹¹²See footnote 3 Ch. VI for Sir Edward Boyle's comment supporting this view. S. Brittan, Steering the Economy: The Role of the Treasury (London: Secker and Warburg, 1969) p 44; or Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: André Deutsch, 1956) p 126.

¹¹³The Devlin Report in Eire made suggestions along these lines, but met

Where the reduction is intentional, there must be some alternative means by which the traditional accountability to the electorate through parliament may be maintained. If an unintentional reduction occurs, the degree to which the official moves into the area of executive authority is directly related to the extent to which the official's administrative capacity inhibits the minister's political leadership.

3. Administrative capacity - is

- (a) competence to assess evidence, to comprehend and harmonise conflicting view, to integrate the demands of expertise with the pressures of political reality;
- (b) control of information and information sources and the ability to communicate such information in times of need;
- (c) continuity of office, in the sense of permanent, full-time presence of an individual, also of the accumulation of precedent and tradition in the office itself.

The official is appointed to maintain the existence of an ubiquitous system, and promotion by merit through a life-time career supports that system. The inherent nature of the forces generated in this way demand very stringent controls if they are not to become too dominant. As Dunsire points out,

"The official's training and experience, and career development gives him a longer time perspective, and places him in a more cause-and-effect universe, where one can recognise the reasons for success and failure and devise corrective measures for error; in contrast, the world inhabited by the politician may seem to the official arbitrary, random, dependent on swings and wheels of fortune, where because of the perpetually myopic scale of vision good men and good works are unrewarded."¹¹⁴

Frustration with short-term considerations, dismay over misuse of knowledge and advice, even a belief in what officials see as the 'public interest', may lead to significant inroads by officials into the politicians' preserve. Sometimes a misguided desire for efficiency may persuade the official to

¹¹³ (contd.)

with strong political opposition from parliamentarians who felt their control over the executive would be weakened. See Report of The Public Services Organisation Review Group 1966-1969 (Dublin: Stationery Office Prl 792 of 1969) paras 10.1.3 - 10.1.5 pp 121-122. The major proposals are contained in the Report, paras 10.12.8, 10.13.1 and 10.13.3, p 133, and also Appendix 1, pp 447-462.

¹¹⁴ Dunsire, op. cit., p 160.

overstep the boundary that must be maintained for the preservation of the Westminster system. The boundary has no specific demarcation lines, as has been suggested above, it relies on the appreciation of all actors concerned that it exists.

Officials in senior positions are most subject to the temptation to allow their administrative capacity to overwhelm the political leadership of the politician. Their self control and understanding of the consequences of allowing themselves this freedom set the limits for others in the system, both politicians and officials. Ridley, writing of the distinction between generalist and specialists, noted that the general administrator must "bring to bear on the work of the department the same type of consideration that the minister would himself bring."¹¹⁵ For any official in this position, having quite frequently more knowledge, more experience in the particular field and often wider awareness of the problems, it requires a sympathetic and deep acceptance of the limitations placed upon him by the need to uphold the formal processes.

The onus of perpetuating the 'rituals' that provide the signpost to those who themselves aspire to senior positions is upon this group, whom Self describes as 'general administrators'. These senior officials have tasks which revolve around policy advising and 'high affairs of State', whereas others who may be quite as senior in hierarchical terms are mainly concerned with management.¹¹⁶ The distinction is not the same as that of specialist and generalist since it is a differentiation on the basis of tasks and not education or qualification. It is not, as Self suggests,

"the distinction between policy and finance as the concern of the generalists and technical and scientific matters as belonging to the appropriate specialists."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵

F. Ridley, Specialists and Generalists: A Comparative study of the Professional Civil Servant at Home and Abroad (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968) p 18.

¹¹⁶ Self, op. cit., pp 163-164.

¹¹⁷ op. cit., p 195.

Predisposition through education and qualification to one field of activity or another may well occur, but it is not that on which differentiation rests.

"The diversities of intellectual knowledge and institutional experience, which are relevant to their [administrators] work are so numerous and complex, that, even setting aside cultural differences, no universal prescription can reasonably be offered."¹¹⁸

Whatever description may be given to these tasks and with whatever prescriptive connotation, either as 'executive' or 'administrative',¹¹⁹ 'generalist' or 'specialist',¹²⁰ 'managerial' or 'technological',¹²¹ lay or expert, or 'general administrative' or 'managerial',¹²² they are all related to activities subsumed under administrative capacity. Through them an official may influence others to act according to his wishes.¹²³ The official who fails to control this potential may inadvertently find himself exercising executive authority or even political leadership. It is only by being politically sensitive - knowing the mind of the minister - that he remains aware of his limitations.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸Self, op. cit., p 215

¹¹⁹B. Schaffer, "The Distinction between Executive and Administrative Work" Public Administration (Sydney) 17(2) 1958, pp 112-118.

¹²⁰Ridley, loc. cit.

¹²¹J. Meynaud, Technocracy (New York: Free Press, 1969).

¹²²Self, loc. cit.

¹²³This is one definition of power and is used here to indicate that administrative capacity is the power base which an official may use. P.E.Mott and M. Aiken, The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House, 1970).

¹²⁴Sir John Crawford, 'Relations between Civil Servants and Ministers in Policy making' in R.N. Spann & G.R. Curnow (eds.), Public Policy and Administration in Australia: A Reader (Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Australia, 1975) pp 165-175; R.N. Spann, 'Bureaucracy and the Public Service' in H. Mayer and H. Nelson, Australian Politics: A Third Reader (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973), esp. pp 588-597; Sir Edward Bridges, 'Portrait of a Profession' in R.A.Chapman & A. Dunsire (eds.), Style in Administration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971).

Summary

The Westminster model of parliamentary government has been an extraordinarily adaptive mechanism for governing.¹²⁵ In this chapter various expectations have been traced from a description of its 'vintage' years in the 1860s, when its central feature - the welding of the legislative and the executive functions of governing in a ministerial department, with coordination being achieved in Cabinet, was at its peak, to current British and Australian practice. Current attempts at explanation have concentrated on process, especially the interaction between the two main elements in these processes - the political and the administrative. The balance maintained between them, or, as Self points out, "the ways in which this elusive dividing-line is drawn",¹²⁶ has profound effects upon the institutional forms of government. This is the main argument in Emy and in Reid's three articles and the basis of Reid's concern for the reduction of parliamentary prestige. Because Parliament is the fount of authority, ministers must act in a responsible way, accountable for their activities to parliament. As soon as that link is weakened, for example if the Executive dominates Parliament, activities will be no less legitimate, since they are performed under the cloak of parliamentary authority, but the way is open to change the appropriate balance. In similar ways the administrative element of the Executive may come to gain control over the political element, especially where their expertise gives them power, e.g. over information.¹²⁷ Previous contributing factors to the maintenance of this balance, such as the common background of the political minister and the administrator; the traditional class based discussion of political matters; the education system; the party system; and the unitary system of government in which parliament is the final legislative body, have been modified or are under threat of extinction. The "search for

¹²⁵ The term 'governing' is used in the same sense as Rose "The study of governing is concerned with relationships, whether between people and institutions in government or between governors and those they seek to govern". R. Rose, "Models of Governing", op. cit., p 466 (see *supra*, p 1).

¹²⁶ Self, op. cit., p 149. ¹²⁷ A.F.Davis, "Politics in a Knowledgeable Society" Public Administration (Sydney), 29 (2), June 1970, 85-108.

a more realistic perspective" becomes more essential than ever to provide a better understanding of the nature of the parliamentary system today. If the strength of the Westminster model lay, as most commentators have suggested, in the integration of the legislative and the executive, its corollary is the importance of political leadership. By creating a situation in which the same group of individuals - ministers - could traverse both the political and the administrative it allowed the possibility for political leadership to overwhelm both parliament and administration. Checks against this were inherent in the accountability of that leadership to Parliament for executive authority and responsiveness to electoral demands. The increasing capacity of the administrator was also a check to an over zealous ministry, provided that capacity was exercised with self control.

The nature of these inter-relationships, the influence of one part over the other must be investigated to ascertain whether the two elements operate as a partnership or in conflict; together in harmony or separated along distinct paths.

This thesis is a study of the relationships between ministers and their senior departmental staff in Tasmanian state government. By using the conceptual background referred to in this chapter, it is possible to extract some generalisations from even such a small sample as is discussed here. A combination of these concepts derived from institution and process, allow for more interpretation of the individual expression of opinion by the actors themselves. All ministers and senior public servants have some common appreciation of the parliamentary system of government in which they operate, but this merely gives them an intuitive set of guidelines within which their daily pressure of business must be performed. It is the grossest framework and it is their interaction that fills in the fine detail, hopefully maintaining the framework and the basic assumptions on which it is founded. The key to understanding whether the boundaries are maintained is the balance between political leadership and administrative capacity. The thesis will

therefore attempt to unravel the extent to which political leadership is still exercised and the limitations under which it is exercised. It is not surprising perhaps that, as Headey pointed out, officials would rather have the intelligent layman type minister,¹²⁸ but it may have deleterious effects for parliamentary government to promote that trend. The balance may demand a more active and expert minister, whose capacity equals that of his expert advisers. Hopefully, this thesis may indicate some answers to these problems by focusing on the extent to which the activities of senior officials and the work of the department within its operating environment enhances or detracts from the political leadership of the minister. The next chapter turns to a consideration of the empirical base and how the data may be ordered to achieve this aim.

¹²⁸Headey, op. cit., p 103 "...they (civil servants) favour a Minister who is a policy selector and possesses the qualities associated with the intelligent layman, who can win cabinet battles and conduct himself with aplomb at the parliamentary despatch box."

II

A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR THE STUDY OF THREE TASMANIAN DEPARTMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The apex of the 'political administrative arch' is central to any consideration of the relationship between political leadership with its corresponding executive authority, and administrative capacity. The existence of what Butler identifies as "two of the key constitutional principles - individual ministerial responsibility and collective ministerial responsibility" will dictate the balance of these relationships.¹ He argues strongly that these principles are "rules of general practice which permit orderly and efficient government" and "government subject to democratic control".² They are observed "sometimes more sometimes less faithfully" and are not to be regarded as "iron laws of political behaviour".³ Although he does not find the degree of change in the observation of these principles significant enough, he does agree that the real question is whether there are changes in current practice which require a fundamental redefinition of the concept.⁴

Reid repudiated Butler's analysis of the Australian context and forcefully suggested that

"It is...incautious to take an ideal which has been bandied about in a political setting based on a unitary form of government and, with minimal empirical study, espouse that ideal prescriptively in a federal polity without apparent regard for the consequences."⁵

¹D. Butler, "Ministerial Responsibility in Australia and Britain", Parliamentary Affairs, 26 (1972-73) 403-414; also in his The Canberra Model (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973), esp. Chapter 7.

²Butler, Parliamentary Affairs, p 413.

³ibid.

⁴ibid.; see also H.V.Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy, op. cit., p 272, where he quotes Butler with approval.

⁵G.S.Reid, "David Butler's ministerial responsibility", unpublished Seminar Paper Australian National University, November 1972.

He argues that there are a number of singular features in the Australian context, such as "the blending of a federal organisation of government with the 'Westminster-type' fusion of parliamentary and executive powers"; or the "existence of an elected Senate with a power of veto over all legislation"; as well as the "six State Parliaments and State bureaucracies..."⁶ These all demand that such constitutional principles as individual and collective responsibility be defined specifically for the Australian context, rather than assuming that they operate in Australia, if perhaps in a lesser degree than in Britain. Reid's earlier essays (referred to in the last chapter) provide some evidence that such redefinition would be substantially different from that proposed by Butler. He asserts very clear distinctions in the relations between ministers and parliament; in between the two houses of Federal Parliament and between ministers and their bureaucracy which precludes some of the assumptions about the functioning of the Westminster model in Australia. He suggested that "bland assertions about ministerial responsibility simply obscure our perceptions of the problem."⁷

The reality or otherwise of these two key elements of the Westminster model, the political and the administrative, therefore demands a more rigorous clarification in the Australian context than it so far has received. Both the empirical evidence and its interpretation require to be related specifically to Australian institutions and history. Analysis by methodologies that are more subtle and sensitive to phenomena than mere description may provide some indication of this reality. It would be but a short step from studies of this kind to redefinition which would be of value for political institutions in this country.⁸

⁶G.S.Reid, loc. cit. See also Emy, op. cit., pp 270-280, where he discusses the concept of ministerial responsibility in the Australian Federal context, and the discussion in the last chapter.

⁷Reid, loc. cit.

⁸Reid supports Stretton in the latter's advocacy of prescriptive roles for the scientist, only so long as the pre-requisite is discovering and understanding. Reid, loc. cit.; H. Stretton, The Political Sciences (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1969) p 71.

Greater understanding of both public and private organisations has been possible through the study of inter- and intra-group and inter- and intra-organisation relationships. Concepts derived from these studies may assist in describing and explaining individual activities within public institutions by ministers and public servants.⁹ R.G.S.Brown observed:

"...academic students of public administration... have used the methods of the historian and the constitutional lawyer and...rather neglected the less formal aspects of administration."¹⁰

A feature of current trends away from this 'orthodox' or traditional description of institutional arrangements has been a proliferation of methodologies. Too often empirical studies create their own methodological framework without reference to similar studies elsewhere or, alternatively, they distinguish the particular technique adopted from others. Over time, it is possible that an accumulation of such techniques may by adaptation and evolution find some common ground and produce an acceptable alternative to narrative and descriptive methods. Comparative studies wherever possible would reduce the potential ethnocentricity of methodologies derived from particular situations; these could be across national as well as organisational boundaries.¹¹

⁹Some early American examples in the field of public administration occur in H. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1957); F. Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); P. Selznick, TVA and the grass roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949). Two British authors using the same view are R.G.S.Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain (London: Methuen, 1970) and R.J.S.Baker, Administrative Theory & Public Administration (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1972). For a discussion of the various approaches to the study of Public Administration see A. Dunsire, Administration: The Word and the Science (London: Martin Robertson, 1973).

¹⁰R.G.S.Brown, op. cit., p 120.

¹¹For examples see A. Webb, "Social Service Administration: A Typology for Research", Public Administration (London), Autumn 1971, 49, 321-339; where he uses Blau & Scott as the basis for his work. See also G.Smith, Social Work and the Sociology of Organisations (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970). This has been advocated for some time by Dwight Waldo through his editorship of Public Administration Review and his writings, for example: Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Problems and Promise (Chicago: Comparative Administration Group. American Society for Public Administration, 1964) and D. Waldo, "Comparative Public Administration" in P. LeBreton (ed.), Comparative Administrative Theory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp 92-138.

With more self-conscious application of methodological techniques, what was previously accepted as an 'empirical truth' (for example the existence of a particular balance between political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity, called ministerial responsibility) may be seen to be perhaps a normative interpretation. The traditional expectations of the patterns of action in the government system and the relationships between the political and administrative elements within that system may, as Emy, Reid and Self suggest, be nothing more than a series of myths supportive of the ideological framework of social norms. This may be the reason the model, as outlined previously,¹³ has been critically analysed in Britain and Australia over recent years.¹⁴ The familiar politics/administration dichotomy has been re-interpreted by these new conceptual approaches to take account of the more complex nature of the governmental processes. Two aspects of this dichotomy, which were seldom identified or differentiated, are now being recognised. The dichotomy can refer to the necessary difference in the positions of politician and official - one elected, the other appointed - and the organisational consequences of this, which has been the traditional view. It can also be an indication of activity, what politics or administration involves in terms of processes. By differentiating activities in this way, three crucial inherent qualities emerge as suggested in the last chapter: political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. Relating these qualities to Self's administrative arch and the analytical techniques subsequently discussed in this chapter, the above assertions may be tested to reveal alternative ways of assessing the support given to the basic assumptions about the Westminster system of government.

As previously noted, the classical version of the Westminster model relies on maintaining a clear distinction between the positions of politicians

¹³The Westminster model, see Chapter I, p 6 et seq.

¹⁴See previous discussion, Chapter I, p 10 et seq.

and officials, because the politician must always be seen to be responsible for the actions of the officials. The simple and fundamental concept of ministerial responsibility, which implies accountability to parliament through control of a department, demands compliance with the stark distinction between politicians and officials. Once this breaks down, the whole validity of the Westminster system of parliamentary government begins to crumble. To this extent there may be agreement with Dunsire that

"...Common sense, or the plain man's point of view, says that there must be some dividing line, if only to make it sensible that some people in government are elected and others appointed."¹⁵

But it is impossible in the complexities of government activities in the 'administrative state',¹⁶ to maintain the purity of this difference in action. Attempts have been made to allow for these changes through reinterpretation and yet still maintain the virtues of the classical version, and these have been discussed in Chapter I. Although these terms have often been used as if they were synonymous, policy is best seen as the activity of the elected politician; administration as the activity of the appointed official. The Maud Committee Report expresses this understanding of the dichotomy in the clearest of language:

"...to distinguish between policy and administration, this is a constantly recurring theme in the written evidence....if only policy could be separated from administration; the former to be exercised by members and the latter by officers, this would be a solution to problems and a step towards reform."¹⁷

In discussing the Fulton Committee's report, Brown notes the difficulty imposed by this imperfect distinction, because the "Committee had to keep reminding itself and its readers of the constitutional limitations which would

¹⁵ A. Dunsire, Administration, op. cit., p 158.

¹⁶ F. Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957) .

¹⁷ Report of the Committee on the Management of Local Government (The Maud Committee), Ministry of Housing and Local Government. (London: HMSO, 1967) para 109. Similar expressions of this view may be found in many reports of inquiries into government during the 1960s.

have to be modified if its recommendations were implemented."¹⁸ By this Brown meant that it is the official who has most to lose from any removal of the division. So long as he can show the distinction exists he can maintain his jurisdictional boundaries and incur no direct responsibility. He has an indirect responsibility through the minister for acts within his jurisdiction and none at all for those which are called 'policy'. In the latter case the minister is solely answerable and directly responsible, whereas in the former situation only vicariously so. Dunsire makes the important point that the politician is able to exclude the official from action which may be normally regarded as administrative. The official cannot do the same in return, unless he overtly assumes the role of expert in some professional or technical capacity beyond the normally administrative.¹⁹ In using this 'authority' against the politician, the official strays out of his administrative role and must clash with the strong presumption of legitimacy of the politician exercising his political judgement.

However, influences may also operate in the opposite direction. Officials performing clerical, or more especially, managerial, tasks find they are no longer within their jurisdiction, they are political because they impinge on a sensitive constituency issue. Jurisdictions of the official are suddenly transferred to the politician, as will be seen in the case of the provision or withdrawal of school bus services by the Education Department, or the even more formal procedure for exempting a student from attendance at school. Members of the public directly affected by decisions of departmental officers may challenge their validity, and in doing so transfer them to the politicians. In consequence, the minister becomes very involved in decisions, removing the previously administrative jurisdiction into the political arena.

The jurisdiction of the official is taken along the 'arc' into the

¹⁸Brown, op. cit., p 93.

¹⁹Dunsire, op. cit., p 160.

junction where "the influences that have been generated within the administrative process flow back into the higher levels of the political process."²⁰ Politicians and administrators are thus actors in a single process in which dynamic forces produce "fusion of political and administrative influences which have been generated lower down the arcs".²¹ The narrow view that politicians are hierarchically superior to officials and therefore their tasks are in some way divided on the basis of that authority relationship, must be invalidated on this argument.

Aim of Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to test the validity of the concept of Ministerial responsibility derived from the Westminster model of government in the context of the State government of Tasmania. If it has been adapted, in what way has it changed and what are the consequences of this change for the parliamentary form of government as a whole? This information will also indirectly support or refute the different view of the politics/administration dichotomy put forward by Self, providing a means of explaining the reality of government in a way which leads to greater understanding. The methodology used is interaction analysis, as applied by Simmons in the Washington State Executive.²² This technique provides a framework for ordering the otherwise formless information obtained in such analysis. It has no purpose other than as a means by which the material can be objectively assessed in terms of already identified variables which have general application. Although this technique was applied in the United States to the relatively unique phenomena in one state, it does seem appropriate for use in this context. In adopting this technique the potential for comparative analysis is also enhanced as suggested by Waldo, since both studies are concerned with government at the state level

²⁰Self, op. cit., p 150.
pp 161-162.

²¹op. cit., p 151; see also Brown, op. cit.,

²²R.H.Simmons, "A Brief Survey of American State Executive Studies", Western Political Quarterly, 17 (December 1964) 777-783; R.H. Simmons, "American State Executive Systems: An Heuristic Model", Western Political Quarterly, 18 (March 1965) 19-26; R.H.Simmons, "The Washington State Plural

in a Federal system.²³ Waldo's advice about studying middle range phenomena as the most beneficial basis for comparative study is also heeded. Middle range phenomena can be encompassed in a theoretical framework more readily since generalities are not abstracted that are valid for more than the study undertaken. This does not lessen the usefulness of such studies, however, because an accumulation of these generalities may well be the basis of the 'imaginative leap' to abstraction or general theory.²⁴

In the remainder of this Chapter the methodology as used in relation to the Washington State Executive will be described and discussed, then its adaptation to the Tasmanian State Executive. Some of the problems of such transposition will be raised and answered and the parameters of the study outlined. In subsequent chapters the empirical study will be detailed and the hypothesis outlined above will be tested.

Summary of the Interaction Analysis in Washington State²⁵

The model falls into two parts, first the parameters of the model briefly stated, second the characteristics of the system within which and through which the interaction model operates. This summary is necessarily merely a statement of the model as it appears in Simmons' works and no attempt has been made to comment other than in elucidation.

I) The Interaction Model -

- (a) the State Executive contains the properties of a system;
- (b) it can be seen as a subsystem of the greater political system which involves both other States and a Federal level;
- (c) the Executive is an assemblage of organisation units, it is

22 (contd.) Executive: An Initial Effort in Interaction Analysis", Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June 1965) 363-381.

²³ State government is well researched in the U.S. system but sadly neglected in Australia. See R. Simmons, B. Davis, R.J.K. Chapman and M. Wood, "Australian State Administration", Public Administration (Sydney) 33, (March 1974) 60-75, and D. Heard and R.J.K. Chapman, "A Bibliography of Tasmanian Government and Politics", Supplement to Politics, 9 (1) (May 1974). Note also Emy, op. cit., p 400, where he too indicates the lack of systematic material available on the Westminster model in the States.

²⁴ Medawar uses this phrase as descriptive of the way many theories are conceived in his discussion on hypothesis and imagination in P. Medawar, The Art of the Soluble (London: Methuen & Co., 1967) esp. pp 147-155.

²⁵ Simmons, loc. cit., footnote 22 supra. Throughout this summary no direct references will be cited. The basic conceptual material is found in the Western Political Quarterly March 1965 article and this has been incorporated with some modification. Where this modification is regarded as vital appropriate reference has been made to the text. For convenience the texts are referred to in subsequent footnotes as: WPQ December 1964; WPQ March 1965 and WPQ June 1965.

like a close confederation of functional states;²⁶

- (d) these units operate according to regularised patterns of interaction and interdependence;
- (e) they also develop patterned responses to the inputs and feedbacks from the socio-cultural environment in which they exist, these patterns are seen as forming closely knit interest clusters;
- (f) such patterned responses to the incoming stimuli occur through decisions and activity of the individual units;²⁷
- (g) the decision, activity or inactivity is calculated to make a difference in the unit environment and social relationships;
- (h) these patterned responses may perform the function of maintaining or altering institutional and system processes and relationships for the unit;
- (i) the patterns of interaction and interdependence described above are assumed to be capable of identification and demarcation;
- (j) their identification and demarcation does not mean that they necessarily remain stable, but the basic characteristics are ever-present in changing, dynamic interaction and as such they may be delineated and described as a plural executive;
- (k) the term 'plural executive' implies that these units are independently powerful, acting on their own initiative and largely self governing.

The use of the term 'regularised patterns' is of vital importance in this scheme, since only those kind of interactions can most readily be identified and demarcated by research. It may seem that this term is at odds with the disclaimer in (j) above, indicating the dynamic qualities of these interactions. The words 'regularised' and 'stable' are not intended to be synonymous, 'stable' inferring a propensity to avoid change, to remain static. The word 'regularised',

²⁶For the British oriented the use of the term 'Executive' must be clarified, since there is a sharp distinction in its usage. Here the term is used of those persons involved in the political level of the administrative side of government. It is as if the separation of powers between legislative and executive involved the latter in another split between that part of the executive involved in an administrative process - in which the professional core operates, and an executive process - in which political implications play a much more important role and those involved are markedly different.

²⁷In subsequent discussions it was felt that decisions to do nothing were equally important as a unit response in terms of inputs into the environment. The term 'agency' in the American literature has been changed to organisational 'unit' as being more appropriate, but is used interchangeably hereafter.

on the other hand, implies a pattern of activities which, although capable of changing over time, are internalised by the agency in some legitimated form. Such adaptation to change is, of course, supposed to be a sign of organisational vitality, although not all such government agencies meet this expectation.

II) Fundamental characteristics of the system in which the interaction model operates:

- (a) there are certain variables and forces assumed to occur within the system;
- (b) the system is composed of demarcated organisational units and their subsystems which form part of the State Executive system;
- (c) there are a number of important dimensions of such agency subsystems.

Explication

In more detail these characteristics are described as follows:

- (a) a variable is a force which has a specific effect on the role and functions of an agency; as input causing stimulus to the decisive activity of the agency, e.g. the budgetary process.

It is any aspect of the processes of interaction which can be shown to provide such inputs to or feedbacks from the agency environment resulting in that stimulus. The particular form the variable takes is identified through the force causing a particular effect within the organisational system.

Such variable as the budgetary process can operate with considerable force and provide evidence for significant power relationships in the system or within the agency itself. The use of the term 'power' here is related to the idea of the force or stimulus of a particular variable, being thought of as the capacity for action or being acted upon, or the capability of producing an effect. Therefore, variables that are identified as active forces within the agency

system may be modified. Such modification would result in significant readjustments among the units of the agency subsystems.

It is because of the dynamic nature of these variables and their stimulus within the agency and its subsystems that there is a continual interaction involving changing relationships. Nonetheless, as previously indicated, certain patterns may be identified which are crucial in formulating the role and functions of the agency. For the American State Executive one of these variables which has for long been recognised as of considerable force within the system is that of gubernatorial leadership. As such it becomes one of the central themes of the analysis, identifying those forces which are centrepetal, i.e. which encourage more integrated relationships with the governor, and those which are centrifugal, i.e. which impede, diminish or prevent gubernatorial leadership.

- (b) The State Executive system boundaries are defined as comprising all those agencies performing executive functions within the State including the Governor. Each agency involves actors who, as individuals, or as members of a group, perform the business of the executive. The main characteristic of this business is to make decisions and carry out activities calculated to effect change in the environment the agency serves, promoting agency interests. In addition such decisions and activities are constrained by the need to reduce conflict and tension with other agencies and thus promote survival potential. The agency subsystems are incorporated through the unit's own specialised environment - the agency itself, constituent groups, legislative, state and federal governmental organs. The components of this subsystem may be of greater significance in determining agency role and function than the gubernatorial relationship.

The State executive is seen as a number of loosely knit units, each one of which is interdependent with the other. At the same

time each one gathers into its own subsystem units on which it can rely for support when it becomes involved in decisions or activity. Analysis thus centres on the relations between these component parts of the State Executive system, taking each fragmented part as dynamic systems themselves. Each of these fragmented parts is also a system, having its own subsystem of interacting units with varying degrees of autonomy. The diagram below endeavours to elucidate the complexity of this problem which is not clear from the Simmons' articles but is simply one of focus.²⁸ In Fig.I.1 the focus is on A unit which sees B and C as its subsystems and interacting with it.

Fig.I.2 is focussed on unit B and sees A and C as its subsystems, so that it is possible for unit A to be both system and subsystem and C to be subsystem of both A and B at one and the same time. Concurrently all these units may be viewed as in Fig. I.3, part of the State Executive system, each a component part of that system's subsystem.




Fig. I.1




Fig. I.2




Fig. I.3

²⁸ The diagram is adapted from the discussion in N.Gross, W.S.Mason and A.W.McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley Inc., 1958) esp pp 48-57.

Naturally, for analytical purposes the focus has to be clearly stated and the boundaries of the system and its subsystems defined. Ultimately however, the interaction analysis provides a complete picture of the way each of these systems functions for the other and the manner of its influence.

- (c) The manner of the influence or the differentiation of the forces which the agency subsystem exerts within the system are seen as the third characteristic - the dimensions of the subsystem. These are the variables referred to in the first part of this section. The forces which operated within the subsystem have extension and magnitude throughout its processes to affect changes on the various interacting units. Of these forces, four are suggested as the most potent for analytical purposes: Power configuration; program activity; role of Governor; and circumjacent relationships. In addition to these, although not regarded as so crucial, are the quality of executive leadership in the agency; fiscal and budgetary relations; federal, legislative and clientele relationships; traditional historical patterns of interaction; the social system or environment in which the agency subsystem operates and personnel patterns. The detailed description of the primary forces below indicates that some attempt has been made to take account of these lesser factors.

Power configuration - i.e. the agency's capacity for action, being acted upon or for producing an effect in its environment. This capacity appears to be derived from a number of forces (these may be termed 'power resources' of a unit in the subsystem):

- Legal characteristics;
- essential character of the budget process;
- nature of its operating funds;

subsistence of federal, legislative and clientele relationships;

characteristics and quality of leadership, patterns of tenure and succession ;

role and structure of agency social system;

effectiveness of professional staff;

traditional patterns of dependence and autonomy.

Program activity - i.e. the repetitive patterns of interaction among habitually participating groups (in-groups within the agency subsystem and a complex of more or less interested out-groups which are not part of the agency sub-system but are affected by or affect that subsystem). The effectiveness of the governor in supervising a particular agency resides in his ability to exercise the option of initiating action. This capacity for initiative may be derived from:

his position in authority as constitutional officer;

his quality of authority as party leader;

his personal qualities of leadership and effectiveness.

The distance of the agency from gubernatorial supervision may range from that of close dependency to almost complete independence. However, independence from the governor's supervision within the system may not preclude dependence on one of the other units within the subsystem.

Circumjacent relationships - i.e. those ties an agency has with groups external to its formal institutional structure, such as

clientele or constituent groups;

legislative committees;

state or federal governmental organisations.

Such relations may be co-operative, accommodative, competitive or conflictive.

Evaluation of the Simmons model

The model, and therefore the interpretative elements, are based on an Eastonian analysis of political systems.²⁹ Two of the assumptions implied in Eastonian analysis - equilibrium and persistence - produce specific consequences for the analytical model described above. As previously noted (p55) the State Executive is treated as a system with the governor and agencies as subsystems. Because of the need for systems maintenance, implicit in the model used through the concept of equilibrium, all these subsystems are anticipated to aim for maximum effect and minimum conflict. Yet, at the same time, again implicit in the model through the concept of persistence, each subsystem - governor and agencies - will be endeavouring to maximise its own survival, i.e., function as autonomously as possible. For this reason the term 'plural' has been used to designate the executive system. The Eastonian analytical base also involves connotations of a particular explanatory kind, e.g., that power is of central significance to the system. In order to maximise effect and maximise potential survival capacities the exercise of power and the control of sufficient support in its exercise are essential. The Simmons analysis, therefore, is forced to use as its crucial focus the role of the governor, rather than just explicating the interaction between the subsystems. Institutionalised centralisation of the executive function and the separation of policy making from administration is combined in the office of the governor. It was the tenet of all early administrative reform in the U.S. to aim for the implementation of such principles.³⁰

To a large degree, therefore, the Simmons analysis was dominated by a search for the validity of this orthodox view. The centrality of the

²⁹WPQ, (June 1965) p 364, Fn.6. Assumptions implicit in the use of this analytical conceptual framework are discussed in Appendix II and their limitations are canvassed there.

³⁰For a general discussion on the literature in respect of state governments and governors see WPQ (December 1964), and for Simmons' view of the role of the governor WPQ (March 1965). Other texts directly concerned with the governor's role are: C.B.Ransone, The office of Governor in the United States (University of Alabama Press, 1956); L.Lipson, The American Governor: from figurehead to leader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) and for a more recent survey: C.B. Ransone (ed.), Symposium: "The American Governor in

governor's position and his role in any interaction between other subsystems was consequently regarded as a vital focus of the analysis. The persistence of the theme of centripetal forces (those which encouraged a more integrated relationship with the governor) and centrifugal forces (those which were found to impede, or prevent gubernatorial leadership) is evidence of this.³¹ Consequently the analysis does not so much "center attention on the relations between the component parts of the fragmented state executives",³² as centre attention on the "dilemma of the governor".³³ His situation is that "he is theoretically and often actually held publicly responsible for the exercise of effective leadership, yet he is often without adequate tools to exercise such leadership."³⁴ If he is to be regarded as the policy maker and developer of policy initiative as political leader then all elements of the state executive should be integrated under his leadership. The fact is that many of these elements are diffused and fragmented, some agencies playing important and often crucial roles in determining programmes and expenditures necessary to satisfy policy decisions.³⁵ The extent to which the orthodox role of the governor is eroded through this growing fragmentation and increasing autonomy of the subunits is the crux of analysis. Because of the implicit assumptions mentioned previously, the subunits were assumed to be in a conflict situation.³⁶

30 (contd.)

in the 1970s", Public Administration Review 30 (1) (Jan./Feb. 1970).

³¹ WPQ (June 1965).

³² WPQ, (June 1965) p 364.

³³ WPQ (June 1965) p 373.

³⁴ ibid.

³⁵ WPQ (June 1965) p 364. This view is essentially similar to the idea that presidents of the United States have to rely principally on their 'power to persuade' to achieve their objectives. A view which has been strongly argued in R.E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960); see also an essay by P.W. Sperlich, "Bargaining and overload: An Essay on Presidential Power" in A. Wildavsky (ed.) The Presidency (Boston: Little Brown, 1969).

³⁶ The Eastonian analysis assumes that the inputs into the political system - demands & support - are conflictive. The pluralist view of society, in which the government is the allocator of authoritative values and acts as arbitrator, underlies most of the writings on American Government. See for example: T.H. Eliot, Governing America: Politics of a Free People (New York: Dodd Ricards & Co., 1962); J.M. Burns & J.W. Peltason, Government by the People, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966).

The governor battles to maintain his control over policy making against agencies who were anxious to erode it; concurrently agencies as between themselves, engaged in promoting their own survival; neither exceeding the limit beyond which such conflict would upset the equilibrium of the system as a whole.

In this way it appears that 'explanation' derived from the analysis was to some degree normative in character. The interpretation of the data was directed to an assessment of the validity of orthodox theory rather than a construction of reality. The explanations themselves were epistemologically grounded in that orthodoxy thus detracting from the potential benefits of a "systematic-empirical methodology" - hopefully to yield "a deeper understanding of state administration."³⁷

Adaptation of the Simmons interaction analysis model to the Tasmanian State Executive System

The context of the state executive systems must be clearly defined as well as its constitutionally prescribed framework. In both U.S. and Australia, the constitution has existed for a considerable time prior to any analysis of interaction within the system. The institutional and social expectations must therefore be fairly strongly entrenched in both the system and the environment. In a governmental setting of the Westminster model type, as in the Tasmanian State system, there has been a continuous accumulation of normative demands over time. Some demands were formulated within that system, but many were externally imposed. For example, the fact that the Tasmanian State Executive has grown out of the colonial government, controlled from Westminster until 1856, must have some conditioning effect.³⁸ When an individual enters a role within that institutional framework he is initially governed by strong pressures to

³⁷ WPQ (March 1965) p 26.

³⁸ See R.L. Wettenhall, Evolution of a Department (University of Tasmania, 1970) and W. A. Townsley, The Struggle for Self government in Tasmania (Hobart: Government Printer, 1951). See also the discussion in Chapter I: L. Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt Brace & Worlds Inc. 1964).

conform. Precedent plays a highly important part in constraining his activities and defining their boundaries. Activities beyond the expected will bear the burden of disapproval, not only of the present but of the past as well. In similar ways new agencies are subjected to the same constraints. The outcome must be accommodated within the analysis if it is to be valid across cultural and governmental boundaries.

The constitutional context in which the two state executive systems function, i.e. the American and the Australian, will be initially distinguished and then the term 'executive' clarified. In the U.S. the Presidential formula is perpetuated at State level, and in Australia it is the parliamentary, representative formula. Both countries have a Federal system, although there are differences in the relationships between Federal and State governments derived from constitutional form as well as practical expediency. These factors will only be of relevance in the analysis in discussions about autonomy and the extent to which an agency is able to gain support outside the State executive system. Since the analysis is concerned solely with the internal interaction, there is little need to comment on the Federal/State relationships other than to note specifically where they impinge on that interaction.

Of more importance is the structural nature of each system and the differences consequent upon that. It is here too that the use of the term 'executive' is significant. The American Presidential system is formally structured on the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial powers. A separate structure is created to operate in each sphere with the personnel of each structure remaining within its boundaries. Each of the structures provided checks and balances against the others to prevent anyone gaining complete ascendancy and thereby governing in an arbitrary manner. The Executive element of this system is the implementing arm, the structure which performs the day to day tasks of government under the control of directly elected men. At the State level the Governor and senior officers in charge of departments are elected members.

Often, the senior officers are mixed, some elected, others appointed; for example: of the five agency heads in the Washington study three were elected and two gubernatorial appointees.³⁹ At the same time the tasks they perform are provided for them by the legislature, which is comprised of elected members, although none of them involved in the Executive. This infusion of electees rather than appointees in the two structures provides for responsiveness to the public interest. However, as with the Presidency at the Federal level, the central constitutional importance of the Governor in the State system cannot be ignored. He is in some ways the topmost point of the political hierarchy, but certainly the topmost point of the Executive authority hierarchy. The way in which any one governor chooses to exercise this position of leadership and in what particular way he amalgamates his apparent dual role is a matter of research. Simmons suggests for the Washington case that "he is unable to manage the executive branch with any degree of effectiveness or comprehensiveness", although, whether this occurs because he is placing too much emphasis on his political leadership to the detriment of his executive authority Simmons does not say.⁴⁰

In the Westminster parliamentary system the separation of powers is not fundamental, in fact it is deliberately blurred, although the three elements of state - legislative, executive and judicial are present. Only the judicial is absolutely separated in a way much more certain than the American. Checks and balances between the three elements depend on this judicial structure in a much less formal sense, there being no constitutional appeal to a Court.⁴¹

³⁹WPQ (June 1965) p 365.

⁴⁰WPQ (June 1965) p 381. The study of political leadership in this context has only recently emerged again with the publication of G. Paige, Political Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1972). As he says in his Preface - it is an attempt "to combine old concerns into a distinctively new pattern." Reference to the relationship between his conceptual pattern and this study is made in Chapter I.

⁴¹As there is to the Supreme Court in the U.S. or in the Australian context to the High Court. There are, however, severe limitations to the capacity of the Australian High Court to intervene in other than direct challenges to constitutional validity of government activity. See for example" M. Neumann, The High Court of Australia: a Collective Portrait 1903-1970

In the Westminster system convention, custom and the Rule of Law dominate its functioning. The legislative is supreme - the legal fiction that sovereign power is vested in the Queen in Parliament perpetuates the concept that the legislative and executive powers are merged in this body. Only in Parliament do we find elected representatives. However, in order to maintain the link, and through this to control the Executive, personnel from the legislature are appointed to executive positions. Members of the legislature are appointed to be Ministers of State responsible to the Crown, and thereby to Parliament, for the performance of the executive functions.⁴² They are thus at the same time in a position to control that performance. These ministers, by convention, now derive their positions from belonging to the majority party group in the Lower House of Parliament and are usually leading members of that group. The Crown no longer exercises any power of appointment to this position, although the authority remains. The responsibility for formulating the policies, which must be endorsed by the legislature, is with the ministers who collectively form a Cabinet, with one of their number appointed as 'prime minister', (at state level in Australia he is called 'Premier'). It is the job of the Premier to lead, but remain only primus inter pares constrained by the need for collective agreement with all his colleagues in Cabinet.⁴³

The Executive in this system is the structure of departments and statutory authorities which perform the day to day duties of government, implementing those policies decided upon outside the structure. However, unlike the American system, there are direct political links to the authority structure, through these ministers in Cabinet. This group is the policy making

41 (contd.)

(Sydney: Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Sydney, 1971); G. Sawyer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968).

⁴² These matters are more specifically dealt with in Chapter I, where the Westminster Model is discussed in detail.

⁴³ While this may be the formal relationship there is considerable debate especially in the U.K. about whether the more recent trends have been to Prime ministerial dominance. See references in footnotes 45 & 46 post. Encel thinks otherwise about Australia (op. cit., p 107).

political leadership and at the same time has executive responsibility for supervising the activities consequent upon those policy decisions. In this situation therefore, there is a collective, rather than a single, centre for both political and authority leadership within the institutional structure - cabinet rather than governor. In the Westminster system there is a greater diffuseness, and although it may be possible to reconcile for some purposes, Simmons' analytical model must be distinguished from his conclusions if the model is to be applied to the parliamentary system.

There are, however, more similarities in the two State systems than dissimilarities. It is largely in the practical application of a responsible and responsive ideal that the two differ. Yet, for analytical purposes, understanding these distinctions is important, it prevents false assumptions being transposed across cultural boundaries. So it is necessary to be aware that the interaction taking place between the agencies in the Washington State Executive is constrained by the dominant constitutional position of the governor. All executive acts are to be supervised by him and are his responsibility. It is his task to energise the government - for this his leadership must be clothed with sufficient authority. Yet he has to be surrounded by sufficient safeguards to make arbitrary decisions unlikely, for example:

- (a) the possibility that the political party of which he may be state leader may not have the majority in the legislature; or
- (b) the other elected senior officers in the state may not belong to his political party or accept his leadership in all matters.

In these ways the ideal of the 'plural executive' is enhanced and to some degree interaction between agencies in this environment will be influenced by the capacity of the Governor to marry his political leadership with institutional authority. Agencies may well feel encouraged to exhibit independence in such a climate, especially where there is an elected head.

The Department of Public Instruction in Washington, headed by an elected superintendent, for instance, exhibited autonomous tendencies. The centrifugal

forces at work here, derived from the legal separation of the executive from the legislature, combined with an effective assertion of independence by the agency head through their administrative capacity.⁴⁴

Within the Tasmanian State Executive System interaction occurs in a different context of interplay between political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. Here the focus of attention must be upon the Cabinet in which the first two factors merge. This central body comprises all those ministers/leaders and especially the premier. It is the initiating body for policy discussion and dictates the guidelines for government action which departmental officers should follow.⁴⁵

In this situation it is tempting to equate the position of Cabinet in the Tasmanian system with that of the Governor in the Washington system, using the idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces in analysis. The Governor is head of an hierarchical apex with no single person below him capable of making decisions or of being accountable in quite the same way as a minister. The Governor is rather like all ministers rolled into one, i.e. the Cabinet; but not like the Cabinet itself, which is an amalgam or collegial decision unit. Comparative study must not uncautiously transfer analytical techniques between systems, glossing over the very real differences that arise. For reasons made clear by Encel, it is more appropriate to see each minister as the top of an apex similar to that of the Governor. The Cabinet operates through conventions which do not place it at the top of any hierarchy of authority within the executive structure, unless in practice this arises through the competence of a premier or defect of a minister. There can be little doubt that, given the appropriate circumstances a premier could become dominant despite Cabinet, or

⁴⁴ WPQ (June 1965) p 373. An interesting comparison with a similar potential for autonomy through administrative capacity in the Tasmanian Education Department is provided here. See Chapter IV.

⁴⁵ Haldane referred to the Cabinet as being the mainspring of all mechanisms of government, Great Britain. Machinery of Government Committee (Haldane) Cmd. 9230 (London: HMSO, 1918). This has been the view of most commentators since then - see J.P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (2nd ed. London: Stevens, 1968); Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1961).

through it. The discussion does not pre-empt this possibility. On the other hand it is not based on the dubious expectation that it will always operate like that. In Australia Encel's verdict is that the collective responsibility of Cabinet is used by prime ministers and premiers only when they feel the need to protect their authority. He points out that

"In Australia the basic convention is not collective responsibility within Cabinet but the individual responsibility of each minister to his party."⁴⁶

An attempt is made to represent these differences in Fig. II and III below.

By convention the executive authority stops at the minister himself for every functional area. It is not carried through into Cabinet because the minister is himself directly responsible and accountable to Parliament for the functions of his department. The Cabinet, in this sense, is merely an organisational mechanism by which activities can be coordinated at the highest political decision level between the ministers.⁴⁷ While there can be no gainsaying the fact that ministers, whether British or Australian, do not resign as expected by the convention of ministerial responsibility, it is still assumed that ministerial responsibility is the central doctrine underlying the Westminster system of government. If these expectations are unfulfilled then explanations must be sought through empirical analysis rather than by the assertion that since it has not occurred it is not part of the system. Similarly, any suggestion that an Australian state premier could be equated in any way with a U.S. state governor would be invalid. Whilst some premiers operate in personal styles like strong governors this is not their substantive constitutional position.⁴⁸ That constitutional position is being evaluated in this thesis.

⁴⁶S. Encel, loc. cit.

⁴⁷Any attempt to detract from this position of the minister and supplant his authority with that of Cabinet has been strongly resisted, according to some writers. P. Gordon Walker, The Cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); B. Headey, op. cit., esp. pp 42-43; see also H. Daalder, loc. cit.; H. Morrison, Government and Parliament (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

⁴⁸This impression is supported particularly in respect of the Victorian Premier Sir Henry Bolte in P. Blazey, Bolte: A political biography (Melbourne: Jacaranda Press, 1972); N. Blewett & D. Jaensch, Playford to Dunstan (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1971) provide similar comment on Playford's 27 years in South Australia.




FIG. II

CABINET
(also Premier)




FIG. III

The minister, then, is the central focus of the Westminster system, having both responsibility to account for his actions and control over his department. This statement must not be taken to exclude the very real possibility in Australia that ministers may be subordinate to the collective entity, Cabinet. Party political solidarity seems often stronger in Australian politics as Reid shows in the earlier discussion about the suppression of politics in parliament. However, these possibilities must remain in the realm of speculation at the state level of politics until empirical evidence is provided.⁴⁹ Since the minister is accountable and is also an elected representative the dual role of political leadership and executive authority is incorporated in his position. This combination of leadership and authority in both minister and governor, while operating in different contexts, allows the transfer of Simmons' techniques of analysis.

The significance of the term 'executive' in the Simmons analysis is that it refers to the uppermost layer of government in which the elected leadership and appointed leadership are combined as executive authority. At the second and subservient level are the remaining personnel within the agencies, the permanent officials, who may have some delegated executive authority but no leadership. Through their administrative capacity they provide the support for the first level and may play a significant role in any interaction between the agencies. This is little different from the version of the interaction in the 'grey area' of Self's arch.⁵⁰ Distinctions of a conventional and constitutional kind must have consequences that are significant in the processes within the two systems, but the similarities should provide a reasonable ground for cautiously adapting the analytical techniques used by Simmons. This argument must also be strengthened by the fact that the focus of this research is also commonly based on the apex of Self's arch where the broader political and administrative implications of activity are markedly different from the

⁴⁹ Encel certainly does not support those views in respect of the Federal government, as noted footnote 43. Neither are they supported by the study undertaken in this thesis as may be seen Chapter VI.

⁵⁰ See Chapter I, pp 18-20 for a discussion of Self's political administrative arch.

rest of the system of government in both countries.

So, in this analysis of the Tasmanian State Executive System, a major concern will be the accountability and control of the minister, his political leadership and the constraints on his exercise of executive authority, especially those derived from administrative capacity. Cabinet and Parliament will be regarded as variable forces influencing these aspects of the minister's activity, bearing in mind that he is a member of both. There will, as mentioned above, be consequential differences in the influences these forces exert from the American situation, where the governor and senior officers are not members of the legislature, nor of a similar body to Cabinet. Centripetal and centrifugal forces such as were conceptualised by Simmons in his analysis will be as evident in the Tasmanian system as in Washington. Obviously, ministers as members of a Cabinet could be placed in a significantly less autonomous position than their constitutional status may allow. The minister can be overruled by his peers, or at least supervised in a way not likely with the Governor. However, these differences emerge in practice, it must not be assumed that the use of the conceptual and analytical techniques imply any transfer of American doctrines to supplant or support those of the Westminster system. All that is intended, as has previously been noted, is to utilise those concepts and techniques by adaptation for the better understanding they may provide of the empirical data collected.

The subsystems of the Tasmanian Executive system will be described as bounded by the minister, as executive authority, and those units which are directly under his control and supervision. The system will comprise all such units of government and these will be the organisational units for the purpose of analysis.⁵¹ In Tasmania separation of these organisational units becomes

⁵¹ Earlier discussion about the assumptions underlying the politics-administration dichotomy, Chapter I, p 49, provides a basis for including the minister in the executive system. The attempt to draw a line between the permanent staff of a department and the temporary minister and call one executive the other political, is challenged, see A. Dunsire, op. cit., p 153 et seq. Different individuals may behave differently in office, but the role of minister qua minister does not change.

complicated by the fact that only ten ministers are responsible for them all. It may therefore easily occur that one minister is supervising two or more clearly distinct organisational units, each vying with the other for support from various sources, including the minister. These arrangements remain by no means static, agencies may be moved between ministers without too much concern for their consanguinity. At the elections (of May 1972), there was a change of government from a Liberal Party majority to a Labour Party majority. At the previous election (May 1969) the Liberal Centre Party coalition gained a majority for the first time for some thirty-five years and thus changes of portfolio have been more frequent in the last few years than for much of the past. The list below shows some of the radical changes that took place in the allocation of the main departments over the period from 1968-1973.⁵²

<u>1968*</u>	<u>1970/2**</u>	<u>1972/3</u>
(*Taken from Wettenhall <u>The Guide</u> , pp 18/19	(**Taken from <u>Tasmanian Year Book</u> , Govt. Printer, Hobart 1972)	(Based on research and Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, Premier's and Chief Secretary's Department, Hobart, 1972)
Premier, Treasurer, Minister for Mines and Minister in charge of Hydro-Electric Comm- ission.	Premier, Treasurer and Minister in charge of the Hydro- Electric Commission.	Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Mines.
Attorney General	Attorney General, Minister for Police and Licensing	Attorney General, Minister for Environment and Minister Administering Racing and Gaming Act
Minister for Education	Minister for Educa- tion	Minister for Education

⁵² A full and comprehensive list of these organisational units for the Tasmanian Executive system will be found in Appendix II together with the changes taking place since 1968 utilising the classification scheme in Wettenhall, The Guide, on which much of the following discussion about selection for research purposes is based. The main criteria for the classification scheme in the Guide were constitutional (legal or statutory) and descriptive. The formal requirements of enabling legislation (described as the Charter) were taken together with the detailed descriptions of functions, organisation and finance. The written record was used with a comprehensiveness that made the book a definitive source for the Tasmanian Government Administration in 1968.

<u>1968</u>	<u>1970/2</u>	<u>1972/3</u>
Minister for Lands and Works	Minister for Lands and Works and Local Government	Minister for Lands and Works and Local Government
Minister for Agriculture and Tourism	Minister for Agriculture and Forests	Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries
Chief Secretary, Minister of Labour and Industry and Social Welfare	Deputy Premier, Chief Secretary, Minister of Labour and Industry and Social Welfare and Minister for Tourism	Chief Secretary, Minister of Labour and Industry and Minister for Transport
Minister for Housing and Police	Minister for Housing, Racing and Gaming and Mines	Minister for Police and Licensing and Minister for Tourism and Immigration
Minister for Health	Minister for Health and Road Safety	Minister for Health, Social Welfare and Road Safety
		Minister for Industrial Development, Forests, Minister administering the Hydro-Electricity Act 1944 and Minister assisting the Treasurer

It will be noted that a number of these departments have remained as primary organisational units throughout, Treasurer, Health, Education, Housing, Chief Secretary, Attorney General, Lands and Works and Agriculture. Reasons for changes in other units are difficult to assess but would certainly relate to their comparative freedom from direct ministerial control since they are set up as Commissions, e.g. Forestry, Hydro-Electricity or Transport; or that they wax and wane in importance dependent on the political climate of the time, e.g. Tourism was given a boost during the Liberal Centre Party Coalition because of the interest of the Deputy Premier; equally, the Environment is currently in political vogue.

Selection of subsystem units for research

In order to ensure that changing portfolios would only be a variable of the most minor kind in the analysis, it became necessary to select those departments which seemed to remain whole as a primary organisational unit.

within the System. Such selection is an important factor in relation to the question of control and capacity to supervise, since a multiplicity of functions would of itself create problems for a Minister.⁵³ Those departments seen as primary organisation units were selected: Health, Housing, Education, Lands and Works, Attorney General, Agriculture, Treasurer and Chief Secretary.⁵⁴ However, this sample would have been too large to analyse in a comprehensive survey and a further selection had to take place.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the Westminster model, as stressed in Chapter I, is the responsibility and control of the minister in charge of a department. Insofar as departmental matters are concerned the minister is both responsible for actions taking place within the structure to Cabinet and Parliament and at the same time sets the guidelines for those actions. It is therefore possible to hypothesise about relative autonomy. For example - that in an ideal ministerial department the minister is wholly responsible for and wholly accountable for its activities, with the sanction of resignation in the event of failure. However, such a situation may no longer pertain because of the increasing influences of Cabinet and collective responsibility; party loyalties and the growing technological complexities of departmental tasks. Yet there linger certain distinctive qualities inherent in the creation of a ministerial department, which lead one to expect something different if a public corporation is created instead. The relationship of a minister to a public corporation is intended to be different from that of a minister with his department.⁵⁵ An apparent continuum can therefore be drawn

⁵³ This did become obvious when interviewing the Liberal Centre Party Coalition Minister for Housing, Industrial Development and Fisheries; see Chapter III.

⁵⁴ For a discussion of this concept of primary organisational units and the use of the term "Ministry" see R.L. Wettenhall, "Concepts of Ministry", Public Administration (Sydney) 29(3) (December 1970) pp 319-329.

⁵⁵ For discussions about this see W.A. Robson, Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership (2nd ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1962) pp 160-162, which summarises much of the early discussion which took place in the literature on this question. For an example of this literature see D.N. Chester, "Public Corporations and the Classification of Administrative bodies", Political Studies Vol. 1 (1953). For a discussion of the differentiation see R.L. Wettenhall, The Guide op. cit., esp. pp 5-15.

between the two virtually impossible poles, complete dependence and absolute autonomy. This argument was underlying Wettenhall's classification system into ministerial departments, departmental offices, departmental corporations, public corporations and regulatory bodies. Ministerial departments are nearest to complete dependence and regulatory bodies nearest to autonomy. This classification could therefore provide the second criterion for selection. If the focus of the investigation was to be on the accountability and control of the minister and the constraints placed on his authority, then an examination of a cross section of departmental types would complement it.

Selection was made on the potential for meaningful and useful conclusions bearing these matters in mind. The need for a cross section of the continuum necessitated the avoidance of extremes. Therefore, a clearly defined corporation operation, a public enterprise, should not be included because the only complexities here relate to whether or not it should have been created in the way it was - a matter outside this thesis. A good example of this type would be the Hydro-Electric Commission, about whose autonomy much discussion has taken place, although no one doubts that it exists. On the other hand, a ministerial department, such as the Treasury, so clearly under the control of the minister and for whose tasks he is so clearly accountable, should also be avoided. The real test of the classification would be in the middle areas of the continuum, the departmental offices and corporations. On this basis a selection was made of the following:

- (a) Health;
- (b) Education; and
- (c) Housing.

(a) Health and Education - with certain reservations the Guide suggests these two departments are ministerial departments. Of the Education Department Wettenhall states:

"Some way removed from the pure (or ideal) type are the departments whose permanent heads - and possibly other officials as well - are vested with statutory powers and responsibilities in their own right ... If these "quasi-ministerial" departments conform in other respects

to the ideal pattern, and if their minister is generally understood to exercise important and over-riding powers, especially in the relevant policy making areas, then I have included them in the category of ministerial departments. Among those so treated are Education...."56

This uncertainty about the true position and the fact that the majority of its officers are professional teachers, not appointed under the provisions of the Public Service Act 1973, make this department worth including. In addition, the most senior officers including the Director General have always been promoted from the teaching staff not the administrative staff.

A similar basis for inclusion exists for the Health Department, although there are other more complex factors involved. Until 1960 it was very much controlled through the statutory powers of the permanent head. In that year however, the Health Services Act was passed with the apparent intention of divesting the permanent head of much of his power and placing it in the hands of the minister. At the same time this department is also strongly professionally oriented, with a large number of its employees outside the control of the Public Service Act 1973. Added to this is the fact that its permanent head, most deputy heads and, since 1959, the minister himself, have been from the medical profession.

(b) Housing - this department provides a different kind of problem, being represented in the Guide as departmental corporation:

"...offices or agencies whose staffs formally constitute departments for Public Service Act purposes, but whose governing organs are given the status of corporate bodies separate from the collective legal personality of the Crown. In some cases a single nominated official at the head of the office is so incorporated. (This) group includes agencies like ... the Housing Department ... It will usually be found that the conferring of this distinct legal personality indicates involvement in operations of a commercial character, and that ministerial control is limited and somewhat remote, in keeping with the general rationale of public enterprise organisations."57

⁵⁶Wettenhall, Guide, p 7.

⁵⁷op. cit., p 11.

Since it implies a differing potential relationship between minister and department the inclusion of the Housing Department was seen as providing an alternative source of information.

In summary, this study attempts to apply a methodological technique developed in another jurisdiction, namely interaction analysis. In applying this methodology the central concern will be questions about the political leadership and executive authority, and thus the responsibility, of Ministers within the Tasmanian State Executive, and the balance maintained with administrative capacity.

A conceptual design for the study of the subsystems of the Tasmanian State Executive

The component subsystems of the Tasmanian State Executive function according to established patterns of action, interaction and interdependence. As noted previously they differ in kind from those described in Simmons⁵⁸ as they form part of a larger political system based on the Westminster model. Such organisational units do not operate in isolation; internally they comprise consistently related positions and patterned inputs and feedbacks from their environment. At the same time the personnel filling these positions develop responses to the incoming stimuli which may provide precedents for future patterns, acting to maintain or change institutional or system processes and relationships.

These processes and relationships operate at a number of levels inside the organisational subsystem, in regard to both the formal relationships and informal substructure. However, both of these are overlaid⁵⁹ by the external environmental influences directly impinging on the unit's activities, through e.g. clientele, pressure groups, professional association, legislatures or

⁵⁸WPQ (June 1965) p 364. The boundaries of the State System are the minister and those elements over which he exercises nominal or statutory control, differing from the American 'executive' equivalent.

⁵⁹For an example of the concept of 'overlays' see J.M.Pfiffner and F.P.Sherwood, Administrative organisation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960) Chapter 2.

other units. At the same time there are other indirect stimuli operating through the subsystem, e.g. personnel matters, the social system values. All these interactions and processes in some way affect the operations of the unit and it is assumed that they can be identified and their influences demarcated. In this way the subsystem form and boundaries begin to emerge from the mass of formal and informal interrelationships which are the total system activities. It is only when these subsystems are identified that analysis of the system proper may become possible. The potentially innumerable and intermeshing complex relationships which must necessarily occur in any such system need not deter the analyst, since it is reasonable to assume that certain variables are of greater importance than others.

As previously stated, Simmons uses the term 'variable' to mean any aspect of the processes of interaction which may have varying effects on the organisational unit; added to which certain of them seem crucial to the way in which a unit may operate. Simmons identifies the following:

1. Executive leadership;
2. fiscal and budgeting relations;
3. programme activity;
4. federal, legislative and clientele relations;
5. traditional historical patterns;
6. the social system; and
7. personnel patterns.

Each of these variables exerts a different stimulus to activity within the unit and may be then regarded as a 'force'. Such forces can be shown to support or diminish, increase or detract from the accountability and control of the minister. Simmons uses the terms centrifugal and centripetal to delineate these forces which may discourage or encourage more integrated relationships with the Governor. As has been previously argued, the use of such terms for the ministerial position would be inappropriate, the most useful adaptation is to concentrate on those forces described as centrifugal, i.e. those which seem to impair gubernatorial leadership. For any minister the most

vital element of his role is political leadership.⁶⁰ Any activity which inhibits his political flexibility reduces his leadership capacity. It is suggested that this is clearly shown when a minister is listened to because he has the authority to make decisions which affect organisational behaviour.⁶¹ However, the load on a minister renders it impossible for him to "adequately scan, let alone control more than a small portion of the policies for which he is accountable." It therefore becomes

"...government by exception. Most activities continue without ministerial scrutiny and ministers select for attention those which make special demands on resources or have a sharp political impact or politically strong ideological appeal."⁶²

If the minister is to fulfil his responsibilities in terms of parliamentary accountability he must not only maintain political leadership but also executive authority. Any force, such as administrative capacity, which detracts from that leadership or authority is analytically vital. Nonetheless, it appears that certain forces may be more significant than others, in the sense that they appear more frequently, may be institutionalised, or become strong precedents for future action. Such forces do not depend for their existence on the individual personality of the actor who happens to be in the role of minister at any one time (although there may be weak and strong leaders amongst ministers as there are amongst any group of individuals). The analysis has to be directed at those forces which have been identified as having a persistent or cumulative effect on the subsystem, no matter who the ministerial incumbent happens to be.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of the concept of political leadership see L. Dion, "The Concepts of Political Leadership: An Analysis", Canadian Journal of Political Science 1 (1) (March 1968) pp 2-17, in which he makes the point that it is important to see leadership as a pattern, as part of an interaction process, as does G.D. Paide (ed.), Political Leadership, loc. cit. For a discussion of these roles of politicians as perceived by themselves see B. Headey, British Cabinet Ministers, loc. cit. The entire subject is discussed in Chapter I and further in Chapter VI.

⁶¹ Kogan, The Politics of Education, op. cit., p 33.

⁶² loc. cit., p 48. Further support for this statement may be obtained from B. Castle, "Mandarin Power" extract from Sunday Times (June 10, 1973), mentioned in B. Headey, British Cabinet Ministers, op. cit., p 33.

Simmons has covered much of the groundwork from which such analysis can proceed; the forces he has identified, he suggests, were found in every subsystem studied and in each case "had a determinative effect upon the agency's role, function and distance from gubernatorial control."⁶³ Set out below is an adaptation of Table 2⁶⁴ which generalises the forces and their effects in terms of the Westminster model. It will be seen that in the original seven forces were mentioned: two of these have been omitted since there is no equivalent situation in the Tasmanian parliamentary system. These are:

- "(4) The existence of statutory exceptions from the governor's quarterly budget review and his overall budgetary controls;
- (5) The existence of informally acknowledged and practiced exceptions from the governor's budgetary control, biennial and quarterly reviews (in the absence of statutory exceptions):"⁶⁵

Crucial centrifugal forces involved in the processes of subsystem activity:

<u>Centrifugal Force</u>	<u>Potential Effect</u>
(a) Strong affiliations with <u>circum-jacent groups</u> ; clientele, co-optive activity, parliamentary oversight of actions, lack of participation by minister -	a tendency for the department to rely for support on the circum-jacent affiliation rather than ministerial support for action, thus increasing administrative capacity at the expense of political leadership
(b) The extent to which the <u>legislature</u> has created substantive laws providing formal executive separation, e.g. appointment of personnel outside the Public Service Act; budgeting procedures; formal statements about the mission of the unit; formalised precedents which assist permanent head to assert independence without ministerial support.	provides a restraint on a minister attempting to increase his influence against that of the department; also provides right climate for permanent head or departmental officers to promote autonomy. Thus impeding the executive authority of the minister.

⁶³ WPQ (June 1965), p 373.

⁶⁴ Contained in Simmons, WPQ (June 1965), p 374. Certain forces such as legislative relations would have a more specialised meaning in the American context where there is a separation of legislative and executive. The greater dependence on individual representative support and the committee system would make these relations significantly different forces for a governor. This force has been adapted to the more integrated Westminster system see (b) Table 2.

⁶⁵ WPQ (June 1965), p 373.

Centrifugal Force (contd.)

- (c) The existence in the department of a core of professional staff, which may include the permanent head, and the extent of control over such staff by the minister -
- (d) Financial arrangements for funding departmental policies; e.g. dedicated funding, freedom from close Treasury control, the ability of the department to make long term plans without fear of change, the extent to which there is dependence on Federal funds -
- (e) A tradition within the department of autonomy, derived from past accepted behaviour; the creation of an 'aristocratic agency' -

Potential Effect (contd.)

creation of relations of a supportive nature between head and staff where there is conflict with the minister; makes for greater executive independence and higher external status, reducing the minister's capacity to exercise political leadership.

dependence on annual appropriations without a tradition of support from parliament places the minister in a strong position to exercise political leadership; where funding is derived from internal sources or from Federal sources there is less likely to be dependence on the minister for support and greater independence as survival is more guaranteed, increasing administrative capacity.

this would strengthen external ties and sustain independence even against strong leadership of a minister; it would produce the most conflictive situation as between the political leadership and the executive authority of the minister and the administrative capacity of the Department.

It is not claimed that this list is exhaustive of the possibilities, but these do seem to have been dominant in Simmons' analysis and for that reason are used here. They may be summarised as: circumjacent groups, legislative provisions, professional staffing, finance, and departmental traditions.

These are the components of the analytical framework within which the examination of selected departments in the Tasmanian State Executive will take place. The following Chapters will take each department: Housing, Education and Health, and analyse them through use of the five 'forces' and endeavour to establish the relationships between their elements, noting the interaction, the interdependence and identifying those variables which dominate the particular system in terms of their effect on the political leadership and executive authority of the minister.

III

THE HOUSING DEPARTMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before undertaking a more detailed analysis of the forces and interrelationships discussed in the last chapter, it is necessary to provide some introductory background:

The Department was formed as a result of the separation of the Housing Division of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania into a department of the Public Service, in 1953.¹ The Agricultural Bank had to this date been the operating authority for the Homes Act 1919 as amended. Under the original Act the purposes were 'to provide for homes and advances for Homes for Persons of Limited Means'.² Such persons were defined as 'eligible persons' in the Act:

"...a person who satisfies the Trustees -

1. That his income at the time of his application for an advance under this Act does not exceed Three hundred pounds a year; ...
2. That he is
 - (a) married; or
 - (b) has dependents for whom it is necessary for him to maintain a home."³

The main provisions of the Act indicated that it was the intention of the Government to encourage home ownership by means of advances to such persons rather than to provide housing at low rental.

¹Homes Act 1935, s. 6B, as amended by Homes Act 1953.

²Preamble to Homes Act 1919.

³Homes Act 1919, s. 2.

The amended Homes Act 1973, under which the Department operates, has hardly reflected the changing emphasis of its functions. There are significant differences from 1919, when the first Act was passed, but the broad outline of the authority has been fairly constant despite amendments from time to time.⁴

The newly appointed Director of Housing in his first Report described the functions of the new Department as:

"...administering (a) that portion of the Homes Act which relates to the acquisition and development of land for housing purposes and the erection of houses for rental and ultimate sale;...Those portions of the Homes Act which relate to the making of advances to individual home builders and the provision of finance to purchase homes erected by the Housing Department are administered by the Agricultural Bank."⁵

However, even at this time other factors were at work which stimulated a changed role for the Department. Prior to 1946 the extent of its operations had been relatively slight, with the provision of houses for home owners its main concern, as indicated by the extract from the Director's Report for the year ended 30 June 1945:

⁴It has been subject to amendments but mainly of a minor nature. The Homes Act 1935-53 has been amended in the years 1954, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1965 and 1966 and was under review for major changes. This review culminated in the Homes Act No. 1 of 1973, which also incorporated the new Commonwealth State Housing Agreement. (See also later footnote 22). Of the 47 sections of the Act, some 12 may be regarded as mechanical, i.e. concerned with administrative matters; six as defining Treasury requirements; 10 are concerned with the Director's dealing with land, erection of dwellings and powers to lease and sell; the remaining 19 are related to advances, conditions of sale and remedies for the recovery of instalments.

⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 75 of 1954, Report for the year ended 30 June 1954. The phrases underlined by the author indicate the prevalent perceptions of the Department's future at that time. (Footnotes 6, 7, 8, 9 omitted)

"The following is a summary of activities under the various statutes since 1934 -

Homes Act - individual homes	365
Group homes (occupied on rent purchase terms)	156
Old Age persons homes (for rental)	6
Homes for casual workers (for rent purposes)	12
Homes for Burnie Paper Mill employees (occupied on rent purchase terms)	22
Housing improvement loans	81
Commonwealth - State Housing Agreement (complete or under construction)	331*
	<u>973.</u> 10

(*This item relates wholly to houses built under the Agreement signed earlier that year by which the Commonwealth funded house building for rental and sale purposes. It represents, as can be seen, one third of all houses built by the Department in 10 years and demonstrates the sudden pressures placed upon the then Agricultural Bank.)

At this time the Commonwealth entered the housing field with a massive stimulus in the provisions of the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement. Such interest was partly due to demand factors, but also because of the Chifley Labour Government policies and the State response, especially through the Cosgrove Labour Ministry. As an indication of the changing patterns of thought which were to alter the State's approach, the principles on which a State could participate in the scheme of Commonwealth assistance are worth noting:

- "(1) The Commonwealth will lend money for approved housing schemes to State Housing Authorities at Commonwealth long term bond rates.
- (2) Housing Authorities will build homes and administer schemes as principals.
- (3) Homes erected under the schemes to be let at economic rental or one fifth of the family income, whichever is the less.
- (4) The Commonwealth will contribute three fifths of any loss under the scheme.
- (5) As a condition to obtain assistance from the Commonwealth the States

¹⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 29 of 1945

- (a) should have adequate machinery to deal with:
 1. Erection and administration of homes for rental;
 2. Assistance for home purchasers;
 3. Slum clearance;
 4. Town planning;
- (b) should agree with the Commonwealth upon common minimum standards for accommodation, construction, etc.;
- (c) that allotment of homes should be on the basis of need."¹¹

The immediate reaction within the State was to reorganise the Agricultural Bank as from 1 March 1946; three divisions were created - Land Settlement, Rural Credit and Housing.¹² At the same time moves were afoot to provide a political head for the Housing Division, leaving the rest of the Bank under the portfolio of Agriculture. On 10 December 1946, by a Proclamation under Ministers of the Crown Act 1923, the Governor

"...committed to the Honourable Eric Elliott Reece, Honorary Minister, the duties of the office of Minister for Housing, including the Administration of the following Acts:-
The Homes Act 1935; Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement Act 1946;..."¹³

This appointment did not, however, remove the Housing Division, now with its own Minister, from the Agricultural Bank Department. Nor did the Housing Division have its own Divisional Head until the position of Director was created in 1949.¹⁴

A further development in 1947 was the appointment of a Joint Committee

¹¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 29 of 1945, Report of the Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania for the year ended 30 June 1945. Some further details of the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement can be found in M.A.Jones, Housing and Poverty in Australia, (Melbourne: University Press, 1972), esp. pp 3-7; and Department of National Development, The Housing Situation (Canberra A.C.T.: Commonwealth of Australia, December 1956).

¹²Plan of Organisation of the Agricultural Bank Department, Tasmanian Government Gazette 1946, Vol. CLXXXVII (1), Government Printer Hobart, 1947, p 378

¹³Tasmanian Government Gazette 1946, Vol. CLXXXVII (2), Government Printer Hobart, 1947, p 2896. It is interesting to record this first portfolio of the recently retired Premier, The Hon. Eric Reece.

¹⁴Agricultural Bank (Administration) Act 1949.

of the Houses of Parliament to "inquire into and report upon all aspects of home-building, both State and private..."¹⁵. This Committee, after reviewing the evidence noted the contribution of the Agricultural Bank Housing Division

"...(it) has made a valuable contribution to the problem of housing the people, especially on those in low income groups.¹⁶ In spite of hampering effects of the Public Service Act, the Bank has succeeded in building up a Housing Division, carrying on building under both private and day labour schemes."¹⁷

The results of its investigations suggested other alternatives:

"Your Committee considers that the nature of the existing administration of the State Housing Authority is not ideally suited to the task allotted to it."¹⁸

The Report then goes on to suggest a State Housing Commission with a Commissioner and two Associate Commissioners assisted by four technical advisers. The officers of the Housing Division would transfer where appropriate.

"...such administration would not mean upsetting the present work of the Agricultural Bank or any of its Departments, but would enable the Bank to apply most of its attention to tasks more appropriate to its organisation and normal functions.¹⁹ Moreover, it should be provided that the hampering effects of being subject to the Public Service Act be absent from the suggested Commission."²⁰

These recommendations were never acted upon and no further attempts have been made to form a Commission. It is possible that these suggestions

¹⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 18 of 1947; Joint Committee appointed 13 March 1947

¹⁶Joint Committee, para. 68

¹⁷Joint Committee, para. 69

¹⁸Joint Committee, para. 85

¹⁹Joint Committee, para. 95

²⁰Joint Committee, para. 96

were present in the minds of those responsible for the subsequent changes under the 1953 Act.

As previously noted, the Homes Act, 1973, remains the charter of the Housing Department, providing a fairly specific and technical function on the one hand - that of building houses and planning subdivisions - and an administrative function of estate management on the other. In order to accomplish these functions certain expertise was found to be necessary and required a relaxation from the controls exercised (a) by the Public Service Commissioner, under the Public Service Act in relation to staffing and (b) by the Treasury in relation to costing, budgeting and accounting. The amendments to the Act passed in 1953 were to a degree successful in this intention. The role of the Director was strengthened by statutory powers which are significantly different to those of other Permanent Heads. Wettenhall suggests that this was done in order to "minimise political intervention in housing allocations, etc., and to maximise the possibilities of commercial management."²¹ These powers are contained in many sections throughout the Act, but some more important examples are:

- s. 6A
 - (1) Governor to appoint Director of Housing
 - (2) Directors shall not be subject to Public Service Act 1925
 - (3) Terms and conditions of Director's appointment determined by Governor
 - (4) Director to retire at 65 years
 - (5) For the purpose of acquiring, holding, disposing of and otherwise dealing with land, the Director shall be a corporation sole, by name, Director of Housing, and that name shall have perpetual succession and a seal of office.
- s. 6B
 - (5) The Director may, with the approval of the Minister, engage and dismiss casual employees for work, other than clerical work, in the Department.
 - (6) For the purposes of the Public Service Act the Director shall have the same powers as if an officer under that Act.

²¹Wettenhall, Guide, p 247.

- s.7A-D Directors borrowing powers.
- s.11 The Director may acquire land under the Public Authorities Land Acquisitions Act (providing for compulsory purchase)
- s.17 Director has power to let or to sell without deposit, on such terms as he shall think fit.
- s.27A Director may refuse to enter into a contract for sale of land with an eligible person and his decision shall be final.
- s.43 Director may sell land not required by the Department
- s.43A Director may, with approval of Minister, sell or hire plant on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit.
- s.46 (2) Director shall cause to be prepared in respect of his operations under the Act during the financial year, a profit and loss account and a balance sheet.

In sum, they allow greater operational flexibility in the day to day work of the Department and in control of building staff and costs. At the same time, since the Director is constituted "a corporation sole for the purpose of holding,...,land" and the Department operates as a trading enterprise with its own funds, there are potentially strong forces operating to reduce ministerial control and responsibility.²²

Despite these provisions in the statute which lead to this conclusion, and which persuaded Wettenhall to place this Department in the classification of 'departmental' corporation' rather than ministerial department,²³ there has been a Minister for Housing since 1946. It is true that over these 26 years the portfolio itself has been subject to much juggling between Ministers and has only been held as a single portfolio, i.e. not in conjunction with one or more additional portfolios, for a non-consecutive period of ten years:

²²These forces have been increased by the passing of the Homes Act 1973, which substantially increases the functions and powers of the Director

"The Minister made it clear that it is no longer sufficient to have a state housing authority whose major task is merely to erect standard houses on standard blocks of land... it is necessary...to concern itself with a much broader outlook... Accordingly the Homes Act No. 1 of 1973 greatly expands the Director's powers in relation to land development and land utilisation..." Director's Report for year ended 30 June 1973 P.P. No 93 of 1973.

²³Guide. p 248.

TABLE I

December 1946 - November 1947	Housing only	
November 1947 - December 1947	Housing and Mines)	*This period was
December 1947 - February 1948	Housing only) the shortlived
		Brooker Ministry.
February 1948 - August 1958	Housing only) *This was the
) second Cosgrove
) Ministry
August 1958 - May 1959	Housing only) *This was the first
May 1959 - September 1961	Housing, Police) Reece Ministry
	and Licensing)
September 1961- May 1969	Housing and	
	Forests	
May 1969 - April 1972	Housing, Indust-) *The Bethune
	rial Development) Ministry
	and Sea Fisher-)
	ies)
April 1972 - April 1974	Housing only) *The second
April 1974 - April 1975	Housing Chief) Reece Ministry
	Secretary)

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The longest period of continuous primary responsibility was during 1949-1956, when one man was Minister for Housing. Whether there is any significant correlation between the latter and the fact that this period, especially 1952-1954, saw the most fundamental changes in the Department, is difficult to say with certainty.

The number of houses constructed during this period may also have some bearing on this question. In his Report for the Year ended 30 June 1954²⁵ the following figures were given by the Minister:

"Houses completed since 1944 (includes all kinds of houses under all Acts)

1944-46	285	
1946-47	81	
1947-48	212	
1948-49	201	
1949-50	312)	
1950-51	620)	
1951-52	752)	Period of Mr. Ward's incumbency
1952-53	566)	
1953-54	476)	

²⁴ Sources: Walch's Tasmanian Almanac (The Red Book);
Tasmanian Year Book

²⁵ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 75 of 1954, Appendix III.

In the Report for the year ended 30 June 1969 to the Minister, the Director made the following statement:

"The Housing Department plays an important part in the economy of this State, and in fact is a necessary part of the machinery of government. Its importance cannot be underestimated -

It provides 20% of all new accommodation erected in Tasmania each year;*

It houses over 1,300 families each year;

It has constructed 11,464 homes in all parts of the State since 1944;

It employs over 200 technical and administrative officers, and 357 day labour personnel to carry out construction and development programmes, and to manage its homes with over 50,000 occupants;

As the biggest landlord and homebuilder in the State, it is an important part of many aspects of the State's economy."²⁶

*(This claim bears comparison with the statement made by the Joint Committee on Housing in its Report, 1947, p 8, para. 66, in which it refers to the evidence that the total number of houses completed by the State in the three years since 1944 make up 17% of all houses in the State. Obviously, there are many possible interpretations of this fact, but one that stands out in view of the way in which it was made in the Director's Report is that private home ownership is, and always has been, the dominant aim of successive governments, no matter what their political persuasion.)

The importance of the Department's contribution was stressed by the Director in October 1972, when he referred once more to the 20% contribution and went on to discuss the Department's potentially new role.²⁷ Amongst his proposals one was dominant - that some 40% of land on Department subdivisions would in future be set aside for private sale. The purpose of this proposal was two-fold:

"It will make sure that the sort of land price spiral, which has caused fantastic problems in cities such as Sydney and Perth, does not occur in Tasmania ... Secondly,

²⁶ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969, p 3

²⁷ L.F.Allwinton, Director of Housing, "Fitting into the Broad Spectrum". Papers given to Seminar, Housing for People Hobart, Tasmania, 25 October 1972. The same view also received strong support from the Legislative Council in their debate on the Homes Act 1973. In this Act provision was made for allocation of 85% of housing built for people with sub standard incomes to comply with the Federal Government conditions to the new Housing Agreement Mercury, Debates 5 October 1973, p 29.

it will introduce architectural and social variety into new Housing Department subdivisions...This is seen to be the key to a balanced and happy community..."²⁸

Once again, therefore, there appears to be a move to increase the promotion of home ownership, although there is no suggestion that it will decrease the rate of building for rental. The provision of homes at low rental to those who cannot afford to rent or buy in the open market must remain at the core of the Department operations.

There are fluctuations in demand from year to year, but over time there is a consistent demand which forces applicants to be placed on a waiting list. Currently, the waiting period averages between 18 and 24 months, depending on the type of accommodation required. Those with large families, for instance, must wait longer because the 'normal' type of accommodation provided is a two or three bedroom house. As at 30 June 1971 84.5% of the applicants for rental housing earned \$70 or less; of these some 18% had \$25 or less and 66% had \$60 or less.²⁹ These figures appear to indicate an important demand which needs to be met by the Department in its role as the largest landlord in the State. Yet, once again, there are signs that the duality of its role is recurring. The justification for this policy is new, the circumstances are changed, and local criticism of the barren and unsympathetic environment of some Housing Department estates may play a part in shaping the aims. However, none of this can hide the fact that to provide low cost

²⁸ Allwinton, *loc. cit.* There has now been considerable criticism of the integrationist ideas propounded by Mr. Allwinton here, for the literature see further J. Frieden and R. Morris (editors), Urban Planning and Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968); H. Stretton, Ideas for Cities (Adelaide: Orphan Books, 1970); F. Thompson and L. Bryson, Australian New Town (Melbourne: Penguin, 1971).

²⁹ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 62 of 1971, Director's Report for the year ended 30 June 1971, Appendix G. For a comparative analysis of the formal requirements of State Housing Authorities and a 'profile' of socio-economic characteristics of public housing occupants see M.A. Jones, *op. cit.*, especially Ch. 3.

homes for rental to people on low incomes and to sell land and houses as any developer in the private market (even though the sale price of the land is held at a non-competitive level and the houses sold over a 53 year period at an instalment rate which is equal to a reasonable rent) are not similar tasks and must create an ambivalent attitude in the Department. Such an attitude must become especially evident in the field of estate management, where houses cheek by jowl are occupied by owners who, having bought the block of land, had their house privately built; owners who are buying a Housing Department house on the long term purchase agreement, and those who occupy a Housing Department house on rental. This juxtaposition will be reduced by judicious placement of the 'better' tenants near the owner occupied houses, and perhaps the creation of separated communities of occupants having similar life styles. Such circumstances, perhaps, were not envisaged by an Act empowering the Government to provide homes for eligible persons.

Garden competitions, tree planting ceremonies, the encouragement of community centres and Department involvement in such public relations exercises as the Hobart Trade Fair, may all be seen as part of the same purpose. It may be that these policy decisions are an attempt to provide realistic alternative accommodation in community terms. Rather than just build houses at the lowest cost to meet the needs of a minority and be forced continuously to attempt to balance the books, a more 'socially responsible approach' is being tried. Whatever the reason behind it, the example of the perennial problem of Rent Rebates points to departmental difficulties where political leadership is ambivalent.

Since 1960 it has been the practice of the Department to provide rebates of weekly rent to those who are in need and to certain other specified classes of tenant - aged pensioners, widows and deserted wives, invalid and war pensioners, T.B. pensioners and those on unemployment and medical benefits. In the year to 30 June 1972 the total cost of such

rebate was \$405,087, or approximately 16% of the total rent collected. Periodically, the Auditor General draws attention to this Rebate, either because it is contrary to s. 16 (2) (which provides for a minimum rent based on cost to the Department, i.e. an economic rent) or because more has been allowed than permitted in the Estimates. Such a situation occurred in 1972 when the Auditor General drew attention to an expenditure of "\$30,087 more than the funds authorised by the Treasurer to be available from both sources."³⁰ He also pointed out that there had been an increase in the number of persons receiving rebates, 1452 as at 30 June 1972, compared with 1,100 at 30 June 1971. In commenting on this increase the Director stated:

"A further indication of the relative severity with which economic fluctuations affect Tasmania is the rapidly rising number of and cost of cases where it is necessary for this Department to grant relief from weekly payments of rental or purchase instalments...The cost of these subsidies has more than doubled in five years and looks like continuing the upward spiral."³¹

In application to the Grants Commission for a Special Grant for Tasmania for the year 1970-71, one of the points made was the unprofitable nature of the Housing Department. But it was made clear that it was only because of the burden of rent rebates which had to be recouped from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Thus the uncertainty of the Departmental position over its policies and the possible conflict with Treasury must be resolved. The Director is hopeful that the rent averaging scheme proposed in his Report for 1972 will clarify the situation:

³⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1972. Auditor General's Report to 30 June 1972, p 76. The two sources referred to are the Consolidated Revenue Fund and a Commonwealth Rental Assistance Grant of \$75,000.

³¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 3

"Should some system of rent averaging eventually be introduced it will be necessary to carefully consider the provision in the legislation which now requires the Director to pay annual operating surpluses to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. This provision will have to be eliminated if the Department is ever to stand on its own feet financially. At the same time it will be necessary for the costs of rental subsidies to be kept in the right perspective. These are purely a social service cost and, as such, should continue to be met by Consolidated Revenue Fund, thus avoiding the anomalous situation of being paid by the lower income sector of the community which occupies departmental accommodation."³²

The ambivalence of the current policies in the Department are nowhere better displayed than in this problem. The rebate system is indeed a social service, but it is a 'hidden' cost in the sense that it appears as cost of housing. So long as housing includes the provision of land for private building and homes for purchase this aspect of the Department's activities will not be properly assessed.

Analysis

With this background material it is now possible to take the factual material from Annual Reports and interviews with Ministers and senior officers in the Department and relate it all under the headings specified

³²Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 4. A discussion of the concept of rent averaging is contained in M.A.Jones, op. cit., pp 156-60, and in a subsequent discussion of rent policy generally places the onus of meeting the 'social service cost' on the Commonwealth (p 170). Also see, for example, F. Thompson and L. Bryson, loc. cit. For a general discussion of the entire topic of the tasks of government housing authorities see M.A.Jones, loc. cit.; see also J. Colman, Housing Authorities in Urban Renewal, Australian Institute of Urban Studies, in Association with The Planning Research Institute within the University of Sydney, July 1970.

within the close of the last chapter. These headings provide the framework to discover in particular circumstances the relationship between the minister and his department in terms of political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. The analysis therefore will be limited to interactions and activities indicative of these factors within the department. The forces used as criteria by which to evaluate such interactions and activity are: circumjacent groups; legislative provisions; professional staff; financial arrangements, and departmental tradition. Each of these matters will be treated separately and a final summary given.

A. Circumjacent groups

The primary groups which have ties with the agency outside its formal institutional structure may be listed as its clientele - the tenants and purchasers, and other authorities and agencies affected by and affecting the development plans of the agency. In some cases these ties may be characterised as almost institutionalised since they are persistent and ongoing, but the important point is that there remains no formal machinery for deliberate and specific intervention by these groups in departmental structures. For example, there has existed from time to time an Interdepartmental Committee for coordinating estate developments, but it is only called together at the instigation of the Housing Department without specific membership or defined jurisdiction.

On the other hand there are those, which may be called secondary groups, who have some institutional relationship with the agency. However, this formal arrangement is not such as to provide the right to engage actively within the departmental decision making structure. An example is provided by the Commonwealth, which regularly calls together the State Housing Ministers for a conference to discuss matters of common interest. Such procedure is quite outside any formal arrangement that might exist regarding financial assistance (a matter dealt with under heading D later).

In this category, therefore, may be found the State Cabinet and sometimes a particular member, more especially the Premier, the Commonwealth Government and Parliament.

These groups will now be dealt with seriatim:

- (i) Those who derive benefit from its services - tenants or prospective tenants and purchasers of houses are most likely to have a consistent and dominant affiliation with the agency. There are conflicting views about this as between officers and Ministers, although it is possible the conflict is more imaginary than real. It may be based on a different interpretation of what is meant by influence. The Deputy Director was very certain that the goals of the department are dictated by client demand. But he was viewing goals in an unspecific way, i.e. in terms of the purposes of the Department as a whole - the building of houses. Therefore he regarded client demand as an indicator of the pace at which the department operated - low demand, less houses built. He stated, that external bodies and individuals influence housing policy. Need was the primary criterion for the location and quantity of housing.³⁴ However, he was quite emphatic that in relation to quality the department and its technical staff were the final arbiter. One Labor Party minister did not accept this rather compliant role for the department, which apparently his Liberal predecessor had adopted. He thought that in his predecessor's time there had been too many advisory and other subcommittees, rather than keeping the decisions under direct control. He saw his task as coordinating and initiating; taking over control of priorities and economies. Although he acknowledged the client orientation within the department, he did not feel that the

³⁴ Interestingly enough, there is not, nor ever has been, any active tenants' association. Even for individual estates such bodies have had a very short life. One of the officers in the department deplored this situation; he indicated that even the officers in the department had failed to stimulate growth of such associations.

function was merely to react to demand. On the question of evictions he appeared to take a strong line, refusing to tolerate large accumulated arrears where the tenant concerned was not under any disability. Evictions increased rapidly within a short time after his taking office, but he claimed no hardship accrued because those who were really in need, e.g. welfare recipients, were excepted.

Relationship with the tenants may be termed 'paternal', in the sense that is reflected in this extract from the Director's Annual Report:

"The problem of developing a sense of community in large housing estates, where people of differing backgrounds, environment and living standards are brought together in a comparatively short space of time, is one which is difficult to solve. Frictions occur and families are frequently involved with sickness, unemployment and bereavements. Unless sympathetic and, occasionally, firm action is taken by authority, social problems occur which can reflect on the community as a whole."³⁵

The Director stated that tenant relations with the department were a matter for the Welfare Officers and Reserves Officers in the Estates Branch, the Minister or the Chief Officers rarely became involved. The Liberal Minister supported this view; he indicated he never had any real contact with the tenants during his term of office. Any complaints were dealt with at counter level or at the next higher level, although a senior officer indicated that there may be some feedback from this level by referring to 'informal contacts' with tenants. The dominance of this attitude within the department may be gauged from the following extracts:

"During the year more than 3,000 visits were made by Welfare Officers. These included the usual calls made shortly after the tenants or purchasers have moved in; investigations following complaints; calls in connection with applications for rental rebates; and the usual follow up of problem cases. Welfare Officers also insisted on a general survey of certain sub-divisions. While on the whole the condition of the properties was of reasonable standard it was found

³⁵ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 67 of 1968

necessary to conduct an intensive campaign in some cases to compel occupiers to clean up their dwelling and grounds."³⁶

"With 12,336 houses now under the control of the Department, the increased number of deserted wives and widows with families, and elderly people being assisted, together with the low income and unemployed families, the work of the Welfare Officers is becoming increasingly important."³⁷

It was not possible to find evidence in Director's Annual Reports of any mention of a strong and viable tenants association, or a group formed from tenants of a particular estate. Nor was there any mention of their existence in interviews. However, it does appear that some exist, although how active they are is difficult to say. For example, in answer to a question in the House of Assembly about recreation areas reserved in Housing Department subdivisions Mr.D.Clark, then Minister, replied that one such area had been developed by a progress association.³⁸

- (ii) The work of the agency impinges on the activities of numerous groups external to it. Such bodies as the local authorities, in whose areas estates are built, have to be consulted and brought into the planning process. (However, the Housing Department does not have to obtain planning approval under the Town and Country Planning regulations.) Similarly, in planning for an estate of several hundred houses, services not under the control of the department have to be alerted and coordinated. Such services would include electricity, roadworks, transport facilities, telephones, water, education and so on.

The location of large estates to meet housing demand may involve the development of industries in areas where little employment is available to meet the needs of an increased work force. In these situations liaison with interested enterprises takes place, quite often

³⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 42 of 1964

³⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972

³⁸Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, Vol. 182, Part I, 1970, p 106.

through the Department of Industrial Development. Sometimes the decision to develop industrial potential is dependent on the Housing Department's ability to provide cheap accommodation for the potential work force. This has been particularly evident in Tasmania, where such development has often been related to natural resources found well outside existing settlement areas. Examples of this occur in George Town for the aluminium smelters of Comalco; in Savage River for iron ore mining; and in Triabunna for the woodchip plant and the fishmeal plant.

There are also forces at work from associations, employers and unions of employees. The latter are the more important, due to the agency being the largest employer of skilled building tradesmen in the State. The existence of a 'day labour force' will be dealt with in more detail under heading E, but it must be noted here as causing the unions concerned to have considerable interaction with the department. The Director indicated, that the unions do not like the use of private contractors by the Department. It has been the practice over the years for a proportion of house building to be let on tender to private contractors, although the bulk has always been constructed by the day labour force. The Master Builders Association has favoured this action, since it permits their members to maintain an even flow of work throughout the year, especially in areas where the demand for building is limited.

As may be expected, the ministers differed over their attitudes to this situation. The Liberal Party promised in their election statements to maintain the day labour force and did so. However, there was some personal preference expressed in Cabinet for allowing a greater proportion to go to tender with private enterprise. This situation does not seem to have occurred, although the Labor Minister indicated that, when he came to office, he lifted restrictions on the replacement of those day labour force men who left. His view was, that

the day labour force provided a very important source of employment within the State, and that conditions of pay and employment in private firms could be strongly influenced by pay and conditions of the State-employed tradesmen. There was also the apprenticeship system which was implemented properly in the departmental work force, providing an example to private industry which had lagged behind.³⁹

The local government councils seem to be the other important group with whom the department has some interaction. Most of the deputations seen by ministers were connected in some way with municipalities. They either wanted the department to build an estate in their municipality to generate financial resources and development or had some problem about an existing development. Deputations from the municipalities of Kingborough, Green Ponds and Brighton were given as examples whose main problem areas were the provision of sewer and drainage facilities for housing estates. Under the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (which terminated on 30 June 1971) no funds were received from the Commonwealth to provide initial services, and the Department had to rely on councils to provide some of these facilities out of their own funds. This often caused embarrassment to them and led from time to time to serious disagreements between councils and the department.⁴⁰

Despite these setbacks, or perhaps because of them, the Department does make an effort to maintain liaison with such bodies as: Hydro Electric Commission; Education Department; Transport Commission, Metropolitan Transport Trust; the Metropolitan Water Board and the

³⁹In most of the Director's Annual Reports the following sentence appears as an introduction to the section on Apprenticeship: "The Department accepts a responsibility to encourage and train apprentices in the building and associated trades to ensure the provision of trained craftsmen in the future." Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969, p 11

⁴⁰See for example the reports on Springfield Estate and the Glenorchy Council. Mercury Debates 1967 p 35, where the Glenorchy Council were criticised for repudiating an agreement on subdivisional costs between the Municipal Association and Housing Department and thereby losing \$30,000 in rates annually.

P.M.G. Department.⁴¹

However, there is little evidence that these bodies have ever initiated moves which have influenced the agency to any great degree. Any discussions are largely ad hoc for a specific estate development. During the Liberal government's period in office, 1969-1972, there existed a Housing Advisory Committee, whose aim was to avoid some of the earlier difficulties about siting and housing costs. The Director, however, felt that the departmental officers would be well aware of most of the matters brought up by such a body. Generally such a committee does nothing more than emphasise areas of importance, areas about which the department itself is already preparing plans.

- (iii) Cabinet at the State level does have undoubted influence on the activities of the agency, as it does on all government departments. However, it is quite clear that in this area there is no formal requirement about submission of matters to Cabinet. The next section on legislative provisions shows that the department does have jurisdictional certainty through comparatively clear legislative authority. Most matters are under the Minister's control, even where specific authority to act has been given to the Director.⁴² Certainly, different Ministers see their task as including private as well as public housing. This does not yet mean that they endeavour to impose regulations on the private building sector. It is largely done through direct action within the terms of the existing authority, for example, selling land on estates at discounted prices; leading the way in housing estate planning and management; housing standards; and in employing apprentices with its day labour force or demanding, that those private contractors who wish to build departmental housing employ the appropriate number of

⁴¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969

⁴²Homes Act 1935, s. 4 (a)

apprentices. There has been no point of conflict with Cabinet as yet on such policies, especially since it is unlikely that direct Cabinet sanction has been required by any of these moves. However, two examples of conflict are known. One, given by Mr. L.F. Allwinton, Director of Housing, occurred prior to the last election, when a Liberal Government was in office. The Director, in pursuance of an already declared policy, was selling land "on such terms and conditions as he thought fit".⁴³ The Cabinet decided against selling on the terms he had agreed and he was required to comply despite his protests. In this case his minister did not support him in Cabinet. As mentioned above, the current minister has reversed this trend and is pursuing an active policy of land sales at discounted prices. The most obvious inference to draw from this example is that the influence of Cabinet very largely depends on the minister's approach.

The second example is rather different since it occurred in a Parliamentary debate, but it does show the pressures that operate on departmental policies. The Minister was guiding the Substandard Housing Control Bill through the House of Assembly, and he was asked by the Opposition why there was no mention of its application to Government housing. The Minister replied immediately that, of course, it did apply to government housing. The Premier speaking to the Bill later denied that it applied to government housing such as that provided by the Housing Department and for government employees such as teachers and members of the police force. Despite subsequent attempts to extricate himself from this impossible position, the Minister had to suffer the ignominy of a non-confidence motion in the Lower House, and the Bill still contains no reference to its application to government

⁴³ These words are taken from the statute, Homes Act 1935, s. 43

housing.⁴⁴

The other Cabinet influence most frequently referred to was that of Ministers of other departments, endeavouring to change the allocation of priorities of development to meet their own departmental requirements. This has already been mentioned in relation to industrial developments.

- (iv) The dominance of the Australian Government over all financial aspects of State agencies which provide services with a capital dependence is well known. (Further discussion of this aspect occurs in heading D subsequently.) However, there are also a number of other non financial activities that take place on that level of government. In particular the State Housing Ministers Conference, at which matters of common interest and concern are discussed, is an important source of stimulus. Ministers and senior public servants sit round the table as equals discussing the agenda, providing an important forum of interchange in which personalities will play a part. The relationship between the minister and his chief officer could well be affected in such a forum. The results of these meetings are not to change policy direction in the agency. Rather, they act sometimes as a stimulus for an exchange of ideas on common problems. The Director could recall no major policy changes required because of the Minister's attendance at such conferences.
- (v) Finally, as in any system of parliamentary government, the members of Parliament will have some interaction with the agency usually in a less structured way. Question time is an important and persistent method of attempting to influence the policies of an agency. For a variety of reasons, including the lack of a Hansard, and the inability to ask

⁴⁴For details see The Mercury Debates, 15 November 1973, p 30, which reported a censure motion moved by the opposition against Mr. Lowe for his misleading Parliament. It was defeated 18-12 on a party vote.

questions without notice,⁴⁵ this means of inquiry into the day to day responsibilities of ministers is not very adequate for the ordinary member. Generally, his main approach is to the Minister by deputation or interview.

Ministers usually spend a high proportion of their time, estimated to be about 30%, in meetings with deputations and on committees. These committees are not usually derived from parliament, as there are no specific select or joint committees whose task it is to keep abreast of affairs in the field of housing administration. The committees referred to are those ad hoc advisory or non-executive committees created with or on the initiative of the Department, which are largely information centres for its members and provide a useful forum for the Minister to explain his policies. Complaints and demands for investigation are mainly dealt with by departmental officers who almost invariably attend such meetings with the Minister.

The greatest single source of intervention in departmental affairs by parliamentarians appears to be the budget debate. This is especially so since the estimates are no longer a single line item. Previously, with funds largely coming from Commonwealth sources, no details had to be provided for the minor amount spent from State funds, and a single line item in the estimates was all that was required. When the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement terminated in 1971, Commonwealth funds were made available as part of a general grant. A full estimate of departmental spending became necessary, and it had to be justified in the context of other State expenditure and resource allocation. It was

⁴⁵ See particularly P. Boyce, 'Tasmania' in J. Rorke (editor), Politics at State Level in Australia, Department of Adult Education, University of Sydney N.S.W. (N.d.) pp 89/96. For a discussion of question time in the Federal Parliament see J. Howard, "Question Time: Myth or Reality", Public Administration (Sydney) December 1972, 363-375. See also list of questions asked in Sessions I and II of the 35th Parliament in Appendix IV and note that of the average 420 questions only 31 were about Housing, and then mostly particular questions. See K.G.Haines, Questions asked in the House of Assembly (Tasmania) 1952-1966: An Analysis (Unpublished Diploma of Public Administration Dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1968, p 88, especially as to supplementary questions.

suggested that, because of such requirement, the department could be subject to more criticism. The likelihood that some expenditure could be trimmed would exert a strong pressure during the preparation of such estimates.

Another potential source of external pressure is the parliamentary officer known as the Auditor General. His task is to scrutinise expenditure of a department and any aspects of administration which impinge on that expenditure to ensure proper use of departmental resources. Even when there was only a single line item this applied and there have been occasions on which criticism has been directed against departmental procedures. For example, he commented on the practice of the department to extend existing contracts to cover further works not included in the tender on which the contract was based,⁴⁶ which had occurred at Mornington Subdivision for water reticulation and Warrane No. 2 Subdivision for development works. The Auditor General reported that the Director "stated considerations affecting the decisions to extend existing contracts were the achievement of a maximum level of cash expenditure prior to 30/6/68, because in previous periods cash expenditure had fallen short of loan allocation and this had contributed towards an adverse loan allocation for housing in 1967-68." The Auditor General's opinion was that "the department's desire to accelerate its building programme and its anxiety to expend all funds by the end of the financial year are still not satisfactory excuses for not inviting competitive tenders in such instances."⁴⁷ Such trenchant public criticisms must

⁴⁶ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 31 of 1968. Auditor General's Report to 30 June 1967, p 165, where he pointed to the extension of a contract for water reticulation at Mornington Subdivision and development works at Warrane No. 2 Sub Division.

⁴⁷ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 31 of 1968, p 165; other examples occur at p 163 in the same Report or Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1972, p 76

make the agency more than wary of overstepping its authority. The Departmental Officers did not think this too onerous, however, since there were within the department two full-time audit clerks and an auditor from the Auditor-General's office together with the department's own internal audit team. These officers were considered to provide good coordination and made most unlikely any activity which would cause a repetition of the above criticisms. The department had always been subject to the same kind of scrutiny as others, which would not be altered, even if the changes in funding would be made more severe.

- (vi) Apart from the above relations with circumjacent bodies either external to or internal within the State System, one group was particularly mentioned. This is a group of committees centred on the Public Service Commissioner's Office (now Board), dealing with the administrative side of the agency. The Commissioner's office is not only the service agency for staffing on the Public Service side, as mentioned more particularly under Professional Staff - heading C later, but also for equipment and office accommodation. Four Committees have been set up by the Board to fulfil these tasks, the Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids; Photographic Equipment Committee; the Public Offices Committee, and the Public Offices Sub-Committee. The composition and function of these committees is set out below:

TABLE 2

Public Offices Committee

Composition: The Chairman, Public Service Board (Chairman)
 Director of Lands
 Director of Public Works
 Under Treasurer

Function: to carry out investigations and advise the Treasurer on
 (a) The purchase of properties required for office accommodation and the sale of property surplus to requirements.

- (b) Erection of new office buildings.
- (c) Leasing of premises.
- (d) Modification, partitioning etc. of Government owned and leased premises.
- (e) Standards for furnishing and refurnishing of Departments or sections of Departments.
- (f) Accommodation needs of the Service and to initiate services etc. and to advise the Government on additional needs.
- (g) Allocation of funds to Departments for office accommodation purposes.

Public Offices Sub-Committee

Composition: Chief Inspector, Public Service Board (Chairman)
 Valuer-General, Lands Department
 Chief Architect, Public Works Department
 Manager, Supply & Tender Department.

Functions: As for the Public Offices Committee but within certain limits.

Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids

Composition: A Public Service Inspector
 Manager, A.D.P. Section of the Public Service Board
 An officer of the Supply and Tender Department
 An officer of the Treasury Department

Functions: To examine and recommend applications and proposals by Departments for the provision of mechanical aids.

Photographic Equipment Committee

Composition: Manager, Department of Film Production
 A Public Service Inspector
 An officer of the Supply and Tender Department

Functions: As for the Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids but in respect of photographic equipment.

(Source: Personal communication Secretary, Public Offices Committee, Public Service Board Hobart, 14 May 1974.)

Senior officers were especially perturbed about the invasion of these committees into the normal control the Director exercises over his department. One example cited was the desire to change the departmental accounting and

record keeping procedures through the use of data processing machines. A proposal had been put forward as early as 1961, when IBM had been consulted about whether the Department should have its own machines or transfer to the proposed central data bank for all government business. A decision was still awaited despite repeated requests. At a lower level of importance was the replacement of typewriters, which had to be approved by the Committee. Similar problems had been experienced with the Public Offices Committee, which had taken five years to be persuaded of the wisdom of allowing the department to be left at its Lampton Avenue offices and to expend money on their repair and renovation, rather than moved into the city to new accommodation.

Summation

The existence of circumjacent groups which operate either to support or reduce the capacity of the minister to control the agency is doubtful on the evidence. One assumption would be that strong involvement of, e.g. client organisations, would strengthen the minister's position. There is little evidence of this happening in practice.

The existing tenant groups voicing their needs, do so through the departmental Welfare Officers. Rarely does there seem to be any spontaneous initiative from the tenants as a group. Similarly strong action by a minister seems to be acceptable to the department without any need for external support, either from Parliament or Cabinet. It was noticeable that differing ministerial styles did have some effect on the relationship. The use of advisory committees by one Minister tended to cause some deferring of decisions, since he

preferred to make his moves as a result of this advice rather than make decisions himself. This could be interpreted as being a cooperative situation tending to reduce the executive authority of the agency and thus increasing the potential for political leadership. However, there appears to be some evidence that the Advisory Committees generally approached the solution of problems from the same professional viewpoint as the agency, thus potential conflict did not eventuate.

The only other influence which strengthened the minister as against the agency was the tendency of successive governments to reorder priorities to suit the needs of industrial development, e.g. building at Triabunna for a workforce to meet the needs of woodchips and fishmeal plants. Such occurrences are not frequent enough nor on a large enough scale to reduce seriously the executive authority of the minister against administrative capacity in the agency. In most cases the agency can accommodate the demand without upsetting their overall planned construction.

One of the more interesting influences from circumjacent groups derives from an internal administrative source, also outside the control of the minister. The Committees set up for the purpose of rationalising use of resources within the Service may well, in the long run, more effectively reduce administrative capacity to act than the other external forces. This would happen if the agency were unable to obtain sufficient back up services for its field operations which are self supporting. The possibility of direct ministerial influence on such committees is slight, but since all matters would have to be referred through Cabinet, his potential

political leadership and executive authority would be increased.

B. Legislative provisions

Legislation is the authoritative source of any agency's activities - it is from statute that the formal substantive purpose is determined. One criterion of the extent to which an agency may be found to have satisfied this stated purpose is the way in which the legislature becomes involved. For example, dissatisfaction with operations in terms of the original goals will often result in changes of a major nature to the Act, the department concerned being alerted to the need for change through parliamentary debate and questions. Alternatively more serious evidence of failure to achieve its formal goals may result in some parliamentary enquiry or select committee. In the case of the Housing Department the original statute has been amended seventeen times since 1935. Apart from the rewriting of the statute in 1953, when there was a changing emphasis from ownership to rental and ownership, there have been no occasions on which substantive changes have been made. The majority of changes have been of an operational kind, e.g. those made under the agricultural Bank (Administration) Act 1949, or Homes Act 1953. (Both referred to in the Introduction to this Chapter in more detail.) Others reflect changing functional needs as the agency increased its activities, particularly after the injection of funds from the Commonwealth in 1946.

In the Director's Report in 1972,⁴⁸ it was indicated that changes were about to be sought in the legislative provisions, but in answer to a question about this the minister said that it was "merely to update the existing statute and allow for some autonomy from irksome external controls of an organisational nature, such as that imposed by having to obtain valuations through the Valuation Branch." Any suggestion of the need to alter the Act

⁴⁸Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 4 (see also p 121, Footnote 22 supra for reference to the Homes Act 1973).

itself radically was rejected by all concerned.⁴⁹

There has been one major inquiry into housing provision in the State⁵⁰ - the Joint Committee of the Houses which reported in 1947. Recommendations of this Committee related mainly to administrative matters because the main concern which led to its formation was lack of performance of the Housing Division in the Agricultural Bank. Despite funds provided by the 1946 Commonwealth State Housing Agreement, house building had not reached even the prewar level.⁵¹

The Joint Committee was anxious that Tasmania follow the other States by setting up a Housing Commission thus separating the tasks of house building for rental purposes and the provision of loan money for purchase. (These matters are more specifically dealt with in the Introduction.) This change was resisted, although more effort was put into rental accommodation as the figures show; from 81 in 1947 to 620 in 1951. (1948: 212; 1949: 201; 1950: 312; 1951: 620).⁵² Eventually the Committee's recommendations led to the creation of the Housing Department as a separate agency, removing it from the Agricultural Bank. This change in 1953 merely formalised what had occurred in practice over the years since 1946, when a portfolio for Housing was created and a Housing Division with its own Director formed within the Agricultural Bank. The activities for which the Homes Act provided were little changed by these administrative alterations and the involvement of the legislature was minimal. It was mainly done by ministerial fiat without statutory approval.

⁴⁹This did not prevent the Director from pointing out that, despite what appeared to be great autonomy given by the Act, his range of activities was extremely limited. These matters are referred to under heading E.

⁵⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 18 of 1947

⁵¹Figures given in Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 7 of 1952 indicate the situation and the boost resulting from this Committee's consideration, as well as being a reflection of the attempt to overcome the post war shortage of building materials. Dwelling houses built in Tasmania (i.e. not only Departmental houses)

1938: 700; 1939: 700; 1946: 279; 1947: 1091; 1948: 1547; 1949: 2312

⁵²Tasmania, Parliamentary Papers No 73 of 1950 and No 7 of 1952.

The continuity of a relatively simple aim - the provision of housing accommodation for those in economic need, whether by way of no deposit purchase agreement, or weekly rental - has allowed the agency to pursue its goal relatively unmolested.

Two other factors relevant to this aspect of evaluation, are lack of any parliamentary tradition in the State to form Standing Committees to investigate specific functional areas and the strong financial support obtained from external funds. The parliamentary procedures in Tasmania have been severely limited by a number of factors,⁵³ one of which has been a reliance on the open forum of Parliament to exercise control over Departments. Only the Legislative Council Public Accounts Committee has existed spasmodically and thus the only detailed scrutiny by the legislature has been at the time when appropriations are considered. For the Housing Department such scrutiny has been relatively rare, with the exception of one area - rent rebates. The reason was that little State money from Consolidated Revenue Funds has been involved in the capital cost of house construction; the only debit has been the cost of allowing specific groups of tenants to pay less rent than the normal amount. Rent Rebates have been subject of debate with increasing frequency in recent years as the amounts involved have increased quite considerably.⁵⁴ Other debates which involve the legislature are mainly concerned with questions of allocation of housing resources as between various areas of the State. With by far the largest proportion of demand coming from the South of the State, most houses are built around Hobart. This situation provides politicians, especially from the North, with opportunity for vociferous support for their constituents' rights.

⁵³For detail see W. Townsley, The Government of Tasmania op. cit., and P. Boyce, 'Tasmania' in J. Rorke (editor), op. cit., p 91

⁵⁴For example in 1949/50 rebates amounted to £1,456; in 1960/61 to £39,035 and in 1971/72 to \$405,086. Further details and sources under heading D.

Summation

Because there is little argument about the formal mission of the agency, and because it is one which no Australian State legislature could refuse to accommodate, there has been no fundamental change in legislation since 1935. Similarly, since there are no legislative committees continuously evaluating the fulfilment of its goals, the agency operates fairly autonomously from legislative interference. Some minor operational matters come within the purview of the legislature from time to time but they have little effect on the overall relationship between the Department and Parliament. As a result the position of the minister is little affected in terms of his control over the Department. There is no question of any legislative body reducing his authority or usurping his role. On the other hand, there is little to provide him with support in any direct way, more often than not his role in Parliament is a defensive one, defending his departmental activities as for example in the case of the allocation of home building resources between various centres. In this way it may be said that the minister is pressed into taking on an agency identification which could well constrain his executive authority within the agency itself. This trend may be supported by the legislative provisions in the Homes Act which deliberately provide the Director of Housing strong authority to act.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, s.4(1) of the Act does make it clear that "In the exercise of his functions under this Act the Director shall be subject to the directions of the Minister." This is viewed seriously and the operations of the agency are regarded as a cooperative venture between the minister and his officials.

The legislature therefore was not deeply involved in agency affairs, other than to redirect in marginal areas its energies and resources. Most matters of conflict were resolved within the department and policies evolved without the need for legislative provisions. One important reason for this

⁵⁵ These are more specifically listed in the Homes Act, referred to on p 87 supra.

is the strong legislation which formulated the original agency mission and the subsequent administrative changes which allowed it to perform that mission properly.

C. Professional Staff

In 1946 the Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank reorganised the structure of their Department into three functional divisions to correspond with their main tasks. Two were Land Settlement and Rural Finance Divisions which were concerned, as their nomenclature implies, with rural areas, the other was the Housing Division, which evolved into the Housing Department. In the Reorganisation Plan the establishment of the Division is shown as

TABLE 3

Housing Division

Executive Officer

Assistant to Executive Officer

Administration Officer

Public Relations Section - Clerk

Inspector)

) Applications

Clerks (3)

Welfare Officer

Tenancies Clerk

Estates Section -

Senior Clerk

Contracts Clerk

Materials and Supply Officer

Clerks (4)

Architectural Section -

Architect in charge

Senior Architect

Architects (3)

Draughtsmen (3)

Junior Draughtsmen (2)

Construction -

Works Superintendant

Works Supervisor

Clerks (2)

Records Clerk

Junior Clerks (2)

Clerk (Launceston Office)

Typist/stenographers (2)


Typists (4)

56

By 1956, after the administrative changes in 1949 and 1953, the Department had grown and was formalised to provide for the more complex elements.

The following organisation chart is indicative of this framework:

TABLE 4




The current organization chart is given on following page.

Some changes have taken place which are found in Director's Reports from time to time. One important step was taken in 1968, soon after the present Director had taken up his appointment, with the creation of a Planning Board composed of senior officers of the Department. Its purpose was "to coordinate land acquisition, planning and liaison activities, and to conduct research and collate departmental statistics."⁵⁸ In addition branch offices were extended to all parts of the State where departmental homes were constructed, supplementing the already existing branch in Launceston

⁵⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 61 of 1956, Appendix I, p 10

⁵⁸Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 67 of 1968

HOUSING DEPARTMENT - ORGANISATION/FUNCTION CHART



TECHNICAL DIVISION
 Architecture and Planning
 Technical Research
 Construction - Contract & Day Labour
 Factory Operation
 Development & Engineering
 Stores & Purchasing
 Plant and Machinery
 Technical Reporting & Advice
 Materials & Construction Technology
 Safety and Fire

MAINTENANCE
 Maintenance Planning,
 Budgetting and
 Implementation

WORKS AND BUDGET AND
TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION
 Works and Budget Control
 Contracts
 Works Orders
 Statistics

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
 Office Administration
 Public Service Staff Admin.
 Industrial Relations
 Organisations & Methods
 Studies
 Research (other than
 technical)
 Training
 Conferences
 Office accommodation
 Mechanical Aids
 Security
 Stores & Office requ's.
 Publicity
 Typing & Correspondence
 Records
 Travel arrangements

FINANCE DIVISION
 Accounting
 Automatic Data Processing
 Budgetting
 Costing & Cost Control
 Pay
 Property Records
 Ledgers
 Machinists
 Factory Accounts
 Insurance

PROPERTY BRANCH
 Land Records
 Purchase, allocation
 and disposal of land
 Securities and conveyancing
 Research into land use
 (commercial, industrial
 civic, etc.)
 Property control & Admin.
 Land purchase & use
 planning
 Sub standard housing

REGIONAL DIVISIONS
 Staff supervision and
 control
 Applications
 Allocations
 Rents and Arrears
 Welfare
 Rotates
 Maintenance
 Inspection
 Security
 Records
 Branch Administration
 Accommodation
 October 1973

with others at Burnie, Georgetown and later Devonport. This decentralisation policy was taken a stage further in 1972 with the creation of Regional Housing Officers for the North (Launceston), the North West (Devonport) and South (Hobart). They are regarded as regional representatives of the Director and have responsibilities for day to day decisions within the scope of policy laid down by the Parliament.⁵⁹

The term 'professional' in this context of agency staffing is not meant to refer solely to those whose qualifications may fall within the recognised professions. Rather, it is meant to convey a commitment to the agency mission, either through long tenure with the agency or because the individual is career oriented within the housing field. Examples of the former may well be accountants who are professionals but scarcely necessarily committed to the housing field, unless they identify with the agency by virtue of their long service.^{59a} An example of the latter may be architects, committed to housing by the nature of their training and selection. Many other non professional technical and clerical officers could also be so described, for example Welfare Officers, storemen, draughtsmen and tenancy officers. The current (April 1974) establishment of the agency is composed of the following:

Technical: 76; Administrative: 169; Accounting: 59;

of these a number transferred to the department from the Agricultural Bank in 1953. The latter group occupy senior positions as follows:

Director; Deputy Director; Chief Technical Officer;

Senior Draftsman; Project Manager; Production Manager;

Coordinator Officer (Buildings), and Chief Financial Officer.

The only section head to join the department after 1953 is the Chief Administrative Officer. Amongst the most senior professional and technical officers other than these, eight joined the department before 1960; ten

⁵⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972.

^{59a}

This concept of 'professional' is different to that of Education- and Health Services, where a person's training leads him in a professional sense to work in the field either as teacher or doctor. There is really no parallel in the Housing field.

between 1960 and 1965; seven from 1965-70; from 1970 onwards 21 have joined.

A group of employees of the Housing department which may be said to identify very strongly with the Department, although not the professional of the same type as mentioned above, is the "day labour" group. These men are tradesmen - carpenters, plumbers, electricians, builders, labourers - whose employment is controlled by the Director, being outside the provisions of the Public Service Act 1973. In one sense their name - day labour force - is a misnomer since they are employed for long periods, some 200 of the 350 have been employed for more than five years. The use of this directly employed work force was started in 1946

"The adoption of this method of construction represents the most radical change in the administration of Government home building in this State. Since the inception of housing legislation it has been the practice to construct all homes by contract...Difficulties in obtaining contractors, particularly in the southern part of the State, indicated that unless a change was made the number of homes erected...would be seriously reduced. Day labour operations were commenced in May on the Lawson subdivision, Moonah and within ten weeks the first home was completed, while an additional 20 were under construction. The scheme has since been extended to other subdivisions..."⁶⁰

By 1949 there were 453 men employed in the day labour organisation and of these 115 were permanently in a factory set up by the Housing Division (as it was then) to prefabricate building materials, e.g. window frames. Whilst the numbers have fluctuated over time, the dependence on day labour for the major share of building has continued, although there are some substantial contracts let, especially along the North West coast. The factory at Prince of Wales Bay has been extended and mechanised and now employs 58, turning out much of the material required for southern estates.⁶¹

A more common usage of the term professional related to the Department is that of expertise or specialism, which would be used by most of the senior officers and the Minister. The field of home building and estate

⁶⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 40 of 1946.

⁶¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 13.

development calls for a number of differing specialisations, but all concerned with the same goal. It is this commitment to a particular goal which allows the Housing Department Director to call for and receive a degree of autonomy even while admitting that ministerial control exists. The belief that the kind of tasks performed by the agency would be carried out better by a semi-autonomous body, such as a Commission, is often expressed, with Housing Commissions of South Australia and Victoria as models. The 1947 Joint Parliamentary Committee on home building made the same point, proposing a State Housing Commission to replace the Housing Division. However, the reasons for any such move at the present time would not be to avoid interference from ministerial control, but rather to avoid the constraints of the Public Service Act and the Commissioner's Office (now the Board) with its Committees. (See p105 for examples of these). The Director made it clear, that he found great difficulty in matching the agency desire to fulfil its functions efficiently, with the constraints resulting from having to meet the demands of an administrative nature from the Board and the Public Offices Committee and Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids. They make it difficult to obtain the best staff for the jobs available in the agency, because those within the Public Service Act have to be filled through the Board and are subject to relativities and classification problems. Delays in appointment are also common, and since much of the planning and design work has to be prepared well in advance of actual building, lack of appropriate staff can hamper a proper flow of work. The Joint Committee made a similar comment in 1947, when the agency was part of the Agricultural Bank, and no doubt their remarks were taken into consideration when the 1949 changes were made.⁶²

⁶²The whole question of control of public service personnel by a central agency, such as the Public Service Commissioner, or Board, as it is now in Tasmania, is a matter outside the terms of this thesis. The fact of its existence is, however, important for the Housing Department, in that it does limit a totally professional approach. See also Chapter V on Health Services and the reasons for the creation of a Mental Health Services Commission in the 1960s.

A latent professional approach to the task was very evident here, as indicated by the Director's statement to an audience directly concerned with both public and private housing:

"...I can see Government housing authorities generally (and the Housing Department in Tasmania in particular) assuming a far more active role in establishing this [the community] environment. We can talk to, and cajole Government Departments and instrumentalities into doing things that we want done, when we want them done. We can cause private enterprise to create shopping centres. If they don't we can create them ourselves. We hope to be able to influence industrial development, to a degree necessary to ensure jobs for our occupants, within reasonable proximity to our subdivisions."⁶³

The Minister generally expects a professional approach from staff. The highly technical nature of the work within the Department makes it necessary to depend on expert advice in order to make decisions. Major policy decisions or priority decisions are the ministers' field of competence, and the basis for such decisions must be a comprehensive report of professional men. Ministers, therefore, demand from their staff high professional quality, thoroughness and ability to take in many points of view. Ministers recognise that there could be conflicting points of view even between professionals in the field and they want all the evidence before them when they make final judgement. This atmosphere created by both Director and Minister must enhance the already implicit professional expectations of the agency staff.

Summation

The common assumption about the professional employed in an organisation is, that he will tend to create a tension between organisational goals and his own. In relation to the public service it is assumed that, where a department is performing a professionally based function, the strength of

⁶³ L.F.Allwinton, Seminar: Housing for People, op. cit., pp 4 and 6

the minister's executive authority will be significantly weakened. The presence of professionals within the agency and the dominance of a particular expertise should, in the case of the Housing Department, support that assumption.

The relatively diffuse professional groups within the agency, engineers, accountants, architects and planners, would seem to militate against this. On the other hand, it is true that the relatively longer service with the Department of some professional and technical officers promotes a kind of organisational solidarity which is similar to that suggested by a professional orientation. The presence of a numerically large group employed outside the direct control of anyone other than the Director must weigh heavily against the minister's executive authority. However, there was a very strong emphasis from both officers and ministers on the cooperative nature of the agency. Directors rarely exercised any powers without consulting the minister first, and it was emphasized that the operations of the department are based on cooperation. This view was supported by one minister, who commented that any decisions about departmental policy had to be based on balanced judgements. He pointed out, that the reports of professionals were vital as a basis for decisions, but the final result depended on a team effort. He did indicate, however, that on a number of occasions in the past initiatives from officers had been stifled with the result that these officers had ceased to use their initiative. The senior officers and the minister were in constant communication about general and specific matters, and that the minister and the Director together made policy. It appears therefore that, although there are potentially divisive forces operating, the Director's style of leadership is cooperative. Potential conflicts over jurisdiction are reduced and, since most difficulties occur over means rather than ends, ministerial leadership is seldom challenged.

D. Finance

The source of the funds at the disposal of an agency must cause

significant differences in its response to its environment. For example, the single line item estimate is regarded as grossest freedom from control by an agency subject to itemised appropriations and the restriction of virement. So too the availability of earmarked funds⁶⁴ must allow appreciably greater freedom from control. There will be much greater reliance on the support of the Minister, when the funds of the agency depend entirely on his ability to 'battle it out' with Treasury and Cabinet and then protect the allocation through the appropriation debate in Parliament.

As has been mentioned previously, the Department was substantially reorganised in 1946, largely to be able to use the funds offered by the Commonwealth Government under the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement 1945. The agreement provided for capital funds to be loaned to State Governments for the specific purpose of building homes, the State paying a low interest rate on the funds, thus being enabled to keep rentals low. The period of agreement was for an initial five years, renewable for a further period by negotiation, although the amount of funds available was negotiated annually.

Tasmania did not renew the agreement after the first five years, complaining that

"Although some benefits have been derived through its participation in the Scheme those benefits have not been as great as was originally anticipated. The Commonwealth Government has therefore been advised that the State no longer desires to continue as a party to the Agreement."⁶⁵

"...the benefits which the State expected to receive under the Agreement were largely illusory and ... the manner in which the Agreement had been operated had not enabled it to provide dwelling accommodation on terms and conditions favourable to the tenant; nor was it receiving from the Commonwealth the degree of assistance which it expected to receive..."⁶⁶

⁶⁴What Simmons calls 'dedicated revenue sources'. Simmons, op. cit. WPQ (June 1965) p 38

⁶⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 73 of 1950

⁶⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 7 of 1952

The next round of negotiations before the 1956 renewal period brought Tasmania into the agreement again, but not before State Government had attempted to obtain conditions more to its liking.

"The inflexible nature of the Commonwealth and State financial arrangements which provide for allocation of loan funds on an annual basis has had the effect of limiting forward planning of housing projects and the organisation of continuous programmes. If assured finance could be provided for triennial periods planning would be facilitated and efficiency improved."

From this point in time Tasmania remained in the Scheme until the Agreement was terminated by withdrawal of the Commonwealth in 1971.⁶⁷

The consequence of this situation has been that dedicated revenue sources have been available for the Housing Department for nearly 20 years of its existence. There have been some limitations and restrictions placed upon the funds by the Commonwealth, but these have been minimal: no shop building, only specific site works and provision for rent rebates. The State has therefore had no call on its resources to meet the cost of housing and Consolidated Revenue has been paid a small surplus each year from the balance of agency income over expenditure. For example: in 1967/8: \$127,277; 1968/9: \$115,523; 1970/1: \$12,223; 1971/2: \$46,101.

Even in the case of rental rebates, which were a reduction of potential profit, the Commonwealth Government makes a payment to the States to allow assistance in cases of need. Previously, the special capital funds for housing under the Agreement were at a rate of interest lower than that now paid for loans through the Loan Council allocation. Since that rate is current market rate, the Commonwealth made two allocations to the States to allow them to provide homes at rentals lower than the economic cost to the State. These arrangements are carried out under the State Grants (Housing) Act 1971; both Commonwealth Statutes themselves changed by subsequent executive action.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Further details of the saga of the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement can be found in M.A.Jones, op. cit. and Department of National Development, op. cit. (see footnote 11)

⁶⁸ This change is referred to in the Tasmania Treasurer's Budget Speech (contd.)

After the termination of the Housing Agreement on 30 June 1971, the latter Act provides (inter alia) that \$2.75 million should be made available for five years cumulative in each year for the purpose of providing low rental homes. In addition, a rental assistance grant is made to the States totalling \$1.25million annually for five years, in order to meet the rental rebates that may be granted. Under these arrangements, which replaced the agreement, Tasmania received \$109,725 in 1971/2, which enabled the rent charged and repayments on purchase agreements to be held one per cent lower than the economic cost. The sum of \$75,000 was also received as rental assistance grant towards a rental rebate cost of \$405,086 for 1971/2.⁶⁹

The pressures on the State to continue the same rate of home building and provision of low rent accommodation are still maintained by this external funding which is not derived from contested resources within the State. In the case of capital funds, the following extract indicates the complex nature of the arrangements, indicating the way in which the funds were not necessarily directly requested without State involvement:

"Under the earlier Agreements, each state was free to determine for itself the amount it wished to borrow for Housing. This choice was made after the Loan Council had made its decision on the total Works and Housing programme, and on the total amount to be allowed to each state. Thus in deciding the amount to be taken up under the then Housing Agreement, a State was able to take into account the relative priority of Housing as compared with other capital requirements."⁷⁰

At the same time the availability of capital funds from sources outside those controlled by the State directly, must have had a great effect on the consideration given to decisions about priorities as between State

68 (contd.)

to which reference is made later in this Section. The changes in this area of financial assistance have been so rapid that it must be noted the discussion only takes into account activity prior to 1974.

⁶⁹ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972

⁷⁰ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 25 of 1973, Budget Speech and Financial Statement of the Treasurer for 1973/74, p 15

capital expenditures. This is highlighted by the changes which occurred during 1973 affecting the 1973/74 Budget. These alterations in procedure, implemented by the Australian Government, were intended to provide a significant financial input to state housing construction. The Australian Government was to make \$16million available to the states, apart from their borrowings through the Loan Council. This constituted an increase of 88% in possible expenditure, which was to be used during the two years 1973/74 and 1974/75. The actual amount to be used by each state was a matter of decision by the Federal minister in consultation with the State Housing minister. In this way the State would be forced to give higher priority to Housing if it were to take up a larger share of the money.

"An increase of this order would have been completely beyond the State's capacity under previous agreements and to this extent the new Agreement can be seen as a means of obtaining substantially more funds for Housing than otherwise would have been possible."⁷¹

It appears that, although the previous arrangements for capital funding might have left some measure of flexibility with the State, the new arrangements certainly do not. To this extent therefore, it may be that the new arrangements will provide a dedicated funding source for the Department in a way the previous capital programme did not.

A comparison of the Receipts and Expenditure Account for 1968/69 and 72/73 in Table 6 indicated only a marginal change in the capacity of the Department to operate outside the direct financial structures of the State.⁷² It is true that the large income component represented by rent allows considerable flexibility which is not present in other agencies. But it does not mean that the current changes have altered the feeling of autonomy within the agency. Having to obtain funds from the Australian Government must make ministerial leadership more difficult in the future, and the Director will lose flexibility because of the need to prepare estimates for approval by the

⁷¹ ibid.

⁷² Source: Parliamentary Paper 38 of 1969; Parliamentary Paper 44 of 1973.

TABLE 6

Comparisons of Profit and Loss Statement for 1968/9 (prior to the State Grants (Housing) Act 1971) and that of 1971/2 (subsequent to that Act.)

<u>1968/9</u>	Earnings for the year:	\$
	Rent receivable (including \$184,859 for rebates from Consolidated Revenue)	1,901,898
	Amount receivable from purchase of dwellings	3,623,120
	Income from Sundry loans	67,550
	Miscellaneous income	<u>49,527</u>
	Total Income earned	5,642,095

Less Operating Expenses	\$	
Principal repayments . . .	526,900	
Interest on State Treasury loans and C/S Housing		
Agreement loans	2,676,650	
less capitalised	<u>67,484</u>	2,609,166
Maintenance of Estates	360,643	
Insurance, Municipal rates and taxes	1,354,348	
Salaries and administrative costs	644,550	
Provisions:		
Depreciation of plant, vehicles, office buildings and equipment	10,855	
Bad and doubtful debts	<u>20,110</u>	
Total operating expenses		<u>5,526,572</u>
leaving a net profit of		<u>115,523</u>

<u>1971/2</u>	Earnings for the year	\$
	Rent receivable (including \$329,083 for rebates from Consolidated Revenue and \$75,000 Rental Assistance Grant from Commonwealth Government)	2,314,818
	Amount receivable from purchase of dwellings	4,875,937
	State Grants (Housing) Act 1971 Commonwealth funds	109,725
	Miscellaneous income and income from sundry loans	<u>169,698</u>
	Total income earned	7,470,178

(contd.)

Total income earned 7,470,178

Less Operating expenses

Principal Repayments 678,493

Interest on State Treasury
loans and C/S Housing
Agreement loans

\$3,479,354

less

capitalised 81,444 3,397,910

Maintenance of Estates 512,719

Insurance, Municipal rates
and Land tax 1,804,422Salaries and administra-
tion costs 930,923

Provisions:

Depreciation of plant,
vehicles, office buildings
and equipment 15,112

Bad and doubtful debts 29,746

Repayment of Loan 47,617

Total operating expenses

7,424,077leaving a net profit of \$ 46,101Source: Parliamentary Paper 38 of 1969;
Parliamentary Paper 44 of 1973

Minister and Cabinet. It is perhaps in this area that the change will be most noticeable rather than in the actual funding. When the Agreement was in force the State Treasury had little reason to be involved in the agency affairs. The only call on State funds was for rebate payments and there was no other estimate called for from the agency, but any major proposal to average rents or to change bases of rent rebates would involve discussions with the Treasury. The funds the State received from the Commonwealth were paid through the Treasury but, apart from keeping a receipts- and payments account and a balance sheet which had to be verified and audited, the usual Treasury control through accounting procedures was not exercised. With the changed circumstances the Department now has to comply with usual procedures which apply to other Departments, and its affairs become subject to much greater access and thus to criticism and control. In both, Treasury and parliamentary terms, it means that, despite some dedicated revenue still being paid by Commonwealth, the Department loses some of its previously held initiatives. The senior officers favour the system operating in other states, where the Housing Commissions had a single line item rather than items and detailed votes.

The previous funding, direct through the Housing Agreement, had meant that large capital funds were available to the agency without controls being imposed through the State Treasury. Nonetheless, this did not mean the funds were without any conditions at all. The Commonwealth Government exercised some financial and technical control over the expenditure. Indeed, one of the common complaints had been that this control had reduced State decision making capacity in this important area. The arrangements tended to be inflexible as between the Commonwealth and State.⁷³ Of course, it was this very inflexibility which allowed the Department to be relatively autonomous from the State Government point of view. Thus, in the relationship

⁷³Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 7 of 1952. This situation was emphasized considerably as a consequence of the 1973 changes by the Australian Government.

between the Director and minister, the operational control of the Director was considerably strengthened. It appears, therefore, that in the changed arrangements after 1971/2 for these reasons the Director and agency may become more dependent on the efforts of the minister to obtain funding and support for priorities within the State Cabinet and in discussions with the Australian Government. The corollary of this would seem to be an increase in the executive authority of the minister.

Summation

With the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement in force the agency operated in a relatively autonomous position. The funds under the Agreement were at the disposal of the agency and had to be accounted for to the Commonwealth as a Trust Fund. The State Treasury were therefore not involved in internal allocation or accounting, other than normal audit procedures. The availability of such dedicated revenue sources led to a restriction of the potential control of the minister, although it is clear that the minister may have had to fight for priority in terms of loan fund allocation as between other Departments and Housing.

From 1971 the funding procedures changed and the situation became fluid and uncertain. Some revenue appears to be 'dedicated' in the sense that it is derived directly from the Commonwealth and not subject to negotiation within the State sphere. The result of the post-1971 arrangements appeared to reduce the autonomy of the agency and to make it more reliant on the support of the minister to justify expenditure and fight for priority within the State Cabinet. This seems to imply some increase in ministerial control, with a correspondingly decreased capacity of the agency to protect programme activity, thus increasing the scope for political leadership and executive authority.

E. Departmental tradition

It is not often realised that the same kind of organisational loyalty

can exist in government departments as in private enterprise. The assumption is that, since the Public Service as a whole is an organisation, with staff being largely transferrable across departmental boundaries, little of the feeling of identification with the organisation - that is so demanded in private enterprise - can exist. For many departments with largely clerical or 'administrative' functions this could well be the case. But for those departments which rely on specific expertise and have a relatively defined objective, there would appear, in principle, little to differentiate them from private enterprise. Within the department there may grow a promotion structure which is in a sense 'closed', e.g. within the various specialist sections. So for example, it was seen that a majority of the 55 most senior professional and technical staff had been with the Department for 10 years or more - 13 of them over 25 years.

In addition, the day labour organisation of the Department, which is outside the control of the Public Service, is no different from any other group of private enterprise employees. These skilled tradesmen, numerically almost two thirds of the work force of the Department as a whole, depend upon the agency for their employment and look to the Director and his officers as their employer, not the minister. Indeed, it is felt sometimes, that the Director stands between them and the politician, who is not always in favour of their retention. This was especially so when there was a Liberal Government, some of whose Cabinet members expressed a preference for letting tenders to private enterprise and reducing the day labour force. As a result, the Liberal Government, during their term in office, banned replacements for resignations or retirements in the day force. The Labor Government were concerned as it was an important element of the Government's control over employment in the State as a whole that it should have this group. Not only did it provide the opportunity to influence the rate of unemployment, but also other matters, such as apprenticeship policy and wage levels. However, the minister did not directly interfere with the general employment conditions

of the day labour force, leaving this matter to the Director and his officers. There is a high stability rate within this group too, for example as at 30/6/1969 the length of service of its 358 day labour employees was illustrated by the following figures:

20 years or more service	24
15 " " " " 	30
10 " " " " 	61
5 " " " " 	81
	<u>196</u> ⁷⁴

Organisational identity could well flourish in these circumstances.

Staff loyalty and identification is, in fact, strongly encouraged within the Department. Such encouragement was given even when the agency was within the Agricultural Bank. The first Executive Officer appointed by the Board of Management to administer the Division was Mr. Basil Plummer, who became the Director in 1949. The same person remained as Director until after 4 January 1959, having been continuously associated with this area, since he became Board member of the Agricultural Bank concerned with Housing in 1948. His successor was Mr. H.L. Duke, who had previously been with the Agricultural Bank as a clerk and then, from 1946, Executive Officer of the Housing Division until 1953, when he became Assistant Director, on the Department being created, under Mr. Plummer's Directorship. Mr. Duke retired from the Public Service on 31 August 1967 and the present Director, Mr. L.F. Allwinton, took his place. The newly appointed Director, Mr. T.L. Lockhart, appointed in 1975 on Mr. Allwinton's resignation, had been Deputy Director since 1970 and was previously Secretary with the Department. Other senior officers have been there for similar periods of time as was shown (p116). In such circumstances it is not unexpected that a tradition of departmental loyalty should emerge.

Due to length of service there is a feeling of personal involvement

⁷⁴ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969.

with the department and the achievements of the agency are promoted. It was not without a certain pride that the Director made the point, that the department is the largest landlord in the State and the biggest single home builder, although its activity only constitutes 20% of the total construction of accommodation in the State.⁷⁵

There is also the fact, that the agency is meeting a specifically identifiable need of the community. The demand for Department housing is increasing especially in the Hobart area, where the major housing demand in the State as a whole exists. Director's Reports exemplify recognition of this situation, for example:

"...the demand in 1968-9 increased markedly. This is revealed not only in the 19% increase in applications received, but in the fact that the number of cases still awaiting assistance at the end of the period rose by 106 despite the housing of 1,327 families."⁷⁶

"Demand for assistance is steadily increasing, and the Department continues to assist Government and industry by providing homes for key employees, including migrants."⁷⁷

Departmental activities in initiating new standards for housing, landscaping, gardens and general estate layout have all been enthusiastically promoted by its officers. Much of the innovation has come from their ideas in the first place, although a great deal more attention has been paid to these matters since 1971.

A recent Minister for Housing lived in a departmental house himself and had always been keenly interested in the Housing function, being shadow minister whilst in opposition. Some of his proposals were strongly in line with much that the Director and department have been endeavouring to do in the past, although, without ministerial support irrespective of party.

⁷⁵ L.F. Allwinton, 'Fitting into the Broad Spectrum' Seminar: Housing for People (op. cit.),

⁷⁶ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969.

⁷⁷ ibid.

In consequence, there was a much closer working relationship between that minister and the Director. This, coupled with the fact that the portfolio was not a joint one, involves the minister much more in the everyday activities of the department. When questioned on this matter, the minister talked of 'discussions', 'memoranda', 'orders', and 'delegation' in connection with his relations through the Director to the Department. Other ministers have not been so directly involved, indicating that they would only have conferences with senior officers as particular matters demanded. One minister said that when he first took office he started to have regular meetings, but found it was not worth continuing. However, he did make a point of attending all social functions of the departmental officers to which he was invited.

One reason given for not continuing regular weekly meetings was that his ministerial office and the departmental offices were too far apart. This fact is relevant in any consideration of an agency's autonomy, since it may be assumed that there will be less direct involvement of a minister, who cannot have his senior officers immediately on call. Equally, there would be a tendency of such officers to operate in many situations without involving their minister, just because of the need to make decisions when he was not readily available. Another minor problem for a minister in such circumstances is the feeling of being an intruder, where he has no regular office base within the building. All these factors have had a definite part in the evolution of the autonomy of the agency and do tend to reduce executive authority of the minister and his chance to exercise leadership.

When the minister had joint portfolios, whether or not he was particularly interested in them, he tended to become more deeply engrossed in the affairs of the one physically accessible. Since the Housing Department's separation from the Agricultural Bank in 1953, offices have been located at Lampton Avenue, Derwent Park, about 20 minutes by car from the State Offices in Hobart central city. The state of the premises was relatively poor for many years,

but the agency have resisted moves into premises closer to the State Offices. For many years they have been fighting for funds to improve their premises and over the past five years have made great improvements, which have consolidated their position for some time to come.⁷⁸

There are no other State Offices in the same area and no other public servants, Derwent Park being the industrial estate of Hobart. Communication between minister and officer is formalised in such circumstances to a greater degree than occurs where the minister has his office within the department.⁷⁹ The use of the telephone increases and this, in turn, partially defines the relationships in a different way to continual face to face conversation.

An important aspect of the department functions is the provision of information to the minister. Since most of the data on which a minister must make decisions is in the hands of the officers, there is a common belief that officers are able to manipulate the minister. There can be little doubt that by various methods - filtration, sifting, withholding or deluging, a minister can be at the mercy of his officers. This is especially so in an agency whose tasks demand expertise and knowledge outside the capacity of the lay politician. However, such a view can be overstated and too much reliance cannot be placed on it where the officers are career public servants, whose promotion and tenure rely on integrity within their roles. Nonetheless, a strong point was made by the Director about what he termed the 'information lag'. When any new minister comes into the portfolio there is a huge knowledge gap to be filled. Whether or not the minister has been previously involved or interested in the function concerned, he will only have a fraction of the necessary detailed knowledge. Anything he knows will seldom relate

⁷⁸ An interesting result of this relative isolation is that the agency operated a staggered working hour system to allow its officers, especially female, time for travelling to the city centre for shopping. This system was used by the Public Service Board as an experiment on which to base their proposals for Flexitime for the whole of the Service.

⁷⁹ Note the difference in the Education Department (see Chapter IV).

to newly formulated plans 'in the pipeline' or to the more detailed reasoning for decisions made in the past, which to some degree constrain, by precedent, future decisions a minister may have to make. The way in which the minister can absorb this information can also affect the information lag. The Director indicated that quite distinct differences in relations between the minister and his senior officers can result from this situation.⁸⁰

A minister, who may take as long as 12 months to become familiar with the departmental activities and plans, will become engrossed in detail and pay little attention to long term proposals. Such a person is more likely to leave long term planning to officers without making much effort to initiate any projects himself. Another minister, who has a particular interest in the functions of the department and has 'ideas' he wishes to put into practice, may find that many of these are already in train or have been previously rejected. A learning period for both parties is needed, but the relationship created during that period will to some degree dictate the extent of the minister's control. After this period is completed, preferably in a fairly short time for an interested minister, there will be a set pattern of priorities produced by the minister and clarity of instructions will result. If the period of absorption is too long, detail will take over and an adequate ministerial leadership will be the outcome. In this connection it is also to be noted that personal characteristics will play an important part.

While the senior officers of the agency may approach their task in the traditional public service manner, they cannot avoid the consequences of their own character. A strong leader will inevitably emerge dominant, whether public servant or minister, and, however much the officer would want to act out his role as public servant, there are bound to be inevitable tensions. But where the minister and the senior officer are both strong characters,

⁸⁰ For similar points of view see the discussion in Kogan, op. cit. p 155, where Crosland says: "I reckon it takes you six months to get your head properly above water, a year to get the general drift of most of the field and two years to really master the whole of the Department."

there is little doubt that by the nature of their particular roles the minister will dominate.

Under this head of department tradition two other matters require mention. The first is by reference to some changes taking place in fields which involve the autonomy of an agency, such as financial control, office accommodation, staffing, equipment purchase, and housing policy. Prior to 1960 all these matters had been very firmly under the control of the Director (thus implying at least that the ministerial control had been limited) and the department was considered autonomous to a very significant degree. Since that date a decline in that autonomy had been taking place gradually:

- 1) Financial control, which has already been discussed in terms of changing conditions in rebate matters and expiry of the Housing Agreement.
- 2) Office accommodation, staffing and equipment purchases have also been alluded to, noting the increasing intrusion of the Public Service Commissioner and Treasury through committees such as the Mechanical Aids and Public Offices.
- 3) The problem of consistent housing policies becomes increasingly difficult when annual budgeting is required and when the chances of changing priorities are increased.

The budgeting situation has been aggravated recently with the need to compete for funds in the annual application to Loan Council with other departments. Changing priorities becomes much more likely when Parliament has greater possibilities to debate the detailed estimates for the Department.

These factors led the Director to promote the proposals of the 1947 Joint Committee to set up a Housing Commission. It was essential that a professional body perform tasks without interference, although his support was not to circumvent executive authority. Rather, it was to avoid the demands made upon the department by other agencies within the system, such as Treasury, Public Service Commissioner (now the Public Service Board) as well as Parliament and Cabinet. This suggestion may be interpreted as having its roots in 'professionalism', but it is noteworthy that the Director saw

no clash between his support for a Housing Commission and retaining ministerial control. He referred to a "degree of autonomy with the possibility of tight ministerial control." This view seems to indicate the way he saw the autonomy of the agency in the past, i.e. its past tradition.

The second matter is related to Advisory Committees, i.e. cooptation mechanisms, which some regard as having significant legitimization functions for an agency.⁸¹ Neither the Director nor the current minister regarded these committees as of much value. As previously mentioned, the Director thought of them as merely emphasising areas of increasing sensitivity, but producing nothing concrete. He said "the Department is usually better informed, most of the ideas from these committees are already known to the departmental officers". Such committees may also diffuse decision making to a great extent and provide a means of avoiding decisions. The minister's task is to control the advice he receives by appointing those best suited to give expert advice. Then he makes decisions on that advice himself, rather than allowing a committee to recommend decisions. In this way the officers of the department are used to a much greater degree, which allows them to exercise their expertise.

Both these examples indicate that the Director and some ministers tended to support a more professional approach within the department which would certainly fit in with a tradition which seems to have been on the wane since the early 'sixties.

Summation

The emphasis has been on a departmental tradition of 'separateness'

⁸¹ See Brown's discussion of the legitimization phase in his model, op. cit., Chapter I, p 15.

due to such factors as 1) organisation loyalty through long service. 2) A work group, comprising over half of the total agency employees, directly employed by the agency; 3) the stated desire to foster pride of achievement in the agency employees; 4) the encouragement for staff to innovate in their own areas, and 5) the isolation of the agency offices from the functional mainstream of government offices generally. This strongly suggests that the agency would operate with relatively high autonomy not only in its day to day functions, but also in many areas of policy making.

However, this is not entirely an accurate assessment. It is true that these factors predispose officers in the agency to operate autonomously - all other things being equal. But the personal attitudes of senior officers and of the minister concerned must dictate the extent to which this pre-disposition dominates their relationship. There is little doubt that all the ingredients are present for an organisational operation with the minimum of interference, however, neither the Director nor the then Deputy Director conceded that the agency operated in this way. Both, and particularly the then Deputy Director, stated, that operationally day to day functions were under the officers' control, but subject to the overriding right of the Minister to interfere. The Director never exercised any of his extensive authority under the Act without consultation. Constant telephone contact, informal meetings and formal discussions continually took place between the two senior officers and the Minister. (Although some ministers found the offices too far away for convenient involvement.)

It was in the contrast between the 'style' of the ministers, however, that the departmental tradition showed through most clearly. When a minister does not wish to become deeply engrossed in the portfolio and has no great desire to pursue strong policies through the department, i.e. where there is no political leadership, it is the departmental tradition that allows it to proceed towards an objective which has been set down in the past with unimpaired vigour. Where there is no such tradition, the agency would flounder in default of political direction and the exercise of executive

authority.

The stated desire for a more professional approach to the task of providing homes contrasts sharply with the realisation that in present circumstances this desire has to be played down. The recalling of a tradition of autonomy 'before 1960' by a Director who only took up office in 1968, would imply that he has absorbed that tradition from officers still in the agency who remember what it was like. This could be the desire to get on with the job, characterising the professional approach referred to in discussing this aspect of the department. There was also a certain ambivalence about autonomy through professionalism, since little concern was expressed at maintaining tight ministerial control even though the agency were to become a commission.

Conclusion

The parameters of this analysis, it may be recalled, are to identify those forces which have a "persistent or cumulative effect on the subsystem" (supra, p 78). It was assumed that these would indicate activity inhibiting or promoting a minister's capacity for political leadership, irrespective of his personality. Any such constraint would prove detrimental to his control and accountability and increase the centrifugal tendency of an agency. This tendency, given sufficient persistence, results in a reduction of executive authority and distancing from parliamentary control, thus impeding the effectiveness of the Westminster model. Indeed, over a number of agencies the same tendencies could completely undermine the basis of parliamentary government.

A significant feature of the analysis of circumjacent groups is that no cooptative mechanisms are apparent. Neither the agency nor the minister make any attempt to obtain the support of external groups. There are occasionally ad hoc committees created, but most of these are directly concerned with specific estate development and have little to do with agency interrelationships. The leading role played by the Housing Department is

indicated by the fact that the committees most often come into being on the initiative of the Department. When planning has advanced sufficiently the Department moves for the creation of such a committee within the Tasmanian Executive System. The minister is not concerned directly or indirectly with the committees as they are usually comprised of middle level officers. This appears to be evidence of a centrifugal force of a kind, certainly one situation which emphasises the agency leadership potential, in their field of expertise. It may be this feeling of being the initiator which reduces the desire to promote cooptation. The support from outside, which agencies often feel is necessary to continue with their programmes, is not sought in this case. Another interesting feature is that those, for whom the agency provides a service, are rarely overtly involved in any way. It could properly be assumed that either the Minister or the Department would cultivate some support from the client group, the tenants, especially since they are so clearly identifiable. There was no evidence that such a situation had occurred and it was difficult to find any satisfactory explanation. One suggestion was that for the tenants both the agency and the minister were regarded as the 'landlord'; 'they'. Nor do ministers feel client orientation within the department makes it incumbent upon them merely to react to demand. They had made a strong stand on the question of eviction for arrears of rent for the same reason.

There are some indications that the agency is not entirely free of some circumjacent groups. Those derived out of the need to account to Parliament for funds received or where funds are required for particular purposes, actively reduce the autonomy of the agency and place it in a dependent role in relation to the minister. The minister is the only direct access the agency has to that subsystem and it depends on his understanding and capacity to put their case to the extent to which their needs are met. However, this does not make the agency wholly dependent since, as explained, there are funds available to it which do not require the minister's support. The only other time in which Parliament places the minister in the dominant

position is when he has either to deal with grievance debates on the estimates or to answer questions in question time. For the reasons examined earlier and because of the financial situation in the past, the minister has not gained greatly in support of his position from this. It is worth noting that there could be a change in parliamentary relations with the Department because of the removal of dedicated revenue sources. This practice has not been current for long enough yet to draw any conclusions.

Indirectly, however, there have been forces operating within the Parliamentary sphere which do place some demands upon the agency and tend to provide a source of potential dominance for the minister. Earlier, in discussing the influence of the Auditor General on the agency, it was pointed out that there had been trenchant criticisms of the departmental policy in certain areas. These, relating to rent rebates and tendering, had been presented to Parliament in Annual Reports and thus provided grounds for comment about agency activities in that forum. This possibility must always inhibit decisions made within the department and increase the need to confer with and gain the support of a minister.

The one circumjacent group which most directly encroached on the autonomy of the agency, did not do so in order to support executive authority. The internal administration and support services of an agency are vital to its capacity to function effectively. Office staffing, accommodation and equipment must all be appropriate in quality and quantity to the tasks to be performed. It was especially noticeable that the Director was more concerned with the reduction of agency autonomy by the Public Service Board and the several Committees set up by them, than by executive authority or political leadership. The provision of inadequate establishments and divergent ideas about proper classification for tasks within the department make it difficult for the Director to administer his Department to his satisfaction. The increasing professionalism within the field of estate development and management is not reflected in the hiring and promotion policies of the Board. His main complaint about them was that they cannot have the proper knowledge

and yet do not take his advice sufficiently often. Another minor complaint - although real enough - is delays in filling positions. All these factors have a tendency to make the agency less able to operate autonomously, yet they do little to make the minister's position any stronger. A minister may have some chance to make representations to the Board supporting his departmental proposals, but there is no institutional means of forcing them to take any more notice of him than anyone else. Equally, in the case of the accommodation and equipment, there are interdepartmental committees set up for rationalising the most efficient use of these resources. It is impossible, as was shown in the case of the proposals for data processing, for anyone to interfere with such committee decisions. It appears that their main concern is to centralise large equipment, such as data banks, and, rather than move quickly, they let demand build up until pressure is so great that centralizing decisions are the most economic solution.

This is a situation which has been institutionalised as part of the Executive System and is operating as an inhibiting factor for both agency autonomy and ministerial control. Both of these areas are dominated by the operations of the Public Service Board and Treasury whose officers make up the bulk of the Committee members.

The provision of housing at low rental or on purchase agreements with no deposit and low repayment, is a goal that has not been challenged in the Tasmanian context since the first Act in 1935. Legitimacy for the agency mission is thus extremely strong and results in relatively little alteration of the legislation under which the agency functions. There has been no period of persistent questioning of the means by which this goal has been achieved. The immediate post-1945 period produced the search for some alternative methods, but the agency survived any demand for radical change by hiving off the Housing Division. The recommendation of the Joint Committee for a commission was never acted upon and the Housing Division, within the Agricultural Bank, was made a full department under a minister instead.

The only legislative change of any great note was the 1953 Act which gave retrospective legislative authority to the creation of the department. The powers of the Director included in this Act are very great and more in keeping with those of a Commissioner than the permanent head of a public service department.⁸²

There is no doubt that this has led to an attitude within the agency, emphasising their 'separateness' from the rest of the Executive System. This initial feeling may well have had its roots in the reorganisation of 1949, when it was made a separate Division within the Bank. It would have been confirmed by the 1953 legislation, making it much less like a Department subject to ministerial and parliamentary control. Again, this feeling would have been enhanced through the dedicated funding to which reference will be made below. There is no indication that the legislative provisions have done anything other than support the autonomous climate within the department and reduced their dependence on ministerial support within Parliament.

The programmes operated by the Department for the provision of housing has been generally very successful, although there is always a greater demand than housing available. The satisfactory record has protected the reputation of the department, providing no cause to demand legislative change. It is also true to say, that there has been no need for the department to require additional authority to perform its tasks in a changing world, as is often the case with other areas, e.g. Education and Health. The minister is also given protection by these same means, especially from parliamentary attention in matters of detail. The questions and grievances brought to his attention are relatively minor, more often than not specific to a prospective tenant or constituent. Sometimes claims are made about regional differences, but the most telling legislative interference arises from rental rebate matters. It is here that the minister has to make the departmental case.

⁸² It was this difference that led Wettenhall to distinguish the Housing Department from a 'pure' ministerial department in his classification The Guide, op. cit. p 11. This analysis does indicate the possibility that such classification may be incorrect - especially in the eyes of the personnel.

Neither the department nor the minister suffers greatly from this discussion in parliament because the Commonwealth funds were made subject to rebates being granted and they can always hide behind this fact.

The strong legislative provisions in the original statute have been a restraint on parliamentary involvement in the department and at the same time reduced the need for ministerial leadership. Substantive changes to the statute have been rare and departmental autonomy is increased as against a minister, when its dependence on his support for new powers is unnecessary. Such strong legislative provisions will also enhance the position of the departmental senior staff in situations where they wish to promote their own departmental interests. However, as noted, challenges may come from external sources to the exercise of legal powers and in situations such as this Cabinet becomes the arbiter. Without ministerial support at this level, such challenges may be successful despite the legislation, and this will enhance executive authority at the expense of administrative capacity.

The Housing Department seems to attract a staff who find satisfaction in the tasks they perform within the Department, which in turn promotes an organisational loyalty. The actual qualifications of the staff within the department may not be very strong, in that many had not worked in the field of estate management before they joined the agency, but they seem to obtain a commitment once they join the department. The attraction of more qualified staff for the architectural, technical and building operations, has been general over the years, but there has also been a tendency for staff to remain with the department. The generation of pride in their work and the promotion of 'professional' attitudes seems to have been a deliberate objective of at least one Director. The structuring of the department into specialist areas: Technical, Accounts, and General Estates, provides a basis for individuals to become expert in their particular work and thus provide feedback to the agency on its performance.

Apart from those employed in administrative and technical positions, the department has a large construction staff which is directly under the

Director's control. The existence of this group must enhance departmental autonomy, although it does appear that in disputes with unions in respect of this group the Director involves the minister in negotiations.

The creation of professional attitudes and commitment to the agency mission, coupled with the continuity of service of many of the staff, must increase the potential autonomy of the agency. The word 'potential' is used deliberately, since it was stressed by all concerned that at no stage was this potential realised. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the permanent head is in a strong position compared with the minister and the rest of the Executive System. Information and knowledge of a specialised kind contained only within the department with the need to 'educate' ministers and others implies a distancing of the agency from the rest of the System.

The strongest single centrifugal force which promotes agency autonomy is that of dedicated revenue sources. The Housing Department has received from the Commonwealth funding in the vicinity of \$61 million up to 30/6/1972,⁸³ whereas it has provided no capital funding for housing itself, other than through ordinary loan allocations from the Loans Council. The significance of this figure is not that it is so much larger than other departments' grants from ordinary loan funds (for example see the funds provided for capital works in Education or Hospitals, chapters IV and V), but that there is no competition in the State System regarding its allocation. Ordinary loan funds are allocated after discussion at Cabinet level has produced the Grants Commission submission each year. There has to be a limitation on the total amount claimed, therefore each department has to compete for an allocation of these scarce resources. This procedure differs from that of the Housing Department, who negotiated directly with the Australian Government for the necessary funds for their building programme in the following year. These estimates were discussed within the Department, by the Director and Minister, but apart from providing the Estimates for rental rebate refund from State

⁸³ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972. The system of funding changed after 1972 (see p 124).

Consolidated Revenue Fund, no restrictions were placed by Cabinet over the Departmental demands. When it is considered that this situation existed for a period of 20 years with only one short break, it is only to be expected that some sense of autonomy should pervade the agency. This source of funding also demanded officer to officer level contact between State and Federal departments, providing another element likely to support a feeling of self sufficiency within the agency.

As noted, this situation has now changed since 1971, and there is no difference between the capital resources of the Housing Department and other departments, they all come from fund allocations agreed at State Cabinet level. This will undoubtedly subject the agency to more control from the State Executive system and may in the long run alter the past relationships. The new arrangements have not been operating long enough for any impact to have been obvious, although the allocated capital funds in 1974 were not significantly different from those requested by the department in 1972.

One other point of importance is, that where funds have to be obtained from the common allocation, there is more likelihood of Treasury interference in departments. Whilst dedicated funding was available, Treasury had little to control other than the usual audit demands for all government expenditure. The new arrangements may not significantly increase demands from Treasury, but this could be an optimistic assessment. Prior consultation with the minister and the provision of estimates to the Treasury have in the past been matters which the Director had within his control. It may well be, that this state of affairs will no longer exist, reducing administrative capacity through its dependence on external support, particularly political leadership. Previous independence from the usual annual appropriations for carrying on the tasks of the department, both by capital funding and by revenue funding from rental receipts, has provided a foundation for departmental autonomy. Any agency which has internal sources of revenue independent to a large degree from the Consolidated Revenue Fund can proceed with its planning on a longer term basis. It certainly will not be looking to its minister for

support at Estimates time, nor in the Appropriation debates. In fact, the minister may well be endeavouring to obtain assistance from the department with information and answers for questioners. With this position operating for such a long period, the department must have built up a tradition of autonomy.

Institutionalised forms of activity to deal with particular demands placed upon the agency have emerged and the Director does not have quite the same organisational role as other permanent heads of departments. In many areas of activity he makes decisions or delegates the decision making authority to others, not considering the necessity of involving the minister first. There is no doubt that the Director and Deputy Director do involve the minister, because the administrative style is 'cooperative', but the impression given was, that this was the only reason. For example, the department functioned without significant alteration during the period needed for some ministers to 'learn the job' - about twelve months. It was also quite clear that a new minister could seldom take up the portfolio and immediately set about changing already existing plans, because of the inherently greater knowledge and expertise of the officers over that of the minister. The possibility of this internal solidarity is increased by external forces, which support this expertise, e.g. through the Commonwealth Housing Department and their expert bodies, and through overseas contacts and equipment and materials firms' representatives. The minister may have final decision on a variety of matters, but that decision quite often appears to be only 'yes' or 'no', not a choice between a number of alternatives. These have already been eliminated by the agency before placing the recommendation before the minister. Such course appears to be proper in a quasi professional department such as this, which employs experts in specific fields to advise and offer recommendations. Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that it increases the potential for administrative capacity and reduces the areas in which a minister can exercise political leadership and executive authority.

To summarise;

<u>Centrifugal Force</u>	<u>Effect</u>
(a) circumjacent groups	There appears to be no significant reliance on such groups for support nor any cooptative activity; the relations with other groups such as Cabinet and Parliament have not been such as to promote or reduce political leadership at the expense of administrative capacity, although such groups as the Auditor General, Public Service Board and some Interdepartmental Committees have the effect of limiting the flexibility of the agency in certain areas; this is not, however, supportive of ministerial control and political leadership.
(b) legislative provisions	A strong substantive statute in Homes Act 1935, to which Director's powers were added in 1975, has produced definite basis for agency autonomy and reduction of ministerial control, despite S.4 Restraints are imposed upon the extent to which the minister has the right to interfere and thus allow the initiative to be with agency, this provides the right climate for the permanent head or departmental officers to promote their autonomy, reducing the scope for political leadership.
(c) professional staffing	Limited numbers of professional staff in accepted sense of term offset by the mission oriented approach to service of home building and estate management for low renters. Expertise in these areas produces a quasi professional outlook which increases supportive relations within agency and promotes external status. These factors will work to inhibit political leadership in situations of conflict between agency and minister.
(d) finance	Dedicated revenue sources of the past have eliminated reliance on annual appropriations, thus reducing the need for ministerial support. The survival of the agency is not threatened by sources within the influence of the minister and thus he is not needed to provide funds to promote agency interests. Use of the rents received for current expenses without need to call on State Revenues has an important effect on agency autonomy. The presence of a small profit which is paid into Consolidated Revenue Fund enhances agency external status irrespective of political leadership.

(e) departmental traditions

consistent growth of demand and satisfactory supply has given status and increased internal pride of achievement. Long service with department of many senior officers promotes agency loyalty and strengthens internal ties. Day labour organisation provides base for agency independence and freedom from normal System controls. Whilst the level of professionalism does not promote an aristocratic agency it does provide an acceptable internal status to support an independent line and constrain a minister in his dealings with the Director and senior officers.

The combined effect of these forces would indicate that the minister would find it difficult to pursue political leadership or exercise executive authority in the face of determined agency autonomy. Clearly, the test of this hypothesis would only eventuate where there was a conflictive situation which does not yet appear to have arisen. From the evidence it seems that all activities are carried out in a cooperative spirit and agency operations are seldom challenged after extensive consultation with the agency officers. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that a fundamental change in objectives imposed by a political decision would be subjected to strong adaptation measures within the agency, either frustrating or reducing the value of the objective.

IV

THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

Introduction

Prior to 1885 education for the children of Tasmanian families was provided for a fee through local boards of education, subject from time to time to oversight by a regional or central inspection imposed by the Executive. There was little direction or control from the State and the level of involvement through subsidy was minimal. The Public Schools Act 1868 incorporated a single board with an inspectorate and local advisory school boards were encouraged. There was no public education beyond primary school and access to many of the schools in country districts was difficult, indicating the relative lack of attention given to education during this period.

"Poor communications, shortage of trained teachers, and lack of buildings and finance confined government interest initially to granting subsidies to those schools run by private individuals who were willing to educate poor children in return for such aid."¹

Other educational establishments were of course available to those able to pay their higher fees, usually church schools, although some were non-denominational. Such schools provided education beyond the primary level but were not subject to any kind of control or inspection, since they received no assistance from government funds.

In 1882 a Select Committee on Education reported and - amongst other recommendations - proposed "such a redistribution of authority as shall place the whole system [of education] under one paid head official who would be directly responsible to a Minister of the Crown".² Other proposals

¹Wettenhall, Guide p 110

²Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 106 of 1882

were for more autonomy for the local advisory boards and the need for a training scheme for teachers. The Report reveals the poor quality of public education provided at that time, despite the 1868 Act which had made attendance at school compulsory for children between 7 and 14 years of age, provided they lived within a two mile radius of the school. But the Report revealed a number of problems in enforcing the law, especially when parents of such children were supposed to pay fees.

"At present the responsibility of deciding what constitutes minimum attendance rests with the Magistrate. In each district a Magistrate might declare the minimum as four days a week, in another it might be fixed at three days a month. Your Committee recommend a standard of 30 days a quarter."

More importantly, the Report proposed that education should be made free as well as setting the standard of compulsory attendance. The problem was how to pay for it, because the two alternatives it saw as available - local education rates or subsidy from government taxes - were not likely to be popular. As the Committee argued:

"As regards the former, (local education rates) your Committee considers that while it would be more certain in its operation, it would be calculated to make education unpopular and therefore should not be resorted to save as a last expediency.... Having this in view, and seeing how desirable it is to make education popular, your Committee suggest that enforced public aid of schools should be levied in the shape of fines for non-attendance."

As a consequence of this Report reforms were proposed which became legislation in the form of the Education Act 1885 which provided for a system of public education. Schools which had been previously established and maintained by the Board of Education or Chief Secretary were declared State Schools by the Act. Boards of Advice were created by the Act which endeavoured to legislate for matters raised by the 1882 Commission.

A Report of a Select Committee of Parliament provided a comprehensive list of schools, teachers and pupils for the month of March, 1907.³

³Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 40 of 1907

This showed that there were 711 schools under the control of the Department of Education and its minister. The Board of Education had almost gone out of existence, its functions having been taken over by a Department comprised of an Inspectorate and a Director with minimal clerical assistance. The portfolio of Minister for Education was not, however, immediately allocated after the 1885 Act and it was not until 1904 that the then Premier took charge of the portfolio.⁴ All the 711 schools were controlled by the Education Department and all matters relating to their management and support were Department responsibility, subject to some schools remaining under local Boards of Advice for day to day management. Of these 711 schools 230 were 'one teacher schools' and 43 more only had the Head Teacher and a 'monitor', i.e. a pupil over 14 years of age who had stayed on to help and perhaps later become a pupil teacher. The majority of schools had an attendance of between 10 and 100 pupils, while 36 had less than 10 (Fentonbury had only two!). There were 12 with 200 pupils or more, of which 10 were in Launceston and Hobart, the other two being in Zeehan and Queenstown (both mining towns on the West Coast). The Department employed a total of 851 teachers - 711 head teachers, 38 Assistant Teachers, 89 Temporary assistants and 13 pupil teachers.

Teacher recruitment, classification and examination for promotion were the responsibility of the Inspectorate within the Department, under the control of the Director of Education. Since there were only four Inspectors, it is not surprising that matters such as classification got out of hand. There was also a difference of opinion between the teachers and the Director about the appointment and promotion of South Australian teachers. (The Director himself was recruited from South Australia). Such was the ill-feeling

⁴As Wettenhall points out: "Titular recognition came with the formation of the Evans government in 1904: J.W. Evans took personal charge of the Education Department, and is quaintly styled in the records as 'Premier and Minister of Education without portfolio'. - Guide, op. cit., p 110

that the teachers forced the government to set up a Royal Commission on the Administration of the Education Department of Tasmania and the system of State School Education.⁵

The Interim Report of the Commission made a number of recommendations to overcome the immediate difficulties of teachers. It was indicated that a number of factors were involved. For example, many teachers had no knowledge of the regulations under which the Department operated; salary scales and classification criteria were not easily understood, were often impossible to apply and promotion was slow. One teacher giving evidence to the 1882 Select Committee, had been at New Norfolk for 12 years without any change. He said, "I have been 18 years under the Board of Education, have passed all their examinations and am now only receiving 200 per annum."

However, the Royal Commission in 1909 found that the Director was the main cause of the problems,

"It is, Your Commissioners think, certain that the education of the state has suffered partly from the circumstances that the Director has done work that should have been done by others, and partly because his staff of inspectors has, until quite recently been too small to do efficiently and quickly the work involved in training the teachers in new work and methods."

The Commission found that

"Tasmania has provided only the first grade and the last of a system of education, namely, the primary and the University, leaving the gulf between the two to be bridged by private secondary schools, between which and the primary schools there is no coordination, and the doors of which are practically closed to parents whose children cannot afford to pay the fees."⁶

Its recommendations subsequently found legislative form in the Free Education Act 1908, which abolished all fees for state schools, and in the Education Act 1912 which gave the Education Department its present structure and extended state education beyond the primary school. High schools were

⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 49 of 1907 and No. 1 of 1909

⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 1 of 1909 p viii

opened in Hobart and Launceston in 1913 and what were termed "intermediate high schools" in Burnie and Devonport in 1916.

The next major step was the consolidation of the various Education Acts, including the 1912 Act, into the Education Act 1932 under which major legislation the Department still operates, although it has been amended many times since 1932. The preamble of the Act states that it is

"...to consolidate and amend the law relating to education and to provide for and regulate the granting of bursaries and the registration of teachers and schools."

By s. 4(1) the "Governor may appoint a Director-General of Education, a Deputy Director-General of Education and Directors of Primary Education, Secondary Education and Technical Education, and such other officers as he may think fit for the purposes of this Act." Therefore, none of the senior officials in the Department are under the control of the Public Service Board and are appointed, in fact, by the Minister in consultation with the Director-General, in all cases other than his own appointment. Only the clerical staff in the Department are made subject to the Board, leaving all teachers to be appointed by the Director-General outside the control of the Board. The Director-General is "head of the Department for the purposes of the Public Service Act, as if he were an officer to whom the provisions of that Act apply."⁷

All senior departmental officers, mentioned in s. 4(1), have consistently been drawn from the teaching service rather than the clerical side. The promotion ceiling for teachers is therefore higher than for the clerical side of the department and further reference will be made to this important factor later, but it must be noted that it was built into the legislation from its inception. Other employees of the department which

⁷ Education Act, s.4(2A)

are outside the Public Service Act are 'such servants and workmen as are required for the purposes of the Act' and these may be appointed by the minister on the recommendation of the Director-General.⁸ He also has the duty of classifying and paying salaries and allowances to those teachers appointed under s.4(1) and s.4(3) in such a way as he may with the minister's approval determine.

The department is therefore an employing authority of some importance. The growth of full time teaching staff is indicated in Table I.

TABLE 1
Full-time Teachers in Tasmanian Government Schools
At 1st August

Year	Male	Female	Total
1964	393	586	979
1951	422	608	1,030
1956	683	1,478	2,161
1961	908	1,533	2,441
1962	963	1,834	2,797
1963	1,042	1,877	2,919
1964	1,134	1,881	3,015
1965	1,216	1,915	3,131
1966	1,222	1,961	3,183
1967	1,220	2,085	3,305
1968	1,240	2,143	3,383
1969	1,264	2,200	3,464
1970	1,280	2,284	3,564
1971	1,338	2,331	3,669
1972	1,429	2,345	3,774
1973	1,501	2,365	3,866
1974	1,521	2,499	4,020

Its total non-public service staff including teachers as at 1 August 1974 is

Supervisory, Advisory or administrative duties	42
Full and part time teachers	4020
Others	232
	<hr/> 4294 <hr/>

⁸Education Act, s. 4(3)

Teacher training has until recently been the direct responsibility of the department and there has been a Training College in Hobart since 1911 when the Philip Smith College was opened. A further college was opened in Launceston in 1952 and these two institutions remained until 1968. During this time the University was also involved in teacher training, especially for secondary school teachers through the post graduate Diploma of Education courses. The creation of the Tasmanian College of Advanced Education in 1968 removed departmental responsibility for some Technical Education and Teacher Training.

The College was given autonomy from departmental control under the Advanced Education Act 1968 and placed under the direction of a Council on which the department has representation. The expressed purpose of the Council is "to provide a system of advanced education to train persons for the professions".⁹ The department has withdrawn from training its own teachers, although, as an employer, it does retain a considerable degree of influence through its specification of qualification for entry into the teaching service. A further influence is exercised through the department's administration of the Teachers and Schools' Registration Board, which was set up under the 1932 Act for the purpose of regulating the standards of teaching in non-state schools. Table 2 indicates the numbers of trainees involved:

(TABLE 2 - please see next page)

9

Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 9 of 1969, p 27

TABLE 2

Training of Teachers Students in Training as at 1st August¹⁰

Year	Male	Female	Total
1946	32	60	92
1951	83	152	235
1956	124	299	423
1961	183	380	563
1962	229	414	643
1963	221	450	671
1964	225	529	754
1965	258	600	858
1966	299	614	913
1967	321	679	1,000
1968	344	712	1,056
1969	355	773	1,128
1970	405	763	1,168
1971	460	856	1,316
1972	487	871	1,358
1973	488	934	1,422
1974	466	1,046	1,512

However, apart from these staffing provisions the Act places the duty and responsibility for various departmental functions specifically on the minister.¹¹

Amendments to the Act in 1963 and 1966 continue this institutionalised form of traditional ministerial dominance by providing specific powers for the minister in regard to the Board of Technical Education¹² and providing that he may establish, maintain and operate an 'institution for scientific equipment'.¹³ It is also noticeable that, unlike for example Housing, the Annual Report of the Education Department is made to Parliament by the minister and not the Director-General.

¹⁰ Education Department Statistics Branch; personal communication

¹¹ Education Act 1932 ss. 4A, 5, 8, 9, 13 & 16 are examples which are more particularly referred to post p224.

¹² Education Act 1932 s.19 amended by Education Act 1963.

¹³ Education Act 1932 s.32A-C as amended by Education Act 1966.

Growth of the Department

The services provided by the Department have grown steadily over the years since its inception. The introduction of Area Schools for isolated rural communities in the period between 1930 and 1940 was an experiment of considerable importance for Tasmanian education and led the way in Australia. The extension of the school-leaving age to 16 in 1943 and the creation of 'modern schools' were also growth factors.

"In the decade after 1938 Tasmania led Australia in a series of dramatic educational reforms - the abolition of most external examinations, the abolition of homework in the first four grades of primary schools, promotion by age rather than examination results, raising the school leaving age to sixteen, the abolition of inspectors, the transfer of complete responsibility for teacher training to the University."¹⁴

Just as the early reforms had been the direct consequence of the 1882 and 1909 Commissions, so these changes had their origins in two Committees whose reports were published in 1943 and 1946.¹⁵ As a result secondary education in Tasmania by 1955 was organised around the identified needs of children in rural and city areas; and in academic and non-academic subjects. The situation was as follows:

- a) Area Schools - situated in rural areas consolidating adjacent small primary schools and providing a post primary education to school leaving age based on a rurally oriented curriculum. In most cases such schools had access to or actually ran their own farms. They provided six years of primary school and three of secondary, although a few had additional fourth year classes for those who wanted to obtain Schools Board Certificates.
- b) Modern Schools - mainly situated in urban areas for children who were expected to finish their schooling three years after their primary

¹⁴ A. Barcan, "A transition of Australian Education 1939-1967" in J. Cleverly and J. Lawry, (eds.), Australian Education in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Longmans, 1972) p 176.

¹⁵ Education Department of Tasmania, Report of the Committee on Educational Extension (Hobart: 1943); Education Department of Tasmania, Report of the Committee on Education Aims of the Primary School (Hobart: 1946).

education. They were oriented towards technical, manual types of subject and the development of citizenship. Initially, as with the Area School, attached as the 'top' of larger primary schools, they were subsequently made autonomous and allowed to teach a fourth year.


- c) Technical High School - there were only two of these in the cities of Hobart and Launceston. They were intended to provide an entry point for those interested in industrial careers and lead to apprenticeships and cadetships in industry. Their base was also broadened with the introduction of language courses in the 1950s.
- d) High Schools - were to be found in large urban centres and were essentially for the academic child whose expectations were to matriculate. They were selective in intake from examinations in the last year of the primary school. While the curriculum was basically academic, other subjects of a commercial and technical kind were later added. The result was a restricted form of comprehensive school, although it was not so termed at the time. There were eight such schools in 1955: three in Hobart, two in Launceston and the remaining three along the more populated North West Coast.

The pattern remained much the same until the introduction of the comprehensive high schools and matriculation colleges in the 1960s. This change like many others in the field of education was prefaced by much discussion.¹⁶

The first proposals were made to the Council on Secondary Education, set up in 1957 at the request of the Tasmanian Teachers Federation. This Council was an advisory body to assist in planning educational development in the post primary field. Committees to investigate post primary education in Launceston and the development of post primary education in the Hobart

¹⁶For a case study see R.A.Alexander, A Case Study in Decisionmaking: The Establishment of Matriculation Colleges in the Tasmanian Education System. (Unpublished Honours Dissertation, University of Tasmania, December 1973).

THE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF TASMANIA 1973



NOTES:

1. Average ages in years and months calculated from census date, 1 August 1973.
2. A number of district schools include a fourth year class and present candidates for the School Certificate.
3. A very small number of primary schools include secondary classes leading to the School Certificate (Preliminary Award).
4. Special schools are not shown.

area were set up by the Education Department in 1959 and 1960. These, together with the Council, played an important role in arriving at the present state of affairs in education.¹⁷ These changes, while physically expanding the services to meet increasing demands, have at the same time been the product of significant differences in educational philosophies. Not only have these changes of opinion affected the areas mentioned, but their influence has been felt also in the post secondary field.

The Technical Education Branch was formed within the Education Department in 1917 and reorganised into the Board of Technical Education in 1963 in recognition of its increased importance. These considerations are reflected in the Report on The School in Society,

"76...the schools should be concerned in both the development of individuals as individuals and the preparation of individuals to share in and contribute to society.

77...We must remember that the school is not an isolated organisation. Its work is continually affected by outside forces. It does not set its own goals nor can it seek to implement them quite independently of other agencies...

79...While the school's ultimate goal may be to equip children to take their place in society, its ultimate goal is to provide conditions where children may behave and develop as children rather than as little adults, in the belief that childhood lived fully will lead to a capacity for full adulthood."¹⁸

The current position may be seen from the diagram and Table. The diagram indicated the general structure of the school system;¹⁹ Table 3 shows the number of schools involved in each area over the years 1950-1974.²⁰

¹⁷For more detailed analysis of these events see G.L. Johnston, Fifty Years of State Secondary Education in Tasmania 1913-1962, (Unpublished M.A.thesis, University of Tasmania, 1963); Alexander, op. cit.; and L.N. Vertigan, A Case Study in Decisionmaking: A change to Comprehensive Organisation in Tasmanian Secondary Schools, (Unpublished dissertation for Diploma of Public Administration, University of Tasmania, 1967).

¹⁸Education Department of Tasmania, Report of the Committee set up to investigate the Role of the School in Society (Hobart, 1968) p 23.

¹⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 13.

²⁰Education Department of Tasmania, School in Society, Appendix A, brought up to date with figures supplied by Education Department Research Branch.

TABLE 3
APPENDIX A


Type and Class of Schools in Tasmania 1950-1974 : Number of Schools open at Census Date (excluding Special)

School - Type and Class	Number Open					
	1950	1956	1961	1966	1971	1974
Pre Kindergarten	31	51	53	57	44	34
Primary						
IA	2	11	14	12	22	23
I	5	6	12	19	22	25
II	6	10	13	12	19	19
III	7	12	23	34	25	30
IV	20	22	29	30	27	23
V	50	38	31	27	26	28
VI	104	37	17	4	3	6
Total Primary	194	136	139	138	144	154
Primary with Secondary Tops	47	29	19	14	7	1
Area						
IA		1	3	1	2	3
I	1	2	2	7	6	10
II	3	11	14	10	8	3
III	16	22	20	15	15	18
IV	7	5	2	2	4	2
Total Area	27	41	41	35	35	36
District	-	-	-	6	6	-
High						
IA	2	4	14	19	20	22
I	3	3	2	6	5	7
II	1	2	4	5	1	-
III & IV	1	-	1	-	-	-
Unclassified	-	-	-	-	-	1
IA with Matric	-	-	-	-	2	1
Classes	-	-	-	-	-	-
Matriculation	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colleges IA	-	-	-	-	3	5
Total	7	9	21	30	31	36
Secondary (Modern)	1	4	3	-	-	-
Technical High	3	3	1	-	-	-

Note - name Area Schools to District Schools 1974

SCHOOL ENROLMENTS

(1946=100)



Graph 1

All these changes would not have taken place, however, without the demands made by an increasing school population. Graph I indicates the actual enrolments over the years since 1946, showing that the far greater proportion of demand has come from the secondary area in which the changes discussed above have been most clearly in evidence.

Political Leadership and State Aid

Although the first Minister for Education was also the Premier, the portfolio has been one of those frequently joined with other functions under one minister. It has most often been conjointly held by the Attorney General, either alone (for 21 years) or with other portfolios (for 4 years). For 27 years - the longest period by far - it was held by the Premier either alone or together with other portfolios. This indicates that the Department was regarded as of prime importance by the politicians and parliament. Perhaps more significant is the fact that in the years since 1946 it has been held as a sole portfolio for a total of some 20 years, Table 4 sets out full details.

The provision of education by the State has always received support within Tasmania, but there were elements of political risk. The reason why a minister was not appointed during the period between 1885, when the Department of Education was created, and 1904, when Mr. Evans became Premier and minister is evidence of this. Despite the moves to compulsory free primary school education started in 1868 and continued in 1885 little success was achieved until the Act of 1908. The source of this risk is not hard to find - religious education.

"Until 1908 the Catholics struggled to prevent the government from introducing free education while their schools were still unsubsidised. In view of the attractive power of gratuitous state schools to needy Catholic parents this was a natural reaction on the part of the clergy. In the end free education was provided and general public opinion showed no signs of granting Catholic demands."²¹

²¹ R.P.Davis, A Guide to the State Aid Tangle of Tasmania (Hobart: Cat & Fiddle Press, 1974) p. 7.

TABLE 4

	Holder of Education Portfolio
1904-1905	Premier, Minister for Education without portfolio
1905-1906	Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Education
1906-Oct.1907	Attorney-General and Minister for Education
Oct.1909-1912	Attorney-General, Minister for Education and Minister for Mines
1912-1914	Attorney General and Minister for Education
1914-1916	Treasurer, Minister for Education and Minister for Railways
1916-1922	Premier (Chief Secretary & Treasurer) and Minister for Education
1922-1923	Treasurer and Minister for Education
	Attorney General and Minister for Education
1923-1928	Attorney General and Minister for Education to 1924 with Mines and Forests to 1925 with Forests only to 1927 and then reverted to Attorney General and Education to 1928
1928-1934	Attorney General and Minister for Education
1934	ditto
1934-1939	Attorney General, Minister for Education, Minister for Fauna and Game, Minister for Inland and Deep Sea Fisheries
1939-1947	Premier, Minister for Education, Minister administering Hydro-Electric Commission, Minister for Civil Defence, Minister for Commerce and Industry and Treasurer to 1946 with Assistant Minister for Education 1945 then in addition Minister for Transport, Minister for Tourism and Immigration.
1947-1948	Minister for Education and Transport
1948-1958	Premier and Minister for Education
1958-1969	Minister for Education (Mr W.A. Neilson) also Attorney General August-October 1958
1969-1972	Minister for Education (Mr A. Mather)
1972-1973	Minister for Education (Mr Neilson)
1973 to date	Minister for Education, Recreation and the Arts and Minister for National Parks and Wildlife.

Source:

Tasmanian Red Book, Walch's Almanac

A number of premiers and Education ministers were, of course, Catholic and this increased the tension between the needs of a growing demand for state involvement in the field and claims by the Catholic Church schools for parity through state aid. Subsequent events have not buried the issue so strongly evident in the period at the turn of the century.

Dr Davis traces the history of these tensions, especially for members of the Labor Party, committed as they were to free secular education.²² Indeed, one prominent Labour politician, who was later to become premier, Edmund Dwyer Gray, was denounced for his inadequate support of Catholic education from the pulpit of his own church.²³

However, it was not just the Catholics who provided pressure on Education Ministers. The interest of non-Catholics lay in the provision of secondary schools to provide an alternative to those private schools whose fees were too high for the majority of citizens.

"Unlike the Catholics, Protestants were interested in secondary schools which trained an elite, not primary schools for the workers. Until 1912 there were no state high schools to compete with private establishments."²⁴

This pressure led to an acceptance of the concept that all 'private', as opposed to 'state' schools, should receive a return per capita on the basis that parents of children attending those schools were paying 'double taxation'.

"In 1948 a joint parliamentary committee had discovered that Tasmanian private schools saved the state £500,000 per annum. The Liberals, traditionally contemptuous of private primaries but solicitous towards the more elitist independent secondaries, now began to consider their position with regard to State Aid."²⁵

²²See for the period up to 1920 R.P.Davis, State Aid and Tasmanian Politics, 1868-1920 (Hobart: 1969) .

²³R.P.Davis, A Guide, op. cit., p 8 .

²⁴ibid.

²⁵op. cit., p 51 .

The relaxation of the traditional Liberal hostility to state aid led to a long and unsuccessful attempt by Premier Cosgrove, during the 1950s to introduce legislation for per capita grants to non-state schools. On three separate occasions, 1952, 1956 and 1957, he pushed legislation through the House of Assembly only to have it rejected by the Legislative Council. However, the arguments generated during this time affected the Tasmanian political climate for the next decade. Indeed, Dr. Davis claims that there is evidence to indicate vacillations over state aid policies led to much dissension over Liberal Party leadership, possibly even losing them the election of 1959.²⁶ However, it was left to Premier Reece, the first non-Catholic Labour premier in Tasmania, to carry through State Aid legislation successfully.

Federal Labor politics, an imminent election and private school supporters hoping for additional funds, were all elements in this fascinating seed bed, which took until 1967 to germinate. The seedling was not strong:

"These grants [under the legislation] bore no relation whatever to the real difficulties of the Catholic school system which Archbishop Young was determined to keep at full strength and expand to cover the entire Catholic school population. The grants then were a species of Danegeld which the Reece government optimistically²⁷ hoped would keep the Catholics temporarily happy."

A consequence of this was a prolongation of the dispute until the present, the debate becoming more bitter as the underlying issues and principles became less clear. The involvement of the Federal government, through direct and selective grants since the science grants in 1964, did not allow the issue to remain dormant. The problem was no longer one of whether or not to give state aid, but of whether or not to raise the grants already made. Much of this aspect of the fight, or the "Hundred Years War for

²⁶ R.P. Davis, op. cit., pp 60 et seq.

²⁷ op. cit., p 74

State Aid" as Dr Davis called it²⁸ was carried on by two groups - the DOGS (defence of government schools) and the Tasmanian Teachers Federation. The former, "a relatively small but completely dedicated group of intellectuals, many of whom were connected with the University of Tasmania",²⁹ even selected candidates to stand for the state parliament in 1971. They claimed that aggregating all grants and aid, including hidden elements such as tax exemptions, showed private schools were supported by the state to almost the same extent that state schools were. With rapid inflation the position became worse and demands from private schools for further aid only added flames to the fire of the debate, especially after the 1971 budget, which produced what the Catholic Archbishop of Tasmania called 'an almost contemptuous increase of \$4.'³⁰

"The controversy had now become a verbal free-for-all with government, opposition, rival parent bodies, DOGS, ecclesiastics, and teachers in the field battling for their particular viewpoints. The unfortunate government took a battering from every side."³¹

The extremely strong reactions of the Teachers Federation, the association which represents the majority of State employed teachers, indicate its central position in the Tasmanian education system. In the period of the 1950s, while Premier Cosgrove was making his unsuccessful bid for state aid, the teachers were articulate in opposition through their Federation.

"...as state school teachers were responsible for the education of the vast majority of the community's children their practical experience of inadequacies should at least be taken seriously. The teachers in 1957 were supported by numerous state school parents and friends associations whose influence the Catholics admitted to be considerable."³²

As the arguments about comparative financial assistance between state and

²⁸Davis, op. cit., p 97

²⁹op. cit., p 79

³⁰op. cit., p 86

³¹op. cit., p 87

³²op. cit., p 56

and private schools began to dominate, the voice of the Federation was heard more frequently. It was in the term of the Bethune Liberal Government that the Federation actively attacked its master, the State Government. In consequence of the government's announcement that it would increase aid to private schools in 1971, the Federation "denounced it as a 'rude shock' to the state parents and teachers."³³ Later that same year the suggestion by the premier, that the state should pay salaries of private school teachers, was called "'rankly stupid' when some presided over classes of less than ten children while in the state school teachers struggled with 45".³⁴ An indication of the relative student numbers attending state- and private schools in 1966 and 1974 is given in Table 5.

Even the Education Department Superintendants, who had formed their own Institute of Inspectors of Schools, joined in the debate directly in 1969, issuing a statement of their position. In nailing their colours to the non-State aid mast they claim,

"...Institute policy has consistently been identical with that of the two other large organisations directly concerned with the welfare of the state education system - the Council of Parents and Friends' Organisations and the Tasmanian Teachers' Federation. The policy has been to oppose state aid to non-State schools until the state system is provided for adequately."³⁵

In justification they point to their identification with the State system
a
as teachers and subsequently as Inspectors,

"For the greater part of [his] career, each member has been all too painfully aware of the needs of the state school system."³⁶

On no other issue have they found it necessary to go to the length of preparing such a public statement, although they indicate that they are a professional body and concerned with the professional issues in a non political and non sectarian way.

The State Aid issue dramatises in a most revealing way some of the

³³ Davis, op. cit., p 84.

³⁴ op. cit., p 85.

³⁵ Printed handout of the Institute, December 1969.

³⁶ ibid.

TABLE 5

Primary and Secondary Enrolments
Government and Non-Government Schools in 1966 & 1974
(Excludes Pre, Kindergarten and Special)

PRIMARY

		Government	Non Government	Total	% Government	% Non Government
1966	Boys	22,907	4,001	26,908	85.1	14.9
	Girls	21,207	4,293	25,500	83.2	16.8
	Total	44,114	8,294	52,408	84.2	15.8
1974	Boys	21,237	3,068	24,305	87.3	12.7
	Girls	19,846	3,280	23,126	85.9	14.1
	Total	41,083	6,348	47,431	86.6	13.4

SECONDARY

1966	Boys	11,995	2,924	14,919	80.4	19.6
	Girls	10,967	3,178	14,145	77.5	22.5
	Total	22,962	6,102	29,064	79.0	21.0
1974	Boys	15,040	3,022	18,062	83.5	16.5
	Girls	14,239	3,404	17,643	80.7	19.3
	Total	29,279	6,426	35,705	82.1	17.9

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY

1966	Boys	34,902	6,925	41,827	83.4	16.6
	Girls	32,174	7,471	39,645	81.2	18.8
	Total	67,076	14,396	81,472	82.3	17.7
1974	Boys	36,277	6,090	42,367	85.6	14.4
	Girls	34,085	6,684	40,769	83.6	16.4
	Total	70,362	12,774	83,136	84.6	15.4

Source: Education Department Statistics Branch. Personal Communication, providing 1974 figures. 1966 figures in Education Department: School in Society (op. cit.)

major institutional factors which are pertinent to the subsequent interpretation of the interactions and activities of this Department, However, before proceeding to that stage two other important considerations must be discussed, finance and organisation.

Financial Aspects

From the time when primary education was made compulsory, then free, to its extension to the secondary area - from 1868, through 1908 to 1912 - the cost to the community in taxation terms was relatively light, despite the arguments to avoid taxation raised in the Select Committee Report 1882. Table 6 details capital and recurrent expenditure for the three periods

1935/36 - 1939/40; 1949/50 - 1955/56; 1968/69 - 1975/76

The increases in expenditure as shown have always been met from state funds until the sudden Federal Government reversal of 1964. School science block grants of approximately £5million were announced after the 1963 Federal election which seemed to establish the value of direct grants for education as an election winner. From then on the various specialist forms of federal grants gradually increased until by 1970 grants were being made to Science Laboratories (still); Technical education; advanced education; secondary school libraries and universities (other than through the Australian University Council). There is little doubt that to some extent such assistance does have a distorting effect on the spending of the state.³⁷

After 1972, however, the position radically altered through the report of the Karmel Commission.³⁸ This Commission set up by the Australian Government after the Labor victory in the December 1972 elections was intended to identify those areas of education in all states which needed assistance. It recommended funds for primary and secondary education for the period 1974-75 and foreshadowed further Federal assistance for the four year period to 1979.

³⁷This has been demonstrated by B.W.Davis, "Fiscal policies in a claimant state", unpublished paper given to Third Conference of Economic Society of Australia & New Zealand, Adelaide May 1973.

³⁸Schools in Australia. Report of the Australian Schools Commission May 1973.

TABLE 6

Recurrent and Capital Expenditure

1935/36 to 1939/40 1949/50 to 1955/56 1969/70 to 1975/76

<u>Year</u>	<u>Recurrent</u>	<u>Capital</u>
	<u>£</u>	<u>£</u>
1935/36	273,830	54,139
1936/37	292,726	62,375
1937/38	325,862	65,554
1938/39	341,442	78,770
1939/40	356,087	70,472
	<u>£</u>	<u>£</u>
1949/50	2,674,684	485,702
1950/51	2,857,784	1,089,874
1951/52	3,949,938	1,302,120
1952/53	4,913,890	1,237,886
1953/54	5,196,808	1,700,712
1954/55	5,738,110	2,577,186
1955/56	6,087,736	2,196,458
1969/70	27,731,735	4,600,000
1970/71	29,831,050	6,400,000
1971/72	35,359,641	8,000,000
1972/73	37,797,697	10,500,000
1973/74	45,137,372	13,500,000
1974/75	61,186,520	17,500,000
1975/76	80,591,911	27,057,000

(Source: Education Department Accountant)

"The period from July to December 1973 was a period of intense planning to implement the recommendations of the Karmel Report in Tasmania from the beginning of the 1974 school year. Committees were set up to plan, manage and implement the six individual programmes for which funds had been recommended for primary and secondary education in Tasmania."³⁹

Additional funds of over \$12million were provided during the period 1974-75 to be expended on both capital and recurrent costs of, e.g., special education, general buildings, teacher development and disadvantaged schools. These areas would certainly not have been dealt with in a state priority list without external funding sources, but equally they placed pressures on other areas of departmental expenditure.

In a similar way State Treasury has a degree of influence over funds and internal priorities. Annual budgeting means competing for available resources with other departments, the Treasury playing an arbitral role. Treasury can also be involved in much more detail, for example by limiting the number of teachers to be employed or studentships to be offered in any one year.⁴⁰

Organisational Matters

The Education Department is referred to as a 'social welfare department' in the Treasurer's Reports to Parliament and has traditionally had a 'professional' orientation to this purpose. At no time have those in charge of the administration of the Department been other than promoted teachers. There are certain clerical officers, whose senior officer is the Chief Administrative Officer, concerned mainly with accounting, equipment, record keeping and similar support services, but these have never displaced the

³⁹ Report of the Minister for Education for the year to December 1973. Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974 p 17.

⁴⁰ Some of these matters have been covered in D.A. Jecks, "Major Aspects of the Organisation and Administration of Australian Education" in A. MacLaine and R. Selby Smith (eds), Fundamental Issues of Australian Education (Sydney: Ian Novak, 1971).

promoted teacher in senior positions of the department. This situation has led to some extent to a centralised education system. Educational decisions are made by experts at the head office to whom other teachers defer on educational grounds. Perhaps the harshest criticism of the 'bureaucratic control' of the department comes from the principals of schools whose demands are not always met with the expedition they expect. It has also led to some administrative problems within the department in that many administrative officers find promoted teachers rather unacceptable task masters. However, the Chief Administrative Officer did not regard any such difficulties as insurmountable in normal day to day affairs. There were also a number of interdepartmental committees whose members are both clerical and professional, where they worked together very amicably, with satisfactory results. No doubt the fact that the Education Act 1932 gives no specific functional authority to the Director-General, or his Directors and other officers, for departmental administration, accounts to some extent for these tensions.

Analysis

In the remainder of this chapter the framework specified in Chapter II will be used to explore further in an ordered way the information impressionistically referred to above. The purpose, as in the previous chapter, will be to clarify the particular relationship between the minister and his department, more especially his senior officers, and its effect on his accountability and control. Such interactions and activities regarded as important centrifugal forces are dealt with under the following headings:

circumjacent groups; legislative provisions; professional staff; financial arrangements; and departmental tradition.

A. Circumjacent groups

Education in the modern world is an activity which affects every person either directly as a student, or indirectly as, for example, a parent or

employer. In this sense everybody is an expert in the education field and so the minister and departmental officers may be expected to become involved with the world outside the department. The minister is therefore in a relatively exposed position.⁴¹

In fact there appears to be less direct intervention than might be expected from persons and bodies outside the government system. Certainly, the minister spends a considerable amount of time dealing with deputations of one kind and another. Most of these, however, seem to deal with such non-educational matters as the provision of paper towels in toilets; the state of repair of school buildings; or school bus problems of groups of parents living away from main bus routes. Other than the issue of religious teaching in schools and the State aid question, there has not been any great controversy recently about education in a professional sense. Most of the 'consumers' seem to have accepted the professionalism of the teaching staff within the department.

However, it is appropriate to distinguish between two kinds of circumjacent groups who have direct and continuous interaction with the minister and his department - those who are concerned with educational matters and the professional activities of the department and those whose particular interest is the 'administrative' aspect, equipment, buildings, staffing and like matters. The distinction is an arbitrary one in the sense that interest in one may also mean involvement with the other, but for the purpose of seeing the effect and the meaning for the minister and his senior officers it is a relevant distinction. This is reinforced by the interviews which showed generally that "professional matters" were left by the minister for the professional staff wherever possible. For example, the minister would take officers with him to meet a deputation and would expect them to brief him

⁴¹ See for example the range of interested persons and bodies giving evidence to the Committee to investigate the Role of School in Society op. cit., Appendix F, pp 77-78.

before the meeting, but also be ready to express an opinion should the minister ask them. But only professional staff, such as the Director General, Deputy Director General and the Directors, were invited to attend meetings in this way. The Deputy Director General said that the minister involved him in discussions with deputations "very much", whereas the Chief Administrative Officer said he was hardly ever called in. Occasionally, the officer in charge of buildings or bus contracts would be requested to attend where the matter to be discussed was their direct concern.

There are a number of clearly identifiable professional groups and persons who are in continuous interaction with the minister and his department:

- (a) those groups and specialist organisations external to the department whose task is directly related to education, for example, the Teachers' Federation, the Kindergarten Union, the Tasmanian Technical College Staff Society, the Schools Board, Boards of Technical Education;
- (b) those groups within the department itself who have some professional standing, either through their position, for example, the Tasmanian Institute of Inspectors of Schools, or the Curriculum Branch;
- (c) individuals within the teaching service who have been recognised for specialist areas such as the Supervisors of specialist subjects, or Guidance Officers, or even some specialist classroom teachers, e.g. remedial.

The non-professional aspects are the concern of many more bodies - as may be expected - with far more varied backgrounds and thus harder to classify. They include Parents and Friends Associations in each school with a Council operating as a coordinating body at State level and Boards of Advice within municipalities, which may be appointed by the minister to keep him informed about the educational facilities in their municipality. Both of these bodies comprise laymen outside the government system. The remaining groups and individuals are largely within that system and include Cabinet, Parliament, Treasury, and the Public Service Board.

In discussing, briefly, each of the interaction groups mentioned, it is perhaps appropriate to examine the Parents and Friends Associations first, since these are the only Consumer representatives. No student organisation, even where they exist, e.g. Secondary Students Union, appear to interact directly with the minister or the department. All contact between the Parents and Friends organisations and the department is routed through the minister. There are contacts with individual officers in the normal daily routine matters, but other than that the minister deals directly with the public even though he may have his officers present when so doing. Mr. Neilson, who - it will be remembered - had the longest period as Minister since the portfolio was commissioned, stated that he was constantly seeing deputations of all kinds. Parents and Friends groups, who were concerned with physical matters such as buildings, equipment, bus routes and staffing, predominated.

He also pointed out that he allowed his senior officers complete discretion in their dealings with the public and that the practice over the years had grown that the Director General would be most concerned with professional matters. The Director General and his Deputy clearly exercised this discretion very cautiously, both stating that they felt somewhat sheltered from the external world by the presence of the minister who "relieved them of the pressure". Most interviewees noted that ministers never attempted to avoid responsibility by 'placing us in the firing line'.

Mr. Mather (Liberal) who was minister for 2 1/2 years, made the point that there were 240 Parents and Friends Associations in Tasmania, and he visited 150 of these in their own schools during his period of office. Most of the discussions he had were about the needs of the school, what he called 'bread and butter issues rather than broad policy.' He also followed the same procedure for meetings that had evolved during his predecessor's office - collecting information from the department about the problem to be discussed with the deputation, having an officer present who acts as adviser and prepares notes of the meeting and sends a copy of the decisions to the minister, deputation and the appropriate officers in the department.

Since there is a great deal of stress placed on personal contact with the minister in such a sparsely populated State as Tasmania, these deputations are regarded as politically important. The minister does therefore make himself readily accessible to all manner of persons and groups, and it is to be noted that it forms a vital part of the decision processes within the department. This is underlined by the formalising of the procedures for such meetings so that the department is kept informed about actions expected of them as a consequence. As the Chief Administrative Officer made clear, the majority of matters discussed had consequences for the administrative side rather than the professional, that is to say they involved expenditure of funds, probably already allocated for some other purpose. It must be noted, however, that none of the officers felt they were inhibited in any way by the methods adopted to deal with such external relationships. Only when discussion of professional education matters arose were some comments unfavourable.

Another group of extremely important non-professional interactions arise from intra-departmental activities, more particularly with Treasury and Public Service Board.⁴² Apart from the usual Treasury demand for estimates and subsequent audit requirements they have very little direct involvement, since the department appears free to utilise funds once granted. There are a few externally funded projects, some money coming for libraries or science equipment direct from the Australian government, as mentioned previously, but the major proportion of funding is derived from State sources. The commitment to education as a service by all governments seems to have ensured that its resources are much more flexible than in some other departments. As will be mentioned later under "Finance", whilst the actual amount of revenue funding is closely controlled at estimate time, once the funds

⁴² It will be noted later in Chapter VI that these two departments play a vital role in the relationship between minister and official, but more particularly as between official and official. They are representative of 'principle' as opposed to 'interest', which is referred to in L. Peres, "Principle or Interest? Changing Roles within Australian Government."

have been approved the department is relatively free to operate. In any case, there seemed to be very specific financial procedures within the department which were effective in maintaining an internal control system, thus requiring less direct Treasury involvement than might otherwise have been the case. It appeared that the Chief Administrative Officer was extremely conscious of this need, especially on the revenue side of expenditure.

However, relationships with the Public Service Board were regarded as rather frustrating. The Chief Administrative Officer was not so concerned about recruitment and promotion matters dealt with by the Board. He was disturbed at the seemingly unnecessary coordinating committees created by the Board in such areas as mechanical aids and office accommodation. Just as was the case in Housing and Health, these two aspects of the Board's work seem to represent major interference in the work of departments. The Mechanical Aid Committee of the Public Service Board was apparently hindering the provision of visible recording through computer use within the department. This is especially important in a department which pays about \$35 million a year in salaries. The Committee were endeavouring to centralise all computer use with a view to saving on equipment costs, but it seems likely that the very different uses required by each department will defeat this aim. The departmental frustration comes from not being able to make the Committee accept this point. The long lead time necessary for planning such operations means that an increasing work load has to be placed on staff handling material that could better be dealt with on such a computer, staffing problems arise and thus increase the Chief Administrative Officer's difficulties. But this can scarcely be regarded as a major problem area over the whole range of department functions.

Finally, in this group of interactions Parliament and Cabinet must be considered and some reference made to relations with the Australian Government. Ministers, members of parliament representing a constituency and particular electors, must always be subject to some tension in their decisions. Some

will avoid direct responsibility by claiming they were acting on specialist advice, others will try to meet all demands. Neither way will the expectations of the electorate and the specialist proposals be reconciled in every situation. As was suggested, it can be embarrassing on occasions when decisions have to be made on a political basis when it is realised that advice from the professional was against it. The balance between the policy of the department and the politically important needs of an individual voter is a very difficult one to maintain. One example was given, where a decision had to be made as to who should be exempt from attendance at school before reaching school leaving age. This matter is initiated at age 15 by parents of children wishing to take up employment. They approach the Headmaster of the school and the procedures are then entirely based on professional judgement. Often parents of those children, refused permission to leave, take the matter up with their member of parliament and thence to the minister. In this situation he is often obliged to make a specifically political decision to exempt the student against the professional advice of his officers.

The minister pointed out that sometimes officers themselves favour a minister's own electorate in their decisions, not because he asks them, but out of a political awareness. However, ministers generally tended to accept professional decisions to avoid entanglement in political/educational clashes, but they are quite aware of the difficulties. Neither ministers nor officers suggested that individual parliamentarians were a worry to them. Indeed, such is the apparent disdain ministers have for parliament in general that one Labor Cabinet issued instructions that no parliamentarian was to be answered directly by an officer, all statements had to be made through a Press Officer or through the minister himself. This rule was relaxed if the question related to matters of fact under the Act or Regulations. However, some senior officers did not feel constrained by these instructions, since they made a judgement about what was proper to route through the minister. Many of the questions are of a personal nature and it was felt that few

Opposition questions were dangerous for the minister.

One Director did feel quite strongly that, as professionals, they should make public statements, and that the Director-General should be able to make policy statements, in public more often. The Director gave the example of a statement he made about the introduction of driver education at Clarence High School, which had not been previously announced by the minister or sent out as information over the minister's signature. He was "hailed over the coals" by his minister as he had acted contrary to established policy. It may thus be surmised that Parliament does not figure largely in the minds of minister and department as a constraint. This is not to say, however, that the Parliamentary Question is ignored. In this department as in others questions take up the time of many officers and of the minister. For example, in the 35th Parliament Second Session of the House of Assembly from March 11, 1970 to February 17, 1971 Parliamentarians asked 661 questions of which 120 related solely to Education.⁴³

As in the case of other departments there are no Parliamentary Standing Committees which become involved in the department procedures other than the Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation, Public Accounts and Public Works. The Committee on Public Works has the task of investigating all proposals for capital works over the cost of \$250,000. This involves all new schools and many additions and alterations, thus demanding an explanation from departmental officers justifying the expenditure. All building work is done under the control and design of the Architects Branch of the Public Works Department and they are the main witnesses before the Committee, but since the Education Department is the client, they have to give evidence about their particular needs. This does cause them some problem when their requirements are unusual or slightly controversial, as in the case of the Rosny Matriculation College, or Roseneath Open Plan Primary School. There is, however, hardly any argument about the basis

⁴³ See Appendix for details of the questions.

education philosophy behind the planning, only in relation to specific expenditure.

Parliamentarians also become involved in education matters in the supply debates after the budget. There have been no parliamentary inquiries or Royal Commissions into education since the passing of the Education Act 1932, although the Department itself has set up Departmental Inquiries, the last one being in 1968 which produced the Report 'Schools in Society' (p 160).

If parliament fails to arouse much concern in ministers or officials, the same cannot be said of Cabinet, whose decisions could affect departmental programs. At estimate time, when all ministers are attempting to promote their department's proposals, they are judged by their capacity to carry the day for the department. Cabinet decisions about these proposals is intended to have an effect. At other times, however, it does appear that much business is taken up in Cabinet meetings which may not be anticipated by departments. Ministers mention matters 'in passing' for the information of their colleagues and the consequence may be a changed decision. For example, the Education minister, as a result of a Cabinet meeting, agreed to postpone planning for the second stage of Rosny Matriculation College. The Public Works Department officers were told of this decision by their minister almost two months before officers of the Education Department.

One of the problems the officers have to contend with is that of different time spans on which they, the minister and Cabinet operate. In regard to such matters as building and equipment programmes most of the planning is done on a three to five year basis. Estimates of student numbers are based on statistical evidence and plans made for future needs. The minister and Cabinet have to be much more immediately sensitive and ready to switch their programmes to give priority to those areas most electorally advantageous. Forward planning becomes very difficult in such circumstances which is worrying to the ministers who rely most on department advice. One minister

pointed out "We are living in the present, but also in the future, for example the loan funds campaign starts at Christmas. Policy becomes politically difficult to achieve, especially since I regard the middle to long term as my most important decision area."

On the other hand, the demand for resources at Cabinet level is bound to be competitive, and one in which ministers must choose departmental priorities. It is, therefore, a constraint on long term programs, but since most ministers are practical persons they would rather select alternatives on practical grounds. These may eventually prove the theories on which they were based, or may not; for example, the policy to introduce Matriculation Colleges was accepted much quicker than had been expected and proved a great success. Ministers rarely see much difference between deciding about long term and short term proposals, it is the result that counts, and their own preference for certain areas of education at any one time can have some effect on those priorities. One minister of long standing also indicated that normally he would take matters to Cabinet if he felt they were politically significant, not necessarily for decision, but more for information. One particular matter was the closing of a bus route in another member's electorate. He also mentioned that he could not recall any time in Cabinet when the opposition was so great that he had not got his way. The Director General did note, however, that any major changes in policy, or even those not major but politically sensitive, would almost always be presented to Cabinet before decision finally taken. Even where professional advice was given as the grounds for changing policy the matter would not be finally decided until Cabinet had given it consideration.

Some matters are raised outside Cabinet by other ministers, or even by the Premier, direct with the minister. Some Premiers have been more dominant than others in this regard. One quoted example is derived from the Liberal Government's ministry. Under his authority contained in the Education Act, the Director General had appointed two new superintendants, one of whom, Mr. K. Axton, was apparently regarded as unsatisfactory by "a certain group

of teachers". Obtaining no satisfaction from their meeting with the minister, this group had sent a deputation to see the Premier and place their grievance before him. As a consequence the Premier presumably directed his minister to re-examine the appointment, which the minister had caused his Director-General to do.

"Mr. Mather said he did not consider that appointments within the department were a political matter and he had every confidence in the judgement, experience and impartiality of Mr. Gough (the Director General) and other senior officers in making the appointment. However when a deputation eventually brought the matter before the Premier (Mr Bethune) he asked Mr. Gough to re-examine the appointment of Mr. Axton. Mr. Gough now had thoroughly re-examined all aspects of the appointment and this had enabled him to reaffirm his original decision with every confidence that Mr. Axton was the best man for the job."⁴⁴

Such public examples are rare and may not be taken as evidence for strong intervention from Premiers in general, when it does occur, it weakens the position of the minister.

A final example of the way in which Cabinet can interfere with departmental priorities and decisions is given by the Director-General. He pointed out that it has been the policy of all Tasmanian Cabinets to utilise all monies available from Australian Government sources. Since this money is made available without much reference to state needs, e.g. science laboratories, it does distort departmental decisions on some occasions. Where these monies are made available over a period of time they can be built into the forward planning, matching grants, however, provide the department with a problem when state funds could have been spent more usefully elsewhere.

Apart from this financial aspect the Australian Government does not play too great a role in departmental decisions. There are regular meetings of officers and ministers, state and federal, but these rarely affect matters currently under consideration in the department. Recently created commissions at federal level, the Schools Commission, the Karmel Commission, the Technical

⁴⁴The Mercury 19/4/1972.

Education Commission and the Children's Commission have all had considerable direct involvement in departmental affairs, but, since their main thrust has been to providing funds, they will be dealt with in more detail under "finance" (heading D).

It is also proposed to deal more specifically with the effect the professional groups have on the minister and his officers under the heading "professional" (heading C). Nonetheless, stress must be placed in this section on the tremendous impact this has on the department. Both ministers made it quite clear that they were prepared to allow the professionals to make decisions on educational matters. One went so far as to say that he avoided making statements about educational matters that were not prefaced by the words "advised by", and he instanced the decision to allow sex education as part of the social science course.

Three elements appear in all decisions - the political, the departmental and the professional - they overlapped frequently, but they were all relevant in any consideration of the problems. Yet this does not make the minister any less responsible for those decisions in which he allows professionals to dominate. All were engaged in finding means to the ends of education policy. In the final analysis, however, the minister must be prepared to overrule professional advice if the politics of the situation demanded it.

Not all ministers are so certain, some are more ambivalent about their stance. On the one hand one minister stated that it was his practice over many years to allow the Director-General an overall say on professional matters, and that it was less likely that he would have strong disagreements with his officers over those matters than administrative ones. Yet in his relations with Parliament he expected to argue in support of his departmental activities on professional grounds "professional advice conveyed to Parliament often sways parliamentarians."

In so doing and being in the one portfolio for so long he felt he might

be in danger of becoming a professional himself, particularly as he thought his style of administration was "to get much more engaged in professional areas, perhaps more than any other Australian education minister." He did not like to have power without the understanding, and found it hard to reconcile with his particular biases.

Summation

One of the most important elements within the circumjacent groups is the perceived need by the minister, accepted by his officers, to be accessible at all times to the public. This exposes the department to many external forces, which it cannot protect itself against because of the uncertainty. Even though the minister is accompanied by departmental officers, often with special knowledge of the problem to be discussed, there is little control over the minister utilising the occasion for political gain. The wide range of groups involved, from Parents and Friends Associations wanting paper towels in toilets, to student teachers complaining about the severity of bonding, to discussions with the Chamber of Manufacturers about the apprenticeship training at the Technical College, provides a political base for the minister from which he can dominate the professionals. The general attitudes of the professional officers, who feel relatively secure in their expertise and have not been specifically challenged to any great extent by the adoption of a dominant political line by the minister, supplement this element of ministerial control. So long as education is regarded as an area of prime importance for the government the minister is likely to benefit. There is also the fact that the external professional links which the departmental officers have are mainly with those also employed by the department. For example teachers, through the Teachers Federation, the Institute of School Inspectors, or those who are committed to the educational ends and whose appointment depends on the minister, e.g. the Schools Board, the Standing Committee on Teacher Education, or the School in Society Committee.

Education has been a single portfolio or at most joined with one other

for a considerable part of its existence, and more particularly has been the province of a single politician for a long period. Since 1947 there have only been five members of parliament in charge of the portfolio, two can be largely discounted as they were only incumbents for a year each; one other for 2 1/2 years during the only Liberal ministry, leaving two members - Mr. Cosgrove as Premier and Minister for Education during the period 1948-58; and Mr. Neilson, as Minister for Education only from 1958-1973 with the short interregnum of the Liberals 1969-72. There is little doubt that the minister does almost become a professional himself in these circumstances, which considerably reduces the potential support from outside the department for the professional officers.

Circumjacent groups such as Parliament and the operations of Australian Government are to some extent centrifugal forces, but ministers tend to see parliament as more of an irritation than an antagonist or threat. There are no specific groups in parliament with the task of surveying education policy other than the member of the Opposition, whose information sources are extremely limited and it is unlikely that this would provide any support for officers as against the minister.

The operations of the Australian Government especially in the recent two years, has caused some undermining of the minister's control over education decisions. However, this has not increased departmental officers' dominance over these decisions at the expense of the minister. Both seem to be at an equal disadvantage in the process since there are no apparent links between the two groups and their Federal counterparts. It is true that most of the Federal decisions about matching grants and funding in the education sphere are taken on the advice of experts, and may well accord in general terms with the professional opinion of departmental officers. However, there is no direct relationship between those decisions and the programmes already in the planning stages within the department. As a consequence the tendency is to find the minister and his departmental officers together objecting to

the distortions caused by such assistance from the Australian Government.

In general, therefore, it seems the minister is in a very strong position within the department, most of the centrifugal forces operating from the interactions with circumjacent groups are relatively minor.

B. Legislative provisions

Any statute making provision for performing specific functions will be more concerned with stating the means by which the task is to be undertaken than defining the task itself. The Education Act 1932 is no exception in that education is taken as a self evident term. In the Act stress is laid upon the establishment and maintenance of schools, the responsibility of parents of children between the ages of 6 and 16 to enrol their children in such schools, acquisition of land for the construction of schools and the erection and maintenance of school buildings. The only specific reference to the content of education is contained in Section 6, which endorses non-sectarian teaching and restricts the possibility of religious teaching to those who have positively asked for it, and then only for one hour a week by one clergyman.

The Act gives very clear dominance to the minister in relation to the Director-General and other officers so far as duties are defined. The minister has the duty to:

- establish and maintain institutes for training teachers (s. 4A)
- establish schools (s. 5(1))
- close schools (s. 5(4))
- take proceedings against parents for not sending children to school (s.8 & s.9)
- educate blind, deaf and mute children in default of parents (s. 13)
- sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land vested in the department with the consent of the Governor (s. 16(2))
- make an Annual Report to Parliament on the condition and progress of the school maintained (s. 19)

- vest his powers under the Act in respect of Technical Education in a Board of Technical Education (s. 19A - D)
- establish, manage, maintain and operate an institution called the "scientific equipment centre" (s. 32A - C).

In addition to these direct duties contained in the Act, there is provision for the Governor to appoint senior personnel, teachers and other officers, i.e. outside the Public Service Act, and to make regulations. These latter are most importantly related to the terms and conditions of service of the non public service staff of the department, the teaching staff.

These staff are to be "paid such salaries and allowances and classified, as the Director-General, with the approval of the Minister, may determine." (s.4(4)). But beyond this reference to the duties of the Director-General and the provision for recommending to the Minister appointment of "such servants, workmen and other employees" (s. 4(3)) there is nothing to indicate his major functions.⁴⁵ It may be that this is a direct result of the earlier history of the department which gave rise to several Royal Commissions and Inquiries in the first decade of this century. Whatever the cause, it is significant that while the statute has been amended some 22 times nothing has been done deliberately to change this situation. Ministers did not feel any radical change was necessary, because the existing statute allowed sufficient flexibility and changes to occur if required. One minister went so far as to say the "Act positively suited him", and that "it was an extremely flexible Act for the minister, although perhaps not for Parliament or the public." If any attempts were made to redraft it might be seen as an opportunity to restrain activities in some way not now possible. There did not seem much likelihood of this occurring as no one had ever put pressure on

⁴⁵This Act is very different from either of the major statutes under which the Housing Department and Health Department operates, in not giving specific authority for certain acts to the Director-General.

the minister to redraft the Act.

The Chief Administrative Officer, whose task is to ensure that a proper authority is available for all departmental activities, especially those which require expenditure, stressed the importance of the statute, but also the regulations made under it. He noted that most day to day activities of the department were covered by regulations or administrative instructions under the hand of the minister. These permitted the officers to deal with most of the administrative duties specifically given to the minister by the Act. He pointed out that the minister has the right to exercise any of those duties, but that he rarely does, "incursions into the field by the minister are not generally of any importance". The Director-General thought that a rewrite was preferable, but unlikely to occur for practical political reasons. He particularly gave as an example of the problems that could be encountered, the religious education question. So he was prepared to settle for piecemeal change as and when possible.

This is indeed the kind of change that has occurred with 22 amending Acts since 1932. Of the 48 sections in the original Act only three have never been amended - s.26 (Payment of bursaries); s. 43 (Appropriation of fees and penalties to the Registration Board); and s. 44 (Inspections of schools by the Registration Board). All of these sections are relatively minor administrative matters which would not change over time. The latest amending Act (No. 41 of 1967) gave legislative approval to the organisational form the department had evolved to that time and also made more explicit arrangements for Technical Education, giving more discretion to the Boards of Technical Education.

None of the changes that have taken place in the legislation have caused any particular difficulty in Parliament. Most have been derived from within the department as providing legislative authority for changes that had already taken place or that were planned. The fact is that Parliament is

not sufficiently expert in the area to understand what may be required in matters of detail. There are no special committees to air publically possible internal problems or generate interest in broad policy areas. The range of activities carried out by the department under the Act and the interpretation of priority areas is in no way inhibited by the legislation.

There are some Australian Government legislative provisions which impinge on the decisions made in the department. All are concerned with special financial assistance for Science Laboratories (1965); Technical Training (1965); Advanced Education (1967); Secondary School Libraries (1968); and University financial assistance (1963-66). Many of these special purpose grants have been absorbed into new proposals derived from the Karmel Report.⁴⁶ As a consequence the States Grants (Schools) Act was passed in December 1973 in Commonwealth Parliament, bringing into being a funding programme for six individual areas: disadvantaged schools, special education, libraries, teacher development, general recurrent and general buildings. These programmes are based on State expectations for the future and this may be tied to planning at state level.

Some necessary readjustment of the organisation of the department has occurred and a number of committees have been set up headed by various departmental senior officers to administer each programme. As the Annual Report of the Minister stated,

"The Karmel Report is generally viewed as one of the most significant educational documents produced in Australia and contains many implications, not only for priority programmes in education but also for the administration of these programmes!"⁴⁷

What the consequences are for the position of the minister in respect of

⁴⁶Schools in Australia prepared by an Interim Committee of the Australian Schools Commission, May 1973.

⁴⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 45.

his departmental officers is, at this point in time, impossible to predict. It could well be, however, that they will undermine his dominance through the continual interaction that must occur between professionals, both educators and administrators, from his own department and the Federal department. At this officer level, it may be imagined, many of the basic decisions will be taken, preempting subsequent ministerial control over priorities.

Summation

Generally speaking there seems little in either the current statute or the amendments to alter the original Act. The formal arrangements stated then and unchanged since, have been to provide the minister, not the departmental head with authority and no means by which the department head could use that legislation to inhibit the minister. There are no permanent parliamentary committees and have been no recent inquiries to change the legislative position.

Another factor, which militates against the possibility of using the legislation as a means of altering the balance between the minister and departmental head, is the lack of definition of purpose in the statute. There is nothing in the Act which a departmental head could use to identify as a professional as opposed to a political aim. It was quite clear that these two perspectives may be opposed to one another, but clothing the political aim with reputed professional advice means that there is no redress, apart from publically contradicting the minister. Such an action would not result in any benefit where education receives uncontested support from all sources of authority of the public in general.

The only time the parliamentarian is really active is during conflict between one or more of their constituents and the department over some decision on educational matters or funding. Neither of these problems is likely to enhance the position of the departmental officer at the expense

of the minister. There is little other opportunity of departmental officers building influence networks within the legislature.

C. Professional Staff

The division of tasks by function directly leads to differentiation by specialisation in the complex activities of government. It is not unexpected, therefore, to find that departments have their own particular professional group around which the departmental function is built. Education, like engineering, is traditionally both a field of specialisation and a generalisation for many other specialisms. Unlike engineering it has only recently become acceptable as a profession.

In the Tasmanian context, the numerical dominance of the primary school section has had a significant effect on the rate of change to professionalism. It was only in 1958, with the introduction of comprehensive schools, that the secondary school system grew beyond the four academic High Schools in Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and Devonport, founded between 1913 and 1916. The relatively few high school teachers required had been trained at the University of Tasmania, where from 1948 the Faculty of Education offered a Diploma of Education in an additional year following a three year undergraduate degree. Most primary school teachers and some secondary teachers were trained in Practice Schools, in conjunction with the Philip Smith Teachers College under the control of the Education Department until 1971. Since that date the College of Advanced Education has been responsible for the training of primary school teachers and some secondary and physical Education and Art Teachers, and the University Faculty of Education for most secondary and some primary school teachers. These courses have reflected the rapid growth of specialist educationists throughout the world in the past ten years, with the consequence, in Tasmania as elsewhere, of the greater recognition of teaching as a profession.

During the whole of this period teachers, whether primary or secondary, have almost all been members of the Teachers Federation. This body has had a continuous existence for over 70 years, and was until 1969 the only association which was available to protect teachers' interests. In 1969 there was a breakaway movement by those employed at the Technical College, because, they claimed, their interests had been subordinated to those of teachers in general and primary school teachers in particular.

Sectional meetings have more recently been held to accommodate the differing interests within the Federation. For example, in 1968 the following groups met at the Annual Conference: Area School teachers, High School teachers, Primary School teachers, Infant School teachers, Technical College Instructors and Lecturers, and Supervisors. Of these only the Technical College Staff have become a separated body.

Continuous existence of the professional body has done much to promote the identity of the teacher in society and foster in teachers a community of interest. If professionals were to be dominant in education decisionmaking rather than allow the minister to dictate aims, the Teachers Federation would play a major role in education policy. It could be expected to act as a forum in which the broader issues of education are discussed and to have an extremely influential place in the Tasmanian education context. This has not occurred however, although the Federation has played a very important role in maintaining a close contact between teachers and the department. The extremely good relations, disturbed only rarely, have been directly brought about through the way in which the department consult with the Federation. There are examples which indicate the strength of these ties with the Department. One relates to the introduction of a new classification and promotion scheme in 1955; the other concerns the apparent interdependence of Federation executive membership and promotion to senior administrative positions within the Department.

In 1955 a major reclassification of positions was undertaken and consequent changes to the promotion system were made. The work was completed and changeover effected without the conflict normally associated with such internal disturbances. Undoubtedly, this was in large measure due to the joint Federation and Department consultations and committees which the Director recognised:

"After considerable planning in cooperation with the Tasmanian Teachers Federation a new scheme of classification and promotion was inaugurated as from the beginning of 1955. Positive efforts have been made to enable the Tasmanian Teachers Federation to participate in the cooperative formulation of major policy and the assistance given by the Federation is highly valued."⁴⁸

Other formal linkages, apart from the informal ones maintained through senior officers' prior membership of the Federation mentioned later, are through committees, such as the Joint Departmental Standing Committee which meets regularly and discusses a wide range of matters of mutual interest. There are also other committees to which the Federation appointed representatives in 1974 such as

- Promotions and Certificates
- Appeals Board
- Regulations and Certificates
- Teaching Aids Policy
- Building Appraisal
- School Furniture
- In-Service Education
- Interim Committee for C.C.E.T.
- Disciplinary Appeal Board
- Aus. Schools Commission committees -
 - Karmel Co-ordinating
 - Disadvantaged
 - Teacher Development
 - Special
 - Recurrent Secondary
 - Country Education
- Leave Review
- Primary Libraries
- Director-General's Organisation Enquiry
- Canoeing

There can be little doubt that the value of the Federation to the Department has also been recognised by the number of ex-officio bearers who take up

⁴⁸ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 60 of 1956; Directors Report for 1955

senior positions in the Department. The list below shows recently retired officers indicating their position in the Department at retirement, and the office held in the Federation prior to their appointment to the Department administrative staff:

M.A.S.McNeair	Superintendent of High Schools President of Federation 1934, 1939, 1949, 1950 Australian Teachers' Federation President 1949	Retired 1965
L.F.Briggs	Superintendent High Schools President 1941	Retired 1965
P.J. Clifford	Principal Launceston Technical College (superintendent status) Executive member 1959-60	Resigned 1967
G. Lewis	Director of Adult Education President 1945-1948	Retired 1973
C.D. Brown	Director of Secondary Education President and ATF President 1966	Retired 1973
K. Lee	District Superintendent North West Vice President 1966-67, Acting President 1967 to April	Retired 1972
T. Jacobs	Superintendent High Schools President 1965	Retired 1972
A.T.Brown	Director of Personnel Vice-President 1959-61	Retired 1974

(Source: Teachers Federation Records, provided by Deputy Secretary)

Similarly, of the senior departmental staff in service in 1974 the following had been Federation executive members:

J.G. Scott	Director of Secondary Education Executive member 1960-63
R.F. Scott	Director of Primary Education Vice-President 1966-13/1/1967 then Acting President until April 1967 then appointed Superintendent

L.F. Billing	Director, North West Region President 1957-1959
G.E.N. Miller	Chief Personnel Officer Representative on Promotions and Certificates Committee
K.R. Hudspeth	Staff Superintendent Buildings President 1955-1957 A.T.F. President 1955
N.H. Campbell	Coordinator of Planning President 1961-1963
D.R. Hunt	Superintendent President 1970-1973 A.T.F. President 1962
P. Rollins	Superintendent Vice-President (North West) 1970-74 President elect 1974 did not take office
E.G.A. Morse	Superintendent Executive Member 1972-74

(Source: Teachers Federation records, provided by Deputy Secretary)

In another way ties have been strengthened between the teaching service and the department, and thus implicitly with the Federation.

All these links, however, have not resulted in a responsible professional organisation in the view of the Director-General: "I would like to be able to regard it as a responsible professional organisation, but I cannot say it has been anything other than a trade union." Concentration on salaries and conditions, individual grievances and matters such as these, combined with production of the Tasmanian Teachers Journal, has been its strength. Even in the Journal there is little discussion of the education issues, these were left to the Curriculum Branch of the department with its publication Tasmanian Journal of Education.

There has long been a convention that the permanent head of the department should have been a teacher, normally from the Tasmanian service. For example, the last six Directors-General (the title was changed in 1967) have been

1919-1945	G.V. Brooks, who came from interstate to be a teacher in Tasmania before being promoted to Director.
1945-1951	C.E.B. Fletcher, who came from South Australia as an Inspector in the Education Department and was later promoted to Director.
1951-1952	P. Hughes - Tasmania
1952-1962	D.H. Tribolet - Tasmania
1962-1966	V.R. Long - Tasmania
1966 - to date	A.V. Gough - Tasmania

It should be noted that all were promoted through the ranks of the service from teaching, then inspecting, and administration at senior levels within the Tasmanian Education Department, prior to their appointment as Director. These links have undoubtedly strengthened the professional approach of the Department and thus provide a potential challenge to the dominance of the minister. This can also be seen from the increasing size of the senior professional staff over the two previous decades (Table 7).

The number of teachers who have now found promotion into the senior positions has more than doubled. The effect on the minister of this and other changes referred to is quite significant, as some statements discussed later in this section reveal.

For much of the department's existence since 1904 its administrative element, i.e. that outside the actual teaching and related establishments, has been quite small. Its tasks are now oversight of the provision of equipment and buildings; servicing and maintenance; salaries and general accountancy. Prior to 1945 much of this work was left to local boards and headmasters, but, with the sudden growth of education services after that date as with other

TABLE 7
E D U C A T I O N

Personnel engaged in Supervisory, Advisory or Administrative Duties

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1974
Director-General (Director)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Deputy (Secretary for Education and Chief Education Officer)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Directors	-	-	-	-	4	5
Regional Directors	-	-	-	-	2	3
Superintendents (Education Officer)	10	(na)	18	21	18	15
Supervisors	9	(na)	10	11	13	17
*Assistant Directors (Technical)	-	-	-	-	-	1

*A Superintendent (Technical) had responsibility for this task before 1970 when a Director of Technical Education was appointed.

departments of government the Education Department was reorganised. Many of the day to day school matters were still left to headmasters, but much more central coordination and decision-making took place. This meant a growth of a central administrative office for such matters as equipment, school building, salaries, wages and financial controls, school bus contracts, free milk and free book services and many other similar matters. Parallel to this growth the Director of Education gathered around him professional educators to assist him in departmental activities which required particular specialisms. There had always existed an Inspectorate, who maintained a watch on the standards in teaching, curriculum and school conditions throughout the State. The Superintendents filled this role later by being both inspectors and advisers, and District Superintendents with the subsequent assistance of the subject Supervisors. The increasing number of schools to be administered, brought about by the rapid growth in building to meet increasing pupil numbers, caused organisational changes which automatically followed the pattern set in 1904, dividing the tasks of the department into administrative and educational. However, the emergence of the professional

educator as a kind of 'administrative class' occupying, by lateral recruitment, all the senior positions within the department did not naturally derive from this pattern.

As shown previously in the above table of appointments to supervisory positions, this growth has been steady over the last two decades during most of which time Mr. Neilson has been minister. There is no direct evidence and must therefore remain in the realm of speculation, but it does seem likely that his preference for a professional view may have played a significant part in this growth. However, it is to be noted that he did seem unsure on the wisdom of appointing professionals to senior administrative positions. He said, when asked about this, "There is some case for non-professional influence at the top: we should be looking for proven administrative experience."

Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that the practice of making such appointments to the senior positions within the department creates tension between the two elements. The headmaster in the school has a different perspective. He is responsible for an organisation catering for anywhere between 50 and 1500 pupils and administrative requirements - form filling and documented requests for assistance - are increased by an increasingly centralised control. The department is only bearable if he can contact one of the senior men on the education side and try a short cut. The senior men are likely to be contemporaries of headmasters and therefore know one another well. As Mr. B. Mitchell, the Deputy Director General, said:

"When I took up my first appointment outside the school situation in 'administration', I did not feel isolated from my colleagues. Perhaps this occurs in Tasmania because of its size and partly through the Teachers Federation, with whose Committees I still had dealings. There are also many personal friendships made through the teaching years that remain, for example I personally know all the headmasters."

On the other hand, Mr. Dwight Brown, Director of Secondary Education, found his change somewhat less easy because he had been President of both the Teachers Federation and the Australian Federation of Teachers for the twelve

months prior to his appointment as Superintendent, and was therefore not in such daily contact with colleagues. But he also made the point that identification of interest with the practising teacher was hard to break, "What you have to do is to guard against the feeling that the teachers are always right."

The problem of balancing interests seems to dominate departmental activities. The demands of the teachers and headmasters, of educators and administrators, and the constraints of a financial and political nature, must be mediated within the department. The view of the administrative side, expressed by the Chief Administrative Officer, was that a person in a senior position would "hardly ever make a decision by himself." Most of the differences which arose were sorted out between the people interested and certainly never reached the minister for his adjudication.

One senior official drew attention to a relatively recent innovation, the Ad-Hoc Committee, comprised, he said, "of young, but upward mobile teachers together with the Director General and deputy". It is advisory only but has proved "rather embarrassing in some cases." There were many committees within the department through which much of the major decisionmaking was done. Most were combined educators' and administrators' meetings, for example there is a Senior Officers Committee, meeting fortnightly and a Building Appraisals Committee.

There is also a Finance Committee which significantly comprises the Chief Administrative Officer, the Secretary, the Accountant, the Budget Officer and a Senior Executive Officer (Equipment). There are no educators on this Committee and this, combined with the views of the Chief Administrative Officer about his role, indicates the basic reasons for conflict between the two groups. He sees his role as dealing with the "housekeeping side of the department", making sure that expenditure is authorised, in fact playing a Treasury role within the department. But his officers are also concerned

with the expenditure of funds, on peripheral matters in education terms, although directly related to teaching and very often of consequence to teachers' performance in the classroom. Maintenance of buildings, provision of equipment, furniture and amenities, payment of salaries and interpretation of leave regulations and wages awards, and servicing of the numerous committees and meetings that occur within the department as well as between the minister and others, are their basic work and seldom is there a decision made by the administrative side that does not have direct consequences for the educators. Yet, the adaptability of the public service side of the department allows resolution of most of the problems without recourse to the minister.

This view is not necessarily shared by the teachers, who do not see the public servants as adaptable, rather as domineering, allowing them little chance to influence the major decisions about their working conditions. Whichever view is correct, it does not appear to affect the minister in any direct way. - one minister especially admitted that he did not spend enough time on administrative matters. His inclination was to measure things in educational terms, becoming too engaged in professional areas, which he recognised, was probably the result of his being minister for a long period. His own assessment was confirmed by the Director-General, who thought that the minister should not act as a member of the staff, a reference to the minister's habit of joining committees of staff members in their informal discussions or 'popping in' to talk to officers. This style may have grown in the period of the previous Director-General, with whom the particular minister was not so secure. Much more discretion over professional matters was given to senior officers under the present permanent head than before. Nonetheless, the minister was in contact with the professionals more than others.

"I am most often in contact with the Director-General, his deputy, Mr. Fleming (Buildings Officer), Mr. Cox, (Bus contracts Officer) and Personnel Director. I also make a practise of going to a school and talking to the Headmasters and teachers."

A significant omission from this list is the Chief Administrative Officer, which is confirmed by that officer,

"The minister deals directly with him (Buildings Officer) not through me. The Officer in charge keeps me informed on the more important matters, e.g. any changes in priorities in the building programme."

Not all ministers are the same, perhaps due to different lengths of time in office and the necessary learning time when taking up a new portfolio. One such minister noted

"I would most often be in contact with the Director-General and the Chief Administrative Officer, the Directors of Primary, Secondary and Matriculation, as well as the Director of Personnel. They come at my request or at their request, I have an open-door policy with senior officers."

No minister had any memory of having to settle a dispute between the two sides of the department as there was a high degree of cooperation.

The general picture to emerge so far is that the professional aspects of the department are dominant subject to certain constraints, particularly budgetary. The grouping of professional senior officers around the minister; his own declared predilection for the professional perspective; the clear relationship between the qualification of educator and the purposes of the department - education; all promote the feeling that the department is 'directed by a puppet politician dancing to the professional tune'. This is not how the professionals themselves see the situation. Nor is it supported by the stance taken by the Teachers Federation on matters related to education policy.

The Director-General was quite clear about the relationship between himself and the minister. As the professional, he, the Director-General, was in a better position to make decisions about educational matters. The minister, however, was the person with the political power to approve or reject such decisions. It was only sensible, therefore, to avoid conflict by creating a cooperative relationship between himself and the minister. Both sides had to be prepared to use debate and persuasion rather than arbitrary decisions, even where either side had some executive authority to act without

reference to the other. There were some matters on which there could be no compromise in professional terms, especially through the support from the other professionals within the teaching service. In these situations the Director-General and his other professional officers are considerably strengthened in their debate with and persuasion of the minister by their links with teachers. The homogeneity of qualification and objectives helps in this regard, but the Director-General was definite that even this did not basically change his position in respect of the minister. There was seldom a situation in which a decision was taken without the approval of the minister, although the minister may decide without any reference to his officers.

This view was supported by the Deputy Director-General, who agreed that, because of the professional basis of advice, the minister may have to act in ways which he disliked. Yet despite this, the minister does have the final decision and he may choose to reject such advice. He often has his own priorities which have to be absorbed into the general departmental list of priorities. When asked what he thought his objectives as minister were one interviewee made no attempt to defer to the judgement of professionals, he said.

"My objectives are to provide the best possible education for children of the state. What is 'best' is what I, as minister, consider necessary from time to time. Sometimes I may clash with my officers, largely because they have more sympathy with the people capable of using education than those who are less capable. I tend to favour the latter."

There is a feeling of give and take between the ministers and professionals in the Deputy Director-General's view,

"I do not feel constrained, I am free to act providing it is within my own area of authority which is clearly defined. If I feel the need I can go to the minister any time with ideas for change."

Placing the minister first as the ultimate decision point, whilst allowing for professional influence, does indicate that the potential centrifugal forces of professionalism are not allowed to grow by the responsible attitude of senior officers.

Not all officers are totally committed to this view. Some senior officers thought that they should have at least the opportunity to make public policy statements on matters within their competence as professionals, even when they were not in agreement with the minister's policy. For them the vehicle would be the Institute of Inspectors to which they all belonged. As 'public servants' they agreed they could not overtly attack departmental policy even though the policy was adopted against their advice. One example of the use of the Institute previously mentioned was their rejection of State Aid, another concerned the question of whether Superintendents should be appointed on short tenure rather than as promotion in a career structure.

Summation

There are three groups of officers within the department:

1. Those appointed under the Public Service Act, described in the Education Act 1932 as 'clerical' whose tasks are administrative servicing of the financial, inventory, buildings and the like.
As at 1/8/1974 they numbered 573;
2. those appointed by the Governor, i.e. the senior professional staff and all teaching staff of schools, together with the staffs of the Teaching Aids Centre, Curriculum Branch, Guidance and Welfare Office, Physical Education Branch, Schools Library Service, and Technical Colleges. The number of these as at 1/8/1974 is 4,294;
3. those appointed by the Director General as bursars, cleaners, teaching aides, groundsmen and others of a casual nature for specific schools. There are no numbers available for this group.

The numerical strength of the professionals and the professional objectives of the department place them in a very strong position, both as regards the clerical staff and the minister. The former being expected to act as a service group for the educational tasks and thus only able to exercise

expenditure control rather than policy control. The minister, being a layman, must take professional advice. Although it has been indicated that, in the case of the longer serving minister, there has been an increasing professionalisation of his own perspectives. All this must lead to the predominance of centrifugal forces within the department, creating a situation of executive independence based on the professional group of senior officers.

This has not occurred for two reasons on the evidence presented, on the one hand the officers themselves have refrained from taking the dominant role, and on the other they have received no explicit external support from their fellow professionals who are all employed by the department. To erode the minister's inherent control through the conventions of ministerial responsibility, departmental officers would have to operate deliberately in conflict with their minister. This is especially so when the minister is a strong one, but in any case, there appears to be an explicit restraint exercised by the officers themselves. Their own sense of what is proper for them to do has militated against using the undoubted opportunities they have for imposing their own decisions within the department. They have also probably been assisted in this regard by the innate growth factor in Education supported by a strongly committed minister. Not many of their desired reforms have been blocked either by the minister or Cabinet. The changes that have taken place in education policy have undoubtedly been derived from the professional advice the minister received, but equally the minister has made his mark in terms of the priorities for these changes. The professionals have not received much external support from either the clientele or the Teachers Federation in regard to educational policy matters. External pressure has been about the bread and butter issues which are largely the concern of the administrative side of the department. It does seem, therefore, that the propensity in a homogeneous and professional department, such as the Education Department, to centrifugal force, is counterbalanced by restraint on the part of the professional officers and a lack of external support.

D. Financial arrangements

An agency, whose function has been so totally accepted within the community, is in a privileged position regarding its relations within the government system. There is rarely any challenge to its declared policy directions, as has been previously demonstrated, the main disagreements occurring within the agency itself, between its expert staff. In the same way provision of funds is never in doubt, although not in the sense of earmarked funds for specific annual expenditure, rather as a recognition that the gross total expenditure of the past year will form the base for the total expenditure for the current year and so on.

The department's need to provide satisfactory estimates with supporting case, to justify its expenditure for any one year is not thereby reduced. But it does relieve the direct pressure felt in departments which have to justify their mere existence by showing the benefits of last year's expenditure before they are allowed more. One minister described the situation:

"We do not really have to justify education expenditure at Cabinet because it is well accepted policy for governments to spend money in this area."

There is little debate on the overall benefits of spending money, or on the way it had been spent, on education as compared with other government functions, and certainly very rare criticism of the consequences. The department was seldom asked to produce evidence of results, especially in regard to educational matters, although sometimes as regards buildings and equipment.

The following Table, showing the funds expended on education in the two periods 1949/50 - 1955/56 and 1969/70 - 1975/76 and the percentage of education funds to state expenditure as a whole, shows quite clearly a difference between capital and recurrent. On the one hand in respect of all funding the actual expenditure has increased but capital expenditure has also steadily utilised a greater percentage of the total state funds. The percentage change between the two periods in recurrent expenditure, from an

average of 18% in the 1950s to 34% in the 1970s, does support the above statement and signifies the almost bi-partisan nature of education policy. But it is the relative capital percentage that is most striking, from an average of 5% in the first period to an average of 17% is a very significant increase and must be regarded as strong evidence of commitment to education by all political parties. In the period from 1969/70 to 1971/72 the Liberal party was in power, while at all other times Labor were the governing party.

TABLE 8
Recurrent Expenditure
Capital Expenditure

Year	State Total	Education Dept.	%	State Total	Education Dept.	%
1949/50	13,688,486	2,674,684	19.54	11,742,200	485,702	4.13
1950/51	15,682,950	2,857,784	18.22	30,801,998	1,089,874	3.54
1951/52	20,548,254	3,949,938	19.22	34,047,376	1,302,120	3.82
1952/53	24,263,416	4,913,890	20.25	40,151,828	1,237,886	3.08
1953/54	27,287,950	5,196,808	19.04	31,815,530	1,700,712	5.35
1954/55	31,130,362	5,738,110	18.43	29,377,938	2,577,186	8.77
1955/56	35,277,936	6,087,736	17.25	27,047,860	2,196,458	8.12
1969/70	161,879,354	31,418,950	18.72	204,984,730	10,589,938	5.17
1970/71	83,791,811	29,831,050	35.60	57,663,000	6,400,000	11.10
1971/72	97,175,233	35,359,641	36.39	63,801,403	8,000,000	15.53
1972/73	114,275,285	37,797,697	33.08	78,220,724	10,500,000	13.42
1973/74	132,127,293	45,137,372	34.16	75,215,508	13,500,000	17.95
1974/75	167,738,535	61,186,520	36.48	86,529,718	17,500,000	20.22
1975/76	244,977,678	80,591,911	32.88	102,375,000	27,057,000	26.43
	913,813,399	317,635,926	34.76	515,083,983	87,557,000	17.00

Source: Accountant, Education Department

Moneys are provided effectively on an annual basis through the State Government budget, which means that the department is involved in the pre-paration of annual estimates for both capital and recurrent expenditure. However, because of the long lead time in respect of, say, school building programmes, an attempt is made within the department to operate on at least a three year basis. The dove-tailing of this with teacher training and

staffing forecasts based on a five year forward plan, and the recurrent expenditure on an annual basis, provides great difficulties. In particular as the whole process is tied to a strict time schedule. Similarly funds allocated for the year must be expended or committed by the department within the twelve months, otherwise it falls back into Consolidated Revenue rather than being carried forward to the department's credit in the following year. The consequence of these factors is to inhibit the freedom of the department to some degree in detailed matters and tends to perpetuate the marginal change approach to estimating. So, for example, the Deputy Director-General, whose task is to supervise teacher training and staffing needs, uses forecasts based on estimated five year periods, refining a specific yearly forecast at estimate time.

The problems of prediction are illustrated in Table 9 and Graph 2 set out below. The five year prediction of student numbers from 1968-73, on which staffing and training requirements would be based, was considerably out, especially in the primary schools. The current estimates are shown from 1974-1982 and may be more accurate with the relatively recent census figures available.

The Chief Administrative Officer was the person largely concerned with the preparation of the estimates for consideration by the minister. His view was limited to an annual perspective. His main concern was that the figures were 'spot on' for one year. He was particularly definite about the recurrent expenditure situation

"...only a marginal increase each year on a percentage basis, which does not leave much room for innovation. It only allows marginal change on the past year's performance."


On the other hand, less directly concerned with controlling the expenditure, the Director-General had a broader and more relaxed view, "We are able to spend the money how we like so long as we do not exceed the vote." Ministers also stressed this need for flexibility in the spending of the vote, which

TABLE 9
Prediction of Government School Enrolments

Year	Primary Enrolments	Secondary Enrolments
1946	26,910	5,478
1951	33,441	9,693
1956	43,522	13,599
1961	47,317	19,429
1962	47,811	20,707
1963	48,414	21,470
1964	48,869	21,948
1965	49,491	22,317
1966	49,750	22,907
1967	50,417	23,997
1968	45,954	25,050
1969	46,294	26,176
1970	46,137	27,207
1971	45,566	28,217
1972	44,517	28,861
1973	42,836	29,054
1974	43,634	29,299
1975	43,900	29,430
1976	44,030	29,290
1977	44,800	28,590
1978	45,380	27,680
1979	45,210	26,920
1980	44,620	26,780
1981	43,930	27,230
1982	43,190	27,810

Source: Education Department Statistics Branch

GOVERNMENT SCHOOL ENROLMENTS



Graph 2

must cause the Chief Administrative Officer some anxiety at times.

However, even though there are these constraints, as has been shown the department has a reliable and steadily increasing source of funds which it obtains without too much difficulty from the State government. The detailed allocation of those funds is largely an internal matter between areas of departmental concern, such as primary, secondary, technical or pre-school. All officers agreed that such bargaining or negotiation as did occur should be kept at an officer level. There were various committees within the department which met from time to time to resolve differences, but the minister was not involved and was not asked to act as arbitrator in such disputes. As one officer said,

"There is a committee situation for resolving differences between ourselves. Purves (CAO) gets all the estimates and then prunes them until they come within the expected marginal overall figure. He also works out the priorities within the estimates with the Director-General beforehand."

Nonetheless, officers are aware from two main sources of developments a minister might favour. The Director-General is the main link between the minister and these committees, because he "...consults with the minister about the tentative solutions. There is little room for manoeuvre in financial matters anyway." The other source is the direct contact the minister has with his other officers about specific matters. One such example of direct contact was the question of the bond to which teacher trainees are held after they finish their training. The Deputy Director felt it should be removed, and, although this was a matter in his area, it had both financial and political implications, so that he left his proposal for the minister's decision. In this way the minister is involved in the affairs of the department and his views become known on a range of matters. As the Director-General points out, "It would be naive to give the minister no power. We would rather go along with the minister if we could."

Once the estimates have been settled they go to the minister who has a final discussion with the Director General before they are passed on to

Treasurer and thence to Cabinet. It appears it is up to the Director-General to interpret for the committees the priorities that the minister has uppermost in his mind, so that they can be incorporated at the time of preparation in committee. Rarely has the minister changed priorities in estimates, as one officer says of his estimate,

"I normally never see the estimate from the time it reaches the CAO until the Cabinet approves it. The Minister has never called me in to talk about my priority list in the estimates. If I want any changes I deal with the Director-General."

As mentioned previously, there is an intradepartmental Finance Committee which meets fortnightly to allow discussion of current expenditure in terms of revenue. The CAO is also a member of the Senior Officers Committee which meets regularly to discuss matters of general concern, including those having financial implications. His membership of these committees does ensure coordinative activity in financial terms. As the CAO said, "A person in a senior position will hardly ever make a decision by himself." He gave as examples of the kind of changes that came from these committees the decision to phase out double student desks and the decision to provide hard-wood teachers' desks. In both cases it took about two years to adopt, because it had to go through a series of decision points after the suggestions had been received by the administration side from teachers in schools.

Timing plays a very important part in political terms, the capability of a minister to decide the reallocation of resources to a politically sensitive area may be decisive. There are, however, severe restrictions in this regard imposed by the need to begin planning for the following year in about December. Ministers newly appointed found this particularly restricting, they would be more sensitive to political factors.

"Policy changes are very difficult in these circumstances from a political point of view. The politician has to live in the present as well as the future. He may be able to obtain a middle or long term change of direction, but he also wants immediate returns."

This is extremely difficult to achieve when capital programmes for the next

financial year have to be planned six months in advance of the beginning of that year.

The actual planning involved is not so difficult as it is already based on a three year rolling budget, as previously mentioned. The problem is to get an appropriate balance between educational requirements and political advantage. Longer serving ministers did not seem to suffer from quite the same problems, perhaps due to the longer term of office which made their officers sensitive to their views.

There does seem, therefore, to be support for the proposition that time constraints involved in budgeting are a centrifugal force. The potential, hinted at in the statement of the less well entrenched minister, is not completely borne out by either a longer serving minister or his officers. Nonetheless, the officers do support their own programme priorities in the process of negotiation and they have voiced their disapproval of interference by the minister. One example of interference by the minister imposed by external groups influencing him was the payment of university fees for teacher trainees. The minister had accepted proposals from teacher trainees against departments' approved allocation of resources which had to be reallocated accordingly.

Another indication that the minister does have a great deal of influence is by comparison of expenditure in different areas of education. For example, during the years 1968/69 the minister had made a strong commitment to Matriculation College development, and there was a significant increase in expenditure directed to them. Later, in 1970, the next minister expressed some concern over the lack of priority given to pre-school education and some high school improvement. Subsequently - in 1973 - the minister felt that

"...there had been pressure during the Liberal Government time for high school expenditure. The primary area has been less demanding but does need more than it is getting and it will be my endeavour to see it gets it."

As a consequence expenditure in this area rose by 7% in the years 1974/75.

TABLE 10

Percentage of total expenditure allocated by educational field

Year	Primary %	Secondary incl. Matric.) %	Technical %	Balance % Teacher Education
1960		n o t a v a i l a b l e		
1970	36.40	45.42	16.05	2.13
1972	27.06	64.42	8.44	.08
1974	34.62	53.48	11.80	NIL

(Source: Accountant, Education Department)

Finally, in any consideration of financial arrangements the position of the Australian Government must be taken into account. That government provides no guaranteed finance for education as occurs in housing. What it has done for many years is to offer specific grants in certain fields of expenditure it wished to have priority within the States. In the main these fields have centred on science and technical education, which has resulted, according to the Director-General, in "the State having altered some of its allocation to obtain the matching grants." Levels of expenditure reached in previous years had to be maintained for this purpose in areas which would otherwise have been reduced and re-allocated. It also means a continuing recurrent commitment to support services for such expenditure, which would not otherwise have been so committed. There is a consequent distortion in expenditure which is quite significant, for example in the year 1970/71, \$1,069,000 was received from the Australian Government.

This activity has increased as a result of the Schools Commission Report which provided the following funds for the years 1974 and 1975:

TABLE 11

Programme	1974 (\$'000)		1975 (\$'000)		Sub-Totals (\$'000)		Totals (\$'000)
	Recurrent	Capital	Recurrent	Capital	Recurrent	Capital	
Disadvantaged schools	156	96	234	144	390	240	630
Special education	266	252	394	378	660	630	1 290
Libraries	70	575	70	575	140	1 150	1 290
Teacher development	108	...	162	...	270	...	270
General recurrent	1 590	...	3 390	...	4 980	...	4 980
General buildings	...	1 440	...	2 160	...	3 600	3 600
	2 190	2 363	4 250	3 257	6 440	5 620	12 060

(Source: Annual Report of Minister of Education: Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper of 1975)

The influx of \$6.4m for recurrent expenditure and \$5.6m capital works has an enormous effect on the resources already planned for allocation from previous years. Much of this money must inevitably be absorbed within the existing framework of allocation, otherwise it causes problems of reallocation and support expenditure not dealt with in existing plans. It is not surprising that in the Minister's Annual Report to Parliament it said

"The Karmel Report ... contains many implications, not only for priority programmes in education but also for the administration of those programmes."⁴⁹

Summation

The department obtains its funds from the State, with only a small percentage from other sources. It is not apparently hampered in its purposes by having to compete for these resources with other agencies. In one sense the

⁴⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 16

department is certain to receive at least the same gross sum as the previous year, with the possibility of a percentage increase overall. As with dedicated funding (knowing that they will be certain of funds) this does allow officers to promote their own particular activities. However, the position within the department does not favour a uniform approach by all officers because there are very different demands placed upon resources by each area. For example, not only does the cost of administration have to be met, but also the costs of instruction, building operation and maintenance, and fixed charges. There are also preschool, primary, secondary, technical and previously teacher education, each of these under the control of a Director. This gives rise to a matrix of potentially conflicting demands on the available resources. The evidence indicates that these are negotiated away internally by the officers of the department, but not without bearing in mind the minister's own priorities and expectations. A potentially centrifugal force is therefore dissipated through internal bargaining and deference to the minister before proposals are placed before him for his approval. In this way the minister is strengthened since his demands do not compete with a combined officer-only allocation. By adopting an accommodatory approach the officers have enhanced the minister's position.

The combination of long term requirements, educational demands and political expectations on which the capital and recurrent expenditure estimates for the department are based, ensure ministerial control. The fact that the department is one of the major expenders of State Government funds also plays an important part in reducing the centrifugal forces. The approval of the minister to expenditure is vital to make sure he retains his commitment throughout the following year. For example, the building programme is always subject to some changes of a political nature, the postponement of the second stage of Rosny College is one example of this. Another one of a different kind is deferring the payment of teachers' holiday pay to overcome a liquidity problem.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Mercury, 29 November 1974

Once the estimates have been approved, the Director and his officers are able to operate within their authority from the Appropriation Act, although subject to indirect Treasury control. Apart from the effect of Australian government specific grants, which are becoming increasingly important, there is little direct influence of circumjacent groups in financial matters. What there is, however, does not support the officers as against the minister. Rather, it is the minister who gains from such funds, since it is Cabinet who are anxious to obtain grants at whatever cost to the planned programme, not the officers. There is some potential for centrifugal forces, but the attitude of the officers militates against these forces becoming too great. No doubt, a change of attitude on the part of the officers would make some difference, but the wide range of activities funded by the department would make it difficult to obtain sufficient cohesion between officers to present a united front to the minister.

E. Tradition of autonomy

A professionally based department such as education is expected to be autonomous. The balance between the politician and the expert is assumed to be weighted in the expert's favour, through the identity of interests between those who are in the schools and in the professional side of central administration and support services. These factors should contribute towards reducing the political control. There is no doubt that such ties are very strong in the Education department, cemented by long years of working in the same field for the same department. The ties are not, however, to the department as such, but rather to education, which may not be the same as departmental objectives.

There are a number of reasons for this situation. In the first place the centralised control exercised by the administrative group in Head Office has sapped the innovatory energy of the teachers as a whole. The enormous difficulty of obtaining change: for example, the two-year long process to

obtain single rather than double desks, makes a concerted effort by teachers unlikely. There is also the difference between the needs of the various sections within education. The requirements of the primary group of teachers are vastly less expensive than the technical for example, but also less easy to control. Large mechanical equipment is easier - though more expensive - to obtain and its use easier to control, than the range of minor items of paper, plasticine, games and books for the primary school. It is also more predictable, perhaps even more respectable educationally. Certainly, technical teachers have traditionally regarded their needs as completely different from primary teachers, even forming their own breakaway Association because they felt overwhelmed by the demands of the primary teachers who controlled the Teachers Federation. The fragmentation between secondary and primary has not reached that stage, but the Federation have heeded the warning and provided sectional meetings for all remaining groups.

There have also been subject groupings formed for the exchange of professional information in the teaching of a particular subject area. These have been given departmental support by appointing, in the administrative levels of the department, a number of supervisors for the main subject areas, English, modern languages, mathematics, sciences, music, and speech education. The consequently fragmented group of professionals are really only able to find common cause on what may be termed trade union issues of salaries and conditions of employment. They cannot provide a single source of support to the professional officers in the department and have not therefore been able to promote an autonomy for themselves.

The senior officers, it is true, feel united to a limited degree, although this was more possible when there were fewer of them. Now there are many more (43) spread throughout the department and the State at regional headquarters, not meeting so regularly as they once did. Three regional offices have been instituted over the last two years, with Regional Directors and senior staff. Their functions are still developing but include placement

of teachers in schools, equipment, building operation and maintenance, and inspection of teaching. It is possible that this may provide a base from which regional staffs see themselves as more autonomous than the central staff ever did. If this occurs, however, it will be at the expense of the department as against the minister, and may eventually cement an even greater control relationship between the minister and his head office. As it is, the potential autonomy of the professionals is continually undermined by the way in which both cooperate for the same ends. The minister and the department are treading the same path, caught up in a growth situation. The acceptance of education as a vital function of government, and the consistent commitment of large proportions of state funds to it allows both to obtain their objectives. In this situation, there is no need to claim, or even prepare for, autonomy.

In one sense it is true that the minister is committed to activities within the education field by teachers in schools, in the curriculum branch and in head office. The example of sex education was given as one of the areas in which the departmental professionals had been left completely alone to decide. Other examples are changes in curriculum, like social sciences, or mathematics or teaching French in primary schools. Many of these new directions for education are initiated by the professionals, teachers in schools or those in administrative positions. There is undoubtedly a more ready acceptance of these ideas within the department because of the fact that those in the top administrative post have risen from the ranks of teachers. It could be assumed, all these factors would lead to greater autonomy in professional terms, but this is not so. As pointed out earlier, growth promotes cooperation so that at least all are obtaining some part of their expectations. Since the minister obtains political prestige from the resulting educational benefits for the community, this reflects in the increasing legitimacy of the teachers themselves.

The relative status of teachers in society is in the process of change, but the changes have occurred more in their salary relativity than in public image. An Australian survey indicated that doctors, solicitors, dentists and engineers were placed at the top of the scale with semi-skilled and unskilled workers at the bottom. Teachers came in the middle range along with nurses, policemen, farmers and public servants. Primary teachers were rated lower than secondary.⁵¹

There seems to be little difference, whatever country of the Western world is surveyed. For example, Stellwag found that in Holland the teachers themselves had the same view of their own status:

"Primary teachers are placed on the lowest level of the intellectual professions immediately below them are the middle class civil servants. Secondary teachers are placed on a higher level but below other intellectuals - ministers, engineers, doctors, lawyers and university professors."⁵²

However, when their relative salary position is considered they have more than kept pace. Table 12 shows this especially in relation to the majority of teachers, the four-year trained group, and the school principals. It has been practice to compare four-year trained teachers with University lecturers for salary parity when salary claims have been made by the Teachers Federation. The positions of Senior Master and up have been related to the senior administrative officers of the public service in the department for this purpose.

⁵¹R.D.Goodman, "The Education and Professional Status of Teachers in Australia" in The Year Book of Education, edited by G.J.Bereday and J.A. Lauwerys, (London: Evans Bros., 1963) pp 443-455. This confirms a similar survey by I.S. Turner, published in the 1953 Yearbook, pp 250-261

⁵²H. Stellwag, "The attitudes of teachers towards their profession in the Netherlands" in The Year Book of Education, pp 425-431; see also G.E.Spring, "The Status of the Teacher and his school in the Community", LEADER, 3(6) (1966), 47-50

TABLE 12

Comparison of salary relativity in years 1966 and 1975

<u>1966</u>	\$		\$
4 years Trained		University Lecturer	
Start	3,276	Start	5,400
Finish	4,716	Finish	7,300
Senior Master	5,124	Senior Executive Officer (6)	5,058
Infant Mistress	5,556	Administrative Officer	5,274
Vice-Principal	5,604	Secretary	5,952
Primary Principal	6,210	Deputy Chief Admin. Officer	7,200
Post Primary Principal	6,492	Senior Superintendent	7,452
<u>1975</u>	\$		\$
4 years Trained		University Lecturer	
Start	8,347	Start	12,063
Finish	12,220	Finish	16,193
Senior Master	13,518	Senior Executive Officer (10)*	13,580
Infant Mistress	14,329	Administrative Officer	13,899
Vice-Principal	15,149	Secretary	15,501
Primary Principal	17,485	Deputy Chief Admin. Officer	17,537
Post Primary Principal	18,190	Class 18**	18,250

* There has been a change of grading for this position and it is not therefore strictly comparable.

** The position of Senior Superintendent no longer exists but Class 18 of the Public Service Award is equivalent, although no one in the Education Department is actually on that grade, the Deputy CAO having a rating of Class 16.

Source: Teachers' Federation Deputy Secretary and Public Service Association

There is, therefore, a combination of maintenance of public status levels and increasing salary levels to professional equality which produces tension. Teachers have become somewhat self defensive in order to protect their position and are prepared to allow the minister to exercise such control as he has without hindrance.

Given changed circumstances in which the funds for education were cut, it was no longer regarded so highly, and its benefits were judged by its costs, it is possible that, as in some other states, e.g. New South Wales, there could be a call for the closing of ranks and a greater demand for autonomy as against the minister.

Another factor to note is the identification of the same ministers with the professional viewpoint, perhaps because of the tradition of one politician having a long spell as minister of this one department. One such minister said:

"My style of administration is to get engaged in professional areas, probably more than any other Australian Education minister. My bias is that way and I have a number of professional contacts outside the state."


This predisposition does lead to some problems, as the Deputy Director-General pointed out,

"Earlier the minister would accept advice, would study his brief well and try to understand the aim. Latterly, this has not been the case, he has acquired more knowledge and as a result is more likely to query the advice or use his own judgement."

Such crossing of the professional boundary has therefore reduced the autonomy of the teacher group in the department. Not so much because the minister is 'one of them', but because there is an increased awareness of their needs which seems to result in their achieving growth in their field. At the same time, the lack of direct links with circumjacent groups, such as clients or other educationists, gives them no external support to use against the minister. The Teachers Federation could have been such a link, but as has been shown this body has not proved adequately equipped for this task.

There are a number of other external bodies and committees with which individual teachers are involved, but this does not provide the continuous and professionally oriented linkage necessary to form an 'aristocratic agency' which promotes centrifugal forces. Historical events have also made this unlikely. The relatively poor standing of teachers in the state until well into the 1950s and their minimal educational qualifications did not give them the foundation on which to build autonomy. The small, composite class schools educating rural children to grade 6 was the dominant type in the education system until that time. The growth of Area Schools and use of School buses changed the image of education from rural to urban and enormously increased the prestige of the teacher. But it was not until salaries and qualifications were such as to place teaching on a par with the public service that it became possible to use a professional tag.

Within the Department there is little basis for creating an autonomous situation, there being a number of vertical and horizontal hierarchies as shown in the diagram:



This not only prevents the whole department from pulling together to provide a united view to the minister on any issue, but it also reduces the possibility of such a move coming from the head office.

The teaching service spread across the schools in Tasmania, has its apex in the senior officers at head office. However, the great majority of the public service staff are located in that office as well as the minister. One consequence thereof is that for the teacher out in the school head office is seen as 'them', a group against whom battles have to be fought to obtain funds, equipment and other resources. In the all inclusive 'them' very often no distinction is made between the public service component and the senior education officers. It also operates in reverse with senior education officers at head office seeing demands from schools in the same light as the public service group who have to maintain financial control. One senior education officer indicated, when discussing his relationship with the schools, that school principals were more inclined to "line up with us" now they were responsible for some of the work previously done by administrators at head office.

Summation

Because there does not seem to be one locus of professional interest with which all professionals within the department can identify the possibility of a 'departmental' autonomy seems remote. There are at least four major and two minor divisions within the department as a whole which would reduce such centrifugal tendency. The education oriented element, the service element and the head office and field (schools) elements have been mentioned as major deterrents to accommodating all points of view under one autonomous grouping. The internal divisions within education between pre school, primary, secondary and technical, and within services between resource allocation and resource control are the other two minor factors which reduce this possibility.

In all these matters the relation between the minister and his senior officers is dictated by the need for some direction for policies in the long term, say three to five years. No single group can, in these circumstances, so dominate the decision making process as to take away the minister's control. As one of the administrative officials made quite clear, the senior education and administrative officials have a wide discretion in all matters, yet it is rare for any one person to make a decision by himself. Most often there are committees, or ad hoc meetings for particular problems, or merely routine consultation between colleagues. To this extent it may be thought that the department does dominate the minister, since none of these meetings includes the minister directly.

However, when asked what he would do in the event of disagreement with the minister over some policy, the Director-General pointed to many possible courses of action from resignation, executive action without the minister's consent, to withdrawal, permitting the minister his way. None of these situations would be likely to occur, he thought, because they were both human beings who had to continue to work together. He went on "It would be naive to give him no power, since in actuality he has control."

One minister supported this view feeling that he was there to provide a balanced view, the lay minister choosing between various kinds of advice. He admitted this became more difficult after spending a long time as minister in one functional area, but he claimed he was always "seeking to be more reasonable trying to reconcile power with understanding."

Perhaps it may be that personalities play a great part in the way potential centrifugal forces are utilised. Even in situations, where the personalities are less amiable, the internal divisions of the department would make it almost impossible for the Director-General to mobilise sufficient support from within the department to reduce the eventual control of the minister.

Conclusion

Any forces which could inhibit a minister's capacity for political leadership in the subsystem under study, the Education Department, are detrimental to control and accountability. The evidence does not appear to indicate the existence of such forces in the department, where the minister appears to have adequate control.

A highly significant activity is the minister's practice of spending a great deal of time on meeting deputations and travelling to schools. The openness, practised by both ministers interviewed, increases the potential for leadership and initiative at the expense of the professionals who are seen in these situations with the minister, acting as advisers, not decisionmakers. The circumjacent groups with which the department and minister are involved do not therefore look to the departmental officers to solve their problems when they can have direct access to the minister. The Parents & Friends Associations, from whom the professionals may possibly expect support, do not identify so directly therefore with the profession of teachers. In the same way, individual groups of teachers find it possible to obtain access for their own purposes when the minister visits their school, thus circumventing the official channels through senior officials. In one sense both senior officials and the minister may be seen as distinct from the teaching staff generally and thus a potential centrifugal force is undermined.

While the purposes of the department are contained within the term 'education', it is not single centred as a function and there are many competing forces. Any conflict within the department, or between the department and its environment, seems to be absorbed by the aura of legitimacy of anything educationally preferred, because most demands are met to some degree. As has been mentioned, neither Parliament nor Cabinet seemed to have much desire to change the policy of continuing expansion. There was very little controversy over educational policies other than the perennial religious problem of State Aid. Occasional challenges have been made but mainly over non educational

matters, administrative in content, political in intention.

Perhaps two factors relating to circumjacent groups require special attention, since they do reduce the control of the minister. The first is the problem of long-term planning and budgeting which, because of its long lead time, does tend to reduce the political options of the minister. The three to five year rolling programme, which is related specifically to buildings and staffing requirements, is based on projections of student populations and demand in various parts of the state. This means planning for building, purchasing land, and arranging to have appropriate resources available to meet these projections. All such decisions are taken within the department on the advice of the senior professional staff, after general approval by the minister. It is quite clear, however, that decisions made two or three years ago may not be so politically viable once they move to fruition, and this does reduce the capacity of the minister to deal with the needs of the moment. Although significant changes can occur with the support of Cabinet, as was seen in the postponement of the second stage of Rosny College.

The second factor, which has a similar result, is the increasing intervention of the Australian Government through funding programmes under the Schools Commission. The total effects are not yet apparent because the main thrust has been too recent, but it can be seen from previous experience with provision of special funds for such service as Libraries and Science Laboratories, that some changes will be forced on already prepared plans. The capacity of the minister to direct policies and decisions is certainly undermined and the changes could be used by the professionals to promote their particular interests, because they have access through their common professionalism to the Schools Commission and its committees in ways which the minister does not.

The effect of the legislative position is not clear, because, while the Act gives the minister very specific authority in most areas the tendency has been for the department to rely on change by regulation. In this way legislative authority can be obtained without the open parliamentary debate that would occur for statutory change. The flexibility of regulations and the fact that

they are usually drafted by, and as a result of the demands of, the departmental officials, would seem to be a clearly centrifugal force. It is true that the minister must finally give his approval to such regulations before they are tabled in parliament, but it is always possible that he does not fully comprehend their significance. Despite this fact, it was not evident that many regulations had had the effect of increasing the effectiveness of the departmental officers as against the minister. Rather, the regulations had allowed the department to operate with greater internal coordination and ultimately permitted the minister, through his officers in head office, to have greater centralised control.

Of the two main groups of officers within the department - teaching staff and administrative staff (including senior education officers within head office) - the latter have become dominant as a centralising force. The need for resource control and allocation has been the basis for most of these moves, and it has been these head office activities which created another divisive force, reducing potential centrifugal forces. The functional expertise of the department is in teaching and the teaching staff are numerically greater, so it could be assumed the centrifugal force would be irresistible. Add to this the recently acquired professionalism of the teaching staffs and their increasingly important salary status in the community and they would seem to be in an irrefutable position. Yet, this has not eventuated as a result of a series of fractures in the structure, derived from the fragmented nature of the work of the department. The split between schools and head office and within head office itself with its vertical and horizontal hierarchies has already been noted. A further division arises from the varying demands made by the three levels of education - primary, secondary and technical.

The role of the Teachers Federation is indicative of this divisive situation. There does not seem to be any way it can retain its membership were it to pursue the aims of a professional association concerned with ethics and policies. The close links between the department and the Federation seems to indicate that concentration of the Federation on salaries and conditions of

service is what the department feels is appropriate. The senior officers of the department stress the great benefit of the direct access between the department and Federation. For these reasons it does not seem that the potential centrifugal force of professionalism has been realised.

The provision of funds on a continually upward spiral, using the previous year as a springboard for the next; the fact of strong public acceptance of the benefits of education, gives legitimacy to the large expenditure. It provides political benefit for the minister, and a strong minister will be concerned to use that source of power to his best advantage. In the subsequent contest between professional demands and political benefits there is little doubt that the evidence shows the latter to have more weight. The minister, because of the single portfolio and the tradition of long incumbency, has usually been able to force his position deliberately on the professionals. In part this has also been due to the reluctance of the professionals to dictate their own point of view. There does appear to be a continuing commitment to the increased provision of funds for education without much oversight in a political sense. In this situation the occasions for conflict are less numerous and the centrifugal forces are reduced.

Overall, therefore, it seems that the forces supporting ministerial control are dominant, yet there is a sense in which this judgement may not be entirely adequate. The stress on the part of the officers was on 'reasonableness', on the pointlessness of taking matters to a confrontation with the minister. The number of officer committees in which the bargaining and negotiation takes place, and the emphasis by the Director General on keeping in touch with the ministers' views, so that all may be aware of them in their decisionmaking, must weigh heavily in favour of centrifugal tendencies. The circumstances which would indicate the reality of these tendencies may occur when there is a reduction in the resources available to education. Where the legitimacy of particular policies are challenged, or where they have to be justified in competition for funds, some indication would be given as to who

really wielded the power. On a rising tide of legitimacy and resources education has prospered and there has been little occasion for such confrontations to occur. When there was a conflictive situation in the period under discussion, it has been the minister who has prevailed. Three examples have been mentioned, the Axton case; the Rosny College case; and the holiday pay deferment.

These are relatively minor matters and cannot be taken to support an alternative view; nonetheless, when taken together with other evidence presented in this Chapter do reinforce the feeling that the minister is able to exercise political leadership freely. Perhaps the areas in which he may equally freely exercise executive authority are less clearly defined.

To summarise:

Centrifugal Force

Effect

a) circumjacent groups

Apart from some lobbying of parliament and deputations to the minister by Parents and Friends groups, there are no close affiliations with clientele which would enhance centrifugal forces. Some cooptative activity creates links into the community but not sufficient to produce centrifugal support. Relations with Parliament and Cabinet especially enhance ministerial control at the expense of agency autonomy and provide means for political leadership and executive authority.

b) legislative provisions

Education Act 1932 has been the substantive statute under which the department operates; there have been changes in detail but none directly reducing ministerial authority. The basic relation between powers of minister and officers remains the same, providing strong support for political leadership and executive authority.

c) professional staffing

Dominance of professional teaching staff both numerically and in senior positions in department. This produces strong centrifugal forces but is ameliorated by divisions within professional staffs. The division between levels of education primary, secondary and technical is cut across by the division between teachers in all these areas and the senior

c) professional staffing (contd.)

senior educationists in the Head Office. This reduces the force of professionalism and at the same time provides the minister with more opportunities to exercise authority.

d) finance

There are no dedicated revenue sources although the commitment to education is such that annual appropriations have been continually increasing. Normally this would enhance the centrifugal forces, but it does not seem to have done so. This may be because of the divisive nature of the demands, as mentioned in c) above. Each area is seeking resources and competes with others, thus reducing the solidity of the professionals' stance as against the minister. At the same time the minister has the public service personnel as a buffer, since their task is resource control and allocation, which increases his capacity to exercise leadership and control.

e) departmental traditions

The legitimacy of education as a service has increased the possibility of centrifugal forces operating. In fact this has not occurred, there does not appear to be any loyal feeling in the staff towards the department, nor is there any attempt made by professional staff to 'identify' with the department. While the department does employ most of its professional staff for their entire career, it fails to provide a focus for loyalty. There is a deep division between those out in the schools and those providing support service and leadership, even though they may all be professional teachers. Equally, there is a deep division between the public service staff and the professional staff. The potential for the exercise of executive authority by the minister is therefore increased. The possibility that centrifugal forces could emerge is remote in the current climate and given the existing personnel.

The strength of the political leadership exercised by the minister is shown by aggregating the effects mentioned above. Those areas in which it may be expected that the centrifugal forces would be strongest: circumjacent groups, professionalism and traditional autonomy, provided no evidence to

indicate that effect. The potential for the exercise of executive autonomy is undoubtedly present in the professional orientation of the department, but a number of factors were identified which militated against this happening. The general commitment to education, by both the public and the government, has not produced any situations when the professionals have not been accommodated. In a similar way, so long as activity of an approved kind was evident the minister was gaining the credit and found it unnecessary to intervene too directly. One other significant feature which affected the situation was the length of ministerial incumbency. One minister had some 12 years in the portfolio and thus almost became one of his own officers, identifying with the professional point of view or even representing such a point of view from time to time. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the minister was able to retain his opportunities for political leadership and executive authority.

THE HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT

INTRODUCTION

By 1885 Tasmanians had their first Public Health Act which was intended to provide the necessary stimulus for the already existing Local Boards of Health to pay more attention to their duties. Prior to this date such Local Boards as did exist were scarcely operating satisfactorily. A number of statutes affecting the two main tasks of these boards had been passed over for years. Some related to the preservation of clean water sources;¹ others to the prevention of the spread of infectious disease, either through controlling poor sewage disposal and drainage² or increasing hygiene.³ However, this legislation was not sufficient by itself to contain the residual effects of Tasmania being an isolated convict colony for some fifty years.

Earlier, in 1876, there were three general hospitals: in Hobart, Launceston and Campbell Town; four institutions for such people as orphans, indigent females and invalids (mainly aged persons and paupers); and a hospital for the Insane at New Norfolk. Altogether they provided institutional care for some 1630 in-patients and 8000-9000 out-patients, and more than 960 permanent residents from the needy and insane. These were supported at a cost of £22,887 - or 7% of the total revenue, by a population of 99,328 of whom 59,000 had been born in the Colony.

As may be imagined, the conditions in the institutions were not very

¹Hobart Town Water Act, 1835; New Norfolk Water Supply Act, 1840; New Town Rivulet Preservation Act 1941

²Launceston Drain Act 1863; Rural Municipalities Act 1863

³Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1881; Quarantine Act 1881; Vaccination Act 1881

adequate, even for that time, and did not provide other than the minimum health care. Evidence given to the Commission of Inquiry into the General Hospital, Hobart Town provides some indication of the facilities. Women nurses were first appointed to replace male nurses in the General Hospital in 1875. A Lady Superintendent, Florence Abbot, together with four other nurses, came from Sydney on a twelve month contract. By July of that year Florence Abbot was writing to the Colonial Secretary that neither she nor the other nurses could remain beyond their contracted time. She listed some twenty-five deficiencies which led them to take this step; amongst them were the following:

"2. Patients not to be admitted dirty or filthy, unless too ill to be cleaned. At present patients often not bathed; or if bathed not properly cleaned and vermin consequently introduced into the wards either on the person or in the clothes.

4. Present hot and cold water arrangements very defective - hot water often not to be had - the copper fires lighted only once a day, and supplies from the kitchen often the only resource and not always to be got there.

14. The mess room of the male wards on the ground floor flagged cold to the feet of patients and difficult to keep clean. It should be boarded.

16. Sinks are wanted on each floor.

17. A water closet is wanted in the female lock ward and another for diphtheria, scarlet fever and erysipelas wards."⁴

The report also contains complaints of drunkenness among patients and some of the male staff, non-removal of insane persons and dead bodies, and the use of improper language in front of the female nurses. The Commission found "these complaints, twenty-five in number, are well founded". The Commission also mentioned the fact that an earlier inquiry by a Select Committee of the Legislative Council in 1874 had found similar conditions and yet no action had been taken.⁵

Other examples of hospital services may be elicited from annual reports of these institutions. The Launceston General Hospital was particularly

⁴Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 4 of 1877

⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 66 of 1874

pleased that it had been able to reduce the number of persons using the outpatient facilities. This apparently beneficial result had occurred

"mainly due to refusal to supply many cases applying who were well able to pay for advice and medicine elsewhere - information as to their means having been obtained through the instrumentality of the Superintendent of Police."⁶

The cost saving action obviously proved far more attractive than a desire to keep the community healthy. A similar quantitative view of health care may be seen from another report, although this example does not relate to finance, rather to balancing the patient numbers.

"There is little in the history of the Hospital (for the Insane) for the past year requiring special notice or comment. An unusually large number of patients have been admitted during the year, but as the deaths have also been abnormally numerous, these with the patients discharged during the same period left a total number of inmates nearly the same as at the date of the last report of the committee."⁷

Such institutions as there were, provided minimal services in order to keep the costs within bounds, paying little attention to the patients' needs so long as some institutional care was available.

These institutions were not the only aspect of health care as previously mentioned legislation indicates. Local boards of health were there to see to these public health matters, such boards probably comprising the same individuals who were on hospital committees of management.⁸ These local health boards were, if anything, less effective than the hospital management boards. A description of the conditions may be obtained from the first report of the newly appointed Officer of Health for the Hobart Registration District.

"The unsanitary conditions existing in almost every part of the Hobart Town Registration District are numerous; but in this Report I am necessitated to confine my observations

⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 6 of 1877

⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 6 of 1877

⁸A description of these boards is contained in R.L. Wettenhall, "Nineteenth Century Boards", Public Administration (Sydney) 12(3) 1963, 255-267

to the three suburban townships. ... (New Town, Sandy Bay and Wellington Hamlets) Efficient sewerage is much wanted. The greater part of the sewerage at New Town soaks into the surface soil or evaporates, polluting the air; ... similar also is the condition of the sewerage channels in Sandy Bay... There is no efficient means for sewerage (from Wellington Hamlet) to reach the Hobart Town Rivulet - now and for a long time past the filthy and noisome cloaca maxima of Hobart Town. The south side of the Cascades Road is usually a ditch of sewerage filth, polluted by and poisoning the air by noxious gasses. Pig sties abound ... mostly in a condition offensive to sight and smell and injurious to public health... The greatest nuisance everywhere however are the private cess pits where human excrement is often kept for years without removal. ... Voluntary efforts upon all sanitary matters, however, are not to be relied upon; and it will require legal compulsion to make this plan general, so as to relieve one of the (naturally by climate and position) most healthy places in the world from its greatest obstacle to public health."⁹

The public commitment to the maintenance of health and prevention of disease was honoured more in the intention than in the act. Typhoid fever and other infectious diseases was rife, as the first Report of the Central Board of Health after 1885, noted:

"This yearly visitation of typhoid fever which is certainly a preventable disease ... often connected with the water supply or the provision of milk, calls for earnest consideration and continuous action by local Boards of Health. It is emphatically the scourge of middle and active life and that the ranks containing the bone and sinew of the country should be thinned by a disease that proper precautions are almost certain to stamp out is not creditable to any administration."¹⁰

However, the Board must have had some beneficial effect because in 1900 it was able to report

"Fifteen years have now elapsed since the passing and putting into operation of the first Public Health Act. During the fifteen years preceding, during which no special organised sanitary action was taken, the following were the death rates from zymotic* diseases:

5 years ended 1875	- 27.3 per annum per 10,000 persons living
1880	- 33.2
1885	- 22.1

Evidently no controlling influence to prevent rising and

*'Zymotic' is a generic term for contagious diseases.

⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 23 of 1877

¹⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 92 of 1886

falling in the death rate....

The next fifteen years:

5 years to 1890 - 21.7 per annum per 10,000 persons living

1895 - 15.8

1900 - 12.5 ...

These figures show that with the Health Act there was established a controlling and highly beneficial influence over these diseases and though there still can be noted a yearly variation ... steady inforcement of sanitation and unwearying exercise of preventive measures against causation and spread of infectious diseases can be depended upon to save life and lessen suffering."¹¹

These changes must have been part of the change in attitude of citizens as well as Board activity for although there were some 73 Health Districts in Tasmania, only 30 had officers of health. At the same time the Central Board itself was staffed by the minimum establishment and they complained about the fact that

"Parliament thought fit to make no increased provision for the administration of the Health Acts, although the work of the Central Board has increased with regard to all branches."¹²

Other factors must also be weighed in the balance against the rather satisfactory picture the Board paints of its own activities. Two examples are offered, one relates to a report of the Royal Commission on municipal government of Hobart and suburbs, the other far more serious, the smallpox outbreaks of 1897 and 1903.

The Royal Commission heard much evidence from residents and medical men about the conditions then existing in Hobart and reported (inter alia)

"9. We are led to the conclusion, after hearing the evidence dealing with the present condition and the imperfect and unhealthy sanitation of Hobart and its suburbs that the time has arrived when some uniform and effective scheme should without delay be instituted for dealing with the sanitation of as large a central area as possible."¹³

But it was the effect of the smallpox outbreaks which finally forced the Government of the day to remove the Central Board and replace it with a Department.

¹¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 51 of 1901

¹²ibid.

¹³Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 5 of 1901 p xix

The Board of five members created by the Public Health Act 1885 has been intended to operate as a regulatory body over the local elected boards. There were to be officers of health and district inspectors at the local board, subject to the approval of the Central Board. But the payment of the salaries of these officers was the responsibility of the local boards and, as will be noticed later, not many had the funds with which to do this. The Central Board itself was the subject of much dissention within Parliament. The expenditure of the Board was disallowed in February 1887 and the then Premier placed an amending Bill before Parliament to reconstitute the Board as a Department. This Bill was itself amended to allow the Board to continue, but for its members to receive no fees, although its officers and in particular its executive Inspector, were paid their salaries. The powers of the Board were somewhat strengthened in certain areas, especially to isolate those persons who had infectious diseases in hospitals.¹⁴

One proposal that did not gain acceptance was to employ two sanitation specialists, one for each half of the island - it was rejected as being too expensive. The government seems to have deliberately kept funds short, expending only £ 995 in 1889, increasing to £ 1889 in 1902, with an additional 483 for the Medical Department (now the Government Analyst).

"Attainment of the aims of the Central Board was hampered by inadequate provision of staff."¹⁵

Whatever the initial reasons, the sense of urgent need to deal more adequately with epidemics arose out of the traumatic outbreak of smallpox in Launceston in 1903.

The outbreak in Launceston was seen as the result of a number of possible

¹⁴In the smallpox epidemic in 1887 many Launceston residents had been removed to Mowbray Isolation camp, even though they were only suspects and the complaints had been that a number of these had died as a result of this move rather than of their being suspect carriers.

¹⁵Wettenhall, The Guide, p 275

causes, depending on the particular antagonisms of the person concerned. Amongst these were lack of acceptance of vaccination, with the anti-vaccinators arguing that the needle spread disease; the Tasmanian post-1856 tradition of minimal public service and the reduced facilities as a consequence; the death in 1902 of Alfred Mault, whose untiring activity as executive Inspector to the Central Board had aborted the 1887 epidemic; or the peculiar mentality of the Launcestonians who saw protection of individual citizen rights as pre-eminent, even to the extent of doctors diagnosing chickenpox and measles to avoid upsetting the patients' family.¹⁶

The outbreak raged from June to the end of August, resulting in 21 dead; 66 certain cases, and 156 persons isolated. Differences of opinion about the extent and nature of the outbreak and the need for stringent measures to check it made action difficult, especially the feeling in Launceston that the 'southerners' were trying to bully them into unnecessary action.

The role of the Central Board was made less than effective by the activities of its President, the then Chief Secretary, McCall, who was a northerner, reacting against southern intolerance, which expressed itself in demands that all potential suspects should be isolated in institutions.

Roe writes:

"The Central Board met in McCall's absence, its tone set by Crowther: 'Dr. McCall had been humbugged, else he had been humbugging them'. Motions declared that travellers from Launceston must have had successful vaccination not more than one year and not less than eight days before departure. Mail from the mainland should come through Devonport, not Launceston. The government should appoint an independent medical expert to fight the outbreak, under the Central Board's direction Propsting (the Premier) announced that he had seen the proposed motions and accepted them. They went through (Cabinet) briskly, echoing the Central Board. Propsting committed the government to finding the best medical man, inside or outside Tasmania."¹⁷

¹⁶In these and other details I am indebted to the painstaking historical reconstruction of these years by Professor M. Roe, "Smallpox in Launceston 1887 and 1903", Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1976

¹⁷Roe, op. cit., mimeo. p 44

Thus the government unwittingly took a decision which led to the new Public Health Act 1903 and the creation of the Department of Public Health under the control of a Chief Health Officer.

The man they appointed to clear up the Launceston outbreak was Dr. J.R.C.Elkington, who had in the preceding year worked in the Plague Research Laboratory, Bombay, India, and was on furlough at his home in Melbourne at the crucial time. He was extremely well qualified for his task, not only through his studies - he had qualified as a doctor in Melbourne and Edinburgh, but also gained a Doctorate from Brussels and a Diploma in Public Health from Melbourne - but also because of his physical presence.

"Elkington was a man of physical strength and presence,...; pugilism and big-game hunting were his hobbies. He had skill as an administrator,...He was an intellectual, well read and capable of pure, fierce prose. ... If Tasmania needed a Superman here he was, able and ready."¹⁸

His success at coping with the still virulent Launceston opposition to interference from the south,persuaded the government that they should retain his services.¹⁹

"Notwithstanding its theoretical dislike of bigger government, the Propsting Cabinet decided that health services should be restructured under Elkington's headship."²⁰

At the same time the Central Board, over which there had been so much controversy, was removed and a Department under the control of the elected Parliament was created. The authority of the Department however, was considerably strengthened and local Boards were made more subservient to the Chief Health Officer. The statute was also more comprehensive than the 1885 Act, as amended, providing for regulation over most aspects of preventive

¹⁸Roe, op. cit., mimeo p 49

¹⁹Just a few days before he arrived citizens of Launceston had marched on road barriers which had been erected on the main road to Hobart, to make sure no smallpox suspect carried the disease south. There was talk of setting up a separate state and great fear of riots. See Roe's graphic description.

²⁰Roe, op. cit., mimeo.p 52

care - noxious trades, food adulteration, drainage, and checking of disease. In many ways the 1903 Act was the model for the 1935 Act under which the Division of Public Health operated until 1962.

Despite these auspicious omens, the next six years in which Elkington remained in Tasmania as Chief Health Officer was not a time of rapid advance. Political obfuscation seems to have been the root cause, those with responsibility soon eliminating the potential benefits of the changed circumstances.

In his first Report Elkington surveyed the legacy from the Central Board,

"At the coming into operation of the Public Health Act 1903, some 73 local authorities nominally existed to administer its provisions in their general districts. Upon investigation it was found that only 45, or 62%, were Councils or Town Boards possessing rating powers, 28, or 38%, being local Boards in name only without any rating powers or other means of raising funds to carry out the important duties with which they were charged under the act. In other words 38% of the local administrative machinery is inoperative. ... Further investigation produced additional results showing serious deficiencies in local sanitary administration. Of the Councils and Town Boards 16, or 35%, possessed the service of an Officer of Health. Only two of the Town Boards adjoining Hobart had such an officer and neither of those adjoining Launceston.... 54, or 74% of all Local Authorities returned themselves as being provided with Sanitary Inspectors, but investigation showed that 28 utilised the services of police in this connection... 40% of all Councils and 14% of Town Boards had no sanitary bylaws, 52% of local Boards pure and simple being in the same plight. In but a few cases were the sanitary inspectors met with found to have any special aptitude for or knowledge of the work and the prevailing tendency appears to be to regard this important duty as an altogether subsidiary function to be deputed to anybody on whom it can be laid."²¹

His subsequent reports trace the general unwillingness to provide him with the resources, both financial and moral, to administer his Department properly. He complained in 1905 that "under present conditions effective routine measures against endemic disease are impossible ... that the Department resources are inadequate to carry out in its entirety the purposes of the Public Health Act 1903."²² Similar indications of the frustrations with

²¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 48 of 1904, p 3

²²Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 26 of 1905

which he must have daily coped appear in his valedictory Report in 1909, for example,

"The annually recurring necessity for pointing out...";

or

"The necessity for taking steps to ... has been dealt with at some length in previous annual and other reports. It may with propriety be urged again..."

Some gains had been made, however, particularly in pioneering the school health service, but the problem of working through local Boards had restricted anticipated progress.

The subsequent period up to 1945 did not see any dramatic changes, rather a steady expansion of services and a more general provision of preventive measures in the field of sanitation. The establishment of municipal councils throughout the state under the 1907 Act²³ assisted greatly in this regard, since they were multipurpose authorities with rating powers. The general controls over health services were maintained by the Department, especially through their approval of appointments of local officers of health.

The dominance of preventive activities during this period and the extremely large expenditure required to contain the outbreaks of such disease as smallpox,²⁴ meant that the hospitals received little attention. What work was done had to be kept to minimum cost and the result was poor service facilities.

Attention to these matters was seen as necessary, and the Hospitals Act 1918 was expected to reduce the uneven hospital care through management changes, fettering the autonomy of the various hospital Boards of Management. These had come under strong criticism from two interconnected Royal Commissions

²³ Local Government Act 1907

²⁴ The cost of the 1887 epidemic was £ 7800, and of the 1903 epidemic: £ 20,046/3/5d.; extremely large sums for that time, especially when measured against the Departmental Expenditure of £ 1800 per annum. Roe, op. cit.

on General Hospitals in 1914 and 1915. The single Commissioner in 1914 (he was the Chief Health Officer under whose departmental auspices hospitals were supervised, a situation hardly conducive to proper investigation by today's standards, but in the light of the extremely casual nature of much public administration of that period hardly surprising) concluded that the way the Boards were constituted 'leads to cliqueism and may have as a result the formation of what may be termed 'A Mutual Admiration Society'.'²⁵ Nor was he very satisfied with the results of their activities,

"I feel somewhat reluctantly compelled to remark that the Hobart General Hospital is the worst conducted institution of its class I have ever visited."²⁶

His recommendations led to the 1918 Act and the firmer control of hospital management and finance by the Department of Health. But even then the Department still saw its role as preventive as the following statement of purpose implies.

"The ramifications of the public health services are innumerable. It begins to concern itself with the future citizen before he is born, insisting that his passage into the world shall be made easy as trained and certified skill can compass. When the time comes for him to go to school it medically inspects him. If he is found to have adenoids, or diseased glands, or decayed teeth; if he has faulty sight or hearing; if he is deformed or mentally inferior, or afflicted with any other kind of disease - it gets the school medical officer, the school nurse, and the teacher to work to see that the defect is, if possible, corrected. The house in which he and his parents dwell is also subject to inspection and thus it assists in reducing to a minimum the dangers to which his health is subjected. It sees to the purity of the water supply and does something to ensure that food shall be free from adulteration and contamination. It provides isolation hospitals for those who contract infectious fevers, facilities for the treatment of persons suffering from venereal disease, infirmaries for the indigent sick, and sanatoria for the tuberculous. In many acute infections it not only secures the isolation of the patient, but requires to be notified of the disease; so that by disinfection and other means it may be prevented from spreading. The results of these beneficent activities are easily to be perceived without help from mortality tables and also illustrate what a potent factor the public health is in the welfare of the people."²⁷

²⁵ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 21 of 1914-15, p i

²⁶ op. cit., p xii

²⁷ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 35 of 1919

With slight alterations to take account of modern technological achievements this could be represented as the charter of the Department today. However, there is one major difference and that is the emphasis of hospital care, the increasing dominance of clinical service which was to overwhelm all other services of the Department after the decade of the 1940s.

It has been suggested that the numerous organisational changes which culminated in the Public Health (Administration) Act 1945 were largely the consequence of an integration of the curative and preventive aspects of health. The gradually decreasing availability of private hospital accommodation from the peak years of the 1930s, when there were 76 in Tasmania, placed greater demands on the public hospital system. At the same time new medical techniques, enhanced methods of treatment and reliance on specialised areas of knowledge and equipment, meant a growth in the need for properly equipped hospitals, capable of accommodating such services. The training received by doctors became increasingly hospital oriented, with medical schools always attached to them for research and experience purposes.²⁸

The emphasis in the Departmental activities became increasingly regulatory, certifying the skills needed to carry out optical, dental, nursing, pharmaceutical and medical work. It also had the tasks of licensing private hospitals and inspecting public ones; licensing places of public entertainment; controlling shops and factories; maintaining high standards of hygiene in food. During these years the Department was also intermittently responsible for such matters as wages boards, workers compensation and mental health. Other, more positive areas of action, were the provision of general consultative services to those rural communities less able to use the facilities in cities.

"As early as 1922 the department assumed control of a bush-nursing scheme at the request of the Bush-Nursing Association, which had been attempting to provide and staff nursing centres

²⁸The Medical School in the University of Tasmania was created in 1970 and the Clinical Section located in the Royal Hobart Hospital.

in country areas, and after further evidence had accumulated of difficulties experienced in obtaining medical aid in rural areas a Government Medical Service was created in 1938. Under the latter scheme the department provides locally based medical practitioners in participating municipalities prepared to make a small contribution towards expenses. The School Medical Service [pioneered by Elkington as previously mentioned] also came under the public health administration in 1939, and this was soon paralleled by the School Dental Health Service."²⁹

It was not surprising that this proliferation of services led to a great deal of confusion in the organisation of the Department; Mathews suggests that it was mainly due to the attempt to bring the two elements together.

"It was not until the passing of the Hospitals Act 1918 that the administration of the preventive services had become confused with hospital administration and from that time on, as the undoubted necessity for the provision of more curative services grew, these services were added to the responsibilities of a department completely preventive in outlook and organisation."³⁰

Whatever the reason, the re-organisation that occurred in 1945 was to lay the foundations of the structure of the Department as it exists today. The changes resulted in a Permanent Head controlling a

"Medical Directorate, consisting of the Director of Public Health (Dr. C.L. Park), Director of Hospital and Medical Services (Dr. B.M. Carruthers), Director of Tuberculosis (Dr. T.H. Goddard) and Director of Mental Hygiene (Dr. C.R.D. Brothers), (which) was appointed to direct the various activities of the Department; Dr. Park combining his office with that of Director of Maternal Welfare and Child Health."³¹

One of the contributing factors to this re-organisation had been the changing headship of the Department, significantly from a layman to a medical man. The chart below indicates the situation well.³²

Tudor had been the lay head until 1936 when he was deposed as head by the government of the day in favour of a hospital administrator, Carruthers,

²⁹Wettenhall, The Guide, p 278

³⁰E.H.G. Matthews, "A Review of the Administration of the Health Services in Tasmania", (unpublished Diploma of Public Administration dissertation, University of Tasmania) Hobart 1959, p 13

³¹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 43 of 1946

³²Wettenhall, The Guide, p 291

TABLE 1

Divisional Directorships established in 1945

Hospital & Medical Services	Public Health	Tuberculosis	Mental Hygiene to 1956; Mental Health to 1963; Psychiatric Services to 1968; then hived off to Mental Health Commission
1945-52 B.M. Carruthers	1945-50 C.L.Park	1945-50 T.H. Goddard	1945-51 C.R.D. Brothers
	1951-66 H.M.L. Murray	1951-63 J.H.R. Tremayne	1951-66 J.R.V. Foxton
	1966- A.D.Ross	1963- L.A. Young	1966-68 T.H.G. Dick
<u>Director General of Health Services (plus Medical Services 1952-56)</u>			
	1952-68 J. Edis		
	1968- J.R. Macintyre		
1969-75 J.S. Lawson			
1975- J.M. Sparrow			

previously the Medical Superintendent at the Mental Hospital, New Norfolk.

This appointment as Director of Public Health occurred at the same time as the rewriting of the Public Health Act in 1935. Matthews comments,

"In retrospect it seems certain that the appointment of a hospital administrator to the position of Director of Public Health was part of a long term plan by the government of the day to interest itself more and more in the socialisation of medicine of the curative variety."³³

When Carruthers was called to the armed forces at the beginning of the Second World War, Tudor stepped in to fill the gap, but on Carruthers' return in 1945 he was not given the Directorship of Public Health because it had already gone to Dr. Park. Instead he was given the much less prestigious task of Hospital and Medical Services, which was mainly a controlling and

³³ Matthews, op. cit., p 13.

YEAR	HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES	HEALTH	ANALYST	NEW TOWN		MISC. & GRANTS	HYGIENE
TO JUNE	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1951	1,003,942	972,351	7,180	97,064	110,419	6,132	222,353
1952	1,299,592	1,320,030	7,774	122,601	159,119	7,554	279,774
1953	1,517,497	1,442,917	11,072	141,831	180,197	8,366	301,126
1954	1,611,115	1,531,736	13,493	155,206	200,983	8,931	323,925
1955		1,612,765	15,046	178,617	189,209		349,611

	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1961	2,069,205	260,221	19,374	315,709	216,117	160,693	569,736
1962	2,272,544	176,730	18,738	352,226	215,560	192,019	620,712
1963	2,349,069	196,171	18,668	358,935	216,709	205,842	646,566
1964	2,529,535	205,549	22,497	397,666	224,097	199,197	707,625
	+ 171 pathology serv.						
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
1965	5,793,056	471,490	43,134	847,933	460,254	469,960	1,608,916

	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
1971	11,979,723	908,479	109,834	1,576,604	446,677	663,583	3,032,136
1972	13,650,589	954,022	139,246	1,752,992	454,847	764,228	3,408,462
1973	16,178,135	1,157,435	163,524	1,925,167	343,161	902,500	4,092,099
1974	20,326,260	1,303,823	188,490	2,325,585	347,898	1,000,676	4,752,530
1975	35,647,956	1,693,947	265,114	3,919,616	516,781	1,284,826	7,172,247

1. In the years 1950-1955 this total excludes State grants to Hospitals for the care of the Aged and the Psychopathic Home, Milbrook; included in Public Health for 2 below but includes State government hospital subsidies which are also included in Public Health total as it is impossible to identify the separate totals applicable.
2. In the years 1950-1955 this total includes a sum which was subsidy to all hospitals including St. Johns Hospital New Town, (also shown separately) the home for Invalids, Launceston, and Psychopathic Home, Milbrook. The expenditure on Milbrook also included in Mental Hygiene total.

Subsidy for Hospitals:

1951 - 782,464
1952 - 1,065,682
1953 - 1,190,933
1954 - 1,240,611
1955 - 1,355,962

Subsidy for Psychopathic Home:

1951 - 53,065
1952 - 66,773
1953 - 43,073
1954 - 95,693
1955 - ?

3. Administration costs are not shown separately in the years 1950-1955. These figures are only for miscellaneous expenditure and grants in aid to the Home for Invalids, Launceston (known as Cosgrove Park from 10.3.54.)

(Source: Annual Reports of Health Services Department and Accountant, Health Services.)

inspecting task. This situation remained in uneasy balance, even after the death of Tudor in 1946, but with the pending retirement of the then Permanent Head, Driscoll,

"The new coordinating and professional office of Director General of Medical Services was created as both permanent head of the Department and chief of its Hospital and Medical Services Division."³⁴

Other changes which formed the Departmental structure of today occurred when in order to indicate the diversity and extent of the services provided, the department was renamed 'Health Services' and the title of the Director General became 'Health', and not 'Medical', Services in 1956. In 1960, the major discretionary authority contained in some of the legislation administered by the department, especially the Public Health Act 1935, was relocated in the minister by the Health Services Act. These moves emphasised the shift from preventive activities to curative in a way nothing else could have done. No longer was the Division of Public Health at the centre of the department, permeating the whole with its purposes. Not only was the Permanent Head hospital oriented, but the expenditure of the department gradually reflected the change. Table 2 shows the relative expenditures in three five year periods, 1950-55; 1960-65; 1970-75. It illustrates the apparently self generating demands that curative services make upon the public purse, even dealing with the recurrent expenditure alone. One important facet of this problem is the fact that 65.49% in 1960-61, rising to 76.55% in 1973-74 of this expenditure is on salaries and wages of hospital employees.³⁵

The Director-General expressed his concern at this escalating cost factor in 1972,

"It becomes more and more apparent that the means of providing health care to the public must become less hospital oriented.

³⁴Wettenhall, The Guide, p 279. The story of the intrigues and peculiarly Tasmanian machiavellianisms which took place during this time is unfolded in Mathews, but is irrelevant to this thesis.

³⁵Since 1968 the Mental Health Services Commission has existed outside the Health Services Department, and it is interesting to compare their expenditure. Most of their operations take place within the hospital confines and yet they do not seem to have the same exponential growth.

Community Health services as a whole (based where necessary on major hospitals) could increase considerably the component of health care provided outside hospitals by means of community health centres and domiciliary care, as far as it is safe for the patient to use them."³⁶

Later in the same report there is a reference to "diversifying the means of providing health care to the community" and identifying the problem as one of resources. The method to be adopted according to the report is to accept the "new approach to the essential totality of properly balanced health care services for the future." This involves

"a complete marriage of the preventive and curative services and those component parts of social welfare services which are concerned with the patient and the patient's family both in health and sickness."³⁷

This direction was given impetus by the intervention of the Federal Government and provision of special funds for community health centres in 1974-75.³⁸ But by far the greatest emphasis was still on hospital building and services,

"The National Hospitals and Health Services Commission staff at the Joint Works Council made it clear to us that they were very anxious for the State to prepare Works Programs as expeditiously as possible so that the Commission could be provided with an anticipated cash-flow program over the next few years in order that they may make recommendations to their Government for funding the large sums of money which would be required to be contributed by the Australian Government... /for the construction of public institutional health facilities.7."³⁹

A recent publication has outlined in some detail the current public and private provision of health care services in Tasmania and set out below

³⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1972

³⁷ibid.

³⁸A start was made on two centres: one as a result of the Tasman Bridge disaster in Hobart in the Municipality of Clarence and the other at Kings Meadows, Launceston.

³⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 8

are the relevant extracts:

"2.2.1. Private practitioners

In most urban areas of Tasmania, primary care in the medical and dental fields is dominated by private practitioners. This is also true of some medical and dental specialities. ...

The overall provision of doctors in Tasmania ... would appear to be one of Australia's best. ...

The rural 'shortfall' of medical practitioners is possibly more serious when difficulties of access due to distance and terrain are considered, although the close proximity of many rural areas to urban centres may tend to offset this problem.

Dentists

...the number of dentists practising in Tasmania made the State the most poorly provided within Australia.

Allied Health Professionals

Whilst exact numbers of actually practising physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, chiropodists, etc. are difficult to obtain, present information would seem to confirm /that they are concentrated in certain centres/... However, since a larger proportion of allied services are provided under the auspices of public bodies such as government agencies and hospitals, a somewhat better distribution of services may occur than appears to be the case.

2.2.2 Private Hospitals

...Most private hospitals provide a basic range of diagnostic and nursing services to treat acute (short term) cases only. Patients requiring very specialised treatment would require the resources available only in large public hospitals and long term patients, e.g. invalid aged, are usually referred to a nursing home. ... Private hospitals are licensed by the Tasmanian Department of Health Services.

2.3 The Voluntary Sector

Voluntary agencies provide a wide range of health and welfare services, often using a more "whole person" approach to clients than is possible with departmentally or privately administered services. ... The provision of services for the handicapped tends to be dominated by voluntary agencies. ...

The importance of the volunteer effort is being recognised in the health field; particularly in public hospitals, which have organised volunteer services to assist general staff in many duties...

2.4 Public Hospitals

The 18 public hospitals of Tasmania (4 general, 14 district) and two maternity hospitals are all controlled by independent Boards of Management. Unlike private hospitals they are financed, not only by patients' fees, and Australian Government benefits, but by subsidies of their deficit expenditure by the Tasmanian Government. ... In comparison with other states, Tasmania appears to have an average supply of hospital beds in relation to its population ... Compared with the general Australian standard, the urban areas appear to be markedly oversupplied (particularly in

the Northern and Mersey-Lyell Regions) and rural areas greatly undersupplied. ...

The provision of 'super speciality' services in Tasmanian hospitals is a difficult problem due to the small size of population. ... many Tasmanian patients are transferred to Melbourne hospitals ... The provision of many specialised services in Tasmania sometimes means that these services may be inefficient, particularly if they are duplicated in several hospitals around the State, e.g. in Launceston and Hobart.

2.5 Aged Persons Accommodation

There are three public hospitals for the aged in Tasmania... [providing] public nursing home accommodation for their regions to the extent of 25 (Northwest) 134 (North) and 458 (South). ... the Southern region appears to be largely oversupplied whereas other regions are less well supplied."⁴⁰

The Working Paper also discusses the changing trends in the delivery of health care, noting the "shift in the need for services from the corrective treatment of infectious diseases ... to the 'new epidemics', non-infectious chronic disorders often associated with social factors and ageing." They point to the world-wide trend to provide such services via community health centres, such as were suggested in the Director-General's 1972 Report. This leads to an assessment that the most important areas of concern for Tasmania in the future are:

1. coordination of health services,
2. redressing the balance between oversupply of services in urban areas and undersupply in rural areas,
3. increased services for the aged, the chronically ill and for mental health,
4. attracting and retaining sufficient experienced staff which would be necessary for these increased services.

These considerations merely echo those already stressed in the Annual Reports of the Director-General and indicate the possible direction that will occur in the future. This may well create another pressure for organisational change such as has occurred in the past in similar situations.

The history of the provision of health services in Tasmania is punctuated

⁴⁰ Tasmanian State Strategy Plan, Health and Welfare Services in Tasmania, Working Paper No. 8, Hobart 1975

by these organisational changes to reflect different emphases in the provision of services. The initial reliance on local Boards of Health arose out of the nature of settlement, the difficulty of communications, and the British traditions.⁴¹ The reaction against the creation of the Central Board of Health was on the grounds that it would be an appointed body with authority over an elected one, unthinkable for the 'popular libertarians' of the 1880s. But in the very creation of the Central Board the government of the day seemed less than committed to strong action. They neither provided it with sufficient staff nor adequate funds, so the local Boards remained in control. Similarly, when the smallpox epidemic scared sufficient people into expecting strong action, a Department was created, but this was not overwhelmed with resources. As late as 1934 there is evidence to indicate that local authorities were still not complying with the directions of the department, nor providing appropriate staff.

"More effectual work, however, remains to be accomplished particularly in combatting infectious diseases in districts where officers' duties are not confined solely to health work. It should be realised that recognised measures towards the prevention and control of infectious disease must be applied with the least possible delay if the people are to be afforded the protection to which they are entitled by those responsible for safeguarding their welfare in the field of preventive medicine."⁴²

The Department also saw significant changes in the powers given to its officers over this time, with more direct authority vesting in the Director of Public Health under the Public Health Act 1935. By s. 6 of this Act authority was given to the Governor to appoint a "fit person to be Director of Public Health, who shall

- (a) in every case be a medical practitioner with special knowledge of sanitary and bacteriological science;

⁴¹For further discussion of these early Boards see Wettenhall, op. cit., and F.M.G. Willson, 'Ministries & Boards: Some Aspects of Administrative Development since 1832', Public Administration (London) 33(1), 1955, 43-59

⁴²Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 5 of 1934

- (b) hold office during the Governor's pleasure;
- (c) not engage in private practice; and
- (d) have the functions and duties specified in the Act."

The appointment of a specialist Director in place of the previous lay Secretary, opened the way to provide for more direct authority to him. Some examples are contained in:

- s. 7 - appointment of Health Officers, Inspectors, and Medical Officers subject to Director's control;
- s. 9 - a local Authority may appoint a Medical Officer only with the approval of the Director;
- s. 14(1) - Declaration of disease to be infectious by the Governor on the recommendation of the Director;
- s. 16(1) - Governor may make regulations for preventing the spread of disease upon recommendation of the Director. ⁴³

As a consequence of these changes in 1935 the staff increased from 23 at the time to 189 in 1952, when the long tenure of Dr. J. Edis began.⁴⁴ By the latter date the Department of Public Health had become only one of four Divisions within the Department of Health Services. This reorganisation began in 1945 with the creation of Divisions related to the main functional areas of the Department as a whole. Central to its activities was Public Health which had been the dominant element since its inception in 1903;

⁴³These powers have been subsequently modified by the Health Services Act 1960 and the Public Health Act 1962 which are discussed in more detail later.

⁴⁴These figures for 1935 include the Government Analyst Branch, but not the Mental Hospitals which were then a separate department. Tasmanian Government Gazette Vol. CLXVI No. 10, 100 (January 27, 1936) p 174. The figures for 1952 have omitted the Mental Hospitals, Chest Hospitals and St. John's Park, which were then under departmental control, for a proper comparison. The establishment of the Chest Hospitals was 143, but they were understaffed with a total of 285 established positions, of which over 100 were unfilled. St. John's Park and the Launceston Home for Invalids had establishments of 139. Tasmanian Government Gazette Vol. CXCIV No. 12, 581 (December 19, 1952) pp 3695-3711

in addition,

- (1) Tuberculosis - separately identified in the year 1945 as a specific and separate function, given added recognition in 1963 to organise the Commonwealth-assisted anti-tuberculosis campaign;
- (2) Mental Hygiene - that part of the health care which had always been separately managed in the Hospital for Insane, New Norfolk, under a Medical Superintendent, later reference is made to its chequered history;
- (3) Hospital and Medical Services - a new division which was created in 1945 to control the departmental activities in connection with public hospitals, the licensing of private hospitals and nursing homes, and the District Medical and Tasmanian Nursing Services.

As may be imagined, this diversity of tasks created a very diffused structure, with each segment almost wholly involved with its own function. This was especially so with Mental Hygiene and Tuberculosis, which had entirely separate locations, the former some 20 miles away at New Norfolk, the latter in both New Town Chest Hospital and the Northern Chest Hospital at Perth (Tasmania). Public Health carried out its major tasks as it had previously under the strong powers of the Director and was for that reason somewhat apart from the other divisions, even though it was located centrally. It was numerically superior to the Hospital and Medical Services Division which was initially a very small group whose main function was to act as a coordinating agent for the various public hospital services. All such hospitals had their own management boards under the Hospital Act 1918, but depended for much of their financial assistance, capital in particular, on State Government.

However, for the period from 1952 to 1968 the Director-General of Health Services doubled as the Director of the Hospital & Medical Services Division, which produced considerable distortion in the organisation of the Department. Especially since the Director-General had to have administrative experience within hospitals to perform his duties properly. There was usually a Senior Medical Officer (Hospitals) to assist him and from 1966 a Deputy Director-General of Health Services was appointed to oversee this area in particular.

The first Director-General was Dr. Carruthers, Medical Superintendent, Lachlan Park Mental Hospital, until he became Director and permanent head

of the Department of Public Health until 1939. On his return from service in the Second World War he became the first Director of Hospital and Medical Services, which office was combined in the Director-Generalship in 1952.

The next Director-General, Dr. Edis, originally an obstetrician, came from the Indian Medical Service via the superintendency of the Launceston General Hospital.


The subsequent Director-General, Dr. J.R. Macintyre, joined the Department in 1956 and, after serving as district medical officer, New Norfolk, became Senior, and then Chief, Medical Officer before becoming Deputy Director-General from 1966 until his appointment as Director-General in 1968. Dr. Macintyre is the first Director-General to regard administrative training as an integral part of the background necessary for senior positions within the Department. He has, himself, attended the Australian Administrative Staff College at Mount Eliza, while his Deputy and the last two Directors of Hospital and Medical Services have had graduate Diplomas in Health Administration.

This interest in the organisation of the Department has led to a number of internal re-arrangements which are reflected in the organisation charts.⁴⁵ It is appropriate to refer to these charts individually here, since they impinge specifically on the operating methods of the department and have a direct bearing on the relationship with the minister. They also reflect changes under the Health Services Act 1960 which considerably strengthened the position of the minister. The authority contained in various statutes had previously been given to the officer rather than the minister, e.g. under the Food and Drugs Act 1910 the Director of Public Health controlled the activities of Inspectors, but by the 1960 Act all such authority was deliberately made subject to ministerial consent and delegation.

"A reference in any regulation made under an Act amended by this Act to the Director General of Health Services, Director of Public Health, Director of Mental Health or Director of Tuberculosis shall be construed as reference to the Minister for Health."⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Tasmanian Health Services and Road Safety Department, Organisation Charts (Hobart, January 1971) prepared as a handbook for new staff, and to indicate the general structures as envisaged by the Director-General.

⁴⁶ S.4, Health Service Act 1960



The result of this simple change was to reinforce the ministerial control over his departmental officers and reduce the possibility of them acting without his consent under statutes which released them from this obligation.

Chart I - Tasmanian Health Services and Road Safety Organisation

The organisation of the Department as at April 1969 is shown on the Chart opposite. The Road Safety Branch has been omitted and was in fact transferred to the Police Department in 1975. The relationship of the department to the two Commissions, who have direct accountability to the minister and whose members are appointed by the minister, must be noted. The portfolio of Health Services is now a single portfolio for one minister, but it has not always been so. As with most portfolios in the small Tasmanian ministries one man may have responsibility for a number of portfolios. Table 3 shows the position over the years since the first holder of the portfolio was commissioned.

TABLE 3

Ministerial Holders of Office

1885-1946	The Board of Health and later the Department of Public Health were the responsibility of the Chief Secretary until 1946, when the portfolio <u>Health</u> was commissioned
1946-1948	Chief Secretary and Minister for Health
1948-1956	Minister for Health
1956-1958	Minister for Health & Treasurer
1958-1959	Chief Secretary and Minister for Health
1959-1969	Minister for Health (during this period a medical practitioner was minister until 1961)
1969-1972	Minister for Health and Road Safety (the minister was a medical practitioner)
1972 to date	Minister for Health and Road Safety Minister for Social Welfare (during this period the minister was a medical practitioner until 1974)

Source: Walch's Almanacs, Hobart

There is little doubt that the multiplicity of tasks now undertaken by the department and the increasing direct responsibility for hospitals makes it difficult for ministers to cope adequately with other portfolios.




Chart 2 - Department of Health Services

It will be seen that the department has been subdivided into two main groups, the medical operational services and the general administrative services. The former comprise all the activities accumulated over the years from the time when the area of public health was its main concern. Two groups which have been given separate status in recent years in addition to the general stream of activities are the School Dental Health Services (including the School of Dental Nursing) and the Pharmaceutical Services Section. Its main purpose was to train dental nurses to perform routine dental investigation and repair work on children. Preventive dentistry on children was regarded as more useful in a state which had no University Dental School, and in which considerable concern about poor dental health was expressed.⁴⁷ The District Dental Service was expanded on similar lines to the District Medical Officer Service, with a specialist orthodontist available.

Apart from the three main Divisions, Public Health, Hospital and Tuberculosis, the two specialist Laboratory services form the balance of the medical operational services. This area employs the bulk of the department staff and is the professional medical domain. Even here are many different specialisms between which there can be no transfer of staff or expertise. For example, the medical technologist (bacteriology) in the State Pathology Laboratory, is unlikely to be able to transfer to any section in the Division of Public Health, although one of the Health Inspectors from that Division is seconded to the Laboratory for specialist work. It does seem that there are very limited opportunities for promotion across the sectional boundaries within the department as a whole, unless it is in the area of administration at the senior level.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ See the Report on the Fluoridation of water supplies: Royal Commission of Fluoridation of Water Supplies Report (Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 32 of 1968) before which some 73 persons or groups appeared to give evidence.


⁴⁸ Referred to later in the more detailed discussion of professional staff.


Chart 3 - General Administrative Services

This relatively small group of officers have two main tasks, both servicing the other sections of the department. The first is financial and concerns the recurrent and capital funds expended by the department. The second is the record keeping, staffing, property and transport control for the whole department. It must be noted, however, that each Division and section has its own administrative group of executive officers, typists and clerks. The role of what may be termed the Headquarter's group is to provide an overview of the whole for the senior officers of the department and the minister. There is also the equally important function of internal control over staffing and finance which is maintained by close liaison with the Public Service Board and the Treasury. In some ways the group may be likened to a bridge which links the extremely professionally oriented department to the remainder of the Public Service in other departments. It is quite significant that, unlike the Department of Education, senior officers in this department are employed as public servants (note the letters P.S. in the charts) although in the Hospital Division for historical reasons there remain a number of specifically ministerial appointments.

Chart 4 - Hospital, medical and nursing services consultant and advisory branch

There are a number of significant elements in this area which expends the major proportion of departmental funds. First, it combines supervisory, regulatory and direct service functions. The Hospital management advisory section is the most important segment involved in indirectly managing the fifty large and small institutions providing health care around the state. It has the task of supervising the Hospital boards of management and co-ordinating their demands for capital and recurrent expenditure. This includes rationalising the planning of extensions to existing services or new services and the standardisation of equipment. Regulatory functions are related to





private hospitals, nursing homes and voluntary services of all kinds as well as nurses certification. Direct services are provided for aged persons at St. John's Hospital, where a Superintendent and staff have an average of 500 patients to care for annually. They also administer an outpatients' clinic and provide domiciliary care for aged persons. This operation is as self-contained as that of the other two institutions for aged persons in the State at Cosgrove Park, Launceston and the Spencer Homes for the Aged, Wynyard. However, these latter institutions are managed by the Boards of the public hospitals at Launceston and Wynyard. Another direct service is that of the District Medical Officers who are appointed in conjunction with local municipal councils, but administered by the Division.

Second, the miscellany of activities under the control of this Division does not indicate the dominance of the one main function of hospital management. The regulatory functions are not ones which cause much political difficulty, as do the similarly regulatory activities of the Division of Public Health. The direct services operate more or less autonomously and rarely involve the Director-General in person. Indeed, the situation has been that the last two Directors-General have been employed because of their experience in hospital administration.

Third, a similar phenomenon to that of the department as a whole in terms of promotional opportunities, occurs within this Division. The various tasks are so disparate that professional officers in, say, St. John's Park Hospital could not really transfer in promotional terms to any other section. This may not apply equally to the few clerical and executive officers employed, but their promotional ceiling within the department is relatively low anyway. It is harder to visualise a district medical officer becoming a senior officer within the department today, than to expect appointments to senior positions from major public hospital administrators.

Fourth, there is no administrative support staff for this Division as a whole, and it therefore utilises that of the Department to a quite extensive degree, whereas neither the TB Division nor Public Health have any need to do so.

Chart 5 - Division of Tuberculosis

There is one treatment centre, the 19-bed Tuberculosis Ward at the Royal Hobart Hospital, which has increasingly light use, having an average bed occupancy of 13 during 1973-74. The following Table of incidence over the last sixteen years indicates the trend in Tasmania which for many years was the only State having compulsory X-Rays.⁴⁹ The main function of the Division

TABLE 4

Incidence of Tuberculosis in Tasmania

1958-1974

1958-1959	160
1959-1960	128
1960-1961	117
1961-1962	118
1962-1963	111
1963-1964	105
1964-1965	81
1965-1966	66
1966-1967	58
1967-1968	48
1968-1969	57
1969-1970	46
1970-1971	45
1971-1972	42
1972-1973	49
1973-1974	49


Source: Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 14

is preventive and it accomplishes this task through its mass miniature X-ray section conducted at the two clinics in Hobart and Devonport.

Chart 6 - Division of Public Health

The original core of the department, this Division still functions in a largely autonomous fashion, having its own legislative provisions to administer

⁴⁹ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 14



DIVISION OF TUBERCULOSIS

COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF T.B.

DIRECTOR OF TUBERCULOSIS

(P.S.)

Direct Liaison With

T.B. Organisations - Interstate and Commonwealth.
Minister for Health.
Supts. of Public Hospitals.
Private Medical Practitioners.
Departmental Directors.
Patients, Relatives and Contacts of Tuberculosis.

SENIOR MEDICAL OFFICER

(P.S.)

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(P.S.)

Typist

(P.S.)

Senior Clerk

(P.S.)

Clerical Assistants 2

Stenographers 2

(P.S.)

MASS MINIATURE CHEST X-RAY SECTION

Officer I/C

(P.S.)

Office Assistants 8

(P.S.)

Senior Radiographer

(P.S.)

Radiographers Assistants 6

(P.S.)

Clerk

(P.S.)

Typists 2

(P.S.)

Assistant

(P.S.)

HOBART CHEST CLINIC

Sister I/C

(P.S.)

Sisters 3

(P.S.)

Office Assistant

(P.S.)

DEVONPORT CHEST CLINIC

Sister I/C

(P.S.)

Sister

(P.S.)

Typist

(P.S.)

TASMANIAN CHEST HOSPITAL

Medical Superintendent

(P.S.)

Matron

(P.S.)

Executive Officer

(P.S.)

Ancillary Medical Staff - 3

(P.S.)

Nursing and Nurse Aid Staff 13

(P.S.)

General Staff 42

(P.S.)

See Public Service List for Detail of Personnel and Occupational Groups on the Staff Establishment

MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF T.B.

- : Statutory and regulatory functions under the Tuberculosis Act.
- : Advisor to the Minister and D.G.H.S. on the control of T.B. in Tasmania.
- : Conducting the State compulsory Mass-Miniature Chest X-ray scheme.
- : Controlling the infection of Tuberculosis in the State, by the early detection, treatment and follow up of cases and contacts.
- : Isolating infectious cases and providing immunisation B.C.G. vaccination as required.
- : Ensuring that the Commonwealth / State T.B. Organisation and agreement is complied with.
- : Providing specialist chest physician services to the Royal Hobart Hospital as required.
- : Act or deputise for the D.G.H.S. as required.
- : Attendance at annual conferences of Commonwealth and States Directors of Tuberculosis.

and its own general administrative section to service its needs. It is similarly diffuse in the number of tasks it performs within itself, which is in part a legacy of the past, but also a function of its preventive orientation. The dominant group in the division are the regulatory inspectors concerned with hygiene and sanitation, pure food, infectious diseases and preventive medicine generally. In addition however, there are three elements directly derived from the old Maternal and Child Health Directorate - Child Health Service, Child Guidance Clinic and Mothercraft Home, and Child Health Sisters' training school. There is also the School Medical Service which carries on where the Child Health Service leaves off in terms of the child's age, providing medical checks for children from birth to the time they leave school. Health education has expanded considerably with recent Australian Government funding, especially in the area of drug use and abuse and smoking. A residue of the previous concern of the Department of Public Health with factories legislation is the Occupational Health and Industrial Hygiene section, which maintains a close watch over matters such as noise levels and contamination of workers by toxic substances. One recently identified area of concern is that of rehabilitation of those workers injured at their work; a Director of Rehabilitation has been appointed and will take over this area and probably others, such as alcoholism and drugs abuse leading to dismissal. National Fitness was another supervisory concern of the Division, again on the basis that it is a preventive activity.⁵⁰

It must be stressed once again that even within this Division there are many disparate functions being performed by specialists of a non-transferable kind within the department as a whole. Also within this Division there are a number of areas where close co-operation with Child Welfare Officers of the Department of Social Welfare is necessary.⁵¹

⁵⁰ This function was transferred to the Department of Education in 1974 and is no longer under the control of the Division.

⁵¹ There are arguments for the combination of some elements of Social Welfare and Health Services, which are discussed somewhat superficially in the Tasmanian Strategy Plan Working Paper 8, p 59.

Federal-State partnership

Health care is provided by the State government as a constitutional duty, but there are a number of areas in which the Federal government has become involved. In general terms the State provides direct personal services, whereas the Federal responsibility lies more in payment of various benefits, such as Pharmaceutical.⁵² The Federal government does run the Repatriation Hospitals for veterans and their dependents, including medical services and an artificial limb- and appliance Centre. However, the main thrust of Federal activity which warrants discussing it in terms of 'partnership' is the enormous influence federal bodies have on State decisions in the health and hospital services. This activity is largely centred now on the Hospitals and Health Services Commission and the Health Insurance Commission, although these two bodies have only recently been created. Prior to this the Commonwealth Department of Health performed the main initiating role in the health field from the federal level.

The forms of initiative varied considerably, from assistance with pathology services and acoustic laboratories to the provision of a forum for discussion through the National Health and Medical Council. Some of the programmes initiated by the Federal government have been in areas such as home nursing, family medicine and - more recently - Community Health. In each case State governments have been persuaded, by the provision of finance, to undertake these activities, which, although very desirable in themselves, were not given very high priority at the State level. Another example of such persuasion is the drug education programme, referred to in the Director-General's Report for the year 1970-1971.⁵³

⁵²Since 1975, medical under Medibank (but outside the time limitation of this thesis)

⁵³Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 20: "In the past year a marked increase in work load has been placed on staff of the Public Health Department. Certain main causes have contributed to this. Among them were -

1. The Commonwealth Sponsored and financed drug education programme. A health educator was appointed very early in 1971, but he had to be sent to Sydney immediately after appointment to attend a six months training course provided by the Commonwealth..."

Similarly, the annual meetings of the Commonwealth and State Ministers of Health act as a catalyst for common efforts in specific fields such as drugs. Most often the results are embodied in common legislation, as in the case of Cigarettes (Labelling) Act 1972 which provided for the prohibition of the sale of cigarettes except in packages marked with the appropriate health hazard warning. Another area of joint concern in which the National Health and Medical Research Council are involved as an expert advising body is poisons and drugs. The Dangerous Drugs Act 1971 and the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968 are examples of legislation of this kind.⁵⁴

The work of the National Health and Medical Research Council deserves some further clarification, since it does seem to play a very important role in the kind of health care provided at state level. The Council is comprised of:

Director-General Commonwealth Department of Health - Chairman

Two members of the Department in addition

Director Commonwealth Serum Laboratories

Directors and Directors-General of all State Departments of Health

Director of Department of Health Papua New Guinea

Representatives of: Federal Council of Australian Medical Association

Royal Australasian College of Surgeons

Physicians

General Practitioners

Australian University Medical Schools

Australian Council of Royal College of Obstetricians
and Gynaecologists

Royal College of Pathologists of Australia

Australian Dental Association

Royal College of Radiologists of Australia

An eminent layman and an eminent laywoman appointed by the Minister, and is organised into various specialist sub-committees. It is through these various sub-committees that matters of scientific or technical public health

⁵⁴ See for example Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 60 of 1969, p 9

interest are raised and discussed in full Council. Officers from the State Departments then pursue such matters, either in concert through to their Ministers and perhaps the annual Ministers of Health Conference, or through the Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council until more research initiated by the National Health and Medical Research Council is available.

Examples of the influence of these bodies may be seen from the following extracts from the Annual Reports of the Director-General:

(a) radiation

"A preliminary investigation into microwave ovens in the Hobart area was performed by the inspectors, with a view to wider control of these potentially dangerous machines. The National Health and Medical Research Council's Radiation Standing Committee is currently preparing a Code of Practice on Microwave devices which will provide a basis for control and possible future legislation."⁵⁵

"The Radiological Advisory Council met three times during the year, twice for ordinary meetings and once for a special meeting to discuss the draft of the proposed Radiation Control Bill."⁵⁶

"Instruction sheets have been distributed to the retail firms for issue to purchasers of microwave ovens."⁵⁷

(b) food standards

"The National Health and Medical Research Council referred the following matters to the State Food Advisory Committee for comment -

- (1) Preservative;
- (2) Propylene glycol alginate in sausage casings;...
- (8) Self-adhesive labels for use on foods.

The May 1975 meeting was devoted entirely to the examination and discussion of Standards that had been considered at the Seventy-eighth and Seventy-ninth Sessions of the National Health and Medical Research Council."⁵⁸

It may thus be seen that, although constitutionally the State is responsible for health care, there are many external pressures upon it which force it to respond in quite specific ways. In most such cases the Federal government

⁵⁵Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 32

⁵⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 20

⁵⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 23

⁵⁸op. cit., p 22

does assist through provision of funds for such activities. However, sometimes State initiatives without Federal support are subsequently adopted and supported Commonwealth wide.

One such example is the School Dental Health Scheme, started in 1966. This was the only such scheme operating within Australia until recently, providing school children up to the age of 15 years with complete, free dental care. There are two elements in the Scheme, a District Dental Service and the School of Dental Nursing. The former provides field Dental Officers, Specialist Orthodontists, and graduate Dental Nurses from the School to rural centres in which no private dentists operate. These offer dental services to school children only, in three centres a comprehensive service to school children regardless of age, in eight other centres comprehensive service to all primary children and emergency service to all children regardless of age. The service operates parallel with School Medical Services, giving a comprehensive preventative health care to school children, especially in the areas outside the two main conurbations of Hobart and Launceston. In addition, the School of Dental Nursing provides a service of similar kind to the school children in Hobart. Senior students, i.e. those in their second year of training at the School, treat these children under supervision as part of their practical training. For example, in the year 1974-75 they examined 5,054 children, completed 4,630 simple and 2,962 compound fillings and extracted 171 permanent teeth, among many other operative dental treatments.⁵⁹

Such has been the success of the work done by the graduates of the School - in particular in rural centres - both in educating children about dental care as well as treatment, that the Federal government has proposed providing assistance throughout other States for the setting up of similar schools.

⁵⁹ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No 79 of 1975, p 24

"As far as the School Dental Nursing Service is concerned the offer by the Commonwealth to all States was that they would finance to the extent of 100% of capital costs and 100% of annual running costs, the establishment of dental nurses (therapists) training schools to an extent which would permit each State, by 1980 at the latest, to be in a position to be training an adequate number of dental nurses in sufficient numbers (sic) to be able to provide a field service to attain the objects of caring for all the primary school children."⁶⁰

No State Health Department operates in isolation from trends in the Commonwealth as a whole, far more than in any other functional area, health care is affected by external activities and discussions.

With this general background to the work of the Department of Health Services in mind, it is now necessary to deal with each of the previously identified forces which affect the interactions between the minister and his department. These interactions, more especially between the minister and his senior officers, take place in the context of the matters already discussed, but are better clarified if dealt with in a more ordered way. The remainder of the chapter will therefore evaluate the effect on the minister's accountability and control of the forces already discussed earlier. Each will be dealt with under a separate heading and a final summary given as to the nature of the effect of circumjacent groups, legislative provisions, professional staff, financial arrangements and departmental tradition, on political leadership and executive authority.

A. Circumjacent groups

In systems terms the Department of Health Services is the most 'open system' of the three departments in this study. For this reason the relationship with circumjacent groups is probably the most important of all the forces which affect the minister. The wide range of activities involved in some way or another with health care which fall to the department to perform,

⁶⁰Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 14

increases the interaction with such groups.⁶¹

As has already been mentioned, the Commonwealth-wide membership of various Councils, such as National Health and Medical Research Council or Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council, allows departmental officers to be in constant contact with their counterparts in other States and also with world trends in research. At the same time state ministers meet separately at least once a year with the Federal minister to discuss matters raised by their officials through HASAC or NHMRC, or such matters as they may wish to discuss from their own policies.

But it is not only as representatives on these bodies that officers become involved outside their departments, they are also members of numerous special professional and learned bodies. Apart from the Australian Medical Association, these may include Hospital Administrators, Geriatrics, Radiologists, Cancer Society, or any one of the various Colleges. In this way officers are informed about specialisms which they may no longer practice due to their administrative duties, but in which they still maintain an interest. The enormous interchange of information possible through these contacts has the effect of reinforcing internal divisions within the department and creating competing centres of special interest. This was stressed by one minister who discussed his task as "ministerial mediation between interest clusters". He pointed out, however, that such interests were not always grouped around specialism of a professional kind. He gave an example from the Hospital context where he had to arbitrate between the expectations of the University Faculty of Medicine, honorary private consultants and salaried hospital staff.

The major circumjacent involvement occurs at the state level rather than federal, although the importance of the latter cannot be underestimated.

⁶¹In this sense the Health Department differs from the other two departments studied. The situation is somewhat similar to that described by Brown, "The habit of consultation is very strong in British administration"; but not for the reason he attributes to the British system, because of subject specialisation in the Departments; R.G. Brown, op. cit., p 165

It is at this level that the consumers of the services provided by the department gain prominence rather than the professionals within the department. For every activity separately defined within the department there is a different clientele interested in that part of the service only. This inevitably leads to the emergence of areas of common concern between the officer, whose professional orientation is specific in one area and the client, whose demands are for service in the same area. Because of the enormously wide range of these services it is convenient to consider these in three sections, professional, regulatory, and personal service.

(a) Professional - this section relates to those groups for which the department acts as registration agency by providing secretarial services or of which the Director-General is statutory Chairman, and those other autonomous registration boards on which the department has representation. The former are the Dental Mechanics Registration Board, established in 1957 to allow only those dental mechanics registered by the Board to deal directly with the public; the Nurses Registration Board; the Radiological Advisory Council, which advises the Minister on all applications to use, sell, supply, purchase or store radioactive substances; and the Poisons Advisory Committee of which the Director of Public Health is Deputy Chairman. There are six autonomous registration boards under the general supervision of the Minister, although such supervision is minimal. These are Board of Optical Registration; Dental Board of Tasmania; Medical Council of Tasmania; Pharmacy Board of Tasmania; the Radiographers Registration Board; and Physiotherapists Registration Board. In only the last named has the minister any direct representation, all other Boards may have departmental members, but not in any expressly representative capacity.

Those Boards on which the minister is directly represented must require his attention more than the others, which only have a call on his time if changes to the appropriate legislation is demanded.⁶² One of the most recent examples of this is in connection with the dental profession, where the

⁶²Detailed accounts of some of these Boards are contained in Wettenhall, Guide, pp 300-304.

government of the day forced the Board to accept registration of dental mechanics who could then deal directly with the public from their own establishments. The pressure from the public for more dental services than could be provided by practising dentists, persuaded the government to amend the Dentists' Act 1919 to allow this to occur. Under the 1957 amendment the Dental Mechanics Registration Board was created with two dentists nominated by the Dental Board and two dental mechanics under the chairmanship of the Director-General of Health Services.

Later, for somewhat similar reasons, the government again intervened by passing the School Nursing Service Act 1965. As mentioned above, the School of Dental Nursing was created to train practitioners having limited scope, but able to deal particularly with children's treatments. Again, the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Dental Association is represented by three members of a seven member Dental Health Service Advisory Committee, of which the Minister's nominee is chairman. In each of these cases the initiative for such changes came from the executive area and were brought to fruition by consultation with an advisory group which included the Dental Board and the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Dental Association.

Finally, a further indication of the relationship between these groups and the government is the recent Podiatrists' (Chiropodists) Registration Act 1974. In this case the chiropodists were anxious to protest their professional integrity by restricting the entry of relatively unqualified persons into the field. Their Association persuaded the government of the need for such protection, and the Act provided for the constitution of a Registration Board and registration of chiropodists. The Board comprises the Director-General as Chairman and four others - two of whom are representatives of the Australian Association of Chiropodists, the other two medical practitioners nominated by the minister, one of whom must be an orthopaedic surgeon.

No minister or official indicated that this particular group of clientele caused them any great concern, much more time was consumed by the other two

groups.

(b) The regulatory clientele are those over whom the department exercises some form of direct control. Such control may be in the form of licensing, as in the case of work done through the Health Inspectorate under the Public Health Act 1962 and regulations. Alternatively, it may comprise supervision of activities for the purpose of ensuring compliance with departmental decisions or statutes, e.g. the Food Standards Committee which attempts to ensure uniform standards with the rest of the Commonwealth.

This is by far the largest group and covers a wide range of activities, and much of the work involved in direct relationships is with officers of the department in whose special area the activity falls. There is a strong emphasis on delegation within the department due to the necessity of maintaining links with so many diverse functions. This reduces the direct involvement of either the minister or senior officers. However, there is more likelihood that interests of department and clientele may clash in regulatory activities and many of the Parliamentary questions are concerned with these areas which consequently involve ministers.

More than one minister noted a peculiarity of the Tasmanian situation, which causes many matters of detail to land on his desk. Because of its relatively small population and land mass, the Tasmanian public servant tends to 'dive for cover' more frequently than those in larger states.⁶³ The minister is therefore frequently presented with minor problems which could have properly been dealt with at a much lower level in the system. One minister went so far as to say that, if he were minister again, he would force the officers to make their minds up and take responsibility. However, this

⁶³This is a feature of small political systems, a similar phenomenon has been noted in Eire. B. Farrell, "Dail Deputies: The 1969 Generation", *Economic & Social Review* 11(3) 1971, pp 309-327, and in Tasmania: R.A.Herr with W.J. Hemmings and friends, 'Accountability and Proportional Representation: The Tasmanian Case', *Politics* X(2) November 1975, pp 216-220

may not be a fair commentary, since the public have such ready access to ministers that, what may be normally regarded as an exercise of administrative discretion through delegation, becomes politically significant. For this reason, amongst others, many committees have been set up on which officers and interested persons combine to provide advice and information to the minister. Examples of such committees in the regulatory area are those which the statutes themselves have set up, such as the Food Standards Committee and Pesticides Advisory, in addition to those already mentioned.

(c) The group of clientele with whom the Department has most to do in a direct way is that to whom it provides personal services. However, this particular group is not very large, comprising in the main St. John's Park Hospital; the District Medical Service; the School Medical and Child Health Services; School Dental Health Services; and the Tuberculosis Division. Part of the group, but one with which it has less direct contact, is the hospital patient through the Hospital, Medical and Nursing Services Consultant and Advisory Branch which deals with the Hospital Boards of Management and Community Health Services.

Apart from officers who have responsibility for the provision of these services within the departmental structure, there are no specific committees of a formal nature by which clientele can express their expectations. There is a St. John's Park Hospital Advisory Board which operates as an advisory committee without executive authority and includes the Deputy Director-General. Nonetheless, there are many links with such clientele through voluntary bodies which operate side by side with departmental officers in many of these areas. Some examples of this situation from the past are given by Wettenhall:

"Many such links exist between official departmental activity and promotional and continuing welfare work performed by voluntary organisations...in the training and certification of nurses and in the conduct of district nursing centres and hospitals, the New Town Chest Hospital and the New Town Mothercraft Home, for

example, the department took over and expanded services pioneered by voluntary bodies. An association of a different kind began in 1966 with the improvement by the department of kitchen facilities at the New Town Chest Hospital for the specific purpose of preparing meals for delivery to the aged and sick in their own homes by the voluntary Meals-on-Wheels Associations of Hobart and Glenorchy."⁶⁴

Apart from these voluntary bodies operating in close contact with officers of the department, parliamentarians in questions and direct contact with the minister become the substitute in the absence of formal relationships in committees. Ministers indicated that they spent considerable time on preparing answers to parliamentary questions, one minister suggested a time of one hour each. They also met with many deputations, both at their office and out in various centres visited on special occasions. In this way they kept in touch with what the clientele thought were their needs. All agreed that these contacts helped in some degree to shape priorities and departmental thinking.

Added to these various kinds of external involvement the officers, and especially the senior officers of the department, belong to numerous committees only indirectly affecting their functions. Many are members because of their particular expertise, rather than departmental representatives. These committees include Building Regulations Board, Child Welfare Advisory Council, Fertilisers Board, and Stock Medicines Board. At the same time, departmental officers are intimately involved with many voluntary organisations to whom the department furnishes financial aid, for example, the Red Cross blood transfusion service, Tasmanian Section of the Royal Flying Doctor Service, and the first aid work of the St. John Council.

⁶⁴Wettenhall, Guide, pp 280-81. (New Town Chest Hospital is now known as John Edis Hospital for Drug & Alcohol Dependency)

Finally, there are the relatively autonomous bodies over which the department has some supervisory role on behalf of the minister. The involvement depends to a large extent on the financial aid provided, as in the case of hospitals, where the aid is substantial and the department involvement through the Hospital Management Advisory Section has reduced the autonomy of the Hospital Boards considerably. The Ambulance Commission is a different case, because it operates with a separate government grant outside the control of the department. Although the Minister for Health is responsible under the Ambulance Act for the service and he appoints one of his officers to the seven man commission, there is no direct threat to the autonomy of the Commission.

Summation

The departmental activities cover such a variety of functional areas that no one person could hope to keep involved in them all directly. Historically specialist functions have been added which have already an identifiable clientele and with whom contacts have been cemented. These factors have led to a permeable structure in which both officer and circumjacent groups interact continually. This is enhanced by the considerable delegation practised within the department. Reinforcing the extensive delegation is the specialist nature of much of the work and the qualifications of the officers themselves. Membership of officers in Australia-wide professional associations stimulate considerable interchange of ideas and information which can be absorbed into the departmental thinking. All agreed that the involvement of officers in their professional associations did assist the work of the department. It was also pointed out by senior officers, that with so many professionals involved with their own specialisms, the best that can be expected is co-ordinative control and consultative mechanisms. One example of this was the rationalisation of the supply and use of drugs in hospitals through an ad hoc departmental Committee, comprised primarily of major users of the drugs in private practice and such officers as the Director-General and the Director of Supply and Tender Board.

Similarly, the fact that so many of the senior officers are involved in both Federal and State level committees of various kinds was seen to be beneficial. One officer pointed to the greater integration of professional knowledge and the cross-fertilisation that occurs at all levels because of this. Ministers also participate in many of these committees which allowed for increased understanding of the expert opinions on which advice was often given. Another aspect of interaction with circumjacent groups regarded as extremely fruitful was the cooptation and representation which occurred at the State level in the many committees and boards.⁶⁵ Not only were officers involved in this process, but the minister often had direct access to the various bodies and attended when required.

The activities of the department internalised the demands such circumjacent relationships produced, which caused a serious weakening of ministerial control. The minister can no longer obtain any comprehensive view of the whole, consequently, his capacity for political leadership is severely limited. Not only are his officers in a position to compromise him seriously without his knowledge until it is too late, but many other relatively autonomous bodies may take action without his direct approval. The extent to which executive authority is thus transferred by default is considerable, thus enhancing administrative capacity to act beyond control.

However, restraint is exercised by senior officers in the manner by which they operate. One minister felt disconcerted at their unwillingness to accept responsibility by making their own decisions. Yet all officers stressed the need to understand the minister's thinking and not to operate beyond perceived limits. The most extreme statement of administrative capacity came from one officer who thought that, in the health field, achievement was

⁶⁵ The concepts of cooptation and representation are derived from P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949) in which he identified the involvement of TVA officers in the community and the extent to which their actions were legitimated by this process. The process seems to be much less deliberate in the case of the Department of Health, but it might be suggested that the results are similar.

the result of international trends, not politics. There was no evidence that the minister is ignored in making decisions, even in regard to what may be thought to be purely professional matters.

The Director-General occupies a key role, since it is within his discretion to decide which matters are for the minister and which for officers. The structure of the department is such, that he has deliberately and properly placed himself in this co-ordinative position. Thus it is upon his perception of the balance between ministerial responsibility and administrative capacity that reliance must be placed and professional centrifugal forces kept in check. (The present Director-General has a very strong commitment to the Westminster system of government, feeling that as permanent head to the department it is his duty to act as chief adviser to the minister and co-ordinate the activities of the department).

B. Legislative provisions

The statutes administered by the department number some 60, (a list appears at the end of this Chapter) of which at least half contain substantive provisions, placing a duty on the department or its officers. Many of the earlier statutes give direct authority for such action to Division Directors, especially the Tuberculosis Acts or the Public Health Acts. By the Health Services Act 1960 these powers were made subject to the consent of the minister, and although effectively Directors still exercise authority, it is delegated by the minister and not statutorily from Parliament. This change was insisted upon by one particular minister whose understanding of the Westminster system was respected by all. (This particular minister was highly respected by all senior officers who had worked with him, his motives for the amendment were accepted and there was some relief that the total burden of decision had been taken from their shoulders). The complexity of the departmental activities is such, that no minister could hope to become directly involved in every area, but the statutory change was seen as more properly

expressing the relationship between minister and public servant. Subsequent amendments or consolidations of the Statutes have included this limitation, for example the Public Health Act 1962. Many of the statutes vest an already functioning service in the Department or Ministry and provide them with management authority, e.g. Lady Clark Geriatric Act 1968, Cosgrove Park Act 1962, New Town Mothercraft Home Agreement Act 1949, War Veterans Home (Management) Act 1962. These transfer responsibility for what had been a voluntary arrangement to the department, or provide for departmental involvement in management in exchange for financial assistance.

Other statutes are concerned with hospitals of various kinds, the most important and comprehensive being the Hospitals Act 1918. This charges the minister quite categorically with the duty of administering the statute. (S.5(1)). His main tasks are to determine which hospitals are to be subsidised, on what terms and conditions, or whether two hospitals should be amalgamated. To carry out this task, he may appoint some officer to investigate needs, recommend annual subsidies and generally see the provisions of the Act are carried out. One provision of relevance to the earlier history of the department is s. 6A, which allows the Governor to appoint a medical practitioner to be Director-General of Health Services. It was this statute which was used as a vehicle for accommodating the appointment of Dr. Edis as the first Director-General in 1952.

Hospital Boards are to be constituted under the Act for the management of hospitals, including staffing and financial management, but the minister has to approve the appointments of "any medical officer, secretary, manager or matron of any public hospital".⁶⁶

The Hospitals Act provides for two kinds of hospital, public and private, the former being more directly under the supervision of the department. Private hospitals may be given a subsidy and must be licensed by the

⁶⁶ Hospital Act, 1918, s. 33, which section also limits the authority of the Board in relation to land dealing, mortgaging and capital works.

Minister, but operate relatively free of supervision compared to public hospitals. There are 18 public hospitals (4 general, 14 district) and two maternity hospitals controlled by Boards of Management.⁶⁷ There are five medium sized and three small private hospitals, none of which provide more than the basic range of diagnostic and nursing services for acute cases.

The remaining statutes are concerned with regulating certain kinds of activity in health and allied fields. Some relate to the general management of professional bodies, for control of entry into the profession and professional standards. The most obvious example is that regulating the medical profession in the state, the Medical Act 1959. Others include Dentists Act 1919, Opticians Act 1913, Pharmacy Act 1908 and the latest, referred to previously, the Podiatrists Registration Act 1974.

A different regulatory purpose underlines the Anatomy Act 1964, or the Sale of Blood Act 1964. In both cases the department are empowered to prevent the improper use of the human body. Another statute, the Cremation Act 1934, relates to the regulation of infectious disease, and similar reasons produced the Quarantine Act 1881, although many of the provisions under this latter statute have been superseded by the Federal quarantine powers.

The majority of statutes mentioned are relatively mechanical in their effect, producing administrative and routine activities, occupying many departmental officers, but not directly affecting the major policy of the department. Most of these statutes have remained unchanged with no call for amendment coming from any source. Their main function has been to provide statutory authority for the ongoing activities of the department. However, some have been amended to a considerable degree and these, it must be assumed, involve the most sensitive areas of the departmental business. The Food and

⁶⁷For a more detailed account of the current situation see Tasmanian State Strategy Plan, Health and Welfare Services in Tasmania, Hobart 1975, Working Paper No. 8, pp 21 et seq.

Drugs Act 1910 has been amended some 11 times; the Hospitals Act 1918 amended 20 times; and the Public Health Act amended 15 times, before the 1935 Act was repealed and substituted by the 1962 Act, which itself has been substantially amended. In 1966 some 35 of its 142 Sections were amended, and in 1973 the Public Health Act 1962 was again amended in some 40 of its 142 Sections. The Act was also subjected to amendments in 1968, 1970 and 1974. Other legislation, such as the Medical Act 1959 and the Poisons Act 1971 have been amended from time to time to allow for particular changes.⁶⁸

The majority of current legislation for which the department has responsibility places strong emphasis on ministerial control. This is a deliberate change from the past when the initial statutory authority was given direct to the professionals within the department, particularly the Director of Public Health under the old Public Health Acts. Much of this colonial legislation remained in force in 1960, and it has been the aim of the Department to bring these into line with contemporary needs by amendment. The present Director-General has been deeply involved in this activity, insisting on providing for authority to be delegated by the Minister to officials.

Widely divergent views about changing legislation by substitution or amendment were held by ministers and senior officials. One minister saw the process as a fuss and rather unnecessary, "things went well without it". This view was supported by some of the officials with a professional perspective, although most officers agreed that there was a need to keep legislation up to date and vital, especially some of the old regulatory statutes, such as the Dentists Act 1919. The Director-General had begun re-drafts of such statutes, including the Dentists and Hospitals Acts, as well as completing the major re-draft of the Medical Act in 1971.

⁶⁸The latest amendment to the Poisons Act related to increased police powers of search for narcotics and caused considerable debate. Mercury, 22/11/73. This was done on the recommendation of the National Standing Committee on Drugs to the Ministers' Conference on Drug Abuse.

The case of the Hospitals Act 1918 provides a good example of the differing points of view about legislation. The Act was passed as a consequence of the report of the Royal Commission into General Hospitals 1914, which considered allegations about mismanagement in hospitals. The Commissioner reported, *inter alia*,

"I find that in general hospitals in Tasmania the systems adopted in regard to administration differ somewhat widely and that no one system as adopted in any general hospital is quite satisfactory."⁶⁹

His recommendations for a changed form of hospital management was partially implemented in the 1918 Act.

Since that time, there have been many changes, but the scheme of general and district, or cottage, hospitals has remained. The Board system of management has recently become the concern of the Department, because of financial problems. The changing ideas about the provision of health care and community health services may provide an appropriate stimulus to reconsider the provisions of the Act.⁷⁰ There has been ministerial approval in principle to some aspects of a new bill. However, it is an enormously time-consuming process and, since there is no one within the department able to work full time in addition to their daily activities, redrafting had not yet been completed. But since it was the opinion of this minister that such a narrative should be detailed enough to serve as the Second Reading speech there was little progress.

⁶⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No 21 of 1914-15. This Commission was followed by another, specifically to enquire into the Hobart Hospital of that day; that Commission was much more scathing and gave impetus to produce the legislation. Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 10 of 1915-16. An interesting element of the Commission's recommendations was the suggestion, that all hospitals other than private should be 'nationalised' - p xii.

⁷⁰For a discussion of these matters see: R.J.K.Chapman, "Health Policy in Tasmania", Public Policy Seminar Paper, Tasmanian Development Series, University of Tasmania, 1976. The present Director-General has been concerned with re-drafting this Act for some considerable time and currently has an initial Bill under discussion with interested bodies such as the Hospital Boards.

(This same minister also noted that in his opinion public servants did not have sufficient knowledge of drafting and clause writing, leaving all this to the Parliamentary Draftsman. There may be some truth in this as many Bills, when presented to the Legislative Council in Tasmania, have to be returned for amendments of detail, which should have been unnecessary.)

The Director-General was directly involved in any statutory amendments or rewriting and suggested, that it was very complex and occupied a great deal of time. He was the person mainly concerned in the department with preparation of a brief to the draftsman for such changes. Most of this work had to be done outside normal office hours, as there was no opportunity in the press for everyday business.

It was suggested, that public servants were ambivalent about such activity and that they would rather not 'stir the pot'.⁷¹ The functions of the department are complex enough without having to make them more difficult through opening wide the door to discussion and debate. According to this line of thought, most of the argument about statutory changes would be irrelevant because it would be 'political' rather than 'professional'. Indeed, this seems to sum up the basis for leaving the legislation alone and merely amending 'at the margin' when particular matters need attention.

There are two resulting consequences which seem to be contradictory. On the one hand it provides the public servants with accumulated precedent for any of their activities and permits them to increase their scope for acting within their discretion. In this way the delegated authority is accumulated almost by default, rather than by powers directly given by the minister.

⁷¹ A similar suggestion was made in Education, where a senior official pointed to the problems that would result from the clause about religious education, even though no change was proposed. All the old arguments would be revived with no benefit to anyone - "best leave well alone". (see p 226 supra).

Legislative review would mean that ministers become aware of the detail of departmental functions because these matters are forced on their attention. It is a natural occurrence in all large organisations, for normal activities to be carried out according to precedent, especially in the Health Services Department which carries out such diverse functions.⁷²

Despite the obvious possibilities that officials had for reducing the minister's leadership role, there seemed to be a deliberate reluctance to go that far. They were punctilious about assisting the minister to answer Parliamentary questions, going to extraordinary lengths to obtain information which they knew the questioner wanted, even though the question was not properly phrased. However, officials expected the minister to "put it into political language" once he had the facts.⁷³

Summation

Legislative changes of a major kind do not emerge quickly from the normal daily activities of the department. Ministers rarely initiate such changes, although they are interested in proposals which officials may put forward. Such a situation is likely to promote the centrifugal forces, since long followed precedents are difficult to overthrow and decisions based on them are easily justified as proper exercises of discretion. Officers are strengthened in their actions against any criticisms from outside and ministers have to support them in the legislature. Parliamentary questions are relatively a-political in the specialised health fields, and it is easier to state the facts about such matters as mortality rates, availability of acute beds, or the basis for prohibiting the sale of unhygienic foodstuffs. So long as

⁷²Organisation theorists refer to this phenomenon with approval as 'the exception principle'. See L.Urwick, The Elements of Administration (London: Pitman, 1943).

⁷³A list of questions asked during the Second Session of 35th Parliament, 11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971 is contained in Appendix IV

Parliament does not become involved in probing enquiries, such as Royal Commissions, the public servant has little to fear. Almost all such enquiries have been directed at the (supposed) malfunctions of the public hospital system in which the department is only indirectly involved. It is the minister who is directly responsible for such matters and for this reason he spends quite a proportion of his time on hospital affairs.

Ministers, too, expect to operate within the 'established procedures' when they come to office. At first there is little incentive to make changes, unless to follow a particular policy line espoused in party policy. Their incumbency may be such that they only have time to deal with the routine matters, having little option but to accept the decisions of their officials. Unless these decisions have adverse political consequences, the minister would find no advantage in allowing Parliament to become too involved in department activities.

Since the minister is made statutorily responsible for all operations of the department, no matter of how specialist a nature, his main concern is to insist on the professional capacity of his advisors. Priorities of action and expenditure must also be his decision, and in this way he may be able to maintain a close control over the broad direction of departmental policy. Whatever mechanism is adopted, and the ministers have dealt with these matters in a varied manner, his control is augmented. Ministers gain support for the inherent preeminence of their position by legislative provisions, such as the Health Services Act 1960, especially where it can be seen as a deliberate means of reversing statutory authority previously given to particular officers. The fact that subsequent legislation has followed this pattern, reinforces the minister's central role and provides him with increased prestige.

On balance, the potential centrifugal forces inherent in the unchanging statutes, augmented by the specialist nature of much of the work performed under those statutes, must seem to be strong. However, the manifestations of this

potential are muted at the present time, due to the way in which senior officers see their roles. There is also the important factor of explicit statutory authority which re-inforces ministerial executive authority against any restraints imposed by senior officers.

C. Professional staff

In describing the whole department structure previously, it has been pointed out that there are six main areas of operational service supported by a central administrative staff. The fragmentation thus created is aggravated by the diverse professional basis of the operational divisions. Each division has its own particular specialism, although the majority of these are derived from a medical core and employees are therefore mostly doctors. While a medical qualification or a paramedical education is required for most of the operations of the department, once within the specialist field there is little interchange possible. So, for example, the district dental officer would be unlikely to be able to transfer to the Division of Public Health in any capacity. Similarly, the Chief Health Inspector in the Health Inspectorate Section of the Division of Public Health would not have any opportunity to use his expertise in either the School Medical Service or the Child Health Service, even though they are within the same Division as his own Section.

Professionalism within the department must therefore be seen as vertical rather than horizontal. That is to say, professional officers look within their own small segment of the department for various advantages and disadvantages of service. Cross fertilisation of ideas, information on their expertise, common membership of professional associations, and often a common jargon for the particular function they perform, all draw them together. These same factors tend to separate them from other professionals within the department and institutionalise the differences into formal barriers. While departmental social occasions may lead to informal interaction, there are few other situations which would assist this trend.

Another factor is consequential restricted promotional opportunities.

Where relatively distinct specialisms are performed, those who wish to pursue their interests cannot expect promotion outside that field. Only those who show some aptitude for administrative duties may climb out of their specialism to upper echelons of the hierarchy. It is at these levels that their erstwhile professional specialism is of relatively little benefit. Yet it is this marginally useful expertise which gives the senior officers their legitimacy within the department. To have a non-professional in senior positions would be regarded as a reduction of the authority of senior people. One senior officer commented that doctors accept the decisions of people with whom they have worked on a professional basis. They accept more readily their authority, if only because they are 'professional'.

This professional fragmentation has reduced organisational coherence. There is little feeling of belonging to a corporate whole within the various segments of the department. Each division operates both physically and mentally apart, only relating to one another with regard to staffing, finance and other co-ordinated needs. There is considerable professional competition therefore within the department for resources of all kinds. But most of this is contained by the close centralisation of control exercised by the Director-General.

While there is considerable decentralisation of function within the departmental structure, as has been previously emphasised, the financial, staffing and equipment needs of the various Divisions make demands which only the permanent head is in a position to satisfy. The Public Service Board and the Treasury deal only through the Director-General, and this gives him a major opportunity through which to exercise departmental co-ordination. The emergence of a central administrative group to support this co-ordinative work by the permanent head is essential to his task, which causes tension, arising from professional attitudes in the Divisions. Officers feel any decision should be their own, since they have the qualification to do the job and to

know what is required for it to be accomplished. Exercise of control from the centre, therefore, does not quite accurately describe the kind of consultation that must take place, either directly from Division head to Permanent head or his deputy, or through internal committees. The limited authority of the Director-General ⁷⁴ over minor staffing changes or equipment purchases is made more flexible by the use of the Hospital services and this enhances his co-ordinative control.

However, most Division heads accept the necessity of dealing with their needs on a departmental basis. One senior officer pointed out, that all he could do, was to present his case for funds and staff to the Director-General as best he could and leave it to him to negotiate with Treasury and the Public Service Board.

The relations with the Treasury seem to be mutually beneficial, and no great difficulties occur in obtaining financial support from a number of external sources. There is little interference in the ordinary functioning of the Department by Treasury once the budget has been passed. However, there has been considerable tension between the department and the Public Service Board. The Board find some difficulty in accommodating the enormously large range of differing professional needs of the department within their normal classification system. This frequently meant, that positions within the department were not filled because the salary range set by the Board was too low to attract properly qualified personnel. Frustration with this aspect of the department's activities was one of the reasons for creating the Mental Health Commission in 1968. In this way the particular needs of the mental health area would be reflected in the more flexible appointment procedures, provided by the removal of the Board's staffing control. Other areas outside the Public Service Board jurisdiction within the department are the general and district hospital staffs, the Pathology and Analysts sections of the Department. The remaining Divisions are not numerically larger, but have the wider range of professional needs referred to above.

⁷⁴For example, he is only permitted to authorize expenditure up to \$1000 without ministerial consent.

Any permanent head, who had to deal with such a group of professionally qualified personnel would find it difficult to do so. The differing perspectives that are brought to bear on him, e.g. general practitioners, psychiatrists, surgeons, dentists, sanitary inspectors, make his task an unenviable one. There seems to be little doubt that this has been one of the reasons for the appointment of a medically qualified person to the position. Since 1945, there have been professionals in all the key positions in the Department, and there has not been any attempt to appoint a lay co-ordinator, as had been the case when Mr. Tudor was Secretary to the Department of Public Health.

It has been argued, that the change to a hospital administrator as Director-General in 1952 heralded the increasing dominance of the curative aspects of departmental tasks. Hospitals grew and so did the involvement of the department in their activities. As the costs of these services increased, the desire to maintain some control manifested itself in co-ordinative structures within the department. The Hospital Medical Service is part of that movement, reinforcing the need for professionals in senior positions. The appointment of a Deputy Director-General in 1972 - after a lapse of three years - continued this trend of hospital-based senior officers. The previous Deputy Director-General was a physician Geriatrician until his appointment, and the new Deputy in 1972 had previously been Superintendent of the Royal Hobart Hospital.⁷⁵

There can be little doubt, that these professional appointments have met with the approval of the Department. To have non-professionals in positions of authority would cause some resentment, although one senior officer admitted that having all medical men at the top influenced decisions to an unfair degree.

The existence of qualified officers in senior positions has been offset

⁷⁵ Whether these appointments have distorted the priorities of the departmental expenditure and commitment, or whether they have been in response to the already perceived needs, is a matter for argument. For an earlier discussion see E.H.G. Matthews, loc. cit.

by the appointment of ministers who are medical men, especially in recent years.⁷⁶ But it was generally agreed that, to be most effective, the minister need not be medically qualified. Differences of opinion can occur as frequently amongst qualified persons as any other, and it is quite clear that having medical doctors in all senior positions and as minister as well does not mean unanimity and harmony. What it does apparently mean, is that there is some reduction of individual dissatisfaction when decisions favour one or the other. The respect for the other professional makes unfavourable decisions more palatable than if a non professional authority decides. A minister qualified in the area of his portfolio does have a more onerous task, because he is also politically committed. His own professional judgement may sometimes conflict with his own political sensitivity. This is especially so in a relatively small community. In these situations the collective responsibility of the Cabinet must be accepted as greater than the individual responsibility of the minister, so that he must allow political considerations to override his professional desires.

There is no doubt, that in his dealings with his department and especially his senior officers, he has little chance to allow his own professional predilections to dominate.

Summation

There are two opposed forces operating as a result of the large concentration of professionalism within the department. One is fragmentation, the other is information control.

Where there is such a wide range of different professional interests, even though it is within the generic area of health, the consequence is differentiation. The six Divisions under which the department operates does not exhaust this trend, even within each Division there are many identifiable groups. So, for

⁷⁶ See Table 3, p 257 supra.

example, in the Hospital Medical and Nursing Services Consultant and Advisory Branch there are Nursing Service Inspecting Sisters, Hospital Catering Supervisors, District medical officers (G.P.), and Geriatric services. Similar internal partitions occur within Public Health and Tuberculosis, although to a lesser extent in the latter.

Any common view there might be within the department, because of a commitment to health care of various kinds, is soon dissipated in day to day conflicting needs. It is even arguable that the concept of health care is a unifying force which would promote centrifugal tendencies. Divergent opinions about the meaning of health care derive in part from the different perspectives of professional elements in the department. Some see it as absence of disease, some as prevention of disease, yet others as treatment. Attention has already been drawn to the generally recognized division between those who espouse preventive views and others with curative concerns, often discussed in terms of public health versus hospitals. There are signs of the growth of a more integrated view as a consequence of the pressures of the Australian Government over community health and long-term hospital planning.

Even the close professional relationships that derive from all concerned having qualified in a common medical degree initially, does not reduce the tensions inherent in these alternative perspectives. This is overlaid at the same time by two other elements which further reduce the potential centrifugal forces, the central authority group and the need for co-ordination.

The central authority group within the department has emerged from the originally separable units created in 1945 for specific areas of concern. In those days, each unit had its own statutes, empowering a Director to perform the necessary functions. The result was a loosely knit grouping, which was combined in a ministerial portfolio. The occupant of that portfolio was accessible to all Directors, and his time was utilised according to political necessity or professional pressure. After the Health Services Act 1960 there was an emphasis on co-ordinating activities under the control of the minister and thus through the permanent head.

There had traditionally been a very small staff concerned with those

essential co-ordinative activities: finance and equipment. The demand for co-ordination increased to provide much greater pressure on the central group. Before 1969, less and less of the Director-General's time had been available to deal with the detail, and an officer had been appointed as Senior Medical Officer (Hospitals) to assist the Chief Medical Officer. It is significant that in 1969 the Director-General found it necessary to divest himself of the direction of the Hospital Service Branch and appoint a full-time Director.

The channelling of all major decisions through the central authority group, however professionally qualified that group may be, is bound to increase the control of the minister. As a vital member of that group, the minister can maintain a very real 'presence' in all activities of the department. He does not have to become directly involved in day to day problems, but senior officers become sensitive to what may be regarded as important by the minister of the day.

The outcome has been to reduce considerably the previous autonomy of the separate units and to increase the influence of the senior officers in the central authority group at the expense of individual Directors, even though these Directors may still have access to the minister. The existence of professionalism within the department in such a concentrated form does not, therefore, necessarily lead to the increase of centrifugal forces. Because of the fragmented nature of the professionals and of the increasing importance of those professionals in central authority groups, the minister is able to maintain a considerable degree of control.

A countervailing force to that mentioned above is derived from the rapid growth of specialised information. The capacity of any individual to comprehend fully the technically detailed functions of all health care services is negligible. There is much more mutual exchange within areas of expertise external to the department, than between different areas internally. It is only when attempts to innovate or to change priorities occur, that separate groups within the

department have to justify what their own professional judgement accepts. In this situation the permanent head has to act as arbitrator himself or pass it on to the minister for his final decision. However, neither would have the detailed knowledge on which to make any particular judgement, it must always be a general consideration derived from largely non-specialist factors. Considerable possibility exists therefore for the specialist within the department to influence departmental actions. Many of the initial stimuli for the specialist come from his contacts within other similar departments in other states, membership of professional associations, or specialist groups set up under some federal arrangement. When the information on which to gauge the validity of suggested changes depends upon the judgement of the specialist proposing such changes, those whose task it is to make decisions, are placed in a delicate position. When such proposals receive support from federal associations or inter-state committees, strong reasons must be advanced for failing to take any action. The minister must be able to allay fears that purely political considerations are dominating what should be a relatively non-political area. He gains assistance sometimes - as has been suggested - from his own professional competence, because he does not appear to act out of ignorance. If professionals feel that their knowledge is not utilised, then they become frustrated and lose their commitment to the task. To this extent, therefore, information must reduce the capacity of the minister to control and increase the centrifugal forces.

These two contradictory forces, fragmentation and information control, are at work all the time within the department and make the task of the central authority group and the minister more closely allied than would appear to be the case at first sight. In cases where professionals dominate decisions, as would undoubtedly apply in the Health Services Department, it is usual to explain the process as a reduction of ministerial control. However, because of the relatively large number of different professionals there is little conceptual unity. Only rarely will all groups come together to place a combined

point of view to the minister. Even then, those professionals who are in the central authority group will not be in the same relationship to the minister as the combined group, they will have to act as advisers to the minister on the merits of the case. For this reason the minister will have considerably more control than otherwise, as one minister said: "When a professional becomes a public servant he loses some of his professional commitment." The consequence will always be that political leadership and executive authority are reinforced. There were few occasions on which the minister's executive authority was transferred to the officers because of their undoubtedly superior capacity. The minister's political leadership does tend to be very limited however, in the specialist areas of health care. Initiative must always be with the professional, because of his greater knowledge of the potential in his specialism. As long as this is not used by the specialist to undermine the executive authority of the minister, e.g. by pre-empting options in particular situations before he has had a chance to decide, then the centrifugal forces of professionalism will be contained.

D. Finance

Expenditure on health care has been considerable over the years.⁷⁷ Both health and education are essentially State functions for which the Commonwealth Government offers financial assistance from time to time. The bulk of the funds have to come from State Treasury, even though the ultimate source of funds is Commonwealth Income Tax. This means the State Government have to commit the resources they have available to specific priorities worked out at a political level.

There is little doubt that the area of health has received funds beyond the requirement to maintain equilibrium through the inflationary curve. In the

⁷⁷ See Table 2, p 291 supra

five years from 1970-75 total Consolidated Revenue Fund expenditure has almost trebled, from \$15.75 million to \$53.4 million, an increasing percentage in terms of the total State budget expenditure from 21.4% to 31.8%.⁷⁸ By far the largest proportion of these funds would have to be obtained through the ordinary process of estimate and justification through Parliament, as there are no areas of dedicated funding in the sense of long term specific funding from outside sources.

However, there is a strong presumption, that funds for all health care will remain at a similar level in terms of percentage of State government expenditure. For example, finance for hospitals is unlikely to be reduced below the real expenditure level of the previous year without very strong reasons, even allowing for marginal changes for inflation. Such view is reinforced by one minister, who suggested that the need for health care is a need perceived by everyone, whether it is in fact real or only imaginary. Any expenditure is, therefore, easier to sell to Cabinet than for many other areas, e.g. transport.

The problem is that it is an area in which unexpected increases occur, as shown by referring to hospital expenses detailed in numerous Annual Reports by the Director-General, especially since 1969. The following extract, relating to the cost of public hospitals expressed as a percentage of all health expenditure, shows the enormous difficulty of forecasting in the current situation.

"It will be noted that the exponential curve of predicted expenditure last year revealed an under-estimate of between 3.9% and 5.5% of the actual expenditure and therefore it can be assumed that the new table might well err on the conservative side. ... The following small table shows how the predicted expenditure per annum up to the year 1977-78 has had to be amended each year based on known and predictable factors. The upward trend in predictions is almost entirely due to unforeseen salary rises.

⁷⁸This makes an interesting comparison with expenditure of 7% of C.R.F. on health and 5% on education in 1876. See my paper: Health Policy in Tasmania, (op. cit.).

Financial Year	Predicted Ex- penditure 1970-71 Report %	ditto 1971-72 %	ditto 1972-73 %
1971-72	19.9 (21.0)*
1972-73	22.1	23.1 (24.0)*
1973-74	24.6	25.9	27.3
1974-75	27.2	28.9	30.9
1975-76	30.0	32.1	34.8
1976-77	35.5	39.0
1977-78	43.5

* Actual expenditure⁷⁹

By far the most important area of expenditure from the public point of view and therefore politically, is in the hospital services. The State makes a grant to public hospitals through the department, based on the Hospital Board's own estimate of their requirement. Recently much greater control has been exercised over the hospital expenditure and estimates by the Hospital Management Advisory Section, and from 1970 this Section has worked in conjunction with Treasury to overcome some of the difficulties caused by rapidly escalating costs.

The department is also deeply involved in the control of capital expenditure in hospitals, as it is concerned with the planning processes throughout. This is especially so in relation to the four General Hospitals. For example, there are long-term planning Committees for both the Royal Hobart Hospital extensions, which are currently under consideration, and the Launceston General Hospital where Phase 1 of a redevelopment plan has begun.

"It is envisaged in future, that similar over-all planning committees will be established for all major hospital projects, as it is quite clear that by this means adequate communication can be maintained during all phases of planning between the Department, the hospital architects and the hospital boards concerned."⁸⁰

⁷⁹Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 7.

⁸⁰op. cit., p 16.

In addition to the above matters post expenditure audit controls and overall planning controls operating on capital works, make hospital boards more than previously subject to restrictions imposed by the department.

In a similar way, the department is the channel through which funds are transferred by the government to the Tuberculosis Division, St. John's Park, the Ambulance Commission, and earlier the Road Safety Section. Each of these sections of the department is more or less autonomous in terms of the extent to which funds have to be provided from State Government sources.⁸¹

The Tuberculosis Division receives almost 90% of its revenue from Commonwealth grants direct. It is thus far less subject to changes in expenditure priorities at State level than other parts of the department, although this does not protect it from ministerial action to reduce expenditure, as occurred in relation to the closing of the Northern Chest Hospital, Evandale.

"The number of tuberculosis patients treated in hospital continues to fall, and the bed occupancy rate is uneconomically low. Over the years, the former Northern Chest Hospital was handed over to the Launceston General Hospital, a ten-bed unit being retained for the treatment of tuberculosis; old chalets of the Tasmanian Chest Hospital have been pulled down or used for stores; and one Tasmanian Chest Hospital ward has been transferred to the Mental Health Services Commission."⁸²

St. John's Park Hospital is not quite so self-supporting financially, but, apart from having staff appointed by the Public Service Board and general supervision by the Director of Hospital and Medical Services, there are no direct restrictions. Approximately half their revenue is derived from fees and hospital benefits from the Commonwealth government, the other half is a State grant, and some garden produce is also sold to defray expenses.

The Ambulance Commission is a completely autonomous body set up under the Ambulance Act 1959 to act as co-ordinator for all ambulance services throughout the State. It prepares estimates for all the service with the assistance of the various district boards and distributes the funds received through the

⁸¹For detail see Table 2, p 247 supra.

⁸²Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 20.

department. None of its personnel are public servants and it deals directly with the minister.

Finally, in this group is the Road Safety Branch which was created in 1970 as a consequence of the concern with this problem of the Minister for Health Services at that time. By the Traffic Act 1970 the portfolio of Minister of Road Transport was commissioned and given to the Minister for Health Services. The staff was extremely small and could not be made a substantive department, so it was included in Health Services as a Branch. All funds were again channelled through the department but were wholly expended by the Branch itself, although its books were kept by officers within the department. Its Director had access to the minister, but was subject to the control of the Director-General for such matters as accommodation, pay, personnel and other support services. The Public Service Board regarded the Branch as a part of the department. The estimates were worked out by the Branch and not subject in any way to interference, so long as the major common items were not involved.

Since 80% of the expenditure of the department is accounted for by these various bodies, there is little scope for radical change by the officers within the departmental central authority group.⁸³ The main concern is to keep the proposed increases within bounds, rather than seeking ways of cutting costs in real terms. However, in more recent times there have been strong moves to reduce directly costs in the Hospital area. Apart from the enlargement of the Hospital advisory section, management consultants have been used.⁸⁴

The provision of finance is not a matter over which the minister is able to exercise a great control, but major decisions can be taken by him in regard to the appropriate priority to be given to expenditure in one project rather than another. There seems little scope for affecting the general direction of

⁸³For example in 1972-73 the total departmental expenditure was \$20.67 million and the sum expended on these various bodies was \$19.2 million in 1973-74 \$26 million and \$22 million (see Table 2, p 247 supra).

⁸⁴Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 10; Annual Report of the Director-General in which the activities of management consultants generally and the Royal Hobart Hospital in particular are discussed.

health care services as a whole. Even where the minister was doubtful of the real benefits to be obtained by proposals he was often obliged to proceed, due to the pressure of public and professional expectations. An example was given of the Maternity wing, planned for the Royal Hobart Hospital. This would extend the obstetrics and gynaecology services already provided under the auspices of the Royal and replace the older Queen Alexandra Maternity Hospital. It will cost a large capital sum, which will form part of the Capital Works programme accepted for funding the National Hospitals and Health Services Commission.⁸⁵ The benefits of this new provision will be marginal, according to one minister, because currently maternal mortality is reduced to 1/4 of 1% - even given the present facilities. The only major beneficiary will be the University Medical School, who will have modern teaching and research facilities not currently available.

The budgetary process is not always the same and changes can affect the extent to which the minister has an opportunity to order the priorities. During the period 1964-69 under a Labor Government, the estimates were prepared by the department and discussed by the minister and permanent head, who then both attended a meeting with other ministers and their permanent heads, at which the whole of the expenditure was discussed. This forced a minister into a position where negotiation at the political level had to be seen to be justified to his professional permanent head. Here the minister had much less room to impose his own views on priorities, unless he had agreed them with the permanent head before the meeting. This method of discussing estimates was not adopted again when the Labor Party returned to power in 1972. The previous procedure of ministers only, meeting in Cabinet, was revised. It meant much less time was spent by all parties on the estimates, the larger meeting often took up to a week to complete its work. At the same time it

⁸⁵ See Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 8, where the Director-General discusses the Commission's Five Year Plan. Despite the minister's comment recorded here, the proposal was approved by Cabinet as part of a long-term plan to provide additional accommodation in the Royal Hobart Hospital and to centralize maternity care.

permitted the minister to make changes in priorities after discussions with his permanent head and thus impose his own imprint on them. Such changes in priorities would not affect the total recurrent expenditure significantly, however, for the reasons mentioned above.

Sometimes it is possible for political reasons to switch the order of capital works which have been proposed, but not started. In this way, there may be distortion of an ongoing programme, but such differences do indicate the existence of ministerial leadership and executive authority. However, capital works have another constraint attached which limits this potential for increased ministerial control.

The intervention of the Commonwealth in the funding of capital works during the 1972-75 period through the National Hospitals and Health Services Commission forced the department to deal in long-term planning in a way not previously attempted. Not only hospitals were affected, but the existing pattern of service by a departure to community health service, including centres, imposed by the provision of earmarked funds.⁸⁶ The way in which such changes placed severe limitations on the work of the department may be seen in the comments by the Director-General:

"There was little time to prepare precise estimates of funds which were considered to be required for the various schemes, and at the same time, in the beginning, there was no guarantee available that if schemes were started with the assistance of funds from Canberra, the funds would continue indefinitely and take into account increasing costs. As our Government had to agree to pay 10% of the cost of approved schemes then the possibility of the State being committed to completely financing the projects had to be taken into consideration. There was initially some reluctance to accept an 'open ended' agreement."⁸⁷

This kind of uncertainty about commitment and the consequences of accepting federal government assistance is proper in a public servant, but it becomes politically very difficult to refuse such funds. Often the public has its

⁸⁶Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, pp 14-15, where the Director-General reports on the introduction of three new major health service projects through the Interim Committee on Health and Hospital Services.

⁸⁷Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 7; most of the problems arose from the emphasis on Community Health Services by the Australian Government.

expectations aroused and lack of State government enthusiasm may have electoral consequences.

The dilemma for the public servant in this situation is that his normal channel of communication and information with his colleagues at federal level is limited because he cannot be sure of his minister's mind. This is reflected in the previously quoted Report, where subsequently the Director-General stated:

"We therefore decided to proceed by seeking Cabinet approval in the first instance to submitting various projects and then wait until we knew whether they had been approved or not, before proceeding further."⁸⁸

It may be suggested that in those areas of the department, which would benefit from the infusion of such funds, the officers would use this possibility as a strong lever to press the minister to adopt such policies. No doubt, other parts of the department not so affected would react with caution against too great a commitment in a situation of uncertainty.

There is evidence that competition for funds between the various Divisions of the department was not very great - presumably, in part, because of the large proportion of committed funds. The greater the competition in this situation, the greater the forces operating to reinforce the minister, since he must act as arbitrator and make final decisions. Otherwise his task is merely to place his seal of approval on what has already been estimated and recommended. Any changes that he might wish to make in the latter circumstances would have to be justified to professional officers, who would expect some strong argument based on professional grounds rather than merely political. Nonetheless, there are ministers who feel strongly enough to make such changes, usually based on the expectation of short term gains.

Summation

There are two main financial factors which drastically limit the way in

⁸⁸ Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 7

which the minister can exercise political leadership in the department.

First, the extent of funds already committed to ongoing institutions and programmes is very great, almost 80% in the last few years. Second, the way in which the department is used as a channel for funds spent by relatively autonomous bodies over which the department has very little control.

The committed funds are not 'dedicated', for example, in the sense used for those received under the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement, other than in the case of the Tuberculosis Division. All funds are derived from State Consolidated Revenue and would normally be open to revision at Estimate time. Reference to Table 2 supra will show that prior to 1972 the general shape of the departmental policy had not changed. By far the greatest proportion of its funding goes to institutions which have an ongoing demand and this has left little opportunity for the minister to make any marked impression on the direction the department is taking.

The most significant area for ministers to show political leadership is in capital expenditure, but, since planning for most capital works of any size takes about five years, the electoral advantage to be gained is limited. The newly elected government may have a commitment to certain capital priorities when it first comes to office and may direct the officials to work towards this end, but apart from stating that its aims are being pursued, there is little physical evidence to show for a number of years.

The other factor referred to as a limitation on the minister's control over finance, is the way the department is used as a channel for funds. Those bodies mentioned previously as in receipt of the major proportion of funds, only use the facilities of the central authority group to provide support service for their activities. The accountant keeps the ledgers for some of these Divisions in the appropriate form for audit, and to some extent has day to day controlling functions in respect of the money already allocated. He operates as Treasury would for a small department. The same co-ordinating control occurs in respect of department expenditure on furniture and equipment,

although not over the kind of equipment purchased, only to ensure that prior authority for the expenditure of funds has been received from the minister, i.e. through the approved estimates.

The only time the minister may attempt to exercise direct control in the financial sphere is therefore estimate time. Any revision he may wish to make must be argued through between himself and senior officers at that time. As has been suggested, his room for manoeuvre even here is extremely limited due to Commonwealth government initiatives on the one hand and prior commitments, which cannot be easily altered, on the other. His position in this context is strengthened by the fact that he must fight for departmental funds in Cabinet. The department supports him by providing a satisfactory justification for the increases they propose. Vindicating marginal increases may not be so difficult, but is more problematic for significant changes, which must reinforce the position of the minister.

On balance it does appear that there are centrifugal forces at work to reduce ministerial political leadership and executive authority. There are too few areas where the minister can really exercise sufficient political leadership in the provision of finances. Capital works is one possible area, but this must relate to long term matters and traditionally political leadership is most often exercised for short term benefits. This is not to say, that the centrifugal forces remove the executive authority of the minister. In fact, this seems to remain unimpaired, because of the structure of the department in which there is a central authority group and support service group for the department as a whole.

The question of a desire to exercise political leadership may also be considered in this context. There is some evidence to suggest that it is not in the area of finance that this desire is noticeable, in some ways finance is always available for health care, arguments are about the best means of providing care and the extent of its provision.

E. Tradition of autonomy

Many of the elements that make up the functions of the department have had an extremely long history. The Royal Hobart Hospital and the Launceston General Hospital have both been in existence over one hundred years. There were Homes for the Insane at New Norfolk in the 1830s and some of the buildings used by St. John's Park Hospital today were used for indigent persons and elderly paupers a hundred years ago. All these were institutions managed by appointed or elected Boards and paid for, or assisted, by the government of the day.

An attempt was made to bring these various bodies concerned with health care under some central supervision as far back as 1885 when the Central Board of Health was created by the Public Health Act of that year. Most of the central Board's functions were initially concerned with the prevention of the spread of infectious diseases. The sanitary and hygienic conditions in which people lived were in constant need of control and improvement. It was later, through the 1903 Public Health Act which changed the Central Board into a Department of Public Health, that these other matters became important.

The extent of the Departmental activities, once the Hospital Act 1918 had been passed, has remained much the same. Apart from differing emphases due to changing technology and health care specialisation, the statement referred to on p 287 supra satisfactorily describes the current situation. As one minister noted, the area of health care is one in which politics is an intrusion, everyone has an expectation that the state will provide them with a professional service. This view is reflected in the way the departmental officers see their role, especially with increasing specialisation. Each professional has a personal commitment to providing the best service in his area of concern and this is seen as essential to a proper health care service. The public strongly supports these expectations, largely on the grounds that it will benefit everyone at some time. The concept of health care is dominant and every element of the department subscribes to this aim. Yet two particular actions of govern-

ment have reduced this potential for building up a tradition of departmental unity supported by public demand, which would have been a very strong centrifugal force. The first was the re-organisation which took place in 1945, the second the Health Services Act 1960.

The changes which took place in 1945 did not seem to reflect any deliberate attempt at structuring the department for a purpose, although one commentator has credited them with having an ideal in mind.

"In implementing the re-organisation of 1945, the government was nearer than at any other time to the ideal of providing specialised health and medical services both preventive and curative within the functional limits of one department."⁸⁹

However, as has been suggested earlier in this Chapter, there was an element of patronage involved and problems of personnel returning after wartime service to changed conditions.⁹⁰ Whatever the logic of the changes were, the 1945 re-organisation brought into a loose formal relationship the four main areas - Hospital and Medical, Public Health, Tuberculosis, and Mental. These constituted the basic structure of the department ever since. Mental Health was given a separate status outside direct departmental control in 1968 and the two laboratories, State Pathology and Government Analyst, the School Dental Health Services and the Pharmaceutical Services Section became differentiated organisational groups within the department over the years.

To provide the necessary support services there was a small clerical accounting staff, as previously mentioned. The permanent head of the department was also the responsible person for the Hospital and Nursing Services until 1968 and spent the major part of his time in that role. Most Divisional Directors dealt directly with the minister on matters of importance to them, and with other external bodies without having to channel their actions through any

⁸⁹ E.H.G. Matthews, op. cit., p 17

⁹⁰ It is interesting to note that all those in 1945 appointed Directors of the separate Divisions resigned or retired within six years of their appointment.

co-ordinative mechanism.

The 'federal' nature of the department precluded emergence of any coherent departmental unity, each separate entity growing through increasingly narrow expertise, making the individual Divisions difficult to contain in one unit. It became impossible to unite under one concept of health care the larger differences between dentists and hospital nurses, or preventive and curative. Any existing traditions supported individual units in their autonomy, e.g. the Director of Public Health operated under the statutes with specific authority outside ministerial control. That autonomy was eroded in 1960 by the Health Services Act under which the minister became wholly responsible for all actions by Directors whether stated in the original statute or not. When this occurred, there again arose the opportunity to bring all the fragmented units into one whole. However, the tenuous links remained and no immediate attempt was made to make the organisation structure reflect the authority structure with its apex in the minister.

Prior to 1968 there was therefore little change in the loose confederation of activities with which the department was concerned. The main links between them were a common commitment to health care, responsibility to the same minister, and common support services for accounting and staffing. The current Director-General was appointed in 1968 and immediately set about making the departmental organisation reflect what he saw as the conventional ministerial department with himself as the permanent head, controlling all the work of the department on behalf of the minister. This vision he expressed in the Organisation Charts issued by the department in 1971, where he noted one of his 'statutory functions' as "Permanent Head of Department (Public Service Act)" and his major 'management functions' as

"Chief Advisor to the Minister in the Affairs of the Department;
Co-ordination of the Functions of the Components of the Department and their general direction;
The General efficiency and Progress of Departmental Affairs;..."⁹¹

⁹¹Tasmania Health Services & Road Safety, op. cit., p 6.

The charts similarly showed the Divisional Directors as under the general supervision of the permanent head and through him to the minister.

The organisational moves to formalize the loose arrangement occurred concurrently with an increasing demand for finance from the hospital sector and growing Commonwealth intervention within the health area. All these elements acted together to give impetus to the otherwise natural growth in the administrative support group at the centre. It also allowed the Director-General to appoint, for the first time since 1952, a separate Director of Hospital and Medical Services, thus relieving him of that increasingly onerous task. At the same time the Mental Health Service Commission was created, thus removing one of the major 'problem' areas from the department.

A central authority group emerged, comprising the Director-General, the Deputy Director-General and the Minister, which had the use of the support services group now called the 'Departmental General Administrative Service, General Administrative Division'. While the day-to-day activities of the departmental Divisions were left to them, overall guidance was in the hands of the central authority group. The group may be said to act as a co-ordinator of departmental work, rather than a controller, attempting to rationalize wherever possible in the search for economy and efficiency. There are some key functions it performs, however, which may allow the group to direct and contribute to decisions rather than only to co-ordinate. Three of these can be identified as central personnel authority for the department; operational services equipment purchasing, and finance.

At the present time, these changes have not yet been in operation sufficiently long to promote a departmental tradition. The position of the minister is not subject to strong total departmental pressure, rather separate parts of the department deal direct with him still. This allows him to retain much of his control which might be reduced were the department to have a unified purpose. The Director-General and the central group could give it that sense of unity and purpose if they were to control rather than co-ordinate.

There are signs that this change will probably not occur rapidly, the separate Divisions have so little in common that it is hard to see how they could become a unified whole. Apart from the factors mentioned above, the physical reality is that they are scattered around many locations, only Public Health, the General Administrative Services and the Hospital Management Advisory Section with their Senior staff are together in one building. Even here they occupy clearly delineated space on separate floors.

Summation

Apart from an early period, when the department was fairly small and concentrated on public health, i.e. prevention, there has been no growth of any departmental tradition. There still remains within the Public Health Division a feeling of autonomy, even though the Director has been subordinated to the minister in the exercise of his once autonomous authority. Continuity in many of the other units within the department makes them inward looking, but despite their long existence, they have not been forced into a 'separatist' position. The major public general hospitals do maintain some tradition, but the changes have been so great that they have lost interest in this aspect in the struggle for financial survival.

The general 'federal' structure of the department has entrenched these differences rather than reduced them, although there are possibilities that this trend may change over the next few years. The growth of a central authority group with support services has become a co-ordinating force for the department as a whole. However, none of these events has led to anything which could be seen as a centrifugal force derived from a departmental tradition of autonomy. The minister is free from any kind of departmentally inspired pressure, whether based upon any common professional interests or any other common concern. There is pressure, certainly, from differing groups within the department, but these are usually channelled through the Director-General, placing him in a key position.

The minister has more to fear from the increased authority of the

Director-General than the department as a whole. The new organisational arrangements have allowed for much of the delegated authority to remain in Divisions, but at the same time placed them in the position of having to approach the minister through the Director-General on most matters. Where convention has resulted in the Divisional Director having access to the minister it has become standard practise to let the Director-General know what went on. While it may be thought that this does not alter the situation in which each Director has considerable autonomy, the realities of public service make it likely that no one will make decisions, unless they have cleared the matter with the Director-General first. He is the one who has most knowledge of the minister's thoughts and what decisions are likely to require his personal approval.

Thus, inadvertently, the new organisational arrangements may reduce the executive authority of the minister, although it is unlikely to act as a deterrent to his political leadership. There was certainly no evidence that the slight centrifugal forces, which had emerged in the last few years as a result of the organisation changes, were the forerunner of a situation which posed a threat to the currently strong forces to support ministerial control as a result of there being no tradition of departmental autonomy.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to discern what centrifugal forces are operating in the Department of Health Services. Any forces, which have a persistent and cumulative effect on the way the minister can exercise political leadership and his executive authority, must be identified. These constraints on the minister, irrespective of his personal attributes, must alter his ability to control his department and to be accountable for its actions to Parliament. At the same time centrifugal forces will operate to enhance the administrative capacity of the agency by transferring some of the minister's executive authority to the agency.

A significant force in respect of this department is interaction that takes place between departmental officers at all levels and circumjacent groups. The extremely high percentage of professional and para-professional officers working in the department, means that membership of their professional associations brings direct benefit to the department. These associations provide information sources and pools of specialist knowledge on a world-wide basis, into which the department has access. Not only does this access provide officers with criteria against which to measure their own activity and therefore increase their capacity to evaluate and recommend, it also involves quite frequently personal interaction. Officers belong to many colleges, semi-statutory bodies, and ad hoc committees at all levels of government and in all areas of expertise. These can be extremely influential bodies, such as the National Health and Medical Research Council or Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council. These latter bodies are used by State and Commonwealth governments for expert and specialized advice on matters relating to common action. An example was given in relation to radiation standards and the microwave ovens, considered by the Radiation Sub-Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council. There are other similar groups which meet on a regular basis, giving support to the administrative capacity of the department. One such example is meetings of state officials to discuss the topics and papers presented to the Annual meeting of State Ministers of Health.

At the State level there is also a wide variety of association with other professionals and the clientele of the numerous activities carried on by departmental officers. Three groups of clientele were identified, each having a different kind of relationship with department officers:

- (1) The professional group for whom the department acted as registration and certification service, either as agent or directly. Amongst these were nurses, physiotherapists and pharmacists.
- (2) Those, over whom the department exercised some regulatory powers, such as food vendors, users of pesticides and chemists.

- (3) Those, who received some personal service through departmental officers. In this category were geriatrics in St. John's Park Hospital, dental and medical services in schools, and hospital patients generally.

Representatives of these various groups were coopted in some way on committees, set up by the department to operate in their area. Alternatively, the department had representation on such committees as were set up by statute for the particular group concerned. There was, therefore, major involvement of departmental officers with clientele at all levels within the department, not just the more senior officers, as was the case with the federal committees mentioned above.

Relationships with circumjacent groups form an intertwined and complex matrix, in which large numbers of departmental officers become involved. The extent of these affiliations is so great, that it must have very significant consequences for the way in which these officers view their task. It becomes even more crucial when related to the inevitably institutionalised differentiation within the department. The ever narrowing specialisms that the department incorporates into its structure through the appointment of experts, to perform the wide range of functions now involved in health care, make intra-department discussion increasingly necessary, and there have been more of such meetings recently.

This fragmentation of professional staff within the department was noted as operating against the potential centrifugal force of professionalism. It is normal to assume that, the more professional departmental officers are, the more difficult it is for the minister to maintain his control. The natural course of events will, it is argued, allow officers to control information, have a monopoly of knowledge. The consequence would be to create a very strong centrifugal force against which the minister has little defence. There was certainly much to indicate this kind of monopoly within the department, many of the officers were experts in fields where no one had equal knowledge other than those in the same section. It was suggested that this caused a vertical perspective rather than a horizontal one, that is to say, within the department there was more interaction within a speciality, rather than

across boundaries at the same level. This process was enhanced by the fragmentation noted above, which resulted from many specialisms and fostered by pressure from clientele.

The department is not the monolithic entity that may have been expected. Despite the fact that the generally accepted object of the department is to provide health care, there is little agreement about what that means. There is no unified concept around which departmental loyalties may be fostered. Individuals and groups within the department may have particular loyalty to their section as a part of the whole, but there seems to be no feeling of 'solidarity'. In part this may have had its origins in the emergence of the department as it now is from the re-organisation of 1945. By grouping a number of related activities, Tuberculosis, Hospital and Medical Services supervision, and Mental Hygiene, around the core of Public Health, a kind of 'confederation' occurred. Even when the four different entities were brought under one permanent head there were still significant differences. Their major activities were carried out under several statutes containing direct authority to the Directors of each part. By convention and tradition therefore, the department has really only had the most tenuous of ties through the common need for finance, personnel and equipment.

These needs have been met by the central support service group under the direct control of the Director-General. Until 1968, this group was not seen as very vital to the ongoing functions of the department, it was there to react to demands and to liaise with those, whose responsibility it was to provide the finance, personnel or equipment. This support group had more direct ties with Treasury, Public Service Board and the Supply and Tender Board, than perhaps it had with the other elements within the department. However, since 1968 the Director-General has been moving to create a central authority group, which would include this support service group, as a means of meeting the demands placed upon the department. These demands come mainly as a result of the enormous increase in the expenditure of the department, especially in relation to hospitals. By increasing the capacity of the central authority group to

co-ordinate the activities of the department as a whole, measures for economy and efficiency can be introduced. The benefit of these actions may be that the department will become moulded into a single unified whole, but this has not occurred yet. Until it does, there is little danger of centrifugal forces operating by reason of the high level of professional staffing in the department. Nor is there any likelihood of the potentially centrifugal force derived from the variety of interaction with circumjacent groups.

Major co-optation and representation should provide a very strong base for any department to build up support if it wishes to oppose the minister. There is little doubt that this situation does exist, but not for the department as a whole, rather for the separate sections. Because of this, there is no single body to whom the minister must listen, it is always possible to balance one against the other. So, while the evidence clearly shows that most of the initiative for new activity comes from departmental officers or other external professional bodies, the minister remains in control and able to exercise political leadership through his capacity to decide priorities.

The large body of substantive law which the department has to administer is fairly old, having been passed in the first two decades of this century. Much of it has been amended quite severely since then, although in a number of cases the statutes have been rewritten. There has also been some new legislation, such as the Poison Act 1971 and the Alcohol & Drug Dependency Act 1968, but generally, lack of legislative change provides a strong centrifugal force, especially where the older legislation contained direct authority to officers to act.

Even the Health Services Act 1960 which took away much of that authority, did not prevent a new Public Health Act 1962, containing specific authority for the Director of Public Health to take certain action on his own responsibility. The extent to which political leadership is curtailed by such legislation is negligible, provided other factors do not impinge. It is in the area of executive authority that such statutes have an effect. Any authority to act given to a departmental officer, which is not made subject to the approval of the minister,

must have the effect of reducing the minister's executive authority and therefore make it more difficult to control and be accountable for that action. The Health Services Act 1960 was an attempt to retrieve much of that lost authority. Vestiges of past practice linger in the actions of some senior officers who have been in their positions for many years. Nevertheless, most understand the need to act, bearing in mind the political consequences.

One of the minister's major concerns, causing most difficulty in Parliament, are hospitals. The Hospitals Act 1918 created a system of management boards which were more or less autonomous at that time, the department having a supervisory role only for the purpose of advising on the appropriate level of grants from State funds. The changes that have taken place in the provision of health care, have placed greater emphasis on hospital services. There have been more Royal Commissions into hospitals than any other aspect of the health service area. For this reason, much of the time of the permanent head is spent on work related to hospitals, and the minister must be involved in his department's activities in this area. Contact with hospital staff and patients is through the ministers or by the Hospital Management Advisory Section, who are the only officers to have direct contact, which means that the minister is in a very strong position in relation to the central authority group within the department. It is often the minister who raises a matter for comment and justification rather than it emerging through internal departmental communication. Similar situations occur, where the minister must deal directly with the Ambulance Commission and the Mental Health Services Commission. None of these bodies is directly under the departmental umbrella, although, because of their overlapping interests, there is interchange of information through common membership of committees. All of these forces reduce any centrifugal tendencies there may be through other factors.

The department consistently expends almost the largest proportion of government funds of a recurrent nature. No other department seems to have had so little difficulty in obtaining funds. Yet, there are no sources of 'dedicated' funding of the kind suggested, whereby the approval of Parliament

is not needed. The only major area of funding from outside state control is the Tuberculosis Division, which obtains the majority of its funds from the Commonwealth. The majority of expenditure was seen to be different from many other departments. An average of 80% in the last few years may be said to fall into a 'committed' category. It is committed, because it is used to maintain ongoing institutionalised programmes, without the funds the institutions would have to close. Examples of these were hospital grants, St. John's Park Geriatric Hospital, and district medical officer service. The base level of service has already been set, so that marginal increases in cost occur every year merely to maintain the service. Replacement costs are incurred to provide buildings and equipment at this base level. Any addition to the base must generate its own recurrent expenditure to add to the previous cost. In this sense, therefore, unless a strong case is made out for eliminating an institutional service, the minister cannot alter the financial commitment already undertaken. This reduces his capacity to strike out in new directions, since there is only a very small proportion of the remaining funds with which to operate. There is a chance that the minister could enlarge this proportion by persuading his Cabinet colleagues to increase the size of his funds as a whole, but the likelihood of this occurring is remote. An excessive amount is already committed in terms of institution, even when compared with other large spenders, such as Education. Therefore, no room for flexibility is left. In addition to these commitments the department has historically acted as a channel for the provision of funds to autonomous bodies, such as the Ambulance Commission, and still does. It has no control over these funds, but it means that as a lump sum they decrease the possibility of making a case for a larger share of available resources at budget time.

For all of these reasons, the minister has little chance to exercise political leadership or executive authority in this area, and finance must be seen as a very crucial centrifugal force. Two further matters must be taken into account here, both having a possible mitigating effect on this force.

Expenditure, such as mentioned above, is unlikely to be refused by any government, yet the possibility is there and the minister must make his case to every budget session. The fact, that the funds still have to be appropriated every year, must place the minister in quite a strong position even in this case. As has been mentioned before, the most effective control the minister can exercise in this situation is that of veto and the decision about priorities. The same applies to capital expenditure, over which the minister has much more control. The department must become involved in proposals for capital expenditure, either by way of addition to existing building, new or replacement works. He can influence the priorities to a much greater degree before the matter arrives at the Cabinet level. Both these factors do help to reduce the otherwise extremely strong centrifugal forces represented by finance.

One of the noticeable features of the departmental activity was the similarity of the functions it undertakes today with those of 50 years ago. There is no doubt that there have been changed emphases, one suggested was from preventive to curative. Many of the techniques, and much of the technology is new and has changed the operational methods of that time. However, the changes which have taken place have done so within an already existing structure of the department, such as the School Dental Nursing Service, and more recently an emphasis on community health services and health education. These latter changes have occurred very recently as a result of Australian Government initiatives to provide community health centres. Something similar was foreshadowed in the Director-General's Annual Report in 1972, where he discussed the need for decentralising service provision. But there was little response from within the State at that time.

It may be asked therefore, whether the minister does play any great role in the Department of Health Services. If he rarely initiates any new activities, if his hands are strongly tied by committed finance, if he is surrounded by professionals, whose concerns are more with their expertise than with the department as a whole, what can he do? The centrifugal forces seem to be too strong for him to counteract. Yet, it is clear that the minister is able to

exercise his political leadership in quite important ways, for example in the allocation of priorities in capital works. His executive authority is hardly impaired, one minister going so far as to complain, the officials in the department overwhelmed him by asking for decisions they should have taken themselves. There seem to be two vital reasons for this situation whereby otherwise dominant centrifugal forces seem to have little effect. The minister is placed in a mediating or arbitral position by the fragmented nature of the work of the department. His position has been given added importance by the way in which the department has now been structured to co-ordinate and centralize all departmental functions. At the same time the officials, especially the senior officers, have a strong commitment to ministerial government. One senior man saw his task as carrying out government policy, and viewed with equanimity the possibility that his recommendations may be overruled by the minister.

The lack of unified aim for the department as a whole, consequent upon the large variety of specialised tasks and the number of different professional interests involved, makes it very difficult to produce unity. Intra departmental meetings may eventually produce a centrifugal force with which a minister may have to contend. However, by the very nature of the situation, divisions must occur, even though in most situations differences may be settled through the involvement of the Director-General before the matter reaches ministerial level. The actions of the Director-General as co-ordinator and 'buffer' between the minister and the department are also assisting the process by which the minister gains prestige as a 'last resort'. The minister must also have his arbitral role enhanced by his own direct links out into the community. The relatively small population of Tasmania makes it easy to obtain access to the minister, and there is evidence to suggest that some ministers are able to maintain their executive authority in the department by 'crisis management'. These crises erupt as a result of pressures placed directly upon the minister rather than by any actions within the department. For example, a complaint to the minister by one of his constituents about the demands of a health inspector

for alterations to comply with health regulations. But at least one minister, who felt he could leave the 'professionals' in the department to get on with the job while he concentrated on other matters that he thought more important, found himself continually involved against his will in the arbitral role.

In summary form the effect of the centrifugal forces seems to be:

Centrifugal force

Effect

(a) circumjacent groups

major cooptation and representation with clientele, professional groups and various community advisory committees produces strong support outside the department which reduces a minister's capacity for political leadership. The department has not been able or willing to make use of this support and while it may have some effect on the innovatory processes in the department it has no effect on the executive authority of the minister.

(b) legislative provisions

a large number of the statutes administered by the department are old, some have been amended many times. Earlier preference for direct authority to selected officers has been replaced by ministerial control through the Health Services Act. Precedents set by earlier legislation linger and some officers still operate with executive authority reducing that of the minister. Most actions are taken, however, with the consent of the minister, since officers remain alert to the political climate.

(c) professional staffing

a very high proportion of the staff have some professional qualification. Their affiliations with their own associations make for forces which will reduce the political leadership of the minister and undermine his executive authority. The weight of administrative capacity created by this large professional group is dissipated by its fragmentation within the department. The result is that it has little effect on the minister.

(d) finance

by far the most potent force to reduce the minister to a figurehead having no political leadership nor executive authority. Because of the large proportion of committed funds and the way the department acts as a channel

(d) finance (contd.)

for earmarked grants to bodies outside its control there is little flexibility. Funds do come from State sources in the main, so there is some dependence on the minister to keep the flow. Also, in respect of capital funds the minister is in a position to dictate priorities. These factors mitigate the very strong effect on political leadership and executive control.

(e) departmental tradition

apart from an early period before 1945 when there was the Department of Public Health, no growth of a common departmental identity has been experienced. There is little discussion of, nor reason to desire, a unified aim for the whole department. There has been none in the past and so this poses no threat to the political leadership and executive authority of the minister.

There are forces here which appear to make the minister a far less important figure than expected under the Westminster form of government. Many forces operating are potentially capable of reducing his political leadership and executive authority. However, there operate some crucial countervailing forces which prevent what would otherwise be a difficult situation for the minister.⁹² Implicit in these countervailing forces is the need of all sections of the department to survive. While they are not overtly competing with one another, the wide variety of service and professional activity combined within the department make it difficult for them to work together without some co-ordinative force. This is provided by the office of Director-General which makes the position of the minister very strong. The cautious approach of the officials themselves to taking action on their own responsibility and their sensitivity to the political quality of their acts also makes for an increase in the dominance of the minister.

⁹² Without these forces which support the position of the minister, the arguments for a Health Commission are very strong. They appear to have accepted these arguments in New South Wales. See R. McEwin and P.F. Gross, The Reorganisation of Health Services in Australia (Sydney: Health Commission of New South Wales, 1974). Whether the practical consequences of the creation of a Health Commission actually reduce ministerial control remains uncertain.

Appendix (Chapter V)

Statutes Administered in the Department of Health Services:

Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act (Part), 1968
 Ambulance Act, 1959
 Ambulance Board of Southern Tasmania (Lands) Act, 1968
 Anatomy Act, 1964
 Cancer Committee Act, 1937
 Cecilia Button Medical Centre Agreement Act, 1966
 Charitable Institutions (Repeal) Act, 1970
 Cosgrove Park Act, 1962
 Cremation Act, 1934
 Crippled Children's Hospital (Agreements) Act, 1942
 Dangerous Drugs Act, 1959
 Dentists Act, 1919
 Emmerton Bequest Act, 1965
 Fluoridation Act, 1968
 Guide Dogs Act, 1969
 Health Services Act, 1960
 Hospitals Act, 1918
 Lady Clark Geriatric Act, 1968
 Launceston Public Hospitals Board Act, 1971
 Local Government Act (Part), 1962
 Medical Act, 1959
 Meercroft Home (Application of Moneys) Act, 1963
 Meercroft Home for the Aged Act, 1958
 Meercroft Hospital Agreement Act, 1947
 Mothercraft Nurses Registration Act, 1947
 Munnew Bequest (Application of Moneys) Act, 1958
 New Town Mothercraft Home Agreement Act, 1949
 Notification of Births Act, 1966
 Nurses Registration Act, 1952
 Opticians Act, 1913
 Pesticides Act, 1968
 Pharmacy Act, 1908
 Physiotherapists' Registration Act, 1951
 Podiatrists Registration Act, 1974
 Poisons Act, 1971
 Public Health Act, 1962

Appendix 1 (Chapter V) contd.

Public Welfare Institutions Act, 1935
Quarantine Act, 1881
Queen Victoria Hospital Act, 1952
Queen Victoria Maternity Hospital Act, 1964
Radioactive Substances Act, 1954
Radiographers Registration Act, 1971
Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1966
St. John's Hospital Loan Guarantee Act, 1968
St. John's Park Improvement Act, 1961
St. Vincent's Hospital Loan Act, 1959
St. Vincent's Hospital Loan Guarantee Act, 1966
Sale of Blood Act, 1964
School Dental Nursing Service Act, 1965
Statutory Authorities (Municipal Appointments) Act, 1962
Tasmanian Auxiliary Nursing Service Act, 1949
Tasmanian Sanatorium Act, 1950
Traffic Act, 1970
Tuberculosis Act, 1963
Tuberculosis (Campaign Arrangements) Act, 1950
Vaucluse Hospital Act, 1966
War Veterans Home Act, 1937
War Veterans Home (Management) Act, 1962

VI

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY

In discussing the purpose of this thesis a number of assertions were made:

- (a) that all ministers and senior public servants have common appreciation of the parliamentary system of government within which they operate, but that it is largely intuitive and their daily actions and interactions must be analysed to verify whether or not these support the basic assumptions of that system of government;
- (b) that re-interpretation of the politics/administration dichotomy in terms of processes and actions rather than institutions and positions is a more satisfactory method to explain the current system;
- (c) that the key to such re-interpretation is to be found in understanding the balance between the exercise of political leadership by the minister and the administrative capacity of the officials.

This chapter will attempt to discuss these assertions as they relate to Australian State Government in the light of the empirical studies of the three Tasmanian ministerial departments. The familiar politics/administration dichotomy has already been modified to take account of the more complex nature of government processes. The two aspects of this dichotomy traditionally refer to either the necessary difference in the positions of politician and official - one elected, the other appointed - and the organisational consequences of this, or the differences in political or administrative activity in terms of processes. By differentiating activities in this way three crucial inherent qualities emerge: political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. Relating these qualities to Self's arch by means of the analytical techniques used in this thesis, the above assertions are tested and reveal alternative ways of assessing the support given to the basic assumptions about the Westminster system of government.

The preceding chapters clearly indicate that politicians and officials

believe their work to be different. Ministers 'leave administration to the officials' and officials 'make no decisions on political matters'. However, such statements fail to identify what politicians think officials do, or how officials see politicians, or what the different activities actually entail. There is little difficulty in accepting that the routine matters of day to day departmental affairs, e.g. collating data from records provided, are properly described as the work of officials. That is what occurs at the end of Self's administrative arc. The politicians in pursuit and maintenance of power and the authority to govern must be acting at the end of the opposite arc, performing purely political acts. Party politics, elections, influence and power are the legitimate activities occurring at that end of the arc.

As one moves further up each arc, however, it becomes more difficult to distinguish the tasks readily. It was noted earlier that the same activity could, at two different points in time, be administrative or political.¹ The classical version of the Westminster model, nonetheless, relies on maintaining a clear distinction between these two activities, because the politician must always be responsible for the official. The simple and fundamental doctrine of ministerial responsibility demands compliance with a stark distinction between politicians and officials. Once this breaks down the whole validity of that form of government begins to crumble. An alternative analytical framework which does not imply these assumptions has been used to explain the processes in this thesis.² The framework has distinguished between the office and the activity, between politician and policy-making, between official and administration, in order to ensure that organisational alternatives thought to support the conventions may be discovered. To divest the minister of some of his executive authority might be of benefit to that support, by permitting

¹Chapter 2 p 50.

²Self's arch is an example of such an alternative framework, but it does not result in anything more than a redefinition of the two words "...politics is an area of change and indeterminacy, administration is one of stability and routine." Self, *op. cit.*, p 151. A similar discussion may also be found in R.S. Parker, "Policy and Administration", Public Administration (Sydney) XIX (2), June 1960, pp 113-120.

him greater concentration on his responsibility for leadership. He could in this way become more responsive to parliament, which should enhance his role as a politician. It is unlikely that an increase in the executive authority of some officials would cause them to become more politicians than administrators.

There are many examples in earlier chapters of directors of departments having strong executive authority in the legislation, but using it only sparingly and seldom without informing the minister. It is true that the executive authority that such persons are given may sometimes be used to the detriment of a minister. But ministers concerned, for example, with the Director of Housing did not suggest that he had overstepped the boundaries of propriety in the exercise of his statutory authority. Indeed, to the contrary, the Homes Act 1973 increased the authority of the Director rather than reduced it. The evidence seems to be that officials feel their functions to be administrative and wish to operate within the conventions.³

By concentrating on defining the activities in terms of statements about ministerial responsibility and control, it emphasises that ministers are members of the legislature to ensure a continuous line of control from the public through parliament into the executive. Their major activities are executive rather than political, maintaining authority over their functional areas and responsibility for actions and decisions in those areas.

"Each minister is held to be responsible and accountable for anything done within the segment of the public business under his control and direction....

The general principle underlying the control of the executive branch by the legislature is therefore that every segment of the public service should be under the direction and control of a minister who can be called to account by and in the legislature. The power of control of his department conferred on a minister is the foundation of his responsibility."⁴

³Such evidence is not limited to the Tasmanian context. Sir Edward Boyle says "...departments make up or compensate for deficiencies of their ministers remarkably well, but, oh dear, some ministers really can lower morale very quickly and easily." Kogan, op. cit., p 80.

⁴Canada, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report Number 1, Vol. 1, (Ontario: Queens Printer, 1968) p 44 (author's underlining).

However, controlling must involve political decisions and be subjected to political influences, because the controller is a politician. It is part of the Westminster system of parliamentary government that this should be so, as Self points out,

"Politicians are the ultimate controllers of administrative systems, and one of their chief problems is to maintain and demonstrate the reality of their control."⁵

There are a number of ways by which the politician can ensure this reality - leadership, exercise of authority, taking responsibility - and each of these may be achieved by arbitrary ministerial decisions to make any matter one of policy. Self suggests,

"[Control] means also establishing an atmosphere in which administrators will continually be aware of political guidelines and constraints."⁶

The highly professionalised departments of Education and Health Services with senior officers having professional qualifications in the functional area are the antithesis of a department having Self's general administrator in top positions. They are more like those proposed by the Fulton Committee, yet they accept the constraints imposed by political guidelines. Their expertise and that of the department was at the disposal of the minister, they perceived their role as administering rather than as policymaking. They may feel some disappointment at the way the minister uses their advice and may even attempt to influence him directly to their own view. But in the end the authority and responsibility rests with the minister and he makes policy, not the officials, who are prepared to accept that position.

⁵Self, op. cit., p 161.

⁶ibid.; Michael R. Gordon, discussing the problem of imposing party government on an unresponsive bureaucracy, notes: "...the bureaucratic ethos is as indispensable to good policymaking as is the elan, moral tone, and forward thrust of the partisan enthusiast. Any institutionalised policy process needs to achieve a balance between the two creeds." (p 55) M.R.Gordon, "Civil Servants, Politicians and Parties", Comparative Politics IV (1971), 29-58.

The Australian State Context

Because of the nature of early military settlement and the slow growth of sufficient numbers of free settlers to form an electorate, there was no parliamentary government until some fifty years had elapsed, and then only a restricted franchise.

Military officials and others appointed by the Colonial Office in London carried out the major functions under delegated authority from the Crown. No politician was elected to office, and therefore leadership and executive authority were vested in an administrator, who was directly controlled by the Governor in the name of the Crown.⁷ Even with the emergence of a parliamentary system of government, based on the Westminster model, ministers on occasion had to share their authority with officials. Both the Education Department and Health Services Department existed as Boards long before any responsible minister was commissioned to their portfolios. The consequences were that a department in Tasmania came from a different historical mould from that in Britain. From the very beginning executive authority has been subject to some administrative constraint and had little relationship to political leadership.⁸ Wettenhall suggests that,

"...only three or four policy making departments in Tasmania really conform to the orthodox British view of the traditional ministerial department...[otherwise] they are highly professionalised executive organisations, often with statutory powers vested in officials..."⁹

These latter characteristics were certainly noticed in two of the three departments studied, Education and Health Services. They remained strongly committed to professional senior officials and vested quite specific executive

⁷ A more detailed description of the situation may be found in W.A.Townsley, The Struggle for Self-Government in Tasmania, 1842-1856, loc. cit. and Wettenhall, "Evolution of a Departmental System" loc. cit.

⁸ The Australian variations at both the Commonwealth and State levels of government are discussed in R.L.Wettenhall, "The Ministerial Department: British Origins and Australian Adaptations", Public Administration (Sydney) XXXII(3), (September 1973), pp 233-250 and also in "Concepts of Ministry" Public Administration (Sydney) XXIX(4), (December 1970), pp 319-329.

⁹Wettenhall, "The Ministerial Department" op. cit., p 244.

authority in their permanent head. To this extent, therefore, the concept of executive authority has never been quite the same in Australia.¹⁰ When discussing the question of the administrative capacity of public servants in Tasmania, the traditional overlap into the executive authority of the minister must be taken into account, and too great an emphasis must not be placed on the statutory powers vested in the official.¹¹

Centrifugal forces and the Australian State Adaptation of the Westminster Model


This thesis suggests that the politics/administration dichotomy should be reinterpreted by concentrating on activities and relationships for the better explanation of the governmental processes. The method best suited to analyse these matters has been judged to be interaction analysis, based on a formal framework of role expectation and obligation related to positions. By comparing these formal patterns of action with the actual regular patterns which individuals in those positions undertake, explanation will be enhanced. As discussed in Chapter II, an attempt at the same kind of analysis in the Washington State Executive provided a foundation from which similar analyses of the Tasmanian State Executive could be made.

Central to this technique was the idea of variable forces at work within the activities and relationships which would cause changes to the formal role expectations and obligations. Expectations of this kind would be especially

¹⁰ Butler drew attention to the flatness at the top of the pyramidal structure in the Commonwealth government, which he said suggested that "in the smaller department the top Civil Servant is in a peculiarly dominant position." - *The Canberra Model*, op. cit., p 29-30.

¹¹ Wettenhall notes that the considerations do not apply with the same force at Commonwealth level, where "the designers of the administrative structure came to their tasks rather later, when Britain could be observed basking in its heyday of ministerial administration". "The Ministerial Department", op. cit., p 19.

useful to understand the crucial role of the minister, and it was argued that political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity would be the key variables. This argument was derived from analogy with the concept of centrifugal forces which Simmons uses to denote reductions in the governor's ability to lead his appointed officers. Similar forces would operate in the Tasmanian State Executive to lessen ministerial control and accountability, which depended on the ministers' leadership and authority. Such centrifugal forces favour the official at the expense of the politician and change the fine balance that is necessary for the proper functioning of the Westminster system of government. The diagram below uses the politico-administrative arch to illustrate these forces at work.



The weight of political leadership and executive authority must be sufficient to balance the administrative capacity of the official. Explanation becomes much more acceptable if it is possible to discuss politics and administration as zones of activity in which both politicians and officials operate. In this way it is recognised that they overlap, but by avoiding the use of a dichotomy, it is possible to concentrate on the extent of their overlap in the area of executive authority, which is the critical point.

III The Tasmanian State Executive

Amongst the centrifugal forces the one least likely to reduce political leadership and executive authority was seen to be legislative authority. The effect of this force would be to constrain the minister by statutes formalising relationships between the minister and his department. Such arrangements as stating the functions of the permanent head, or providing him with some executive authority, are the kind to be identified. Very few of the statutes currently in force within the departments investigated seem to be of this type. None draw any explicit distinction between the authority of the minister and that of the senior officers, although the Homes Act 1973 does go some way towards this, as will be mentioned later.

Earlier statutes on which many of the current services were based, gave the directing officers executive authority. The reasons for this have already been adverted to in discussing the use of boards in the nineteenth century as an organisational mechanism for providing services. The contrast between Health Services and Education is quite instructive in this regard, because they were both under Boards in their initial stages. In the 1870s the degree of intervention by the elected body of ministers in the operations of the boards was minimal, being largely concerned with controlling expenditure. The officers were left to run the service and to make their own decisions without reference to a minister - their immediate superior was a board of voluntary part-time laymen who may also have had a professional interest in the function. However, there was a difference between the two, reflected in the statutes, which gave much more executive authority to the Director of Public Health than to the Director of Education. Health was at that time concerned with prevention and therefore was based on a regulative approach. The Director was given specific authority by statute to take certain actions without reference to anyone. Education, on the other hand, was a service for those who needed it, and apart from some authority to take parents to court for not ensuring their child attended school, there

was no need for a similar kind of executive authority. The fundamentally clerical nature of the Director of Education's task has already been alluded to in reference to the Royal Commission Report.¹²

These different qualities, built in to the departmental structure from the earliest time of their formation, remained to constrain the Health Minister in a way that was not apparent in Education. This led eventually to the Health Services Act 1960, which redressed the imbalance by legislating for a return of executive authority to the minister. Senior officers in both Education and Health Services are now on an equal footing statutorily, although it may still be noted that within certain sections of the Health Services Department there are lingering attitudes which do not sit easily with ministerial authority. This is noticeably so in the areas where regulations have to be enforced, such as public health, and where the Director maintains a cautious balance between the exercise of ministerial authority and his officers' statutory authority which has now been inhibited. It is also interesting to note that in the Education Department certain senior officials complained about the lack of executive authority, but they were loath to attempt any changes to legislation.

Another aspect of the uneasy alliance within departments of a fettered authority and the demands of the task is the age of the legislation. Many of the statutes have been passed in the previous century or early this century in conditions considerably different to those current. While they have, in some cases, been consolidated as in the case of the Public Health Act 1962, the changes have been marginal. The majority of departmental needs have been met from time to time by merely amending piecemeal, and this has not reduced the enduring basis of such Acts.

An example is the Hospital Act 1918, the intention of which was to

¹² See p 152 Chapter IV.

formalise the management of hospitals under appointed Boards, controlled very loosely by the minister. The increased dependence by hospitals on government funds, and the changing emphasis on curative services has made much of this statute irrelevant to the needs of the time.

One minister attempting to bring some statutes up to date, met with little success, and he implied that his officers were not interested. They preferred to operate under the existing restricted statutes rather than submit themselves to possibly unacceptable changes which a major rewrite could involve. The possibility that Bills of this nature would provide an opportunity for parliament to inquire too closely into the operations of the department, is also a constraint on the minister. The reasoning behind this argument is not that there is anything to hide, but rather that the demands placed upon ministers and senior officers in such situations do not allow them to pursue their 'real' work, which is a heavy load anyway.

Despite the legacy of the past, therefore, officers would rather restrain their natural tendency to continue the exercise of statutory authority. The alternative is always open to the minister to press for consolidating or rewritten statutes, which will place even more unacceptable strains on their activities. Housing is in a rather different position from either Health Services or Education. Apart from being a relatively new function of government compared with the others,¹³ the Housing Department provides a significantly different kind of service, although its main purpose has been interpreted in a rather ambivalent manner. As discussed earlier, construction of homes for sale on cheap loans or homes for rental to low income earners has been its aim. In either case, building homes has been the demand placed upon the department which has been met by legislation giving much more direct authority to the permanent head than in any other case.

¹³ The Homes Act 1919 as compared with the Public Health Act 1885 and the Public Schools Act 1868.

The reasons for this may be traced to the context from which the statutes emerged, for example the Joint Committee had considered setting up a Housing Commission rather than a department prior to the reorganisation in 1953. While not accepting this proposition, some of the anticipated effects have been achieved by giving the Director executive authority in specified areas. The main thrust of this authority is to ensure continuity and the flow of departmental work as a construction authority. The most effective operations could only be achieved, it was argued, if the legislation provided that kind of authority to the Director. Increases in the Director's authority in the 1973 Act appear to support the acceptance by parliament of that argument.

A similar reasoning underlies the statutory authority of the Director to employ labour outside the Public Service Act. The Director of Education also has this authority under the Education Act, whereby teachers and school service staff are directly under his control. Control over staff in this way does increase the executive authority of a Director, but it does not always allow him to extend that authority to any other part of his activities. The Director of Education, for example, was not able to make changes in school building programmes. Nor did it seem to enhance his authority within the department to the detriment of the minister, even in the case of the Housing Department, where there was a much clearer feeling of departmental identification and loyalty.¹⁴

While there is a slight chance that such statutory authority as has been mentioned may provide the opportunity for senior officers to prejudice a minister, the evidence does not show that it frequently happens. No minister felt that he lacked support from his staff and none complained that his political

¹⁴ This would invalidate at least one of the arguments against direct recruitment by departments.

leadership had in any way been hampered by actions of this kind. Nor did the officers show any desire to wrest executive authority from ministers. There were some expressions of frustration on occasions, but not strong enough to lead to hopes for change.

The Director of Housing did emphasize the importance of continuity in the work of the department, and that he endeavoured to prevent any interruption of the smooth flow. His concern was that new ministers, unaware of departmental forward plans, may attempt to force action which would dislocate such plans due to lack of information in the early stages. He implied that his executive authority would be used in such situations to prevent this happening, and hoped that once the minister had become familiar with departmental operations, he would accept the logic of the action. There is no doubt, that, given the existing statutory provisions, the Director is in a very strong position and this, combined with the relative freedom from financial control, could radically reduce the minister's control. Any strong Director without commitment to the 'proper order', could remove both executive authority and political leadership from the minister.

Because Housing does not need very extensive legislative authority it is more readily contained within a single statute, which may itself be amended from time to time. There is much more certainty about the general aims of such a statute, even given the tendency to ambivalence mentioned earlier. The main task is to provide homes of one sort or another for those less able to obtain one on the open market. As a construction authority its operations require land, finance, materials and labour. Most of these needs are satisfied from sources outside ministerial control, although the evidence was that the minister was involved in setting priorities in these matters.

Health and Education operate in a much more changeable climate, rapid technological and philosophical shifts have occurred, causing demands which require authority from parliament. The range of statutes passed in the last ten years, especially in Health Services, has increased enormously. In these

circumstances a minister who can pilot draft legislation through Cabinet, caucus and the parliament, is a vital requirement. Any tendency therefore towards reducing the minister's executive authority will be offset by the need for ministerial assistance in this area. Similarly, in relation to financial requirements, as in the Education Department, although funds are available, any new demand requires the support of the minister. These factors reduce the desire of senior officers to embark on any radical change in legislation; they would rather use the authority already within the statutes, occasionally interpreting them to accommodate their desires or promulgating regulations which do not receive so much attention from parliamentarians as the bills.

In general, without some reinforcement from other sources, legislative provisions do not place the minister in jeopardy. There are too many other considerations that would prevent any senior officer from depending on his statutory authority to oppose ministerial action. Examples of occasions when the authority of the senior officer was overridden by the minister, were given in both Housing and Education.¹⁵ The strong commitment to ministerial control in the legislation by frequent reference to authority 'subject to the consent of the minister', make legislative provisions more likely to assist the minister than act as a centrifugal force.

Despite this a minister must actually be seen to exercise political leadership in his functional area, because officers given executive authority will use it until they become aware that they are beyond the proper limits. This will most often occur where the minister makes no clear indication of his intentions. The change of ministers in Housing provided an example of the different ministerial styles to which officials have to accommodate, and in doing so, recognize

¹⁵ The Axton case in Education, *supra*, p 219, and the case, where the Director was directed by Cabinet not to sell land. (Footnote 43, Chapter 3).

the changed boundaries of their unchallenged action. Statutory provisions which define executive authority to be exercised by officials may be a centrifugal force, but that force is mitigated by the extent to which the minister exercises political leadership. In the three departments, even where substantive laws provided for some formal separation of authority, ministers mostly exercised this leadership. Where they did not, the officers themselves - out of their own sense of what was proper - made no attempt to usurp additional authority.

The commonly held view is that professionally qualified officers are most likely to misinterpret the proprieties. It is argued that they have a commitment to the values of their chosen specialism and have a belief in their expertise. Direction from non-experts or laymen, such as politicians, is regarded as incompatible with the professional ethos into which they have been trained. A strong tradition of autonomy within departments based on such expertise may also be expected to emerge over time, and Health Services and Education seem the most likely of the three departments to meet these criteria. Both operate services which wholly depend upon professionals, some extremely specialised in their particular field. They are also fairly well established departments with a continuous existence long enough to promote some kind of internal loyalty and independence of spirit.

Professional educators seem to have more freedom to exercise their skills than those in Health Services. Teachers in the classroom are less constrained than health inspectors and hospital administrators. Teachers operate at one remove from the structure in a very real sense; they are physically distanced from it in a way that their counterparts in Health Services are not. Their day to day activities must be far harder to control, the consequences of their activities more difficult to measure. In many ways there is not such clear-cut accountability to any particular individual as there is in Health Services. The pupil in the classroom, or even his parent, is not so able to measure his dissatisfaction with the service as is a patient in

hospital or a dental patient. Education should therefore exhibit strong centrifugal forces derived from these elements. As we have seen, it does not.

Nor do the apparent centrifugal forces in Health Services derived from professionalism reduce the minister's control. There are stronger grounds for the professional basis in the medical areas than teaching, which has only recently become accepted as a profession. Medicine is one of the oldest professions, its practitioners are high on the list of community esteem, and it is a common qualification of those who are in the employ of the Health Services Department. Despite these factors, this department seems even less homogeneous in its outlook and loyalties than Education.

There seem to be four fundamental reasons why neither of these units support the argument from professionalism and tradition of autonomy: lack of commonly held objectives, fragmentation of structure, no integration of the interests of professional associations and officials, and a historical legacy of dissatisfaction with professional services.

1. There is a lack of commonly held objectives between the professionals who are in senior positions in the department - permanent head and directors - and those who are rendering services direct. In both departments, although more evident in Education than Health Services, senior officials are promoted from within the department. The direct promotion ladder within the Education Department from classroom teaching, school principal, and subject supervisor to senior official, has been demonstrated. It is only rarely that external appointments are made to those positions, whereas in Health Services the pathway is not quite so smooth.

Nevertheless, in both areas a rift has emerged between those out in the field and the central administration. Perhaps it has arisen from the physical separation in both cases, or from the fact that in both cases the core of the central administrative group are not professionals but clerical and accounting officers, who are more public service oriented. Whatever the reason, as one senior professional officer put it, the situation is signified by a 'them and

us' attitude. There is no doubt that this also springs from the fact that this central group has to work in closely with the minister, and is physically in close contact with him. The officers involved rapidly lose what contact they had with many of their erstwhile colleagues, and they do see problems from a different perspective. These factors, coupled with the problem of providing easily defineable objectives to which all can subscribe, militates against building departmental loyalties based upon a common profession.

2. At the same time, it must be understood that the common profession is only the lowest common denominator, the rapid evolution of specialisms within a profession has removed any real identity of interest. To meet these specialist needs the organisational structure has become fragmented - in the case of Health Services to an alarming degree bordering on disintegration. The organisation charts show how unreal some of the broad Divisional structure is in bringing together such disparate activities as geriatric care, district medical officers and hospital advisory services under the control of one Director. Even the more homogeneous Public Health Division has within it a wide range of expertise, and of course it was a department on its own prior to 1945.

Teachers, too, are trained in special areas, of which the most obvious are kindergarten, primary, secondary and technical. Each of these areas has its own specific needs and must define its objectives in terms of these needs. As the services grow in size, each area becomes self contained, separated from the others, having as its focus a Divisional Director, part of the central group. It is not surprising, that such fragmented structures fail to provide any support for growth of a strong, professional identity with departmental objectives.

3. The same reasons that caused departmental structures to become fragmented have played their part in reducing the potential for the interests of officials to be integrated with the department through their professional organisations. There are certain differences between the Education Department and Health Services, because the former has a single professional association

concerned with teachers. The Teachers Federation managed to maintain its hegemony over the teaching profession in Tasmania from the turn of the century until recently. It was only in 1969 that the first specialist group dis-affiliated from the Federation and formed the Tasmanian Technical Teachers Association. Yet, even with such a long history, the Federation has not been a truly professional body, rather more a trade union concerned with pay and conditions of service. This is not surprising, since teachers only began to think of themselves as professional a decade ago. So there has grown up a relationship between the Federation and the Department which some would consider too close, based on agreement between them about personnel matters. Outside this relationship are all other considerations of educational direction and objectives, which are rarely regarded as the business of the Federation.

The opposite situation exists in Health Services, the range of membership of professional bodies represented is so great as to make integration impossible. Most of the bodies concerned are of the kind which concentrate on ethical and philosophical matters related to a particular body of knowledge, many are examining for entry into the particular specialist area. The way in which they operate nationally, and their broad concerns prevent them from having the interests of their members within the department as their prime concern. In both cases, therefore, the membership of professional bodies does nothing to strengthen the potentially strong centrifugal forces.

4. Citizens frequently express dissatisfaction about the provision of professional services - and Tasmanians are no exception. A number of inquiries and commissions have been referred to already, which have spent their time investigating the level and effectiveness of the services provided in health and education. The most maligned have been hospitals, not so much because of the actual professional care provided there, but more as a result of alleged management deficiencies. One unanticipated result of these constant investigations has been a disillusionment with professionals in general amongst the public at large. Persistent questioning of the activities of both education and health experts has not allowed an aura of knowledge or immunity from criticism to

emerge. Officials cannot remain insensitive to such accumulated criticism, and it makes them doubly cautious of relying on their professional status. At the same time, it has prevented any specific departmental loyalty to a tradition of professional action which is frequently found in these agencies.

The interaction of these four factors has made closely knit, professionally based 'aristocratic' agencies impossible, even though in these two departments the elements needed for the growth of such agencies are present. The Housing Department is quite different in a number of ways, not least, because it contains no core of recognized professions and yet exhibits all the symptoms of a professional department. That is not to say there are not a number of professions represented in the department - accountancy, social work and architecture amongst them, and also many trade skills of a high order. Nonetheless, there is no such common denominator as teaching or medicine. The real force, which makes Housing more like a professional department, is that derived from departmental loyalty and a tradition of autonomy. The two main foundations on which the loyalty and autonomy are based, are the single objective of the agency as a housing construction authority and the physical isolation of the offices.

Home building, whether for sale or rental, is the focus of attention in the department, and this is combined with estate planning and management. A consequence has been that officials have served with the department over many years, building up an identity between the directly employed day labour force and the public servants in central office, a fact not duplicated in either Education or Health Services. It must also be emphasized, that the operations of Housing are on a smaller scale with less people involved and therefore more easily controlled. There is also the lingering 'feeling' in the departmental offices - which are some 20 minutes drive from the State departmental headquarters - that their isolation is prized in a way which brings all officers closer together. There is no doubt that the centrifugal forces of tradition of autonomy and a kind of professionalism are strong enough to challenge seriously ministerial control in the Housing Department. Only a strong minister

providing clear political leadership, would be able to counter this force.

Political leadership of this kind is even more essential if those centrifugal forces are supported by financial independence. Funds for State departments are rarely wholly derived from any one single source in the sense that they may be regarded as 'dedicated funds'. But resources are derived from different origins, and the degree to which the minister is directly responsible for their acquisition, relates to the strength of this force.

There have been significant differences between the three departments along a spectrum of relative independence (Housing), through to almost total dependence (Education), when dependence is taken to mean reliance on the minister's capacity to obtain funds.

The Housing Department, for an almost unbroken period of twenty years, was directly funded from loans made under the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement. The only constraint on allocations was that the agreement required the State government to take into account their capacity to service the loan funds available. In Tasmania that capacity was calculated on the basis of rentals received and monies paid under house purchase agreements. At no time had the State government to provide supplementary funds from Consolidated Revenue funds for this purpose. One major item that was paid out of State funds and which was a persistently contentious matter, was rental rebate. For this the minister had to bargain with other Cabinet members at Estimate time, but in almost every year of its operation the Department had a surplus which was paid into revenue, and his position was therefore better secured.

Since 1971, many changes have brought uncertainty to the previously steady Commonwealth funding, with the consequent strengthening of the minister's position. There is greater dependence now on the bargaining capacity of the minister at both federal and State levels. In addition, funds are now allocated on an annual basis, whereas the earlier agreements had been for five or three years and this requires much more involvement of the minister in departmental affairs.

Education, on the other hand, has no major source of funds from outside the State similar to that of Housing. Some minor funds were available from Commonwealth sources, although in 1971 there were marginal changes having the effect of emphasising Commonwealth funding for Education. The annual budget round has had to be followed, with its almost total dependence on the minister to fight for the expected allocation from Consolidated Revenue and Loan funds. There does not seem to have been any great reluctance on the part of State Cabinet to maintain a high level of expenditure in education. The increase in the percentage of total State revenue allocated to education from 18% in the 1950s to 34% in the 1970s indicates a commitment by both parties to education. There is a sense in which last year's expenditure becomes this year's dedicated revenue. However, that is not necessarily the case, and the minister must be prepared to defend his departmental estimates in Cabinet.

A minister may be called upon to exercise his authority to settle the internal wrangles for resources between sections of the department. The Education Department have minimized this possibility by a system of intra-departmental committees and only rarely does the minister have to mediate. The funding situation changed in 1971, with more monies being offered from the Commonwealth government. The Schools Commission forced officers into direct negotiations with federal officials, and this had the effect of making their activities less directly under ministerial control. However, at no stage did they take the opportunity to make decisions on their own, and the minister still retained the political initiative, even though reduced.

Health Services, as the Education Department, obtains funds for its own activities. However, it is also the channel through which funds are provided for many other facilities. These funds constitute about 80% of its revenue and they are expended on such institutions as hospitals, which take the largest portion, geriatric hospitals, and dental and medical services. The Department has no direct control over these funds, other than as accountants for the Treasury and as supervisors on behalf of the minister. Any new initiatives are therefore curtailed by the demands of existing services. While the minister may not have much room for negotiation, and the total amount is unlikely to be significantly reduced, the officials still require his support within the Cabinet. For this reason

there are good grounds for suggesting that the scope for political leadership in both Education and Health Services is very great. Any centrifugal forces in either department derived from a commitment to the service or because the funds must support ongoing institutional demands, may be regarded as marginal. The contrary force which reinforces the minister's position comes from the necessity for his support in Cabinet discussions during budget time, and subsequently when expenditure matters are raised there.

Finally, the most variable centrifugal force, operating in the departments, was that derived from officers' relations with circumjacent groups. The strongest centrifugal force was seen to operate in Health Services, the weakest in Housing.

Health care of both the preventive and curative kind is a complex function, using a multiplicity of experts and specialisms. The common concern of these various officials may be thought to increase integration of their activities and commitment to the department. However, it does appear that there is more interaction with other specialists in the same field, or with clientele than with other sections of the department. The consequent interlaced network of communications beyond the department to professional bodies or colleagues, to national committees with similar concerns and to other state and commonwealth officials in the same field, forms an extremely potent force to reduce political leadership. There is also little doubt that this force has similar effects on executive authority. Bodies such as the National Health and Medical Research Council form a prestigious body upon which to rely in providing advice to the minister. No minister could easily shrug aside such advice on merely political grounds, and few would have access to any advisers of greater weight. These affiliations are supplemented by a great deal of cooptive activity in bringing expertise into the departmental structure through the large number of committees - regulatory, advisory and boards of management. In all these matters the minister

is removed from the initiating position, although all these bodies may be subject to his appointment and their decisions subject to his approval, without his direct involvement his executive authority may well be effectively usurped.

When these bodies are federally based and initiatives for common action within states derived from them, the pressure is even greater. It was, in fact, suggested that many of the newer policies and activities undertaken by the department had their source in circumjacent groups such as these, rather than the minister in consultation with his top advisers. Countervailing forces were derived from the gradual emergence of a support group for the minister in the central service section, directly under the control of the Director General, and the fact that the minister is also a member of federal committees and receives many deputations from clients. The minister also frequently pays personal visits to hospitals throughout the State.

A client group, even more clearly defined than hospital patients, on which a department could base a solid clientele affiliation, are tenants. While Health Services have a multiplicity of clients with disparate interests and may therefore be less likely to provide such a common front to ministerial initiatives, Housing differs considerably. Yet, for some reason unknown, the clients of the Housing Department have neither banded together to form a pressure group on the department, nor have the officials ever used them as support for their activities in altercations with their minister. Since most of the building is undertaken by a day labour force, with a very minor proportion on contract to private firms, there is not any significant interaction with outside bodies. It may be that other centrifugal forces operating within the agency give it sufficient autonomy without the need to seek external aid. The physical isolation, the professional commitment and departmental loyalty previously referred to, provide these forces and presumably have not led to a need to build up alternative sources of support. That may also be the reason why greater stress was placed in the Housing Department on the 'interference' of

the Public Service Board and its committees, such as Mechanical Aids and Public Offices.

Education, on the other hand, provides a complete contrast to both of these departments. It is the minister who has the direct involvement with clientele groups and other bodies. The officials have not apparently sought nor gained any basis for affiliation with these groups. Parents and Friends Associations connected with the schools seek and obtain audience with the minister, their contact with officers is only through the minister.

The profession, who are employed by the department direct, regard the senior officers as their employer and do not differentiate them from the minister in this regard. The Teachers Federation is involved in many of the departmental activities through cooptation on joint committees, but these are used as legitimizing or feedback groups and rarely take the initiative away from the minister. The example was given of the way in which one of these committees was used to legitimize the reclassification scheme in 1955.

Another factor, which militates against the use of external support, is the system of internal committees of senior officers, who arrive at mediated settlement of disputes within those committees before involving the minister. There did not appear to be any significant circumjacent groups on which the officials could depend for support against the minister. Rather, it was the minister who had more contact with such groups through direct contact, and who gained any advantage there may have been from that. In this way, the political leadership of the minister was protected, and his executive authority was not undermined. Any action taken by the department was seen to be the result of direction from the minister by the deputations who saw him as a figure of authority.

One of the striking features of the Tasmanian Executive System is the extent to which senior officials are committed to restraint in their activities. Whilst the most innovative would be what Gordon describes as 'activist'¹⁶, they

¹⁶ M.R.Gordon, op. cit., p 40. "They can entertain ideas (though these should not be too passionately held, for that would imply partiality), and they not only can, but indeed are supposed to, express them (for that is the whole point of their anonymity)."

would rarely deliberately compromise the minister. In the privacy of the ministerial office they may stress the inadvisability of acting in ways proposed by the minister, but once the minister's mind is made up the official co-operates to the best of his capacity.¹⁷ Nevertheless, a minister is very vulnerable, no matter how restrained the senior officials, and this is particularly so in the area of executive authority. Even where the statute expressly makes the decisions of the official subject to the consent of the minister, it is not possible for a minister to deal personally with every matter in the department. Senior officials must be allowed to make decisions and some of these will necessarily encroach on the executive authority of the minister.

This situation was most evident in Health Services, where the diversity of activities and the range of specialist needs were so great as to cause one minister to suggest that his working day of 15 or 16 hours was too short to deal with all decisions that required his attention. Additional support for the executive activities of the senior officers in Health Services was received from the relations with circumjacent groups, partly due to their common professionalism. Not all forces within the department operated centrifugally, because the fragmentation of interests increased the dependence of the minister for funds which were largely forthcoming from the State budget. At the same time, despite the professional core of officers within the department, there had never grown up a tradition of departmental loyalty which would provide a basis for autonomy. At the very most it could be said that the senior officials in Health Services operated on the verge of enveloping the executive authority of

¹⁷ One permanent head told the story of his minister demanding a brief to be taken to Cabinet, supporting the repeal of a regulation, which the minister had not long previously accepted. Apparently a group of his constituents had pointed to the unanticipated effects it was having on them. The permanent head, knowing that the effects were exactly the reason for the regulation, suggested that he would provide the Cabinet with the detailed reasons why the regulation was necessary, and Cabinet could then repeal the regulation if it was felt appropriate. The minister agreed and the permanent head prepared his Cabinet submission to such good effect that the matter was never heard of again.

the minister. The potential for undermining the political leadership is always present in these circumstances, because once executive authority is transferred from the minister, there is little left on which to exert his leadership. However, in the case of Health Services, so long as the diffuseness of services remains and the lack of common identity of interest and purpose, there is little danger of the minister's political leadership being totally eroded.

A similar, but not wholly identical, situation exists in Housing. However, the centrifugal forces are not derived from the same sources. In Housing the dedicated nature of the funding has, in the past, helped to create a tradition of autonomy. It has also helped to clarify the nature of the activities for the officials and their day labour force, creating an identity to which all can be loyal. The lack of any identifiable core of staff, which may be described as professional in the normal sense, has not reduced this autonomy and there remains a very strong base of support for the exercise of executive authority by the senior officials. The legislation provides further assistance to officials, because it is the most explicit in its allocation of functions to the Director. While relations with circumjacent groups are not at all strong, there is little need to build up such support when officials are able to utilise their minister's executive authority by other means. Despite declarations to the contrary, there was fairly strong evidence that it required a deliberate exercise of political leadership and executive authority by the minister to obtain a change of policy on the matter of terminating the tenancy of occupiers in arrears with rent payments.

Both Health Services and Education may be thought to provide a similar context in which centrifugal forces could gain an increasing hold. The dominant professional content of officers, and similar legislation should permit the senior officers the same exercise of executive authority. There is not the same combination of forces in Education to permit this to emerge. Education is much more like a normal ministerial department, with the minister very much in control, exercising executive authority and political leadership without too much interference. The only significant force was that of professional

staff, but it was seen how this was too newly emerged to be of any great support. At the same time there were too many internal competing forces for the officers to act as a group to undermine the minister's authority. Individual officers may produce conflict situations from time to time, but generally without the senior officers and others in the department acting as one. More often than not the senior officers were seen by the teaching staff as synonymous with the minister, and their association did little to foster any spirit of professional identity. Funds were almost wholly obtained from the State budget which forced dependence on ministerial support, even though there appears to have been a strong commitment to spending in that field. Another factor, which may have had a strong influence on the way the Education Department evolved in the more recent past, was the long term one particular minister spent in the portfolio. It is possible that his familiarity with the department was sufficient to make him more like one of his own officials. For example, he had outlasted a number of the senior departmental officers who were in office when he was first appointed. Of the three departments Education seems to be the one in which officers have least executive authority and are most observant of the boundary between their administrative capacity and the exercise of authority.

Conclusion

The relationship between the minister and the senior official in the Tasmanian State Executive has been observed in three agencies. The analytical techniques used have provided a profile of the way this relationship affects the activities of the minister, and by extension, the effect this has on the operation of the Westminster model of government at the Australian State level.

Previously, attention has been drawn to the particular historical and cultural differences in Australian States in colonial times. The implantation into the colonies of a set of institutions, which had evolved in the unique British conditions of the nineteenth century, could not occur without some

adaptation. The most significant adjustment had to be made as a consequence of the military and penal nature of the early settlements. The Governor was in charge, reporting directly to the Colonial Office in London, there was no elected politician taking on ministerial portfolios, but senior officials appointed by the Governor. These officials were suddenly transformed in 1856, almost overnight, into ministers in charge of departments.¹⁸ There was no gradual evolution through 'ministerialisation',¹⁹ and the States have been left with what Wettenhall calls the "duality" of some departments, operating like their British counterparts and others as 'public officer departments'.

Such adaptations have been little understood, based as they were on assumptions about the operations of the parliamentary system of government. It was taken for granted that ministers would be in control of their departments, that their activities would be supervised by a vigilant Parliament to whom they were accountable, and that public servants would operate as impartial implementors. The State minister, however individually and collectively responsible, cannot operate quite as in the original British system. Whilst the institutional ritual and symbols are the same, with the same observance of title and formality, the activities of ministers in State parliaments and governments have been adapted to the needs of that context.

It has been the purpose of this thesis to attempt an assessment of the extent to which these adaptations have changed the Westminster model in one State. One of the common manifestations of that model has been an overt adherence to the politics/administration dichotomy, within the formal constitutional framework. Both politician and official believed that they were keeping to their side of the boundary in whatever activity they undertook. They were certain in their own minds, and the institutional ritual reinforced their certainty, that what

¹⁸ Wettenhall, Ministerial Departments, op. cit., where he describes the changeover in some detail, p 242.

¹⁹ Wettenhall's word to indicate the gradual philosophical support for a ministerial department that emerged in Britain in the early 1830s.

they did followed the British precedents. Yet the processes in which they are involved causes the emerging reality to appear differently. Public servants are thought to be usurping the prerogatives reserved for politicians, particularly in the area of policy making. They are thought to be doing this in a number of ways: control of information, continuity of service and expertise, but more particularly by taking decisions in matters for which they held no ultimate responsibility. In this way executive authority and even perhaps political leadership are being whittled away from the politician/minister.

The extent to which a minister loses his capacity to be a political leader in his department through the effects of senior officials, may only be a temporary phenomenon. It may be the consequence of the interaction of a strong official and weak minister, or the minister may only see his task as marginal to his main interests because he has other more challenging portfolios. However, if this loss of political leadership is more permanent, where it persists despite a change of minister, then it may be said that there is a significant loss with important consequences. Differentiating between political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity helps to indicate such permanent changes. However, loss of executive authority, not political leadership, was found more likely to be crucial in any discussion about the position of the minister.

There is little doubt from the analysis as it has been applied to the three departments, that the Tasmanian State Executive has moved some way from the Westminster model. While the ministers may still exercise political leadership to a marked degree, their executive authority is, and has for some time been, considerably diminished. This situation is rarely admitted, because ministers do make many decisions, they have the right to veto any proposal put forward by officers, and their officers make every effort to assist them maintain the pretence.²⁰ However, the centrifugal forces of professionalism and tradition

²⁰ That it is a pretence in contemporary Britain is the view of many writers, see the references given in Gordon, *op. cit.*, p 45, and earlier discussions in chapters I & II.

of autonomy, when combined with dedicated funding, such as occurred in Housing over a period of many years, place ministers in a strait jacket. Officials can be the only beneficiaries of the forces at work in this situation, their executive authority increases at the expense of the minister. The kind of problems that have to be solved daily in Health Services are incapable of solution without the expertise of the officials. No one other than the minister has access to their expertise, but on the other hand he must accept their recommendations because he has no alternative source to use. Teachers make decisions in the school situation which preclude the minister from certain future actions and his executive authority is thereby compromised.

Even though some executive authority has been transferred, it does not necessarily mean that the minister is left with only the hollow shell of his traditional responsibility. This view appears to be supported in the Tasmanian State Executive, where senior officials are strongly committed to maintaining the parliamentary conventions of the Westminster system, seeing themselves as placing their knowledge at the minister's disposal. They make every effort, it seems, to provide the minister with opportunities to exercise both executive authority and political leadership. The direct links individual citizens have with the minister also provide a foundation on which the minister can build his authority and leadership. Officials' own circumjacent relationships are less strong than those of the minister, who, while in office, spends a large proportion of the daily routine, dealing with deputations and meeting people in the work place. In this way the range of departmental activities, that could suddenly become a matter for ministerial concern, is greatly increased. Knowing the mind of the minister makes senior officials more administratively capable, but also more cautious. They are less likely to transgress the bounds of convention if the minister shows his grasp of departmental affairs through political leadership.

The Health Services and Housing Department were examples of how potential dominance by officials is controlled and ministerial responsibility is maintained in

a fine balance which relies mainly on the honesty and competence of the official. Centrifugal forces are working in the system all the time - with or without the will of official or minister. The change from the nightwatchman state to the interventionist state has increased the potential of these forces, especially those derived from expertise, centralised financial dependence, and the demand for long-term planning. Where the officials are careless of the effects of such forces, where they do not deliberately take action to avoid the consequences, then the conventions will be flouted.

In Tasmania - as mentioned above - the majority of officials make the Westminster system function, sometimes despite the minister. On the other hand, there are some officials who despise the politician as difficult and interfering, preventing rational decisions based on expert knowledge. Officials who think like that are more likely to be in the middle levels rather than at the top of the hierarchy, but it does not augur well for the future of parliamentary government if these men take control without changing their view.

Ministers also should perhaps take more trouble to make their political leadership and executive authority clear, and to prevent the potential of these centrifugal forces from being realised. In so far as the minister acts according to the conventions, it inhibits any other actions which may occur to hinder the operation of the Westminster system. Role playing is an important part of the maintenance of such boundaries, where ministers and officials have certain expectations and obligations. More often than not it is the minister rather than the official who is unaware of the danger involved in ignoring these forces, they want to make their mark in some way which will reinforce their political position. This leads them to concentrate on activities that will give them the greatest electoral return, rather than provide their officials with political leadership. Often such leadership is left to the Premier or Cabinet and officials complain about the number of matters decided outside the department.

At the State level Cabinet certainly plays a very important role, which increases the crucial position of Premier to the detriment of the ministers.

Since the Premier is frequently the Treasurer, this also involves Treasury officials in almost every aspect of departmental activity. Such involvement is a countervailing force for senior officials who have to maintain the confidence and authority of their minister to defend their actions in Cabinet and to the Treasury.

At the present time, the responsibility of the minister is consistent with a modified Westminster model. He remains answerable for the departmental activities to Parliament, he can exercise political leadership and he has some limited form of executive authority. Some ministers and most officials understand their roles through training and experience and as a consequence try to operate as if they existed in practice. No official would set out deliberately to undermine the minister's control and responsibility. Any actions that had this result would arise from the daily press of business over a long period of time, in particular from the kind of forces referred to as centrifugal.

The complex, multifaceted interactions that occur within the departments between ministers and senior officials, and between various horizontal and vertical levels of officials, are too labyrinthine for any common pattern. Generalisations cannot be made which relate to a particular kind of structure. Only through the identification of similar forces at work within the processes is it possible to suggest trends over time. These forces form a mosaic in which compatible patterns emerge for certain purposes, such as executive activity, or for ministerial responsibility. Incompatible patterns have been identified from time to time due to the laxity of ministers or unprofessional conduct of public servants. The consequences have always been to move away from that central feature of the Westminster model - ministerial responsibility. Without that vital element representative and responsible parliamentary government according to the Westminster model no longer exists.

The pattern most appropriate to describe the Westminster system is political leadership exercised by a strong party-political figure, who also has

executive authority of which a high proportion is statutorily delegated to officials who themselves have potent, but self-controlled, administrative capacity. The Tasmanian State Executive may be said to conform to such a pattern despite some minor aberrations identified in the analysis.

APPENDICES

- I Administrative Agencies of the Tasmanian Government
 categorised by Ministry and Type as at November 1972

- II Methodological Digression

- III Outline of Interview technique and list of interviewees

- IV Subject matter of Questions asked in the House of
 Assembly Sessions I and II of the 35th Parliament
 1969-1971
 (a) Housing (b) Education (c) Health Services.

Appendix I.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF THE

TASMANIAN GOVERNMENT

CATEGORISED BY

MINISTRY AND TYPE

PREMIER, TREASURER AND MINISTER FOR MINES

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept.
Treasury Department
Mines Department

(b) Not gazetted

Directorate of Industrial Development
and Trade

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

-

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Corporations

-

Public Corporations

-

Regulatory Bodies

-

Satellite Bodies

Agent-General's Office
*Board of Mine Examiners
Civil Defence and Emergency Services
Consumers Protection Council
*Court of Mines
His Excellency the Governor's
Establishment
Mine Managers' Board
Mt. Cameron Water Race Board
Public Offices Committee
Public Offices Sub-committee
Retirement Benefits Fund Board
Retirement Benefits Investment Trust
Ringarooma & Cascade Water Board
Shipping Liaison Committee
State Sinking Fund Commissioners
Superannuation Fund Board
Transport Advisory Committee
Water Safety Council

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972

*DEPUTY PREMIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, MINISTER FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE
RACING AND GAMING ACT*

Ministerial Departments

- | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| (a) Gazetted | Attorney General's Dept. |
| (b) Not gazetted | *Directorate of Environmental Control |

Departmental Offices

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| (a) Gazetted | Parliamentary Counsel's Department
Prisons Department
Registrar-General's Dept. (inc. Lands Titles
Solicitor General's Dept. & Reg. B,D, & M)
Supreme Court and Sheriff's Dept. |
| (b) Not gazetted | Magistracy branch |

Departmental Corporations

Public Trust Office (gazetted)

Public Corporations

-

Regulatory Bodies

Auctioneers' & Estate Agents Council
Publications Board of Review
State Licensing Court
Tasmanian Racing Commission

Satellite Bodies

- *Board of Examiners under the Legal Practitioners Act
- Board of Legal Education
- *Bookmakers' Appeal Board
- Companies Auditors' Board
- Indeterminate Sentences Board
- *Lands Titles Commissioners
- *Public Trust Office Investment Board
- *Rules Publication Committee
- *Solicitors' Remuneration Committee
- Solicitors' Trust

* Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept, Hobart, November 1972

MINISTER FOR EDUCATIONMinisterial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Education Dept

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

-

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Corporations

Adult Education Board (not gazetted)

Public Corporations

-

Regulatory Bodies

Schools Board of Tasmania

Satellite BodiesAdvisory Committee on Interest Subsidies to
Independent Schools

Board of Technical Education

Bursaries Board

*Education Dept. Appeal Board

*Education Dept. Promotions Committees

Science Centre Advisory Committee

*Secondary Schools Board

*State Teachers' Superannuation Fund Board

*Student Hostels' Boards of Management

Teachers and Schools Registration Board

Other Bodies

College of Advanced Education

University of Tasmania

* Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept, Hobart, November 1972

CHIEF SECRETARY AND MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Dept. of Labour and Industry

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

Audit Department

Electoral Department

Public Service Commissioner's Dept.

Public Service Tribunal

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Corporations

State Library of Tasmania (gazetted)

Tasmanian Library Board

Public Corporations

Fire Brigades Commission

Metropolitan Transport Trust

Royal Botanical Gardens Board of Trustees

Tasmanian Grain Elevators Board

Transport Commission

Trustees of Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery

Regulatory Bodies

Miners' Pensions Board

Workers (Occupational Diseases)

Relief Fund Board

Satellite Bodies

Administrative Services of Parliament

Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids

Anzac Day Trust

Apprenticeship Commission

Board of Reference (under Inspection of Machinery Act 1960)

Coal Mining Industry - Long Service Leave Trust

Cinema Board

Consumers Protection Council

*Factories Appeal Tribunal

Factory Welfare Board

Industrial Advisory Council

Ladies' Hairdressers & Chiropodists Advisory Board

Plumbers' Registration Board

Public Service Appeal Board

Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal

Railway Reward Fund Commissioners

Railway Service Appeal Board

Railway Service Promotions Appeal Board

Rental Committee

Royal Tasmanian Society for the Blind and Deaf

Rural Fires Board

Scholarship and Assisted Study Course Committee

Third Party Insurance Premiums Board
Wages Boards (various)

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 197

MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Department of Agriculture
National Parks & Wildlife Service

(b) Not gazetted

*Sea Fisheries Division

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

-

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Corporations

Agricultural Bank of Tasmania
(gazetted)

Public Corporations

Artificial Breeding Board

Regulatory Bodies

Inland Fisheries Commission
Primary Produce Board

- Dairy Products Marketing Board
- Egg Marketing Board
- Milk Board of Tasmania
- Potato Marketing Board
- State Fruit Board
- Tasmanian Ryegrass Marketing Board

Satellite Bodies

Beauty Point Landslip Advisory
Committee

Closer Settlement Appeal Board

Closer Settlement Board

Dairy Factories Registration
Board

*Farmers' Debt Adjustment Board

Filled Milk Advisory Committee

King Island Abattoir Board

Lawrence Vale Landslip Advisory
Committee

National Parks & Wildlife Advisory
Council

*Noxious Weeds Appeal Board

Registry of Co-operative Housing
Societies

Rural Reconstruction Board

Sea Fisheries Advisory Board

Stanley Cool Stores Board

Stock Medicines and Fertilizers Board

Vermin Destruction Appeals Board

Veterinary Board

*War Service Land Settlement Appeal
Board

Weeds Advisory Committees

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972

*MINISTER FOR LANDS AND WORKS AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT*

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Lands Dept. (incl. Surveyor General
and Valuation Branch)
Public Works Department

(b) Not gazetted

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

Department of Film Production

(b) Not gazetted

Local Government Office

Departmental Corporations

Rivers and Water Supply Commission
(gazetted)

Public Corporations

Launceston Flood Protection Board
Metropolitan Water Board

Regulatory Bodies

Town and Country Planning Commission

Satellite Bodies

Board of Tenders for Public Works
Building Appeals Board
Building Regulations Board
Council Clerks Board
Land Valuation Court
Municipal Commission
Nomenclature Board
*Public Service Standing Committee
on Workers' Compensation
Surveyors Board
Valuers Examination Board

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972

*MINISTER FOR HEALTH, MINISTER FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
AND MINISTER FOR ROAD SAFETY*

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Dept. of Health Services
Social Welfare Dept.

(b) Not gazetted

-

Department Offices

(a) Gazetted

-

(b) Not gazetted

*Road Safety Branch

Departmental Corporations

Mental Health Services Commission
(not gazetted)

Public Corporations

Ambulance Service Commission
Hospital Boards

Regulatory Bodies

Alcohol and Drug Dependency Board
Dental Board
Medical Council
Nurses Registration Board
Pharmacy Board
Physiotherapists Registration Board
Radiographers' Registration Board
Tasmanian Board of Optical Registration

Satellite Bodies

*Child Welfare Advisory Council
Dental Health Services Advisory Committee
Dental Mechanics Registration Board
Fluoridation Advisory Committee
Food Standards Committee
*Gellibrand House Board
Guardianship Board
*Health Education Council
Medical Advisory Committee
*Medical Boards (Tuberculosis)
Mental Health Review Tribunal
*Millbrook Home Board
*National Fitness Council of Tasmania
Pesticides Advisory Committee
Poisons Advisory Committee
Radiological Advisory Committee
Royal Derwent Hospital Board
*Tasmanian Cancer Committee

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

*THE MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,
MINISTER FOR FORESTS, MINISTER ADMINISTERING
THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC COMMISSION ACT 1944 , AND
MINISTER ASSISTING THE TREASURER*

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

(b) Not gazetted

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

Supply and Tender Department

(b) Not gazetted

Departmental Corporations

Government Printing Office (gazetted)
Forestry Commission (gazetted)

Public Corporations

Hydro-Electric Commission
Tasmanian Government Insurance Office

Regulatory Bodies

Satellite Bodies

Apple and Pear Crop Insurance Board
*Tasmanian Industrial Advisory Committee

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972

MINISTER FOR HOUSINGMinisterial Departments

(a) Gazetted -

(b) Not gazetted -

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted -

(b) Not gazetted -

Departmental Corporations

Housing Dept. (gazetted)

Public Corporations

-

Regulatory Bodies

-

Satellite Bodies

-

THE MINISTER FOR TOURISM AND IMMIGRATION,
AND MINISTER FOR POLICE AND LICENSING

Ministerial Departments

(a) Gazetted

Dept. of Tourism and Immigration

(b) Not gazetted

Tourism Development Authority

Departmental Offices

(a) Gazetted

Police Department

(b) Not gazetted

-

Departmental Corporations

-

Public Corporations

-

Regulatory Bodies

-

Satellite Bodies

Accommodation Houses Registration
Committee

Finance Committee

*Guest House Board

Indicative, Informative and Directional
Signs Committee

(Police) Board of Selectors

Police Disciplinary Board

Police Promotions Appeal Board

Police Promotion Examination Board

Police Provident Fund Board

*Tourist Accommodation Loans Committee

*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,

Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972

Appendix IIMETHODOLOGICAL DIGRESSIONScientism and Concepts in explanation

Much of the literature on methodological problems in the political and, especially, the social sciences is based upon refutation of the charge of 'scientism'. The search for a set of immutable laws of political and social behaviour has reputable ancestry.¹ Nonetheless, today there is less certainty about the affinity of the social sciences with the natural sciences² although the demand for rigour still remains. Generalisation and prediction derived from an interpretation of poorly collected data may be just as misleading as those derived from poor explanation of very good data. The suggestion has been made³ that the 'normal science' of politics is the actual political arrangements of a society at a given time, whilst political science itself is "a special form of paradigm inspired research."⁴ However, acceptance of this formulation does not avoid the problems in trying to explain those actual arrangements. Wolin points out that new facts are unlikely "but a different interpretation based on new cognitive and normative standards" is quite normal expectation.

This is true, of course, but it begs the question about what 'facts' are. In describing activities in political and social systems there are many potential 'facts', which of them are selected for explanatory purposes is often the unwitting judgement of the researcher. This evaluation will be made

¹ A short discussion of the reasons for, and some of the history of, this search may be found in M.R. Davies and V.A. Lewis, Models of Political Systems, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), Chapters 1 and 2. See also J. Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for Political Science: Scope Objectives and Methods, (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966).

² See the recent debate carried on in the British Journal of Political Science, C. Ake, 'The Scientific Status of Political Science' and Two Comments, January 1972, (2), pp 109-132 and July 1972, 383-388.

³ S.S. Wolin, 'Paradigms and Political Theories' in P. King and B.O. Parekh, Politics and Experience (London: C.U.P., 1968) p 130.

⁴ Wolin, op. cit., p 139.

unwittingly because the implicit value system of that person will prevent him from recognising the whole range of potential facts. Any choice of theoretical framework involves implicit evaluation; but an adequate basis for an explanation which is "not just analytically true, but empirically true", may be achieved through neutrality.⁵ The distinction is important since empirical truth seems to imply achievement of the kind of scientific validity which has largely been rejected. As is pointed out by Mclean⁶ to be scientific, any laws about political behaviour "must predict with certainty how each individual will behave given a choice of actions." If such laws merely predict that a given proportion of men will behave in a similar way, nothing can be validly inferred since there is no way of predicting from past behaviour which particular proportion of individuals will in the future behave in this way. The most that can be hoped for is that in explaining a given aspect of social reality we can utilise implicit and explicit theories as to which are the most crucial factors to observe and interpret.

'Facts' observed through this neutrality would then be subject to specification in a language which itself must be free of dispute. The concepts utilised to describe individual behaviour patterns and the structures in which they occur have also been subject to onslaught.⁷ Whatever language is used by the participants in the political and social situation observed must form the basis of interpretation. In this way the concepts available to the observer are limited, except that he may be epistemologically privileged, since he may operate 'within' that language and be aware of connotations not otherwise clear. The mere observation of activities within a certain

⁵ B. Crick, 'The Elementary types of Government', Government and Opposition, Vol. 3, 1968, p 14.

⁶ Comment British Journal of Political Science, July 1972, p 384.

⁷ H. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, (London: Penguin Books, 1953).

social situation does not of itself, therefore, provide the facts. Nor will the conceptual tools of the observer supplement those facts to find explanation in any empirically true form. In one sense all concepts utilised in political and social explanation have a value context. This is bound to occur when their formulation has been based upon metaphysical or philosophical grounds and is culture bound. Weldon points out,

"It was, and still is, comforting to believe that these [devastating conflicts between associations of human beings] could all be overcome if only the intrinsic or essential nature of associations were properly understood. When this is accepted it is easy to proceed further and to say that enlightenment will be achieved when we discover the true meaning of the words 'State', 'authority', 'right' and the rest. To avoid apparent logical troubles it is often held that enquiry should be directed to discovering the concepts or ideas for which these words stand..."⁸

This describes the concept formulation process which 'scientism' has endeavoured to break, only to become involved in other problems of its own referred to above.

How then is any observer of a political or social situation to fulfil the demands of his discipline and provide theories of political and social behaviour? Is there to be no theory, no generalised description even? Are only the most elementary facts about the actions of individuals in given situations to be recorded without hope of generalisations being deduced, explaining those actions in terms of similar actions at other times and in other situations? Must all description rely for its language on that of the participants, is it not possible to use properly constructed concepts as a kind of shorthand with which to convert specific behaviour into meaningful patterns relevant to more than one instant in time?

Stretton discussed these problems,

"... all explanation is eclectic, even if what it chooses to do is to relate facts by class or law; no explanation can achieve neutrality by sufficiently including all the remotely related facts; the best that any can do is justice

⁸Weldon, op. cit., p 12.

to most of the interests of the audience. ... The choices [by the explainer bearing in mind the audience and which of their disagreed interests he will serve] should be criticised, not only for their technical qualities, but also for their 'fairness' or 'justice' to interested parties for the quality, not merely the inevitable presence, of their values."⁹

The inference supported by much of what Stretton writes is that Crick's perception of an observer's neutrality which may eventually lead him to empirically true explanation is unjustified. All that may be achieved is the observer's own view of social reality expressed in a language using concepts which he regards as universally acceptable, bearing his audience in mind. Stretton suggests that no single conceptual framework can provide the unanimity which seems to be the goal of most social and political scientists. The search for this goal leads them to identify phenomenological similarities about which they conceptualise to provide them with this unanimity. For example,

"...by substituting, what are often, technically crude and unperceptive selectors like 'contributions to the system', 'integration', and 'persistence'. These were meant to be justified by a yield of law; by the discovery of identical functional performance in whole classes of systems."¹⁰

In this way it was hoped to promote a satisfactory classification of social facts and causal mechanisms, 'which should terminate enquiries into all systems, when their classifiable parts were identified and correctly boxed.'¹¹

This search again leading back to 'scientism' avoids a fundamental paradox of social reality which 'expresses the quintessential difference between the nature of social and physical reality'.¹² This paradox is that

"The most fundamental idea concerning the nature of social reality is that the properties of the elements of social phenomena obtain many of their characteristics from the larger phenomena of which they are part, while the larger

⁹H. Stretton, The Political Sciences, (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1969) p 71.

¹⁰Stretton, op. cit., p 195.

¹¹Stretton, op. cit., p 194.

¹²P.S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory, (London: Heinemann, 1968).

entities obtain their characteristics mostly from the relation between the parts of which they are composed."¹³

Cohen goes on to explain that in the physical world entities may be described as being more than the mere sum of all their parts.

"This means that the entities have properties which are not found in the parts taken separately but which are found when the parts are related. But these parts do have characteristics which exist independently of the entities in which they participate."¹⁴

However, in the relationships between elements of which social entities are comprised, the elements themselves may well not exist at all if it were not for their participation in the whole.

"Families consist of spouses, parents, children and siblings, but the characteristics of spouse, parent, children and sibling cannot exist outside of families. Economics consist of producers, consumers, arbitrage brokers, advertisers and so on: but the characteristics of producer s, consumers, etc. cannot exist outside of an economy. Political systems consist of leaders, followers, factions, parties, legislatures and so on, but none of the characteristics of these things can exist outside of their systems."¹⁵

Once this realisation is accepted it provides a basis for future explanation in the political and social sciences. Lukes makes the point that "to identify a piece of behaviour, a set of beliefs, etc., is sometimes to explain it. This may involve seeing it in a new way, picking out hidden structural features."¹⁶

In this way explanations in the political and social sciences are always concerned with explicating relationships within and between social entities and their elements. But since the characteristics of each depend upon the existence of the other, the explanations must always contain evaluation. Explanation never stops short of judgement, since it is comprised of selections and descriptions of pieces of behaviour sorted out

¹³ Cohen, op. cit., pp 11/12.

¹⁴ op. cit., p 12.

¹⁵ ibid.

¹⁶ S. Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' in D. Emmett and A. Macintyre (eds), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1970) p 83.

by the observer. The totality of activity in the entity with all its complexity is rarely capable of comprehension by a single observer.

Selection must be based on the observer's own perceptions of the whole; albeit informed by a heightened awareness of characteristics and data most likely to be important for any particular explanation. Such sensitivity is increased by familiarity in handling the subject matter and a capacity to provide a consistent, internally co-ordinated set of explanations about that particular social phenomenon.¹⁷

Selectivity may take a number of forms:-

- 1) through limitation by conceptual approach; (e.g. behavioural, institutional, or systems);
- 2) by data collection which rejects certain kinds of information as irrelevant for explanations of the kind envisaged; (e.g. constitutional, psychological or legal); or
- 3) by the level of abstraction or generality attempted in the explanation.

Three levels are generally agreed:

- a) direct observation and description of conduct differing only in methodological accuracy from the laymen's descriptions;
- b) deliberate grouping concepts, classification by some common quality or system of internal connections discerned in them all;
- c) 'higher' levels of abstraction, classification and relation at which the functions common to social systems can be identified but their ways of performing those functions can be differentiated.¹⁸

Of these levels of abstraction the latter subsumes the first two because the generality of the research is dictated by the methodological 'kit' available to the observer. Thus it might be postulated that one whose 'kit' is limited to the institutional or historical would today offer a set

¹⁷ The use of "appreciative systems" mentioned in G. Vickers, The Art of Judgement, (London: University Press, 1970) is relevant here.

¹⁸ Weldon, op. cit., pp 149-150. This may be compared with the typology of research into 'operational', 'basic objective' and 'pure basic'. A Cherns, 'Social Sciences & Policy' in A.D. Cherns, R. Sinclair and W.I. Jenkins (eds), Social Science & Government (Tavistock, 1972) p 29.

explanations nearest to the first level. This was not always so, but as the sophistication of research methods increases so does the potential level of abstraction. The dangers of this increased abstraction in political and social science is noted by Stretton, who draws attention to its greater 'manipulative possibilities'. However, for him there are benefits, since 'knowledge ordered in this way may offer more opportunities for contemplation than for social intervention and control'.¹⁹ Certainly the higher the levels of abstraction the farther one gets from methodological individualism or the atomistic approach favoured by some researchers. Identification of social entities at this high level of abstraction has led to the holistic approach, noting the separate elements whilst focusing on the organic nature of the whole. Structural functionalism or functionalism of this kind also has its pitfalls as I shall discuss later. On the other hand, atomism resulted in a view of social entities as wholes made up of identical or replaceable parts which could be assembled in different ways.²⁰ None of these methodological perspectives is entirely satisfactory as a basis for explanation, especially in the political sphere. As previously mentioned, unless methods take account of the fundamental paradox that the parts are shaped by the wholes, yet at the same time the wholes would not exist other than as a relationship between the parts, the explanation of social reality will always be inadequate.

To overcome this methodological problem is extremely difficult, but there are a number of more recent techniques which, if used with awareness and sensitivity, would assist. They would certainly fulfil Crick's requirement of neutrality, although the result may not reach his expectation of empirical reality. The choice of technique must necessarily be that of the individual,

¹⁹Weldon, op. cit., p 150.

²⁰Note the mechanistic overtones here and the use of the term 'machinery' of government prevalent in the literature since Haldane, 1918.

but its description and that of the explanation must be limited by the availability of a language for that purpose. One of the main dangers is to be trapped by that limitation. The implications of adopting a particular stance or methodological technique may be accepted by the observer, but not by his audience. His substantive work is ignored and his method attacked. On the other hand the method may come to dominate the substantive research to the extent that method becomes the substantive part by default.

Language and Concepts in Explanation

Any explanations derived from observation and investigation must be rooted in concepts drawn from the language of the participants. In the first instance an understanding of the norms and values, rules, laws and conventions which support individual behaviour within the structures of the political sphere must be obtained. It is hardly disputable that the actor's definition of his own situation is a critical factor for his own behaviour and must be taken into account in analysis. Yet it is not unusual for the actor's definition to be based on false premisses or on a faulty interpretation of perfectly legitimate concepts from which the norms are derived. In either case these factors must be identified, otherwise interpretation will not be based on valid data. It is therefore essential for the observer to make a clear distinction between the material and formal element of the concept concerned.²¹ Equally, there are certain concepts whose formulations are not universally accepted, the kind of concept which may be defined in different ways with competing theoretical implications, i.e. an essentially contested concept.²² Whilst concepts supply frameworks of understanding, they also provide guidelines for action, thus informing and giving meaning to social

²¹For a discussion of this distinction see J. Kovesi, Moral Notions, (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1967) pp 4-8.

²²W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964) chapter 8.

activity. The observer, therefore, has to consider and accept or reject the theoretical implications of the conceptual frameworks of his subjects, in the knowledge that his capacity to evaluate them is automatically limited by the social, cultural and intellectual acclimatisation he has himself experienced.²³ One way to avoid these difficulties is to accept Weldon's approach to concepts, as 'words which simply have uses':

"There is nothing divine or magical about 'justice' or 'freedom', they are only part of the verbal apparatus we make use of for describing and criticising certain types of human conduct. They are not the names of Ideas or archetypes ... they are not the names of anything. To know their meaning is to know how to use them correctly, that is, in such a way as to be generally intelligible in an ordinary and technical discourse ... This radical misunderstanding as to the meanings of words has given rise to a whole family of philosophical illusions which make up the greater part of what is known as 'metaphysics'. Three of these are especially pervasive in discussions on politics ... they may be called (1) the illusion of real essences, (2) the illusion of absolute standards, and (3) the illusion of geometrical method."²⁴

These illusions are the result of acceptance by social scientists of the scientific method as described by Boulding:

"By measurement, careful observation, controlled experiment, and statistical method, science explores the relational world with much the same kind of feedbacks as the mapmaker. He is in danger of being put to shame by anyone who cannot find the relation he has announced. Science, however, buys its success at a price; indeed a high price. The price is the severe limitation of its field of inquiry and a value system which is as ruthless in its own way in the censoring of messages as the value system of primitive man. ... Furthermore the world of the scientist is the world of the repeatable, the world of the probable. The rare occurrence, the non-repeatable event, the unanswerable question elude him".²⁵

²³ I am grateful to Dr. D.J. Clifford for his help in formulating the above statement of the problem and in particular in discussing Chapter 1 of his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, An investigation into some basic methodological assumptions of current political theory, Manchester University, July 1972, included in which is his discussion of concept formation as messages filtered through a value system.

²⁴ Weldon, op. cit., pp 19-20.

²⁵ K. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan Press, 1961) pp 70-71. See also Chapman, R.J.K., "Machinery of Government: a field of academic study and public enquiry", New Zealand Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 35(1), 1972, pp 17-33.

By such arguments the bogey of subjectivism may be placed in some kind of perspective, but the stigma attached to research without an overt attempt at scientific neutrality will remain. Little can be done to escape this stigma in the social sciences for the reasons mentioned previously. However, it is possible to attempt an objectivity although it is not rational in the sense that it can meet scientific criteria such as

"...to grade people and institutions with the sort of certainty and confidence as that within which, with very minor qualifications, we can grade physical bodies in terms of their size or weight."²⁶

This objectivity is well defined by Hyneman as a

"...conscientious, careful, systematic effort to find out what actually exists and goes on and reports findings in a way that enables other students to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence for conclusions".²⁷

The observer collecting data in these circumstances and with this sensitivity must reduce the problem of subjectivity to a reasonable degree. This is especially so if one accepts that all explanation in the social sciences is relative; since it is based on an empirical appraisal. The observer who endeavours to investigate as many aspects of his subject as he can encompass with the methodological tools at his disposal is unlikely to miss too many crucial factors. His explanation will be relatively better than one which uses fewer of these tools and does not attempt to identify concepts, clarify the use of terms and explicate the values involved.

The use of models in current explanations of government institutions

The term 'model' has been subjected to abuse in much of the recent literature. Here it is used to mean an analytical representation of what actually happens. Such a model has sometimes been prescriptive in the sense

²⁶Weldon, op. cit., p 150.

²⁷C.S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics, University of Illinois Press, 1959, p 78.

that it can describe how the existing system must work if different contributions are combined effectively. The usefulness of any model therefore depends on its capacity to explain what actually happens and prescribe for anticipated results.²⁸

Bagehot provided one kind of model, but he did not attempt the objectivity which we expect today, nor had he available any methodology other than closeness to his subject matter. What he produced therefore was impressionistic, relying on his subjective evaluation of actors within the system. This model is largely irrelevant today, although it has immense historical value. It probably was valid only for the very point in time that he wrote it - it had no capacity to prescribe or predict.²⁹

New forms of analysis have been evolved in the social sciences which can be useful techniques for the study of government and politics. The basis of many of these is functionalism, which appeared in two main forms. On the one hand explanations were concerned with 'how things come to be as they are', on the other, explanations concentrate on the persistence or continuity of certain social forms or patterns of activity. Argument continually ranges within the social sciences about these two approaches and the problem of 'holism', but the language of functionalism has become pervasive throughout. Political scientists, including those particularly concerned with public administration, adopted the Parsonian terminology with great determination, scarcely aware of the pitfalls.³⁰

²⁸ As will be evident from the previous discussion, this is less than law like statements on which it is possible to create such models as are suggested by Davies and Lewis, op. cit.

²⁹ M.R. Davies and V.A. Lewis (op. cit.,) make the same point: "But even Bagehot, ... found himself up against the problem with which modern political theory still attempts to grapple: how, if one is to go beyond the study of mere institutions, are processes - continually changing relationships - to be depicted and yet made to seem more than merely a snapshot of a particular political system at one particular period of time?" p 9.

³⁰ For a discussion on systems for example see I.R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy, Berkeley University of California Press, 1972: on social science methodology generally see Bertrand de Jouvenal, 'The Functions and Roles of the Social Sciences' in Cherns et. al. (op. cit.) pp 3-11.

The 'holist' approach was based on the concept of a social system comprising numerous subsystems all of which interrelated, the key to the interrelationship being an equilibrium which maintained the 'balance' of the system. The 'mechanisms' by which this equilibrium was maintained were termed the functional prerequisites of the system - that is to say, necessary conditions for its operation in equilibrium. Explanations based on this approach led to normative criteria for the selection of these necessary conditions, often implicitly derived from the value system of the researcher himself. There was also a concentration on persistence and continuity as if to support a belief that the total system operated as a timeless reality in which each part is dependent on the other. The basis of this formulation is well summarised by Radcliffe-Brown who held that

"The functional method of interpretation rests on the assumption that a culture is an integrated system. In the life of a given community each element of the culture plays a specific part, has a specific function... The postulate on which the method depends is that there are certain 'physiological' laws, or laws of function, that are true for all human societies, for all cultures. The functional method aims at discovering these general laws..."³¹

In this way social phenomena are thought to be a timeless pattern of inter-related components, sometimes adapting, but persistently operating to maintain equilibrium. These persistent phenomena can therefore be isolated and identified (in analytical not concrete terms) and related to the structures of society. The similarity of this view of society to organisms in the physical sciences, rapidly led to the use of systems as mentioned above. At the macro level, if one takes a system and identifies the component parts (subsystems) these may then be analysed in terms of their input and output functions. Outputs of one subsystem become inputs for another.³² The relevance of those

³¹ A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Historical and Functional interpretation of Culture in relation to the practical application of anthropology to the control of native peoples" in M.N. Srinivas (ed.), Method in Social Anthropology, Selected Essays of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) pp 39-41. Social scientists have been more influenced by the writing of Talcott Parsons, than the anthropological studies of Radcliffe-Brown, who was quoted because he represents the most extreme functionalist position.

³² For an example of the structural functional approach see the writings of G.A. Almond, in which he discusses four input functions and three output functions:

inputs for the other subsystem may be high or low, in the former case it may be said that one subsystem was being functional in relation to the other, that its activity had positive systems' relevant consequences. Where the relevance was low or so doubtfully useful as to cause tension between the subsystems it may be said to have negative systems' relevant consequences. The more amenable the subsystem to the values and norms of the total system, the more likely it is to act in accordance with the expectation of other subsystems and the less likelihood of producing outputs having negative systems' relevant consequences.³³ In Parsonian terms negative systems' relevant consequences result in less integration indicating that the subsystems (structures) are not acting functionally for one another.

This kind of analysis based on Parsonian functionalism when utilised for political systems at the macro level, cannot avoid inherent orientation towards what Stretton calls 'technically crude and unperceptive selectors',³⁴

32 (contd.)

Input functions

1. Political socialisation and recruitment
2. Interest articulation
3. Interest aggregation
4. Political communication

Output functions

5. Rule making
6. Rule application
7. Rule adjudication

G.A. Almond & G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A development approach (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966)

G.A. Almond & J. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960)

G.A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, 1956

G.A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems", World Politics, Vol. XVII(2), 1965

G.A. Almond & S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³³For an example of this kind of analysis outside America, see E. Suleiman, "Sur les limites de la mentalité bureaucratique: conflits des rôles entre cabinets ministeriels et directeurs", Sociologie du Travail, 14(4), 1972, pp 388-409.

³⁴See footnote 10.

e.g. integration and adaptation. Integration emphasises the mobilisation and coordination of behaviour of individuals within structures which are oriented to achieving mutually agreed goals.³⁵ At the very lowest level of integration in which a subsystem acts - to prevent its own destruction - it is bound to make the minimum contribution of activity, which may be functional to the integration of the system. It is conceivable, for example, that the norms of the total system merely set certain ground rules for the control of conflict and that a system is little more than an arena for competition or for reconciliation of competing subsystem goals. Here, there is little that can be isolated as total system goals for which all subsystems are aiming. In a political-administrative system there are a large number of component structures (subsystems) and their goals are rarely clearly stated in a total sense, although their own individual goals may be better understood.³⁶ The functional relationships between the subsystems are therefore rarely unidirectional and the concept of integration is merely a euphemism for survival of the subsystems.

To overcome these problems of analysis and interpretation of data and to avoid terminological problems referred to earlier, Kaplan's suggestions may be adopted.³⁷ He uses the word 'contribution' rather than function for positive systems' relative consequences, whilst calling system or subsystem goals 'tasks'. A subsystem output may therefore be equal to, exceed or fall short of its tasks and make such contributions or inputs to other subsystems which promote, negate or maintain the total system tasks. If contributions by a subsystem exceed its assigned tasks resulting in unanticipated consequences

³⁵ Recall here that Parsons' definition of a 'system' is a collection of individuals agreed on certain values.

³⁶ Whilst it is admitted that in the most general sense such a system may be geared to achieve the 'general will' this is hardly what Parsons would have accepted as a system goal.

³⁷ H. Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A functional analysis of Metro Toronto, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

which over time become acceptable, such contributions become absorbed into the tasks of the subsystem which institutionalises them. Thus regularity of activity by the subsystem in question may produce acceptance of its output over time. Similarly, the subsystem could mobilise support for acceptance of its activity as output. These alternatives indicate, however, the need for a careful analysis of the interaction that takes place within the total system, rather than placing reliance on a structural description of the total system as being valid throughout time.

One further theoretical contribution to this set of constructs which throws light on the problems of analysis of the political-administrative system in particular is provided by Riggs.³⁸ He delineates the potential relationships between subsystems in this kind of macro system which demands certain outputs from subsystems because of their role-set. In this system certain relationships are expected by convention or through institutionalisation, as indicated by the delineation of the Westminster model. The political is assumed to dominate the purely administrative, just as the institutions which represent these concepts, Parliament and the Civil Service, are supposed to reflect this relationship. As a consequence it is possible to indicate diagrammatically the potential interactions between subsystems.³⁹

This realisation indicates the likely complexity of trying to trace the interactions and describe them satisfactorily without initially prescribing the bounds of the system. Riggs makes the point that it is only when subsystems' activity produces outputs which have system relevant consequences, i.e. they are contributing to the total system tasks, that we may define them as part of a system. Where subsystems bargain and negotiate from positions of autonomy then they cannot be included in the same system but must be seen as external to the system being analysed as systems on their own or part of another system. It is therefore essential to recognise that there is more than

³⁸ F. Riggs, "Professionalism, political science and scope" in J. Charlesworth (ed.), The Theory & Practice of Public Administration, Philadelphia American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1968, pp 32-62,

³⁹ op. cit., pp 51 & 53.

FIGURE 1. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRUCTURES




FIGURE 2. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN COMPONENTS




Fig. 1 A prescribes norms for B, which B accepts as authoritative premises for action. A is performing a political function for B and B an administrative function for A. (Or in Kaplan's terms A is making a contribution to B in that he is performing his tasks appropriately) Similar relationships and functions operate between Band C and B and D.

Fig. 2 In this more complex diagram the structures A B and C are shown in more detail to illustrate that political and administrative functions occur both within structures and between them. If A's activities result from interactions between A-1, A-2 and A-3, and other components of A, these may be examined at a different level of analysis from the political and administrative functions which A exercises with respect to structures B and C.

Source: Riggs, *op. cit.*

one level of analysis

- (a) at the total system level, e.g. the macro political level, the polity in Easton's terms,⁴⁰ where research deals with that 'system' and its roles in relation to other systems, e.g. economic acting functionally for the society as a whole;⁴¹
- (b) at the subsystem level where research isolates the component parts of the larger system, e.g. the micro political, and deals with the role and function of those component parts in terms of i) the total system; and ii) the subsystem's own system.

The delineation of the boundaries in this way is very seldom clearly made and much difficulty is caused by the use of the same analytical language for both levels.⁴²

Much of the changing focus of analysis has been dictated by these considerations, overtly expressed or implicit, in the interpretation of the data. The emphasis has been on the activities which occur within and between institutions, and the form the institution has adopted is regarded as derived from these activities. The institutionalisation of activities within the political system was to be judged by criteria which characterised the concept of equilibrium. A representative example occurs in Emmette Redford, where he discussed the part administration should play within the political system:

"Administration then has two aspects. On the one hand, it is an extension of the process of social adjustment. Adjustments and choices among interests, initiated in the macropolitical system, are carried over into subsystems where interests are adjusted and choices made through the interaction of persons in strategic positions. ... Administration in this aspect of its performance is political. But there is something unique about administration. It is at every successive level subject to some direction from a higher authority. There is a difference between the wide-open adjustment of interests in the macropolitical arena and the activity which follows the decision in that arena to set up

⁴⁰D. Easton, Framework of Political Analysis, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965).

⁴¹Examples of this kind of analysis occur in Parsons and Levy.

⁴²Parsonian terminology, especially the AGIL* syndrome, has been utilised for every conceivable kind of system relationship, e.g. W.C. Mitchell, "Structural Characteristics of Policy making" in F. Lyden, G.A. Shipman and M. Kroll (eds.), Policies, Decisions and Organisation (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1969); see also W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics & Social Science, (London: Penguin, 1967) esp. pp 87-110.

*Adaptation; Goal attainment; Integration; Pattern maintenance and tension management.

a program for continuous implementation by administrative action. ...Administration begins when the initial direction is given and it never escapes from that subordinate role."⁴³

In similar ways the functionalist views power as a facility for operating a political system.⁴⁴

The existence of power in society can be explained in terms of the function it performs for the social system as a whole, or in terms of the use made of it by individuals and its results for them or persons close to them. In the former case power is seen as 'functional' for the social system if it allows certain people to make decisions and initiate action which permits things to get done. Power can therefore be one kind of reward system which induces men to perform certain system maintenance tasks. It is a necessary condition for the achievement of goals activated from within the system to maintain equilibrium. Even if the view is that power is a means for certain individuals to dominate others in society, it is still seen as 'functional' for that society if it leads to persistence or continuity of those inter-relations. Only the ideological questions remain to be answered in terms of the perspective taken by any one observer in order to interpret and explain the social phenomena. In both cases the functionalist approach to describing phenomena - 'administration' and 'power' - place them in the context of the total social system and explain them by reference to their capacity for maintaining that system.

⁴³ E.S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (op. cit.), pp 194-195. See also for similar approaches to the political D.J. Devine, The Attentive Public: Polyarchal Democracy, (op. cit.), or R. Dahl, Polyarchy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Note the use of the words 'adjustment' and 'choice' and the attempts to draw boundaries between what is administrative and what is political.

⁴⁴ This discussion is derived from P.S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (op. cit.), pp 63 et seq. For another useful discussion of power in the same mould see P. Mott, 'The structure of power' in P. Mott & M. Aiken (eds), The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House, 1970),

This kind of 'dominant social conservatism' (Cohen's phrase) ignores the problems of unanticipated consequences of individual actions. Whilst all behaviour is purposive, not all results of individual activity fulfil intentions. The sum of all individual behaviour is not, therefore, merely the deduced total of its parts and explanations of social phenomena are not apposite if they fail to take account of this greater complexity.

Functionalism, based as it is on a holistic approach, can only be a part of, but never the whole of, sociological explanation.⁴⁵ The 'holism' by which boundaries of systems within the total system are demarcated merely constructs totalities where none properly exist. These constructed totalities emerge from the researcher's need to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the social phenomena observed. They do not identify qualities which are the timeless reality, or inherent in the systems themselves. It is as though similar qualities to those of living systems: integration, regularity, wholeness, organisation, coherence, connectedness or interdependence of the parts, are only waiting to be classified in the social sciences, so that the principles or laws they express may be codified as suggested by Radcliffe-Brown.

Functional analysis does not replace the investigator's personal values as organiser of functional knowledge. Nor does it provide the criteria by which functions are to be measured as significant or insignificant for a system, or determine the only possible destination of reportable causal chains.⁴⁶ Provided that its limitations are recognized and its focus is not merely to identify operationally acceptable facilities for persistence or continuity, functional analysis may be a very useful method for systematising observations about social phenomena. Justification and support for this

⁴⁵ See Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of functional analysis as a special method in Sociology and Anthropology", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, 1959, pp 757-773.

⁴⁶ Stretton, op. cit., p 177.

limited use of functional analysis in relation to the social system may be found. For example it is suggested that

"...items for comparison and generalisation are not items of social structure and culture, but functional processes themselves - processes necessary to serve certain needs of society and individuals."⁴⁷

The various processes that operate within the total system must therefore be identified and compared so that generalisations may be made about them. In this way actions of individuals, groups and organisations may be observed and interpreted to discover regularity - patterns of action which may be termed structural qualities. Social structures evolving out of these social processes are not judged by criteria which measure their support of continuity and persistence in the system as a whole. Their description and interpretation, however, assist an understanding of their functions for society, and why some seem to serve the needs of society or individuals better than others. In this way it may be possible to examine why, at certain points in time, structures existed which were soon changed and adapted; whilst others remained in the same patterns. From this some general conclusions may be drawn about these structures and their relationship within the context of the social phenomena from which they derived their existence. This emphasis on relationships and processes may be termed interaction analysis, using the phrase applied to small group analyses by Bales.⁴⁸

Analysis and explanation in the government system

The preceding discussion is intended to convey an awareness of the problems involved in explaining political phenomena and to place the methods adopted for research into perspective. In dealing with individuals within the

⁴⁷ W. Goldschmidt, Comparative functionalism, An essay in Anthropological Theory, (University of California Press, 1960)

⁴⁸ R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison Wesley Press Inc., 1951).

institutional structure and in standing inside that structure an attempt may be made to avoid methodological individualism. The emphasis on the systemic nature of the relationship between elements and their social or political entities does not mean that an holistic approach need be dominant. The use of role theory as a means of explanation does not presuppose a dedication to quasi-mechanical, psychological influences as the sole causal factors in these relationships.

Those who seek to explain individual and institutional behaviour in the field of government (a word deliberately used to distinguish from the 'political' which is the concern of more philosophical and economic discussion) are faced with a twofold problem of explanation. First, the study must deal with social entities and their elements in a social setting to which cultural norms and behavioural patterns are relevant. Second, explanation of activities within this environment must be sensitive to customs, laws and conventions which mould and remould those activities. Institutions which are elements of the social entities under study, or even forming the entity itself, comprise individuals plus rules and roles. It is impossible to understand and analyse and thus to explain such entities if only individual behaviour is investigated. The individual roles operate at two levels, one within the person's own perceived framework of social norms and values, the other within the rules, laws and conventions operating within the institution of which he is a part. One level cannot be separated from the other, they are inextricably intertwined. The rules may formulate expected patterns of individual activities - patterns of action that comprise regular and recognisable institutional forms, i.e. a structure or formal organisation.⁴⁹ Within this structure individuals operate, carrying out their activities in the manner prescribed. In the absence of any apparent tension between individual and institution it may be assumed that explanations would assert the stability and appropriateness of

⁴⁹F. Riggs, "Professionalism" (op. cit.), p 51.

such an entity. Where tension exists further investigation would be necessary to establish the cause, which would range over similar institutions to observe whether this phenomenon existed there too. Explanations would then be made about the tensions from which generalisations may be derived, leading to an evaluation of that particular entity in terms of the government system as a whole.

The observer of government will therefore first be aware of one individual dealing with another in ordinary social intercourse noting the social regularities. But at the same time he must place those regularities into a specific situational framework, possibly itself restrictive of relationships which otherwise may eventuate. Individual behaviour in these situations may only become meaningful when a specific substantive environment is provided. The context in which the behaviour occurs is of much more consequence in the study of government than it is in the study of society as a whole. In the latter situation the individual has more choice in his behaviour patterns and in the norms he follows. The observer must therefore be more cautious in his collection of data and in his methodological considerations.

Interaction Analysis explained and justified

Interaction analysis is differentiated from structural functionalism because it attempts to avoid the terminological connotations of the latter, while utilising its systematising concepts. Interaction analysis is best described, therefore, as a research strategy with the primary task of suggesting the more relevant questions to ask and selecting the more illuminating concepts to employ. It is an attempt to organise data into a coherent whole in an efficient and non-normative manner, in order that it may be accounted for, explained or clarified.

Its functionalism is based on the premiss that an area of human behaviour can be described as the interrelated operation of one or more social systems.

These systems may be of the macro type, e.g., nation, state, political, religious, or economic; or the micro type, e.g., local government unit, separate agency, department or office, interest group or political party. The systems which operate may be identifiable either as patterns of action, i.e. regular behaviour patterns; or as collections of individuals who interact on a regular basis and who agree on certain values (norms) which give rise to or result from such interaction; or relatively self contained networks of human interaction. The choice of description does not alter the basic characteristics of the structure described, which are the interrelations of individual roles and activities within that system. As suggested by Parsons, these roles may be derived from the particular normative expectations of either the system or the individual. Where the norms are set by the system they are usually said to emerge from an institutionalisation of the individual norms over time.⁵⁰

Role is a central feature of such analysis. However, it must be recognised that it is a dynamic concept that can only be clearly stated after clarification of the activities of any individual or individuals within the system. The concept of role is still subject to much discussion and has been defined in many ways. In one sense it is what an individual does as opposed to what he is supposed to do - as when one says, "What role did he play?", or is expected to perform - as when one says, "He is a baker". Without wishing to enter into the merits of one usage or another, but at the same time denying that it has no merit at all, the term role may be defined as a structural network of expectations indicated by a set of behavioural rules, patterns and sequences of action or conduct, and/or behavioural values, which can be thought of as jointly regulating behaviour which can be learned and which as a set possess a distinctive name.⁵¹

⁵⁰ S. Eisenstadt, "Change, Differentiation and Evolution", American Sociological Review, 1964, p 375.

⁵¹ As does Coulson, M. in J.A. Jackson (ed.), Role, (Cambridge: University Press, 1972) pp 107-128.

Thus a role may be given a specialised or distinctive name to indicate the institutionalised or routinised set of behaviours expected of the person who undertakes activity connected with that role, e.g. baker. It may be said that such a definition will assist in identifying the structural network of expectations in terms of behavioural regulations which represent to some degree a set of persistent institutional and individual values, as when we describe a person as being a Minister of the Crown, or Permanent Head of a Department of State.⁵²

Where the individual's behaviour acts out the expectations of the system, or where the behaviour is controlled by norms and role prescriptions so internalised by the individual that he is motivated to activity in the manner expected of him, then it may be said that his actual performance is integrated with the expectations.⁵³ Such behaviour may be regarded as a function of the structure in which it takes place, i.e. it facilitates its operation in a regular pattern of activity. This leads to a concern with the way such structures are interrelated and interact one with the other in terms of the macrosystem expectations, i.e. how far activities of these structures have systems-relevant consequences; how the values and norms underlying the interactions are functions for the total system.

Summary

The continuing search for acceptable explanation of social phenomena demands that the researcher becomes self-conscious about his methodology. The volume of literature in the political and social sciences has not produced

⁵²For a much longer and more precise discussion of the concept ending in a series of conceptual terms which form part of this definition see N. Cross, W.S. Mason & A.W. McEarchen, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958) esp. pp 48-67. See also M. Banton, Roles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations (London: 1965) for a general discussion of the concept.

⁵³In some literature this is the 'role-set', e.g. R. Merton, "The role set" British Journal of Sociology, June 1957, p 108, and Banton, op. cit., p 28. However, in Gross, et al. (op. cit.), it is referred to as a position, making no reference to expectations until it is called a rolesector, when it is related to other positions.

any agreed theoretical basis combined with analytical techniques. Each analysis must therefore start anew, searching for an appropriate model and selecting a satisfactory technique. Many different interpretations of the same social phenomenon are possible, confusion results unless some attempt is made to combine and generalise. The language of description and interpretation frequently becomes 'technique-specific', little attention being paid to its ordinary use or previous literature. Derivative and analogous methodologies have been used in the social sciences, the natural sciences being the most common source. This has led to aggregating techniques which suggested that there were some laws or principles of social behaviour of the same kind as those found in nature. Relationships between these pseudo-aggregations were regarded as the dynamic on which a theory of society could be created. Systems, organisms, and functions were thus used as analogies, and the related terminology began to dominate the analyses. The concepts with which commentators described and interpreted their data emerged from this domination - integration; aggregation; socialisation; adaptation and so on. Yet these concepts were ill-defined and open to abuse. The words were repeated throughout the literature, but their meaning was essentially contested. It is now generally accepted that these concepts were normative, in the sense that they postulate an equilibrium, the components of which are already stipulated. Such theoretical models of social behaviour and political systems attempted to do too much, too quickly. The desire for a 'scientific' base created a false link between social and physical sciences. The anticipation that social laws would emerge as more data was collated and aggregated, became an end in itself, creating repetitive models which failed to stand up to empirical validation.

Objective neutrality, distancing the analyst from his material, has replaced social activism in the search for a general theory. Some of the techniques of analysis which have been utilised in systems theorising, or structural functionalism, can be salvaged. These methods must, however, be

cleansed of their implicit value content before use. There is a need to unravel the intricacies of methodologies, which selected concepts for their contribution to the ultimate identification of a set of principles.

Functionalism, structural functionalism and systems therefore have been briefly discussed, indicating their positive contributions and some of their defects. The numerous potential analytical constructs derived from these methodologies need sorting and a selection made by the researcher. His methodological 'kit' will result from this selection, but he will have to explain exactly how these constructs are to work together and the purposes they are intended to serve.

Appendix III

Outline of Interview Technique and list of Interviewees

The basis of the methodology is interaction analysis which demands an understanding of the relationships, in this case between the minister and public servant. One major source about such interaction is information given by the individuals themselves in an interview situation.

In order to obtain the maximum out of each interview they were structured around the five variable centrifugal forces referred to on p 79. A separate questionnaire was prepared for each interviewee, taking into account his position, role and activity. This information was already gained from other written sources, as well as his departmental situation. The questions were not direct, multiple choice or capable of being computerised. They were all based on a dialogue between interviewer and interviewee around the core area to which the question was directed. Each question was prefaced by some statement or statements about the variable force which set parameters for the exchange. Each variable force had a number of questions and statements of this kind about various facets of the area under discussion.

An example of such a question is set out below. It was addressed as one of many others to the Deputy Director of Education, whose major activities included teacher recruitment and professional activities.

"The Department employs some 4000 full-time and part-time staff outside the Public Service Act,

- (a) do you consider that the Minister should accept responsibility in Parliament for the professional work of the Department?
- (b) would you see the task of 'educating' as being divorced from that of funding and organising those doing the job of educating?
- (c) are you under less ministerial control in the areas of curriculum construction and research and teacher training than other senior officers in their particular areas?"

On average each questionnaire contained 15 such questions and took about 1½ - 2 hours to complete. In a number of cases two or three visits were necessary to complete the interview, but there was no one who did not cooperate fully. One senior public servant took a total of six hours in his interview and reviewing what had been written about his Department. Several ministers were no less eager to cooperate in this way.

The interviews were carried out over a period of two years in two separate time blocks due to other commitments. The procedure was to forward

questionnaire when the date and time of the interview was confirmed, giving the interviewee at least a week to prepare himself. In most cases considerable thought had been given to the matter before the interview took place and many suggested that it had forced them to think about matters of which they had been vaguely aware but on which they had not had time to concentrate. Few, if any, interviewees had discussed the questionnaires with others prior to the interview. In no case were written answers prepared and handed out instead of an interview. Every interviewee readily accepted the supplementary questions that emerged from their answers to the original questions. This was a crucial part of the interview, since the background material from which the questions had been originally formulated was available to the interviewer.

A list of those formally interviewed in this manner is set out below. It does not include many who were subjected to questions and were the source of information over the course of the study. Without their advice and assistance the interviews would not have been so valuable.

HOUSING	Ministers	Mr. D. Clark	Liberal
		Mr. D. Lowe	Labor
	Public Servants	Mr. L.F. Allwinton	Director
		Mr. T.L. Lockhart	Deputy
		Mr. K. Nicholls	Administrative Assist.
Mr. R. Annels		-do- Chief Financial Officer	
EDUCATION	Ministers	Mr. A. Mather	Liberal
		Mr. W. Neilson	Labor
	Public Servants	Mr. B. Tribolet	Director (Director-General)
		Mr. A.V. Gough	Director-General
		Mr. B. Mitchell	Deputy
		Mr. C. Purves	Chief Administrative Officer
		Mr. D. Howe	Administrative Assist.
		Mr. C.D. Brown	Superintendant
		Mr. J. Scott	-do-
		Mr. A. Brown	-do-
	Miss E.M.Backhouse	Teachers Federation	
HEALTH SERVICES	Ministers	Dr. N. Abbott	Liberal
		Dr. A. Foster	Labor
		Mr. M. Everett	Labor

HEALTH SERVICES	Public Servants	Dr. J.R. Macintyre	Director General
		Dr. G. Mackay Smith	Deputy and Superintendent of Royal Hobart Hosp.
		Dr. D. Ross	Director
		Dr. J. Lawson	-do-
		Dr. J. Curran	-do-
		Mr. L. Baillie	Chief Administra- tive Officer
		Mr. L. Shea	Administrative Assistant

Also interviewed: Mr. M. Bingham, Leader of the
Opposition and Attorney General

Liberal

Appendix IVSubject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions
I and II of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971. (a) HousingSession I

17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970

Waratah Land for 3 dwellings

Housing Department Factory and its continuance

Currie-site development plans

Carbide Plant, Electrona - assistance to unemployed in Government housing
accommodation

Pensioner type homes to be built - programme for 1969-70

Shopping centres in housing subdivisions

Water and sewage reticulation in Housing subdivisions - contributions to cost
correspondence with the Commonwealth

Home construction in West and North West

Zeehan Teachers Hostel

Rates - exclusion from Housing Rentals undertaking

Survey of Housing needs questionnaire and purpose

Rentals on Government Housing - extent of assurance that increases will
not occur

Seymour Mine supply of coking coal

Repainting Housing Department houses, time in between

Valves in hot water systems in Housing Department homes

Housing Department homes on vacant land Goodwood

Allocation of homes on North West Coast

Housing Department homes - increases in weekly rentals or purchase
payment charges

Housing Department homes - sold privately to purchasers

Housing Department tenants - notification of increases in weekly rentals

Housing Department houses - rentals and weekly repayment charges
- conditions under which may sell homes privately

Major harbour facilities at Bicheno - availability of funds

Housing Department - construction of houses by tender

- building blocks available for Departmental development
in Glenorchy and Northern suburbs

Berriedale land purchase from Hobart Savings Bank

Group Housing

Temporary reduction in Housing payments

Glenorchy housing blocks for private sale

Rates reduction for Housing Department tenants

Session II

11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971

Pensioner applicants for Housing in Hobart area

Benjamin Court flats allotment - question of individual allotment

Housing Department new factory

Land for sale in Departmental subdivisions

Benjamin Court flat allotment - re individual allotment

Tenders for housing construction

Wage as criteria for allotment of housing

Payment of commission by Municipalities for collection of rates by

Housing Department

Pensioner housing application dates

Elderly persons housing - minimum age for applications

Pensioner applicants for housing in Hobart

Elderly persons homes - ages of occupiers

Home construction in the North - tenders

Housing - cancellation of applications

Wire fence boundaries around Departmental homes - replacement

Recreation areas reserved in Housing subdivisions

Deposits paid by housing applicants

Goodwood and Mornington Housing purchase instalments

Launceston housing - vacations and evictions

Two-bedroom housing policy

Elderly persons homes - applicants and availability

Deposit on homes completed by Housing Department

Cape Barren Islanders - money provided by Commonwealth for resettlement

on Tasmanian mainland

Housing - tenders and completion

Burnie Houses unoccupied

Glenorchy housing applications and construction

Southern applications for flats

Housing Department - dwellings to be built in 1970-71

Housing applicants - waiting period
 Latrobe flooding - housing for displaced families
 Rental arrears owing to Housing Department
 Payment components for housing purchasers
 Fibro-cement sheeting - use in Housing Department homes.

Questions asked in Session I	411
Housing only	30
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Housing only	33

Source: Journals and Papers of House of Assembly Vols. 178,180 and 182

Subject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions I and II
of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971 (b) Education

Session I

17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970

Upper Burnie Primary School: Tenders for Kindergarten and sick room
 Parklands High School Burnie: Tenders for library etc.
 Isolation allowances for school children
 King Island District School: Tenders for assembly hall
 Wynyard Residential High School
 Devonport Matriculation College: Possibility of construction
 Educational decisions definition - made by educationalists
 King Island High School: Home Arts facilities
 Education of young children
 Ogilvie High School hostel
 Miandetta School Devonport: Tenders for
 Bursars and clerks for schools
 Blind persons: vocational courses
 Assembly Hall: Priority order
 Brooks High School Technical block
 Special school on Eastern shore
 Milk prices for school supplies
 Devonport Central Primary School playground development
 Graduate teachers comparable training and responsibility
 Primary education - visit of Sir Alan Clegg
 Beaconsfield Area School Home Arts block
 Arts and music blocks in State schools
 Social Science programme for State schools
 Burnie Technical College proposal
 Burnie Matriculation College
 Montumana - Rocky Cape Road - school bus difficulties
 Riverside Pre-School
 Overtime payment for teachers
 Medical rooms and First Aid officers in schools
 Book hiring service staff in schools
 Education Department employees classification list
 Slow learners specialist teachers promotions
 Independent schools subsidies
 School milk freight charges

Wynyard Hostel for high school students
 Nixon Street School Devonport
 Tertiary Education election promise
 Holiday system in schools
 Teachers Federation membership
 Hilton Road School Claremont
 Teachers university fees
 Milk delivery to schools
 Matriculation colleges: Changes in schools of transfer
 Lecturers' conditions at Hobart's Technical College
 Teachers College staff: Promotion opportunities
 Handicapped children's teachers: Training course
 Special school on Eastern shore
 Assembly halls: Priority list
 Senior Master appointment
 Area School teaching staff
 Promotion to Senior Master
 School for handicapped on Northwest Coast
 Penguin Municipality High School
 Parklands High School library block
 Technical Colleges staff society: Recognition by government
 Country students at university: Disadvantages
 School libraries: Survey of needs
 Teenagers' conduct: Code of standards
 West Somerset Primary school: Second stage
 Thinking course at matriculation level
 Teachers' advancement and transfers to isolated parts of the State
 Technical Colleges staff society: Promotion positions of members
 Encyclopaedia purchase applications: Circulation by school staff
 Pre-school construction priority
 Photographs of children: Permission through schools
 Teachers Training College Launceston: Cost
 Technical, musical and physical Education Diplomas: Further study
 Telephones provided for teachers
 School bus operators' health requirements
 Independent schools: Survey of needs
 Zeehan teachers hostel
 Pharmacy degree course
 Education expenditure origin - State or Commonwealth
 Claremont High School storage space

Country children's educational disadvantages
 Claremont High School assembly hall
 Pre-school teachers without employment
 Maintenance work by teachers
 Education expenditure share for State schools
 Educational needs survey
 Education money from State government
 Pre-school teacher for Brighton
 Qualification for driving teachers
 Special school for Eastern shore: Commencement
 Glen Dhu Primary school: Pedestrian overpass
 Penguin Municipality: New Primary school
 Rosetta Kindergarten class
 Commonwealth finance for Launceston Teachers College appointments
 Financial allocation: Launceston Teachers College library
 University courses: Launceston Teachers College
 Applications for lecturers: Launceston Teachers College
 Bursaries to Primary school children
 Education officers: Non-teaching responsibilities
 Military training in government schools
 Unfavourable performance of State schools: Science talent quest
 Teacher students: Hobart Teachers College
 Hobart Technical College: Offer from Fler Co. (Tas.) to make workshops available
 Proposed new Primary school East Wynyard: Expected schedule
 Cygnet Area School: Refusal to use old trade block as child minding centre
 Teacher at Conara school: Notice of termination of services
 Launceston Teachers College: Submission to Commonwealth for funds to allow completion
 Degree courses in Pharmacy in Tasmania: Outcome of meeting of Joint Consultative Council
 Tasmania University fees: Increase of 12% necessary next year
 Warrane High School: Delay in completion of new library
 Teaching staff required to perform duties normally carried out by clerical staff
 Teachers services and transfers
 Matriculation girls hostel
 Capitation grant to Independent schools at first year Primary level
 Lauderdale Primary school: Additional class rooms
 University fees
 Accommodation for Northern university students
 Uncertificated or technical teachers' salaries

Session II

11 March 1970-17 February 1971

Salaries - retrospectivity payments

University courses undertaken by teachers - reimbursement of costs

Compulsory payments by parents of State School children

Teaching duties of Headmasters in Primary Schools

School Clerical Staff

Capitation grants to Independent schools extended to primary level

Wilmot School bus service

Qualifications for science and mathematics teachers

Needs of rural areas for secondary education

Launceston Primary schools' kindergartens

Teachers' salaries retrospectivity payments

Education of Children 3-8 Report

Assembly Hall construction - priority lists

Teachers' salary increase - delay

Cost of reimbursement of University fees to teachers

Commonwealth Secondary Scholarship holders - reimbursement

Technical Colleges - increased fees

Library rooms in primary schools

Library in primary schools - Commonwealth funds

Teachers supervising trainees - payments

Status of two-year trained teachers

Religious education Committee

Pedestrian overpass - Glen Dhu School

Mathematics training for Physical Education teachers

Compulsory levies at State Schools

Shortage of chairs at New Norfolk High School

Shortage of typewriters at Ogilvie High School

Resignations in Education Department

Goulburn State School - entertainment

Future needs for teachers

Australian Education Council meeting

New Norfolk High School staff members

Launceston Teacher Training College - recommendation by Tender Board

Maths and Science teachers - present shortage and qualification

Teaching Service - new regulations

Teachers Classification lists

College of Advanced Education teacher training
 Hobart Teachers College as part of College of Advanced Education
 Geeveston Convent School - non provision of school bus transport
 Accommodation problems at Launceston Matriculation College
 Northern High Schools - teacher shortage
 Prospect High School - class members
 Launceston second Matriculation College
 Technical Education Colleges - responsible authorities
 Tarooma High School Assembly Hall - heating
 Launceston Matriculation College - accommodation for extra students
 Burnie Matriculation College - progress
 Burnie Technical College - design consultants
 Technical Colleges, Burnie, Devonport - Construction
 Deaf pre-school children in North - visiting teacher service
 Deaf, mentally retarded children - separate classroom at Lady Rowallan House School
 Burnie Technical College - cost of model
 Education Department loan funds spent
 Tarooma High School Science Laboratory fire exit
 Burnie Technical College proposal - investigation by Public Works Committee
 State Schools - funds from non government sources
 Parklands High School, Burnie - Damage to courtyard as a result of construction work
 Smoking - education on dangers in schools
 Rosny Matriculation College - model costs
 Teaching service resignations in 1970
 New Town High School - students proceeding to Matriculation
 Rivulet through Kings Meadows High School - piping
 Queechy High School - provision of music/arts block
 Brooks High School - staff shortage
 Delays in reply to teachers questions re qualifications
 Bottled gas supplied to Queechy High School
 Book hiring service in schools
 Launceston Matriculation College - additional laboratory space
 Burnie Matriculation College - delays in submitting plans
 Unionist preference in Education Department - Tasmanian Teachers Federation
 Railton Primary School - additional accommodation
 College of Advanced Education - delay in building
 Superintendent of In-Service-Training - duties, responsibilities and allowances

School classes over forty
 Launceston Matriculation College - construction of classrooms and walkway
 Technical College Staff Society - approach to Director
 New Town High School Staff deficiency
 Woodwork classes at Clarence High School - recommencement
 Brooks High School overcrowding
 Northern Schools closing
 Deaf children - high school accommodation
 Physically handicapped teachers employed by Education Department
 Cosgrove High School Library/ Art Block heating
 Handicapped persons facilities at the College of Advanced Education
 Cosgrove School Library/ Art Block
 Reconstruction work of Parklands High School
 Education Department Studentships - restrictions and choice of University
 faculties and subjects imposed on holders
 Studentship at College and University - numbers taken up
 Cosgrove High School - tenders for heating cable
 Consolidation of Education Department Regulations
 Bellerive Primary School fire - ministerial statement
 Pre-schools - withdrawal of subsidy when linked with primary schools
 Travelling allowances for full time University students
 Fire fighting equipment in schools
 Bonded teachers - service in other states.
 Insurance of State owned schools
 Tarooma High School - overcrowding on buses
 Part time school crossings
 Education programme - priority
 Deaf children at Warrane High School - secondary education
 Young Town State School conditions
 Teachers College graduates - value of qualifications
 Launceston Teachers College students - travel allowance for practice teaching
 Pioneer School - contract
 Teacher training studentships at Canberra
 Chigwell Primary School - heaters
 Colleges of Advanced Education - relationship with other bodies
 - transfer of staff from other Colleges
 East Wynyard Primary School - occupation
 Burnie Matriculation College - referral to Public Works Committee

Geilston Bay High School - provision for deaf children
 Launceston Teachers College - future status
 King Island High School - classroom block, science accommodation and library
 Plans for use of vacated School of Art and Teachers College buildings
 in Hobart
 Bonding system - amounts payable by teacher students
 Advertising for positions in the College of Advanced Education
 Myrtle Park State School - conditions
 Rosny Matriculation College - completion date
 Launceston Teachers College - committee on future status

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Source: Journals & Papers of House of Assembly, Vol. 178, 180 & 182

Subject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions I and II
of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971 (c) Health Services

Session I

17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970

Private and intermediate beds in Hospitals

Intermediate beds Policy: Establishment of Committee

Hepatitis outbreak in Burnie area

George Town ambulance

Zeehan Hospital Proposal

King Island District Hospital: Commencement of work

Oral Contraceptives: side effects

Health Ministers' Conference Agenda; Ministers' non attendance

Home care and paramedical grants

Private and Intermediate beds in Hospitals

Recommendations of National Health and Medical Research Council

Launceston General Hospital: Tender prices for operating theatre block

Pesticide Act regulations

Hospital patients' comfort: Inquiry: Implementation of Report

Nursing pre-requisite qualifications

Launceston General Hospital works expenditure

Launceston General Hospital: Contract for works

Hospitals Budget estimates

Patients' comfort in Hospitals

Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies

Fluoridation of major Water Supplies

Examination of Soft Drink sweetener: Cyclamate

Outpatients centre on the Eastern shore

Sulphuric Acid Plant, Burnie: Emission of sulphur dioxide

Zeehan: Programme for construction of proposed new hospital

Pesticide Act 1968: Tabling of regulations relating to permissible tolerance
sprays

Municipality of Oatlands: Without services of doctor as from November

Public Statement: Future of District Medical Officer Service at New Norfolk
and Maydena

Public Hospitals in Tasmania: Disciplining staff

Nursing Homes: Role of governments

Deloraine District Hospital and Westbury District Nursing Centre: Extensions

Royal Hobart Hospital: Occupation of North-eastern corner building.

Public statement: District Hospitals at Nubeena and Swansea

Session II

11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971

Biodegradable detergents

Hospital finance Inquiry

Outpatients charges

Royal Derwent Hospital: Public statement by medical staff

Vitanova Sobering powder

Trial leave for Royal Derwent Hospital patients

Intensive care unit: Beds occupied by road accident cases

Snorkel as cause of swimming death

Hospital patients' comfort: Implementation of the Report

Royal Derwent Hospital: In-patients applying for trial leave

Pesticide levels in eggs

Insecticide content of milk

Launceston General Hospital: progress payments

Nursing staff deficiencies in General Hospitals

Eggs: pesticide content

Nubeena District Nursing Centre: progress

Herbicide 245T: Contaminants in

Geriatric patients in Royal Hobart Hospital

Alcoholic and Dependency Act: Patients referred

Swansea District Nursing Centre: Tenders for construction

Launceston General Hospital works: Estimated costs

Appropriation Act: Distribution of vote

Fluoridation at Burnie, Devonport and Southern Metropolitan Water supply

Austin Hospital Melbourne: Accommodation for persons travelling with patients

Geriatrics from Burnie and Wynyard areas: Need for additional accommodation

Zeehan Hospital: Closing of

Nursing shortage: Investigation Committee

Barbiturates: Nature of present control

Ulverstone District Hospital: Geriatric ward tenders

Sewage treatment plant: Tamar River

Measles immunisation campaign

General Hospitals staff deficiencies

Children's ward, Launceston General Hospital: Occupation of

Nursing sister: Appointment of, Cape Barren Island

Hydatids Eradication: Information for members

Penguin District Medical Residence and Surgery
 DDT residue in Northern Tasmanian eggs
 Raw milk samples analyses
 Peacock Convalescent Hospital: Patient numbers
 Committee Rooms at the Royal Hobart Hospital
 Queenstown Hospital: Appointment of resident surgeon
 Dental Officer vacancies
 Eastern Shore Ambulance substation
 Geriatric accommodation programme, North West General Hospital
 Radioactive substances: Control by hospitals and other bodies
 Bromureide drugs: Intention to schedule for prescription only
 Sulphur Oxide monitors at Burnie: Results obtained
 Gynaecological patients, Launceston General Hospital
 St. Johns Park waiting list
 Operating theatres at Launceston General Hospital
 Penguin District Medical Officer: Withdrawal
 Beaches Polluted notices
 Handicapped Persons Advisory Council: Disbanding
 Spencer Park, Wynyard: Annex for Handicapped children
 Riverview Homes for Aged People, Devonport: Complaints of conduct
 Mentally ill patients in ordinary wards at Launceston General Hospital
 Geriatric Accommodation at Wynyard: Tenders
 Shelltox Pest Strip: Investigation of toxicity
 Burnie Fluoridation Plant
 Quarantine inspection: Japanese fishing crews
 Diesel oil spillage from vehicles: Case for vertical exhaust

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Source: Journals and Papers of the House of Assembly, Vols 178, 180 and 182

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